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ABSTRACT 
‘Things fall apart, the centre cannot hold’ (WB Yeats)
This thesis investigates regime change to South African employment relations following 
the ending of apartheid. The focus is on a revised centralised bargaining system that 
forms the centrepiece of a corporatist structure intended to help build democracy and 
transform the economy post liberation. The first part of this study describes the 
backdrop against which these bargaining reforms have taken place. Ideal-type 
modelling and ‘path dependent’ accounts of what has transpired post apartheid provide 
the means by which this new employment relations system is explained and multi­
employer bargaining contextualised. Particular attention is paid to the part played by 
institutional actors in bringing these reforms about.
Focus then switches to the employer alone. Through drawing on mostly European ideas 
as to what ‘collective action’ means for employers the argument is made that employer 
associability (that is, their propensity to combine together and act collectively) proves 
integral to the durability of South Africa’s experimentation with corporatism and 
‘organised’ employment relations. This prompts the question as to whether there is an 
‘employer offensive’ against centralised bargaining under way in South Africa similar 
to that observed in parts of Europe. Field studies, in the form of two cross-sectional 
surveys and interviews with selected informants, were designed to test for its emergence 
within South Africa.
Thus, empirical work seeks to address three specific research agendas. First, how much 
consent is there for industry bargaining overall? Second, what underlying thinking
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informs individual manufacturers’ decisions to associate or not? Third, how might both 
these be changing and why? Findings suggest the presence of critical levels of 
associability sufficient to warrant buttressing by the state in order to prevent any further 
weakening in corporatism. Conclusions are drawn in ways that assess future prospects 
for industry bargaining in the new South Africa and identify possible trajectories and 
befitting public policy interventions.
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Chapter 1. Introduction: a topic overview
1.1 Introduction
South Africa is one of those countries where employment relations has figured 
prominently in the struggle to both liberate and transform the whole of society and so 
warrants our interest for this reason alone. This is because a re-institutionalisation of its 
employment relations around the fundamental idea of democratic or social corporatism 
was placed centre-field when it came to political liberation and nation-building. 
Apartheid’s legacy and labour’s political and industrial strength ensured that this would 
be a likely outcome. Not surprisingly, a number of demands are now made of this new 
employment relations regime. The hope is that regime change can help transform the 
country by contributing to its political democratisation, economic adjustment and racial 
assimilation. This weight of expectation is enormous and its prospects for success 
uncertain. However, one reason for undertaking this doctoral thesis is to review not just 
how much progress has been made to date but how far this new employment relations 
has to go before it can be said to have contributed to a South African renaissance as a 
modem democratic state and as an emerging economy.
As illustrated through this country study, the resilience of neo-corporatist institutions 
and their fitness for purpose rests on the capacities of the parties to engage fully with 
what is on offer under an articulated bargaining system. This gives rise to a number of 
questions that in themselves ensure an ongoing interest from a comparative perspective 
in South Africa’s experimentation with this enlightened form of social corporatism. For 
example, will this re-institutionalisation of its employment relations prove sufficiently 
robust, given a labour history characterised by racial segregation and workplace 
adversarialism but also given the requirements of a recently liberalised economy?
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Integral to this broader concern is the extent to which these key corporatist actors are 
prepared to identify with these new and revised corporatist structures and processes. 
One particular worry has employers choosing to opt out of any central bargain in 
sufficient numbers as to place this whole corporatist project in jeopardy. The question 
arises as to how likely is this prospect to occur and, if so, how might public policy in 
South Africa safeguard these fledgling institutional arrangements in ways that buttress 
the co-determinist character of this potentially transformational system of employment 
relations? In asking such questions we start to define a research agenda appropriate to 
the scope of this doctoral thesis. Searching for answers can also provide structure to the 
narrative driving this whole critique of South Africa’s centralised bargaining reforms.
1.2 Topic scope
Political settlement, not violent overthrow, brought an official end to apartheid rule in 
South Africa in 1994. Similarly apartheid labour relations was also displaced by means 
of a tripartite dialogue between organised labour, capital and, first, apartheid authority 
itself and, then, a newly formed Government of National Unity. This political 
bargaining culminated in a formal agreement in 1995 that laid the legal foundations for 
an extensive programme of reform. Its purpose was to bring about a transformation in 
employment relations to match that proposed for the wider economy and society (see, 
for example, Adler and Webster 2000; Baskin 2000; Erickson and Kurivilla 1998; Du 
Toitl995; Macun and Webster 1998). As a consequence, new and revised bargaining 
and consultation institutions have been introduced at the macro, meso and micro level 
(see, for example, Du Toit et al 1996 3-39) that, in harness, form a corporatist1 structure
1 There is an abundant (mostly ‘European’) literature that outlines the various models of corporatism 
deemed possible and the significance differences that lie between them. For now, the terms ‘corporatism 
and ‘corporatist’ are to be used only in their generic sense unless stated otherwise. Certainly, ‘neo- 
corporatist’ (eg: Baccaro 2002a); ‘democratic’ (eg: Webster 1995, ‘bargained’ (Baskin 1993a and 1996) 
and ‘social’ (Dowues Dekker and Johnsen 1998) are all terms that have been applied to the type of 
corporatism that has evolved in post apartheid South Africa. There are subtle differences of meaning
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within which social concertation processes and cooperative behaviours were expected to 
flourish (Baccaro 2003; Baskin 2000).
Making social corporatism an embedded feature of South Africa’s transformed 
employment relations regime became a desirable policy outcome. However, its 
continued success is conditional upon a certain level of co-operation and coordination 
taking place between peak, sectoral and enterprise levels (vertically) and across firms 
within the same industry (horizontally). Fundamental to any such articulation is the 
widespread use of sectoral agreements that encompass the majority of workers 
employed within designated industries or sectors. This requires employer associations 
and trade unions, as mandated negotiators, to be demonstratively representative of this 
majority in order to retain legitimacy with, and speak authoritatively for, their respective 
constituencies (after Lehmbruch 1982; Traxler 1993 and 1995; Vatta 1999).
Within South Africa, a network of bargaining councils has been established as the 
means by which industry bargaining is to take place. Centralised bargaining, in the 
form of industrial councils, had always featured prominently under apartheid labour 
relations. But, in effect, apartheid regulation ensured that industry bargaining was only 
to be conducted by predominantly white trade unions and employers and its coverage 
confined almost exclusively to white workers. Now, under enabling framework
between each but at this stage such differences matter little. For now, the ‘European’ nomenclature of 
corporatism is to be applied but, later, there is a necessity to differentiate between neo-corporatist 
structures and social concertation processes.
2
For the purposes of this work, the terms ‘sectoral’ and ‘industry’ are to be used interchangeably, unless 
stated otherwise. In practice, several possibilities present themselves. National bargaining councils may 
be registered under die Labour Relations Act (s 29) by reference to a whole sector or industry. Indeed, as 
in the case o f the Chemical Industries, the council can even be organised into a number of discrete 
chambers covering particular industries within a larger sector. In contrast, as with the building industry, a 
number of councils may operate on a regional basis. Within the South African literature, ‘centralised 
bargaining’ has traditionally been used to describe meso-level bargaining arrangements. This author, too, 
will call on this convention as and when appropriate.
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legislation (Labour Relations Act 1995) any registered trade union and employer 
association can negotiate with each other as delegated bargaining agents on behalf of 
union members and employers, irrespective of their racial categorisation (s.27). All- 
importantly, however, these same legislative reforms ensure that South Africa’s 
centralised bargaining system remains essentially voluntarist in character for both 
registered parties and those they represent -  workers and employers.
As to the latter, individual firms can either choose to be ‘party’ to the process through 
their membership of a registered employer organisation or, alternatively, remain as 
unassociated ‘non-party’ employers. Whilst ‘party’ employers tend to partake fully in 
bargaining council proceedings by virtue of their associational membership, ‘non-party’ 
counterparts automatically exclude themselves from this process through their 
continued disassociation. Nevertheless, the possibility of shadow bargaining effects or 
of extending agreements to the workers of ‘non-party’ employers ensures that this type 
of bargaining impacts on all employers in the same sector to some extent. In sum, ‘part’ 
employers are actively engaged in industry bargaining, ‘non-party’ ones passively so. 
This dichotomy raises certain questions that this thesis sets out to address: what might 
explain these contrasting outcomes? Why should it matter to custodians of the policy? 
What has been their impact on the bargaining council system particularly and this new 
employment relations regime generally?
1.3 Core propositions
A fundamental premise underpinning this thesis throughout is that centralised 
bargaining outcomes have become pivotal for those wanting articulation to lie at the 
heart of South Africa’s system of social corporatism. This type of bargaining 
supposedly works whereby higher-level agreements frame and govern the content of
12
lower-level negotiations and discussions, the outcomes from which also likely feed and 
inform the agenda of peak-level dialogue. As envisaged for South Africa, multi­
employer agreements provide the means by which such articulation might supposedly 
be achieved (for example, Klerck 1998: 103). Not only can they set norms both within 
and across industries but also contextualise and inform the conduct of any negotiations 
taking place at the enterprise level, not just through these bilateral agreements but also 
through filtering what originates from peak tripartite dialogue. Likewise, they can also 
play the same intermediary role in influencing social, economic and political exchanges 
at the higher-level by taking aboard agendas and outcomes originating from lower- 
levels. These assumed characteristics render industry bargaining central to any 
proposed system of articulation, {after Crouch 1993: 54-55 and 286-29).
For such encompassing agreements to become commonplace, delegated bargaining 
agents operating within council chambers are required to possess a level of resource, 
competence and commitment (herein ‘capacity’) equal to the task of making and 
reaching agreements that extend across any designated sector or industry. It can be 
assumed that capacity problems are less daunting for trade union than employer 
representatives sitting in bargaining councils. This is because trade union members 
appear more readily drawn to the attractions of industry bargaining compared to 
employer counterparts. Evidence for this comes from the respective positions adopted at 
the time that the whole matter was first up for discussion as part of a broader political 
negotiation over the whole drafting of the new legal dispensation for South Africa in 
1995. On the union side, all three major federations (of six) were united in their 
determination to see centralised bargaining form an integral feature of any post 
apartheid political settlement and become institutionally strengthened, even to the extent 
of arguing for compulsory imposition initially. By contrast, centralised bargaining 
proved to be a much more contentious policy for South Africa’s more divided business
community ((Du Toit et al. 1996: 20-32). As early as the late 1980s there appeared to 
have been sections of business ready to reject centralised arrangements on grounds of 
perceived rigidities and in favour of more discretionary enterprise or plant bargaining. 
Meanwhile, the SME sector sought blanket exemption from whole or part industry 
agreements. Any statutory duty to bargain at this or any level was to be resisted 
implacably (after Du Toit et al. 1996: 22-23). Some common reasons for this disparity of 
view on the re- institutionalisation of centralised bargaining are not hard to find.
First, in defending sectional interests, union negotiators are keen to deploy ‘the Device 
of the Common Rule’ with which they try to enforce uniform pay and conditions 
standards as a protection to all employees working in that industry (Webb and Webb 
1913, Part 111: Chapter 111). Once decreed, this Common Rule is expected to extend to 
all workers automatically, irrespective of union membership. South African unions are 
no exception in this regard. Indeed, standardisation of pay and conditions is especially 
appealing to an independent labour movement reared on the experience of an apartheid 
labour relations regime that deliberately segregated the way work, wage and training 
outcomes were to be determined within the formal sector along explicitly racial lines 
(see chapter three). In addition, the prospect of an informal employment sector forever 
undercutting any localised union wage premium makes industry wage setting even more 
alluring for hard-pressed union negotiators. For South African unions and their 
federations, articulated bargaining is perceived as improving the chances of industry pay 
norms taking hold and a racially skewed wage spread becoming narrowed as a 
consequence. This is because the more centralised and bipartite negotiations become the 
greater the bargaining coverage overall -  always a natural ambition for any labour 
movement. For this rationale alone, we might reasonably expect trade unions to make 
multi-employer (as opposed to single-employer) negotiations their bargaining level of
14
choice given its potential for determining industry-wide wage pay and conditions by 
virtue of an extended bargaining coverage {after Traxler 2003 a: 18-19).
The same might not be so easily said of South African employers who previously had 
seen virtue in centralised bargaining (in the form of industrial councils). Here, bounded 
logic always has employers rationally choosing individual over collective exchange 
relations given their superior access to resource power {after Traxler 1995: 33). Indeed, 
conventional wisdom only has an employer bargaining collectively with workers when 
obliged to do so either under state regulation or trade union imposition (or both) and, 
then, preferably, only at the level of the single enterprise.
Indeed, history shows bargaining centralisation to be popular with employers only when 
seeking to enhance their bargaining power by taking wages (and thereby output prices) 
out of competition, neutralising the impact of trade unions on the workplace andJ or 
frustrating their deployment of ‘whipsawing tactics’ against isolated employers ( Sisson 
1987: 189-191). It is these cartelizing properties that have secured the approval of 
business for organised bargaining in the past and help explain why the old industrial 
council system that operated under apartheid continued to meet with the approval of 
South African business (see, for example, Bendix 1996; Klerck 1998; Macun and 
Webster 1998). It is equally plausible that an employer concern for orderliness and 
stability in the workplace (and beyond) following the turbulence of the apartheid years 
and the upheavals of political liberation makes multi-employer bargaining as appealing 
to business (and the state) as previously. But are we right to assume an individual 
employer’s approval for organised bargaining to be so unconditional given South 
Africa’s re-entry into the new economic order of globalisation and when accompanied 
by the importation of neo-liberal orthodoxy?
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As South Africa’s previously sheltered economy becomes more exposed to 
internationalised trade and finance we might expect the business community to become 
increasingly concerned with issues around competitiveness, business restructuring, 
labour flexibility and technology use. If so, then we might also reasonably expect a 
growing disenchantment from some employers with centralised bargaining 
arrangements that are thought to impede their ability to contend with new demands. In 
short, changed imperatives make the perceived ‘virtues’ of decentralised bargaining 
look more appealing to beleaguered employers facing uncertain futures than the 
assumed ‘vices’ of centralised bargaining. Arguably, at the very time that bargaining 
centralisation has begun to gain favour within the labour movement, employers have 
felt increasingly drawn to the attractions of decentralised bargaining (Klerck 1998: 102). 
Certainly, there is already case study evidence to suggest that employers in particular 
sectors (for example, clothing, footwear and construction) are finding ways to by-pass 
industry bargaining processes (for example, Webster and Omar 2003; Wood 2000).
Such conjecture over changes to employers’ outlook in South Africa is also based on 
evidence from other (mostly European) countries where centralised bargaining has been 
put under strain following employer disengagement (see, for example, Crouch and 
Streek 1997; Crouch and Traxler 1995; Hyman and Femer 1998). This raises the 
prospect of South African business becoming more antipathetic towards industry 
bargaining the further away from the time when the new dispensation was first 
introduced in the euphoria of liberation. This conjecture raises a key question for us. 
How many employers might hold to this view and are they sufficiently critical in 
number to jeopardise the chances of single-table employer bargaining becoming an 
embedded institutional presence within South Africa’s new employment relations 
system.
16
Given these potential changes to an employer’s mindset, tolerance of industry 
bargaining cannot be so readily assumed, as in the apartheid past. In contrast, we might 
reasonably expect to see employers adopting a more sceptical stance when evaluating 
the merits of centralised as opposed to decentralised bargaining. Any such calculus will 
impact ultimately on their decision to act collectively over employment related matters. 
As a consequence, newer contingencies following political liberation and economic 
liberalisation make the likelihood of a more diverse set of responses from within the 
business community more probable. Such fragmentation can potentially undermine the 
organising capacity of employer associations and, thereby, the institutional capacity of 
bargaining councils to the overall detriment of articulated bargaining, economic 
coordination and organised employment relations -  attributes highly prized by those 
advocating South Africa’s continued experimentation with social corporatism. In this 
sense, employers now become potentially the ‘weakest link’ in South Africa’s neo- 
corporatist chain.
1.4 The central argument
It would seem that the same arguments that make industry bargaining institutionally so 
appealing to South African trade unions might be the very ones that could deter 
employers henceforth. A union conviction that past iniquities are best overcome by 
means of appropriate employment relations institutions and processes favours the 
centralisation of collective bargaining and the promotion of highly organised systems of 
interest representation. In contrast, a perceived need to address productivity problems 
and enhance flexibility predisposes sections of the business community towards 
decentralised bargaining and diversity in the way interests are to be mediated within any 
employment relations regime. This tension poses a huge dilemma for those charged 
with formulating policy over South Africa’s new corporatist employment relations and
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one for which there is an existing policy compromise that, anecdotally, some employers 
appear uncomfortable with.
When an articulated bargaining system is essentially voluntarist but rests on industry 
bargaining becoming the norm, crucially it is the behaviour of employers, more than 
trade unions, that command our attention. This is especially true when it comes to the 
aggregate decisions of employers whether to combine together and so become party to 
industry bargaining in the first place. In consequence, their propensity to associate or 
disassociate ,and thereby bargain either collaboratively or competitively, has a 
fundamental bearing on what happens to South Africa’s new employment relations 
regime as it moves from an embryonic to a more mature phase of its development. 
Reflecting on employers and their attitudes to both association and bargaining 
centralisation becomes a proper focus of debate concerning future prospects for South 
Africa’s corporatist project. Examining both associability (that is, the propensity to 
associate) and disassociabilitv (that is, the propensity to disassociate) within a South 
African context allows us to assess the chances of employer associations becoming 
organisationally strong and of industry remaining the primary locus of bipartite 
negotiations. It follows that a strong institutional capacity is dependant on there being 
high levels of employer engagement with centralised bargaining through membership of 
employer associations3 that then proceed to act as delegated bargaining agents for these 
associated employers. In the event, such participation is far from certain given that 
associated membership is voluntary and, as such, a matter of individual employer 
choice. The aggregated decision-making of South African employers now begins to 
matter greatly to those advocating the use of industry bargaining in facilitating
3
The terms ‘association’ and ‘organisation’ are to be used interchangeably when referring to those 
bodies primarily established for the purposes of representing employer interests in negotiation and 
dialogue with trade unions, state agencies and government.
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economic coordination and a system of articulated bargaining that is multi-tiered but 
interlocking.
Thus, the greater the proportion of employers prepared to associate, the more powerful 
an institutional force industry bargaining becomes as a result. In short, the density of 
associational membership within a sector becomes a crucial determinant of the future 
prospects for centralised bargaining within a transforming employment relations regime 
like that in South Africa. What counts is that a critical level of associability is reached 
sufficient for coordinated bargaining to occur. Disregarding this principle of ‘critical 
associability ’ may result in adverse consequences for policy advocates wishing to see a 
coordinated bargaining system take hold in South Africa. The worry is that significant 
employer defections from association (ie: ‘disassociation’) equates to a disengagement 
from sectoral bargaining activity such that bargaining councils become weakened and 
their capacity for wage coordination undermined. The central proposition is that this 
spiral into chronic decline can only be to the overall detriment of embryonic social 
corporatist processes. Such reasoning suggests that a critical masse of employers is 
required to associate before sectoral bargaining can fulfil its remit and become 
institutionally consolidated (Traxler 2003b: 206-207). Thus, ‘critical associability’ is 
not just a sufficient condition but a necessary one for the bargaining council system to 
perform a desirable coordinating function within the economy. For this to happen, 
employers have to be willing to engage with these institutions and their related 
processes in the first place. But questions arise as to the prevailing circumstances that 
might encourage or deter association and to the factors at play for employers when 
deciding on their best course of action. The broader theoretical justification for 
exploring employer intentions in this respect is set out below.
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1.5 Some underpinning concepts
The particular rationale for this research is grounded in a number of theoretical 
foundations. Taken together, they place industry bargaining and the propensity of 
employers to engage with it at the epicentre of a system, previously characterised as 
being racially authoritarian (De Villiers and Anstey 2000), and now to be characterised 
as neo-corporatist, democratic and inclusive (Webster and Adler 2000). All three of 
these conceptual building blocks are to be derived from a useful euro-centric literature 
that examines aspects of employer behaviour within the context of markets and 
economies that are organised. The contention is that, in terms of its relevance and 
explanatory power, this literature still holds a particular resonance for an emerging 
economy like South Africa’s.
The first conceptual framework embraces a number of debates and controversies 
regarding the rationale underscoring an employer’s propensity to associate or not. This 
body of work draws on collective-action theory and, to a lesser extent, class and 
organisational theories. More especially, this framework builds on the ‘logic of 
collective action’, first propounded by Olsen (1965 and 1982). Discussion centre on 
reasons why collective association can be simultaneously attractive and problematic for 
employers and similar yet different when compared to collective action decisions for 
workers (for example, Offe and Wiesenthal 1980; Olsen 1965; Streek 1992a). 
Meanwhile, others in the field have explored the power relationship between employer 
associations and their members, the tensions that this can give rise to and the resources 
each can call upon (for example, Traxler 1993, 1995,1998 and 2003 a and b; Van 
Waarden 1995). This body of work appears to pay dividends particularly when used to 
investigate the capacity of associations to both organise and represent employers 
collectively. Meanwhile, other commentators have reflected upon the phenomenon of
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global capitalism and what this signifies in terms of a changed relationship between the 
employer and the state and for organised as opposed to unorganised economies (Crouch 
and Streek 1997; Crouch and Traxler 1995; Streek 1992a and b). All these strands have 
something useful to offer in terms of illuminating the rational-choice deliberations 
behind employer decisions to act collectively. As will become apparent, an established 
literature on employer rationality has greatly informed the development of this thesis, its 
central argument and the design of fieldwork that tries to uncover the intentions of 
South Africa’s manufacturing employers towards their associability and collective 
action.
A second body of work explores the efficacy of those organised economies that value
market and bargaining coordination compared to those that do not and the conditions
necessary for their emergence (see, for example, Soskice 1990a and b; Sissons and
Margison 2002; Traxler 2003b). Arguably, a close reading of this literature suggests the
following. Centralised bargaining appears integral to South Africa’s idiosyncratic on
social corporatism because it acts as the linchpin in a revised system of interest
mediation in which ‘articulation’ and ‘economic coordination’ have become highly
prized public goods {after Crouch 1993 and 1999; Crouch and Traxler 1995; Soskice
1990a). However, it is readily conceded that there was little explicit intention on the part
of those drafting the original framework legislation for there to be an explicit form of
‘institutional interlock’ {after Dore in Crouch and Streek 1997: 26-27). Nevertheless,
the desire for coordination to evolve between peak, industry and enterprise levels can be
inferred from the-purpose and objects clause of the originating legislation. Here, the
declared ambition is ‘to advance economic development, social justice, labour peace
and the democratisation of the workplace’ in part through the promotion of ‘orderly
collective bargaining’ and that at both sectoral and enterprise level (Labour Relations
Act 1995: s.l). Accordingly, bargaining councils have been vested with powers that
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enable them to refer matters upwards for consideration at peak level and to delegate 
matters downwards for consultation in the workplace.
A final focus of interest relates to a discourse that has only recently evolved and is one 
that concerns itself with the threat posed to corporatist structures such as centralised 
bargaining from a changed economic order brought on by economic liberalisation 
world-wide. The contention is that individual companies are beginning to show 
preference for an autonomy and independence of action, separate from that of their 
associations (for example, Crouch and Traxler 1995; Traxler et al. 2001; Traxler 
2003a). Why employers might be increasingly ambivalent towards associability is to be 
explained by their growing impatience with a type of interest mediation and level of 
compromise that is perceived detrimental to their pursuit of (competitive) flexibility. 
This disenchantment with sectoral bargaining in particular and organised employment 
relations generally becomes stronger the more they feel themselves pressured into 
operating in increasingly hostile and demanding product market environments (eg: 
Crouch and Traxler 1995; Lash and Urry 1987; Thelen 2002). All of this is to suggest 
that it is the individual employer who has now become a key actor in any contemporary 
employment relationship even when trade unions themselves have been instrumental in 
establishing corporatist arrangements initially (notably Swenson 1989 andl991).
The assertion is that employers, generally, have begun to mount an ‘offensive’ against 
centralised bargaining arrangements on the grounds that the latter legitimise 
unaffordable rigidities in working practices whilst simultaneously obstructing labour 
flexibility (for example Lange et al 1995; Pontusson and Swenson 1996; Thelen 2002). 
The question now arises as to whether this same phenomenon applies to the new South 
Africa given the presence of a strong labour movement that has helped transform the 
institutional landscape and that continues to exercise considerable political and
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industrial muscle, post liberation (Adler and Webster 2000). Indeed, ten years into this 
new labour relations regime and some commentators have duly noted attempts by 
employers at bypassing bargaining councils through the promotion of enterprise 
bargaining and individualised contingent pay regimes (Webster and Omar 2003: 210). 
Together, these three themes help to define a research agenda that examines 
manufacturing employer responses to revised bargaining arrangements in the new South 
Africa and their part in consolidating corporatist structures, most particularly a revised 
centralised bargaining system.
1.6 Why South Africa?
Consequently, the central dilemma facing South African employers over their 
associability and its significance for South Africa’s experimentation with social 
corporatism sits at the heart of this thesis. The focus is on the extent to which debates 
about associability, and the notion of ‘critical associability ’ in particular, have merit 
within the context of post apartheid South Africa. Indeed, the very choice of South 
Africa as the focus of this country study is justified on two grounds.
First, this analysis of associability takes place against a backdrop of a country bent on 
fundamentally transforming its whole employment relations system (Erickson and 
Kurivilla 1998). Hence, this particular study is nested in a particular setting that has an 
emerging economy that is partly highly developed and partially under-developed but 
one that is also becoming increasingly liberalised. This has a particular significance for 
manufacturing employers - the very focus of this empirical work. Equally, post­
liberation demands are being made of employers to discard blatant racial discrimination 
and despotic management practices associated with an ‘apartheid workplace regime’ 
(von Holdt 2000). Instead, a combination of worker expectations, changed political
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cultures and legal requirements oblige employers to implement affirmative action and 
‘voice’ initiatives along with training and development opportunities that symbolise the 
reparations to be made to non- white workers.
Second, as a further legacy of apartheid, these same employers now find themselves 
confronted by a strong labour movement that can be as well organised in the workplace 
as it is influential within policy circles. Added to this, a new employment relations
regime has been introduced by a liberationist government in political alliance with the
/
biggest union federation (COSATU) that has considerably strengthened employment 
protection rights for workers and organising and bargaining rights for trade unions. In 
short, an urgent equity, efficiency and competency agenda frames any South African 
employer’s decision to engage with new or revised employment relations institutions. 
These contextual reasons alone justify choosing South African manufacturing 
employers as the focus for this particular study of associability, for discovering their 
general disposition towards centralised bargaining and for reaching some overall 
assessment as to its durability, given the changes to their world order. In particular, the 
study provides us with an opportunity to discover what contingencies particular to 
South Africa matters to them when deciding whether to associate and engage fully with 
the centralised bargaining system.
1.7 Structure and organisation of the thesis
This whole study is based on the micro-level of the employment relations system and 
attempts to analyse the acceptability or otherwise of industry bargaining to a sample of 
South African manufacturing employers having to confront uncertainty and change. It 
has been undertaken by reference to a number of research themes that, in turn, are 
informed by various debates reflecting both a South African and European outlook. 
First, some discussion is given over to various policy options available to countries like
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South Africa when contemplating fundamental regime change to their employment 
relations. An explanation is also provided as to why South Africa chose to take the 
policy direction it did. Second, it is also useful for us to understand why reconstruction 
of South African employment relations took the form it did and how it has evolved 
subsequently. Central to this discussion is the extent to which South African 
institutional arrangements can be characterised as being essentially corporatist and the 
challenges to be overcome in making it embedded. Third, this critique of bargaining 
reform raises further discussion as to the preparedness of the institutional actors (but 
especially employers) to engage meaningfully with a transformed employment relations 
system that is designed to elicit cooperation from the parties. Finally, answers to 
particular research questions are sought concerning the following: employer intentions 
towards industry bargaining in South Africa and its prospects for the future; those 
factors that influence employer thinking on associability and collective action; and the 
policy repercussions arising from any such findings by reference to coordinated 
bargaining and organised employment relations.
Not surprisingly given the above focus, the thesis itself is organised into four discrete 
but linked sections. The first explores what ‘regime change’ has come to mean for post 
apartheid South Africa. The second makes the case for considering the employer to be 
‘the weakest link’ in South Africa’s neo-corporatist chain of institutional reform whilst 
the third tries to discover what matters to South African employers concerning reform 
of industry bargaining. This leaves the final part for evaluating the significance of this 
country-specific study both in terms of a potential employer impact on South Africa’s 
reformed system of employment relations and any policy implications this holds for 
those wanting to see the maturation of a revamped bargaining institution.
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In Part one of this thesis, chapter two locates the policy pathway chosen to transform 
South Africa’s new employment relations system by reference to a broader theoretical 
framework. Its purpose is to identify the gamut of idealised policy types on offer to 
those states like South Africa bent on dismantling previously authoritarian labour 
relations regimes and replacing them with ones more conducive to democratic nation- 
building. This conceptual typology allows us to identify the particular strategic pathway 
chosen by South African policy-makers. The framework also provides us with an 
analytical means by which to critique how far this new employment relations has 
evolved post liberation and the general direction in which it is supposedly heading. The 
actual course of this transformation and its implications for the central thesis are then 
tracked in more detail over the next couple of chapters. To this end, chapter three 
identifies the defining features of apartheid employment relations, subsequent resistance 
to it and a partial reform of it. Such an historical treatment invites comparisons to be 
made in chapter four with current arrangements by reference to key design principles 
that inform the replacement employment relations regime as well as to various attributes 
that help define reworked institutional structures. This same chapter explores the true 
character of this regime change, its limitations and the challenges to be overcome prior 
to its consolidation.
Such a critique of South Africa’s new employment relations provides us with the 
necessary analytical background for what is to be explored in part two of the thesis. 
This entails fuller discussions as to the vulnerability of these revised employment 
relations arrangements -most notably industry bargaining -that emanates from an 
enhanced economic status for the employer, given South Africa’s recent exposure to 
trade liberalisation and intensified competition. Thus, chapter five explores the 
significance of arguments that make employers central to the proper functioning of
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corporatist institutions intended to make employment relations organised and bargaining 
co-ordinated.
Meanwhile, chapter six introduces another ‘euro-centric’ debate to explore the meaning 
and nature of employer associability itself by reference to two particular dimensions. 
The first relates to the fundamental logics at work when employers deliberate whether 
to associate in the first place and how these might prove distinctive. The second 
examines the propensity of employers to forego their autonomy of action and not 
conform to the discipline of associational membership, especially in light of more recent 
developments within advanced capitalism. Of particular interest are the rational-choice 
criteria used by employers to determine whether associability makes sense given 
changes to their priorities and interests compared to the past. Chapter seven 
acknowledges the need to contextualise this broader discussion of associability in ways 
that takes account of what has transpired in South Africa and what issues and debates 
are peculiar to it. This first requires us to examine the nature and role of the bargaining 
council system itself before identifying the debates that have sprung up around its 
development that are germane to the country’s business community and a model that 
encapsulates the strategic choices facing employers. Together, these chapters provide 
the conceptual underpinning behind an empirical investigation into what might be 
driving South African (manufacturing) employers to associate or otherwise. The 
arguments and perspectives rehearsed in these chapters regarding employer attitudes 
towards collective action greatly inform the subsequent design of the fieldwork as set 
out in the ensuing chapter.
As a consequence, part three of the thesis gives an account of the empirical work 
undertaken, the findings themselves and their significance in terms of the arguments 
developed previously. Thus, chapter eight provides us with a description of the research
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approach taken, the design of the field work along with some discussion of the strengths 
and limitations of the surveys. Discussion of methodological issues in this chapter 
allows for the presentation of findings in chapters nine and ten along with an analysis of 
their overall significance for us. Results from two cross-sectional surveys are first 
compared in ways that examine the views of both samples towards various aspects of 
associability, the extent to which these might have changed from one period to the next 
and why this might prove to be so. To this end, both descriptive and exploratory 
statistical techniques are deployed in chapters nine and ten as a means of revealing the 
attitudes of employer respondents towards employer associations in general and their 
involvement with bargaining councils in particular. Such methods are intended to 
provide statistical insight into respondents’ propensity to associate and how this might 
be changing given their experience of changes to political, economic and employment 
relations environments over the course of both surveys. Particular focus is also given to 
the constructs at play in the minds of employers when deliberating upon various issues 
surrounding employer associability. Further analysis and interpretation of these findings 
is then undertaken in chapter ten with a view to exercising some judgement as to the 
overall state of employer associability within a South African manufacturing context.
To assist in this endeavour, the qualitative observations of key informants are also 
drawn upon to add further credence to the analysis and to augment evaluation of the 
data.
Assessing the overall value of these findings prepares the ground for the fourth (and 
concluding) part of the completed thesis. This requires the final chapter {eleven) to 
summarise for us what this study has to say about employer associability in South 
Africa generally and its centrality for organised systems of employment relations and 
where political and economic transformation is ongoing. As importantly, this review
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also entails identifying certain policy ramifications for newly democratised countries 
like South Africa that are wedded to institution building along neo-corporatist lines. To 
this end, certain policy implications are drawn by reference to what is thought useful in 
terms of policy guidance, reinforcement and development.
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Chapter 2. Policy discretion for transforming states? The case of the
New South Africa
2.1 Introduction
This paper reviews the kinds of public policy thinking available to transforming 
countries like South Africa that are minded to bring about fundamental regime change 
to existing employment relations arrangements, most likely in pursuit of broader nation- 
building goals. Analysis is conducted by reference to a policy classification that has 
been devised in the spirit of ‘middle-range’ theorising, being neither empirically 
grounded nor highly abstracted (Hyman 1994: 169). In truth, and not uncommonly, this 
type of modelling amounts to no more than ‘multifactor hypothesising’ and, as such, is 
vulnerable to criticism on grounds of exhibiting weak explanatory power (Kelly 1998: 
22-23). Nevertheless, such conceptualisation is still worth undertaking despite 
acknowledged shortcomings. This is because exploring the nature of policy formation in 
this fashion helps to set the foundation for a more considered treatment of public policy 
reform in countries like South Africa seeking to transform the way its labour relations is 
overseen.
In South Africa’s case, a re-institutionalisation of its employment relations ten years ago 
became an integral part of a ‘negotiated revolution’ that officially terminated apartheid 
rule (Adam and Moodley 1993: 59-70). The terms of this political settlement, including 
that for employment relations, continue to provide the policy blueprint for all 
subsequent attempts at nation-building and consolidating democracy that we still see in 
play today. However, the purpose of this paper is not just to identify the strategic policy 
direction that South Africa has chosen to take. Rather, it is to map the whole array of 
policy options generally available to those countries like South Africa that are keen to
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jettison a prevailing policy paradigm and to favour a re-institutionalisation of its whole 
labour relations system.
Typological modelling is undertaken as the means by which we might first conceive of 
a framework that identifies for us a number of policy directions on offer to reformers 
like those in South Africa at the historical moment of political liberation and regime 
change. Here, strategic choice refers to a coherent ‘rationality and calculus’ that 
underpins ‘the patterning of decisions’ surrounding any public policy development of 
employment relations (Poole 1986: 13). Such a stylised framework provides us with a 
typology from which to compare and contrast various idealised policy directions 
apropos of those recently democratised states that then struggle to transform both their 
political and economic domains. Theorising in this way helps us to identify policy 
dilemmas to be resolved, choices to be made and decisions to be taken that, in harness, 
reveal the types of policy orientation available to transforming states seeking to 
overhaul their national employment relations systems (Donnelly and Dunn 2001:24). In 
short, policy routes taken reveal a country’s strong attachment to a certain type of 
labour management approach that is held to be conducive to economic prosperity and 
social cohesion.
For the purposes of this exercise, I confine this analysis to simply typifying the whole 
range of policy discretion available to 'transforming' states whilst readily 
acknowledging their likely preferences to be contingent, constrained and path dependent 
as with most other employment relations phenomena. The central tenet of the paper is 
that policy routes taken reveal a country’s general predisposition towards a particular 
type of employment relations arrangement that is assumed capable of resolving 
problems associated with economic adjustment, distributive justice and industrial peace. 
Indeed, each orientation is best located within an overall framework that can then be
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used to pinpoint key structures, processes and outcomes that, in turn, come to 
characterise specific types of employment relations regime. However, it is also worth 
noting that these same ‘structuring effects’ are the likely product of attempts by the state 
to institutionalise and regularise relations in line with some preconceived ideal, albeit 
one framed within a complex array of perceived social, economic and political realities 
(<after Poole 1986: 11-37). Accordingly, the paper is organised along the following 
lines. There next follows a brief account as to the origins and purpose of this typological 
approach before identifying the reform agenda commonly facing many policy-makers 
seeking to effect changes to their national employment relations systems. This agenda- 
setting takes the form of a number of public policy questions that require answers from 
those charged with bringing about radical alterations to their respective employment 
relations regimes. A more detailed account of the framework itself is next brought into 
the analysis as the means by which particular pathways might be illuminated and the 
policy preferences of reformers highlighted. Such groundwork can then be used to 
locate the specific policy direction South Africa chose to take in the mid 1990s en route 
from a universally despised apartheid labour relations system. The paper closes with a 
discussion of what causes changes in direction in the first place and, again, how well 
South Africa serves to illustrate such 'policy shift'.
2.2 ‘Ideal-type’ frameworks
Generalised notions of state strategy regarding employment relations helps us construct 
a synoptic framework that maps the strategic directions possible, the policy 
prescriptions available and the generic outcomes desirable for those countries wishing 
to effect regime change to their national employment relations systems. Locating where 
a country’s particular policy blueprint for transformed employment relations fits within 
this framework equips us with a better sense of what is expected to be lost and gained,
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where reform is supposedly heading and what institutions become critical from a 
performance perspective. For instance, appreciating which policy route the new South 
Africa has chosen to take and what other pathways it is prepared to forego can only 
enrich current debates as to the efficacy of these institutional reforms and their 
embeddedness.
To help us in this task, a theoretical framework has been devised that draws on earlier 
work by Crouch (1977) as a means of identifying various strategic pathways that 
present themselves to policy-makers for their consideration when contemplating 
fundamental revision to an existing employment relations regime. Each pathway 
represents an ‘ideal-type’, whereby ‘hypothetically conceived interests’ and a 
‘hypothetically conceived rationality’ of choice and action are brought into play, albeit 
within a context of structural constraints and ideological underpinnings {after Crouch 
1977: 12-13). Transparently, the relative power balance between actors will more than 
likely influence policy choice to some degree. But, as Crouch reminds us (1977:13), 
these typological constructs require ‘arbitrary and false distinctions’ to be made and so 
only work best when viewed as ‘extreme cases’. Reflecting on the way that ‘political 
realities’ intrude on policy-making can only diminish our appreciation of the typological 
framework at this stage. Their relevance for us, however, cannot be ignored and is 
brought into the analysis much later when we reflect on what South Africa chose to do 
and why.
Meanwhile, this approach also allows us to identify a ‘framework of dilemmas’ that is 
assumed to trouble the thinking of policy-makers when choosing between ‘stylised 
alternatives’ (Crouch 1977:41). It also indicates to us as to how a chosen pathway might 
be expected to resolve such dilemmas. Seemingly, the framework even allows reformers 
to exercise choices that can take their labour regimes in radically different, if not
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opposing, directions. Whatever direction happens to be taken, the logic of the model 
suggests some combination of ideological and pragmatic reasoning pushing reformers 
towards favouring one particular bundle of policy prescriptions ahead of others. Perhaps 
these policy preferences are best thought of as considered responses to newly perceived 
priorities. These overriding considerations relate back to the kinds of ideologically- 
driven interests, values, constraints and predicaments that might be expected to 
dominate policy thinking on employment relations in advance of any rationally- 
bounded choice-making on the part of reformers. Only by first categorising these policy 
reflections can we begin to conceptualise what form these discrete orientations might 
take by reference to their defining characteristics, structural properties and assumed 
outcomes. In short, these policy constructs are often the product of certain 
preoccupations that reformers are assumed to grapple with when contemplating 
extensive reform of an employment relations system. The question now arises as to 
what these policy concerns might be.
23  Policy considerations
Ideas first developed by Crouch (1977) as to how we might think of typifying ‘class 
conflict and compromise’ in industrial relations are now enlisted as the starting point for 
characterising various policy dilemmas facing reformers. Additionally, findings from 
cross-national studies undertaken by Traxler et al (2001) are also used to inform this 
characterisation. This work surveys the changing patterns of employment relations for 
twenty selected OECD countries from Europe, North America and the Pacific Rim 
between 1970 and 1998. Drawing on institutionalism, class theory and rational choice 
theory, Traxler et al. (2001: 10- 22) have developed a framework by which to gauge 
whether there is a convergence away from systems that are 'organised ’ to those 
‘unorganised ’ in response to the liberalisation of markets. With the former, collective
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relationships remain to the fore whilst the latter promotes individualism as being at the 
heart of contemporary employment relations. This binary characterisation of 
employment relations is particularly helpful to us for one notable reason. Understanding 
this duality and its defining characteristics affords us a better sense of what is likely 
preoccupying the thoughts of policy reformers when considering a re-design of their 
own national employment relations systems.
There is also the concept of co-ordination that can usefully be brought into an analysis 
of state policy and employment relations- one that is derived from recent European 
studies, notably undertaken by the likes of Soskice (for example, 1990b: 176-197; 2000: 
101-112). This work links the existence of largely coordinated market economies to the 
presence of certain key employment relations institutions that run alongside others 
promoting financial, VET and technology co-operation amongst employers. 
Furthermore, it suggests certain ‘variations in capitalism’ such that the production 
regimes of most advanced economies can be allocated to one of two species. First, there 
are uncoordinated or liberal market economies, as exemplified by Anglo-Saxon 
countries, in which ‘non-market’ co-ordination between companies is a rarity, organised 
labour is marginalised, if not excluded and the state disinclined to foster inter-company 
co-operation. This is to be contrasted against ‘business-coordinated market economies’ 
that sustain regularised ‘non-market’ co-ordination between companies leaving the state 
to set an incentivising framework that promotes coordinated multi-tiered bargaining and 
keeps strong unions on side through their ‘incorporation’ into institutional processes 
(Soskice 2000: 103-107). Again, contemplating on the place of such ‘interlocking 
complementarities’ better informs us as to what matters to those responsible for 
transforming their country’s employment relations {after Soskice 2000: 109).
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Given the above, the more important policy reflections to be borne in mind appear to be 
as follows. First, and foremost, the architects of reform need to determine the extent to 
which ‘voice* (most notably union voice) is to be granted to workers in a formal sense 
and made prominent within a transformed labour relations system. More specifically, 
this relates to whether institutional arrangements are to be introduced that encourage 
‘interest mediation’ taking place between labour and business, and if so, in what form 
and at what level(s). Basically, how are the sectional interests of workers and employers 
to be articulated and accommodated within the system in ways that does not lead to a 
worsening in 'class relations' (eg: Lehmbruch 1982: 1-27; Schmitter 1982: 259-279).
Second, and closely linked to the all-important issue of voice representation for policy­
makers, is the thorny matter of interest representation itself. Trade unions and 
employer organisations have evolved as the conventional means by which class interests 
have come to be represented for most countries world-wide. But how well they 
represent their natural constituencies is partially dependent upon the numbers they 
attract into membership in the first place. The more in membership, the more 
authoritatively organised labour and business can portray themselves to each other and 
to the state. Also, the more representative of their constituencies they become, the more 
potential there is for labour and business to act as important civic institutions in their 
own right. What then is considered to be an appropriate policy response for a newly 
democratised state like South Africa when it comes to the organisation of interest 
representation across society? Is it thought appropriate, even desirable, for the state to 
give official support to capacity-building for organised labour, business or both? 
Likewise, is the state to discourage or encourage workers and employers into 
membership or maintain a position of studied neutrality on this and related matters?
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More particularly, is freedom of association only to be minimally acknowledged 
through the Constitution or actively promoted through a legal dispensation that 
encourages both unionisation and associability? The quandary over the state’s 
endorsement of interest representation and its institutionalism ties in with another 
dilemma facing policy reformers. To what extent are unions and employers to be 
dissuaded from acting independently of state interests? Is there to be a requirement for 
sectional interests to be subsumed under, and representative bodies co-opted into, a state 
authority charged with the pursuit of an all-pervasive developmental and nation- 
building agenda of its own? Alternatively, is the public good still best served by 
officially sanctioning a freedom of action for organised actors that compliments other 
likeminded attempts at deepening democracy?
Third, and linked to this issue of interest representation, is the degree to which the state 
should be seen interfering in the employment relationship in ways that imposes on 
protagonists certain ‘rules of engagement’. Essentially, the level of state interference 
determines the extent to which this relationship is to be one that is highly prescriptive in 
tone or essentially voluntarist between employers, workers and their respective 
representatives. The basic quandary is whether a laissez-faire approach to employment 
relations is always to be preferred ahead of regulation. Whether through a legal 
dispensation or direct political interference, policy-makers have to decide the degree to 
which they want labour management systems restricted or enabled. Again, to what 
extent is it thought appropriate, even desirable, for the state to intervene, either directly 
or indirectly, in employment relations institutions and processes? And what form should 
such involvement take? What is the fundamental purpose behind any changes to the 
legal dispensation? Is it to facilitate or circumscribe the behaviours of bipartite actors 
(or both)?
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Fourth, and an associated conundrum for policy makers, is the type and degree of 
orderliness that it is thought desirable to have within the employment relations system. 
This refers to the way industrial conflict is thought best managed from a policy 
perspective. Here, the central dilemma is whether to allow the discipline of the market 
to act as the best guarantor of social cohesion and industrial peace or whether it is 
natural, even inevitable, for the state to involve itself with dispute-handling when 
parties become deadlocked. Another key debate to be had is whether greater reliance is 
to be placed on individualised market relations rather than institutionalised collective 
relations as the means by which the ‘rules of the game’ are to be played out. In short, is 
there to be a preference for individualised contractual relations over collective 
agreement? To what extent should market forces be allowed to prevail over state 
provision in the way that employers and workers conduct their affairs and settle their 
differences?
Fifth, and related to the above, what is the official status to be afforded to collective 
bargaining, especially when held to be core institution within a newly proposed labour 
management system. This raises further questions as to whether collective bargaining is 
to be officially encouraged, whether agreements reached are to be made encompassing 
and where the primary locus o f bargaining is expected to lie in a multi-tiered bargaining 
system. Answers to such questions also reveals the extent to which bargaining is 
intended to be centralised (multi-employer) or decentralised (single-employer) or, 
alternatively, coordinated as opposed to uncoordinated in terms of agendas to be 
pursued and agreements to be reached. Tied in with this idea of ‘articulation’ (Crouch 
1993: 54-5 and 258-60) is that of ‘associability’. This refers to the propensity for unions 
and employers to associate within a larger collective for the purposes of extending their 
bargaining reach, albeit at some possible cost to their freedom of action. Should the
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authorities even go so far as to encourage, maybe even force, unions into joining large 
federations and employers into associations that are then delegated to bargain on their 
behalf? Is it thought desirable for official support to be given to industry bargaining 
processes that possibly help coordinate employers and workers across key sectors or 
even whole economies? Just how much assistance should the state give to organised 
labour and business in resolving their collective-action problems {after Olsen 1965;
Offe and Wiesenthal 1980)? This question is crucial for countries like South Africa that 
want to see a type of centralised bargaining in place that can address simultaneously 
issues of'redistributive justice' and 'economic adjustment' (Standing et al. 1996). But 
also one where an employer acceptance of industry bargaining is no longer guaranteed, 
as under apartheid (for example, Donnelly 2001; Klerck 1998; Macun and Webster 
1997; Webster and Omar 2003).
Sixth, and following on from this issue of collective bargaining, is the question as to
what the appropriate relationship between labour, business and the state should be when
it comes to public policy formulation. Should the state work hard at keeping the
bipartite parties at arm’s length or should it officially incorporate them into the very
policy-making process itself? If so, should such a policy of inclusiveness remain
informal and ad hoc or be founded on more structured and regularised tripartite
processes that produce social pacts and general political exchanges? For certain
European countries, formalised arrangements have come to mean ‘social dialogue’
taking place between ‘social partners’, leading to various ‘labour accords’ or ‘social
compacts’. These concordats typically require organised labour to offer industrial peace,
support for government and wage restraint in return for worker-friendly policies that
provide training, unemployment insurance, welfare provision and some say in
macroeconomic management (Harcourt and Wood 2003: 87). Are such formal
processes equally desirable for emerging economies like South Africa with their own
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transforming agendas or are ad hoc, low profile and less regularised contacts more to 
their taste? Alternatively, and at the extreme, the preference might be for the social 
actors to be wholly excluded from all policy deliberations, denied opportunities to 
register dissent and then coerced into accepting the state’s notion of the public good. 
This is to be contrasted against an alternative policy paradigm that values attempts at 
‘associative’ (Hirst 1994: 26-40) or ‘deliberative’ (Baccaro 2002b: 334-5) democracy 
through Social Partnership.
Finally, grappling with all these policy dilemmas simultaneously forces policy 
reformers to confront some fundamental issues when trying to establish a ‘new order’. 
One such 'big' dilemma facing emerging economies is whether markets are healthier 
when ‘coordinated’ than ‘uncoordinated’ {after Soskice 1990a and b; 2000) and, 
correspondingly, whether revamped labour systems are of more help when ‘organised’ 
or ‘unorganised’ {after Traxler et al 2001; Traxler 2003a and b). The former is often 
caricatured by reference to the presence of tripartite dialogue, centralised bargaining and 
strongly organised groups of employers and unions whilst the latter by market-driven 
individualised contractual relations, fragmented bargaining and weakly organised 
representative bodies.
The link between institutional reform and its impact on an emerging economy has 
significance for us in two respects. First, prejudices concerning the degree of economic 
coordination that is thought desirable (and the mechanisms for achieving it) can heavily 
inform the selection of a strategic pathway. This is most apparent when the desire is for 
a strong state to ‘command and control’ the coordinated development of an economy 
through the machinations of elite (often explicitly authoritarian) institutions, as has been 
the case in parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America. In this instance, the reform strategy 
that best helps or least hinders either collaborative or competitive economic
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restructuring becomes an overriding consideration for those choosing between 
alternatives. Second, there is a strong likelihood that a view on whether a particular 
orientation complements a broader macro-economic strategy markedly influences the 
eventual policy outcome. Indeed, for many contemporary governments, employment 
relations policy is clearly meant to serve grander ambitions that they may well harbour 
such as improving overall international competitiveness. Indeed, in South Africa’s case, 
the transformational possibilities of public policy reform are not meant to be confined 
solely to the employment relations domain but to contribute both to the wider 
democratisation of society and wholesale reform of the economy (Webster and Adler 
2000; 1999).
2.5 Policy discretion for transforming states
Having rehearsed what commonly preoccupies the thinking of those charged with 
initiating policy reform, we next turn our attention to the kinds of strategic discretion 
(however constrained) that are open to policy reformers in countries seeking to overhaul 
existing employment relations arrangements. The choice between alternative policy 
directions constitutes an idealised typology that is set out in figure 1 below in the form 
of a synoptic table with each pathway outlined by reference to its distinctive properties 
and outcomes. Thus, a number of generalised policy orientations are first identified with 
a view to highlighting certain attributes by which they might come to be recognised. 
These refer to such defining features as the amount of state intervention, the extent of 
labour market regulation, the status of interest representation and of (centralised) 
collective bargaining, the levels of protection afforded to employees and the 
maintenance of labour standards within the overall national employment relations 
system.
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Next, it is assumed that each cluster of structural properties will produce a distinct 
pattern of outcomes, whether intended or not. Primarily, this relates to the degree to 
which relationships are thought best individualised or collectivist, and, if the latter, 
organised or not by reference to whether unions affiliate and employers associate in 
ways that make such delegated bargaining both articulated and coordinated. It is this 
assortment of characteristics and assumed outcomes that are held to capture the essence 
of each policy model and, thereby, the spectrum of broad stratagems up for 
consideration by designated policy reformers. Intentionally, this ordering of possible 
policy frameworks moves from one that is characterised as being highly individualised, 
unorganised, uncoordinated and market-orientated through to one that is highly 
collectivised, organised and co-ordinated but state-driven (see figure 2). The 
implication is that there are trade-offs to be taken into account by reformers in declaring 
such a policy preference. This stylised portrayal amounts to a re-working and updating 
of Crouch’s original depiction of ‘ideal-typical formulations’ that lie on a continuum of 
‘market individualism’ and ‘statist corporatism’ at the extremes with the intermediate 
possibilities o f ‘liberal collectivism’ and ‘voluntary corporatism’ in between (Crouch 
1977: 27-41). We will follow in like fashion.
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3. ‘mutualism* (organised) 
[institutional relations]
4. ‘elitism* (highly organised) 
[oligarchic relations]
Structural properties/defining characteristics
business-friendly policies/market-orientated law 
minimal labour standards & protection rights 
weak organising rights/limited freedom to associate 
(individualised) contractual relations only 
market institutions only/laissez-faire state
basic organising & recognition rights (voluntarism) 
adequate protection rights / core labour standards
(decentralised) single-employer bargaining  ►
crisis interventionism/ ‘spheres of influence’ 
few non-market institutions (eg: dispute resolution)
enlightened corporatism /social (‘peak’) dialogue 
extensive protection rights/ norm-setting labour standards 
strong organising & representational rights 
co-determination (sectoral bargaining & workplace consultation) 
state as active ‘social partner’ and framework facilitator
state corporatism/one-party rule
co-optation and incorporation of elite leaderships
^  monopolistic interest representation  p.
iron law of oligarchy/enforced unity 
‘hollow shell’ non-market institutions/processes
desirable/likely outcomes
minimal state intervention in labour markets 
‘light touch’ labour market regulation 
high individualism/ low collectivism 
labour commodification / market discipline 
low associability/weak union voice 
little or no collective bargaining 
uncoordinated economy /no articulation
disorganised collective relations 
joint regulation (workplace agreements) 
bargaining fragmentation (enterprise-level) 
work-based representation & organisation 
some union-free employers / sectors 
low ‘associability’/ union affiliation 
some pattern bargaining effect 
slight macro-co-ordination / articulation
organised collective relations/ political voice 
bargained consensus/policy bargaining 
enabling legislation/extended agreements 
high associability/strong union affiliation 
cooperative and coordinated bargaining 
some macro-co-ordination / articulation
centralised and bureaucratised relations 
state coercion/elite (‘peak’) accords 
restricted protections / state discipline 
forced associability & affiliation 
‘phoney’ centralised bargaining/ weak voice 
high macro-co-ordination/ weak articulation
*atomism’
With this policy orientation, the preference is for employment relations to remain 
largely unorganised, not least because individualised market relations are expected to 
oversee the employment relations scene. The anticipation is that the workings of the 
labour market will determine the terms and conditions of employment rather than any 
mediating bargaining institution. Consequently, personal employment contracts are 
likely to be to the fore with collective agreements the exception {after Crouch 1977: 
27). Classically, unfettered market forces are also expected to act as primary restraints 
on the behaviour and actions of the parties to the relationship. Likewise, conformity to 
the rigours of the market amounts to a ‘self-discipline’ on workers and employers alike 
such that orderliness in the workplace is maintained.
Although direct intervention in market relations is a rarity, this is not to suggest that the 
state is either neutral or passive. In fact, legislation is used to uphold the ‘property - 
rights’ of business in ways that undermine the ‘countervailing power’ of workers 
(Crouch 1977: 28; Fox 1974). Here, the state’s perceived task is to provide an 
infrastructure that is empathetic to businesses struggling to compete within a context of 
globalised competition. Thus, labour market policies are geared to supporting market 
mechanisms intended to promote ‘world-class competitiveness’ and ‘labour flexibility’, 
albeit to the overall detriment of workers’ ‘security' {after Standing 1997a).
This also presupposes a state that, in all probability, upholds minimal protection rights 
for workers and their representative bodies in accordance with, say, the ILO’s ‘core 
conventions’ but does little to enhance the authority of independent unions or employer 
organisations with their respective constituencies. Thus, institutions supportive of 
collective relations and interest articulation hold little or no interest for these policy­
makers. Nor does the allure of economic coordination across markets hold much sway
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either. Likewise, there appears to be little appetite for ‘an agreed structure through 
which interests can express their concerns through autonomous organisations’ (Crouch 
1999: chi2). Indeed, conventional employment relations institutions, such as collective 
bargaining, are thought only to impede the smooth functioning of markets (Ludlam et 
al 2003: 609).
If anything, official policy is likely geared towards discouraging ‘voluntary 
combination’ in line with an avowed aversion towards collective relations generally 
(Crouch 1997:29). Seemingly, many developing economies are drawn to this pathway at 
the behest of a fundamental neo-liberal orthodoxy such as that espoused by international 
agencies like the World Bank, WTO and IMF. Such orthodoxy is becoming 
increasingly allied to policies of economic adjustment and fiscal rectitude that favour 
the dynamic of entrepreneuralism and intrapreneuralism as the means by which both 
wages and jobs are expected to grow. Such policy conviction leads to preferences for 
markets to be deregulated, state enterprises privatised and public services exposed to the 
rigours of the market. Hostile conditions, indeed, for those wanting their labour 
relations organised.
Elitism*
In stark contrast to ‘atomism’ lies ‘elitism’ at the other polar extreme. The policy 
instinct here is for the state, not the market, to rule over the employment relations 
domain. This dominance is to be achieved through a controlling power and influence 
that is channelled through a network of elite relationships forged between the ruling 
authority and a co-opted but highly organised labour movement and / or associational 
business community. In certain countries, elitism takes the form of strong political 
alliances forged between a ruling party and either trade union or business leaders or 
both. Such elitism is largely characteristic of totalitarian or authoritarian societies that
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place great store in the maintenance of order and stability, often in line with an 
ambitious programme of economic development or reconstruction. As a consequence, 
an omnipotent state is wont to intervene directly and frequently in both political and 
economic spheres under the guise of a public interest duty. The state’s espoused role is 
to intervene in ways that replaces interest conflict with a unity of purpose towards some 













Thus, ‘elitism’ demands that business and labour leaders forego any sectional interests 
they may pursue in favour of serving the nation as mediated by the ruling party in 
power. Thus, only the state can legitimately define what is deemed to be in the public 
good and only those ‘private interests’ that are best incorporated into those of the state 
will continue to have legitimacy (Crouch 1977: 35). In this way an oligarchic leadership 
takes shape that begins making decisions ‘for the good of all’ but also acts as an ‘agent 
of control’ in ensuring that decisions reached are duly observed and enforced 
(Dabscheck 1983: 500). Accordingly, an ‘enforced unity’ is pressed on ordinary 
members of unions and employer associations by means of state imposition and of some 
limited political exchange between the higher echelons that is made over the heads of 
those below (Crouch 1977: 39).
In return for their collaboration, unions and employer bodies are licensed by the state 
and granted a certain ‘representational monopoly’ (Schmitter 1974: 97). However, this 
is at some cost to their autonomy of action in terms of nominated leaderships and the 
articulation of interests. Since alternative (unauthorised) interest organisations are to be 
precluded, those enjoying such representational privileges become completely reliant on 
the state for their continued existence and authority (Schmitter 1974: 102-105). For 
these reasons, it is commonly felt that they operate as virtual ‘empty vessels with few 
real functions’ (Crouch 1999). What bargaining that does take place only mirrors 
decisions passed down from on high where, at best, only private negotiations amongst 
the politically powerful are ever tolerated (Giles 1989: 141). Not surprisingly, the 
employment relations system is not just highly organised and the economy strongly co­
ordinated but both are managed in an explicitly centralised and bureaucratised fashion 
such that any meaningful articulation from below is suppressed (after Crouch 1977: 36). 
One outcome from such oligarchic relations is that unions and employer associations
become prone to Michelsian tendencies in that elite leaders become distanced from
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members, stop voicing their interests and start exercising a state-directed control over 
them. Eventually, the common values of the oligarchy and a shared interest in 
preserving an existing order take hold such that the higher echelons only work to 
suppress conflict and instil a compliant workplace discipline (after Przeworski 1991 in 
Adler and Webster 1995: 85-87). Invariably, this ‘iron law of oligarchy’ means that the 
interests of elite leaderships are defended ahead of those placed below them. To this 
end, legislative codes are more likely used to restrict worker rights (such as the right to 
strike) and to strengthen management control.
‘pluralism’
Tacking away from ‘atomism’ and towards ‘pluralism’ suggests to us that reformers 
now wish to bring collective relations into the policy frame as the institutional means by 
which ‘class’ conflicts of interest might best be mediated and contained. Attributes such 
as collective bargaining, dispute arbitration and basic employment standards are now 
introduced into the system as forms of ‘institutional compromise’ between employers 
and their workers (after Giles and Murray 1997: 85). Although ‘pluralism’ shares 
characteristics in common with ‘atomism’, not wishing to frustrate labour from 
becoming ‘autonomously collectivised’ is a significant fork in the road when it comes to 
policy-making and offers the potential for organised workers to counter the market 
power of employers (Crouch 1977: 30).
In taking this direction, the state can be expected to adopt an explicitly non-coercive 
role, only choosing to help the parties reconcile their differences through the provision 
of a supportive mediating infrastructure. If anything, the state probably prefers to keep 
workers and employers at arms’ length, interceding only reluctantly when deadlocked 
bipartite relationships reach crisis-point that the wider public good is placed in jeopardy. 
This means that unions and employer associations are no longer to be seen as ‘creatures
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of the state’, enjoying as they do an independence of organisation and freedom of action 
unknown under elite regimes (Crouch 1977: 31-32). Yet their capacity to shape public 
policy remains limited, given the absence of any formal and regularised access to 
policy-making circles. But this is far from signifying a total lack of political influence 
on the part of business and labour. What tends to happen is that each party lobbies 
competitively and uses their informal networks within the state apparatus in order to 
effect policy outcomes more favourable to themselves.
Another defining characteristic of this policy orientation is a penchant for seeing 
representative bodies as voluntary organisations, with a legal status to match. This 
disposition supports a policy perspective that is neither ideologically opposed nor drawn 
to collective relations but, rather, accepting of its more pragmatic virtues. This means 
that neither unions nor employers are expected to receive especially favourable 
treatment from the state when it comes to augmenting their organising and 
representational powers. Appearing even-handed is considered to be the touchstone of 
this policy orientation and striking the right balance between interests, the primary 
pursuit. Accordingly, both policy and regulation are directed at maintaining a system of 
checks and balances and providing a buffer against abuses of market power perpetrated 
by either side. This means that there is no ‘monopoly of representation’ to be endorsed 
by the state but rather, ‘an organisational market of free choice’ founded on voluntarist 
principles (Schmitter 1974: 96). The presumption is that workers can only really make 
headway through their voluntary mobilisation within the workplace. Likewise, only 
where employers concede recognition can unions try to improve the lot of their 
members by dint of enterprise bargaining such that it now becomes the principle mode 
of employment regulation but only for those workplaces where they manage to gain a 
foothold (Traxler 2003a: 6-7). This helps explains why the relationship between
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employer and worker representatives is commonly characterised as being structurally 
‘adversarial’ and ‘antagonistic’ by nature (for example, Edwards 1986:5).
But a freedom neither for employers to associate nor to recognise unions means that 
there will always be workplaces, undertakings and whole industries that are virtually 
union-free and bargaining-exempt. Such diversity likely leads to variable labour 
standards, conditional upon employment terms being determined through either 
individual or collective settlement. The consequences of this are often twofold. First, 
each zone can act as a counter to the other and so spark competition between the two. 
Second, bargaining styles will most likely be distributive in ways that only adds to the 
adversarial nature of the relationship between the sparring partners who likely default to 
locking horns over ‘pay and flexibility’ bargaining. Given the prominent part to be 
played by single-employer bargaining under 'pluralism' there will be little call for 
employers to associate or unions to federate such that peak bodies can be expected to 
play a minor role in inducing co-ordinated bargaining.
What co-ordination there is, more likely stems from pattern bargaining. This occurs 
when either an individual bargaining units takes the lead in setting agreements that 
others follow or there is a muted ‘cartelization effect’ that surfaces (Traxler 2003b: 198- 
199). This trait, together with ad hoc and sporadic dialogue at the national level, likely 
produces a weak and fortuitous, rather than a strong and deliberate, co-ordinated market 
effect. Although those advocating a pluralist route find virtue in employment relations 
being collective in character, this stops well short of wanting centralised bargaining 
coverage for a whole industry or sector. Likewise, the fact that bargaining can be 
fragmented, its outcomes disaggregated and employment relations decentralised is 
thought not to be particularly problematic for reformers but, if anything, advantageous 
from a flexibility and productivity perspective.
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‘mutualism*
Those wanting their employment relations to be more consensual than contested see 
matters somewhat differently. They would likely wish to steer a different course away 
from pluralism and towards tripartism. For them, the mutual benefits that accrue from 
making collective relations even more organised and legally extended than exists under 
pluralism are presumed to outweigh the potential costs arising from any assumed labour 
market rigidities. This is because mutual gains are thought to arise from this approach in 
ways that further not just the ‘private’ interests of employers and workers but also those 
of the wider public. These mutual gains take the form of certain ‘collective goods’ that 
all parties learn to value such as wage restraint, smoother technological transition, 
economic coordination and social stability (Soskice 1990b: 193-208). Indeed, the very 
institutional form that such ‘mutualism’ takes, and not just its outcomes, may also come 
to be highly prized in terms of the ‘comfort’ and 'certainty' it affords them (Crouch 
1995: 313-321). Accordingly, collaborative relations are perceived to be mutually 
reinforcing for all parties over time.
Its popularity with certain policy strategists derives from the presence of two particular 
constructs: ‘social ‘corporatism’ as a particular system of representation and interest 
articulation (Schmitter 1979: 13) and ‘social concertation’ as a shared policy-making 
and mediating process that helps reconcile conflicting ‘class interests’ (Lehmbruch 
1979: 150). Each, though conceived differently, is complimentary to the other. This first 
aspect refers to a hierarchical but independent and democratic structure of interest 
representation that aims to produce co-operation and cohesion across groups of 
organised employers and workers (‘horizontal co-ordination’) as well as compliance 
from one superior level to the next (‘vertical co-ordination’) (Baccaro 2003: 683-684). 
Early theory maintains that a monopolistic and centralised structure of representation
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for workers and employers renders concerted policy-making, and its implementation, 
more effective (eg: Schmitter 1974: 97). Contemporary empirical evidence, however, 
shows that even where organised labour and business operate more loosely and less 
authoritatively than originally thought necessary, corporatist behaviour is still possible 
provided both sides seek to act cohesively (Baccaro 2002a; Molina and Rhodes 2002).
In contrast, social concertation emphasises the part played by an 'associational cohesion' 
founded on sensitive rule-making, trust and a clear division of responsibility (eg: Vatta 
1999: 246 and 260). Rather than hierarchical imposition, it is ‘deliberative 
mechanisms’ based on ‘democracy’ and discussion’ that ensures interest co-ordination 
operates and policy concertation materialises (Baccaro 2003: 685-686). This idea of a 
more fragmented but yet co-ordinated institutional voice amounts to a form of 
‘associational democracy’ (Baccaro 2002b) whereby social partners show mutual regard 
to each other conditional upon securing for themselves a mandated authority from 
within their respective constituencies (Vatta 1999: 259).
'Social concertation’ also entails a kind of policy-making that encourages political
exchanges between, state, capital and labour representatives that supposedly pays
dividends all round. The suggestion is that organised labour and business do not merely
influence public policy but also help shape it through the political pacts they broker
with their governments. Conventionally, such policy bargaining entails business and
state representatives reaching settlements with labour counter-parts over wage
moderation in return for policy concessions elsewhere (eg: Hassel 2003: 707-708).
More recently, this quid pro quo has been extended to cover welfare, employment and
other labour market reforms as a way of spreading the burden of economic adjustment
and competitiveness exacerbated by the internationalisation of markets (Hassel 2003:
719-722). It is this aspect of tripartism that proves particularly alluring to fledgling
democracies like South Africa struggling to develop their emerging economies in a
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context of market liberalisation and social upheaval. It is these concrete policy trade­
offs that help explain why corporatism is to be caricatured as either ‘bargained’ or 
‘social’ nowadays (Crouch 1993: 38-47 and Schmitter 1974, respectively) - not least as 
a way of maintaining distance from state corporatism and 'elitism' (ie: authoritarianism).
But there is also a certain mutual dependency that takes hold between the 
representative structure and pacting process that proponents of this neo-corporatist 
approach are also attracted towards. Social dialogue and policy mediation between the 
social partners only works well when unions and employers consent to being 
organised into bargaining structures that lead to a co-ordination of agreements across 
enterprises and industries. The more they are prepared to associate between 
themselves the more likely bargaining becomes coordinated and employment relations 
organised under a social pacting framework (after Traxler 2003b: 207). Thus, multi­
employer bargaining appears to go hand in hand with social pacting construction 
(Traxler 1998) and economic co-ordination (Soskice 1990a). These interdependencies 
now set the agenda for those advocating a neo-corporatist route to policy reform. 
Enhancing the organising, associating and coordinating capacities of both labour and 
business becomes a key dynamic behind a neo-corporatist path to employment 
relations reform.
Thus, a state that is supportive of neo-corporatist structures remains an essential 
precursor for those wanting their employment relations organised and multi-employer 
bargaining commonplace (Traxler 2003b: 200; 2003c: 144-5 and 152-3; 1998a: 219- 
23). Not only are strong and free trade unions that provoke employers into 
associational membership and independent associations that bind employers to 
centralised agreements highly desirable but also measures that protect such agreements 
from free-riding and defections from ‘the common rule’ by non-affiliates. Paramount
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for the state are codified extension rules that render collective agreements ‘binding on 
all unaffiliated employers and employees within the domain of the contracting 
associations’ (Traxler 1998a: 213). Legal endorsement of industry agreements also 
improves the chances of the whole bargaining system becoming more ‘articulated’. 
This is because they are often devised to frame and inform agreements reached at the 
enterprise level, having first taken their cue from what has already been mediated and 
compacted at national peak level (after Crouch 1993: 54-55). As a consequence, it is 
only legal extension that makes multi-employer bargaining processes complimentary 
to single-employer and individual contractual negotiations rather than ‘competing 
modes of employment regulation’ that then undermine valued articulation (Traxler 
2003a: 20-21).
Equally important for those promulgating social governance is the principle that
workers be kept informed and consulted over those business decisions that impact
directly on their work and continued employment. Thus, it becomes necessary for
managers to obtain worker consent for change, having first consulted their
representatives. This suggests a ‘co-determination’ of what is decided in the workplace
founded on formal consultative processes that are ‘rights-based’. For those drawn to
'mutualism' on this basis, this work-based focus can only enhance the potential for
further articulation whereby those at the grassroots begin to inform the deliberations of
those placed above them (after Crouch 1993: 54-55 and 258-60). What becomes
important for those advocating ‘mutualism’ are neo-corporatist structures and
concertation process that are mutually reinforcing in ways that strengthen social
dialogue, (multi-employer) co-ordinated bargaining and general interest mediation
between social partners. The state’s role is to provide the institutional means for this to
happen and a legal infrastructure that enables, but not compels, organised labour and
business to engage fully with what is on offer. This equally extends to having policies
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that encourage workers to unionise and employers to associate and for both to comply 
with the authority of their representatives within such an overtly organised framework.
2.6 ‘Mutualism’ and South Africa
South Africa’s preference has been for an institutional environment to evolve similar 
to that outlined above following apartheid’s official demise. This has been achieved 
through the implementation of a new legal dispensation that is crucially the product of 
a political accord between a militant and trenchant labour movement, an incoming 
liberationist government and a powerfully placed business community. As a 
consequence, this compact was considered at the time (1994-5) to be pivotal to the 
success of the broader political settlement that preceded it. The policy intent has been 
clear from the outset. Despite disagreements over the detail, government, labour and 
business appear wedded to the view that any re-institutionalisation of the labour 
relations system should be one that is basically ‘organised’ but, equally, intolerant of 
(racial) authoritarianism, given the legacy inherited from apartheid labour relations. As 
evidenced by a newly agreed dispensation, this policy denouement has led to the 
founding of neo-corporatist structures that are intended to facilitate the development of 
social partnership at all levels.
Accordingly, this new institutionalism provides ‘voice’ opportunities for tripartite
dialogue, industry bargaining and workplace consultation to occur and for the parties
to independently resource and organise themselves accordingly (Habib 1997: 65-68).
Officially encouraging the bilateral actors to engage with social concertation processes
is meant to strengthen the democratic character of this new order compared to the
authoritarian corporatism of old (Schreiner 1994: 10-18). More uncertain is the
suggestion that bargaining co-ordination was foremost in the thinking of those charged
with reaching settlement regarding the institutional form for South Africa’s ‘new’
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employment relations although the prospect of it evolving organically as intended still 
remains a possibility (Adler 2000: 26-32; Du Toit 1995: 804-5). Nevertheless, the 
outcome for South Africa is clear in terms of the strategic pathways available for 
transforming states. There has been a paradigmatic shift in policy thinking from one 
historically founded on a racial elitism for whites (but, nevertheless, one that evolved 
into pluralism for organised black workers in the 1980s) to one now orientated towards 
a more socially inclusive ‘mutualism’ in the 1990s (Habib 1997: 58-62). But this still 
begs the question as to how institutionally robust have these new neo-corporatist 
features become and what are the chances of them remaining resilient in the face of an 
economy only recently opened to competition following the ending of apartheid’s 
protectionist policies (ILO 1999).
policy shift and South Africa
Mapping these pathways prompts a further question as to what causes shifts from one to 
the other in countries like South Africa. Policy thinking over employment relations 
changes markedly when the logic underpinning the predominant policy orientation is no 
longer thought sustainable. Altered policy thinking occurs as the result of the 
accumulated and collective experiences of those acting in thrall to a prevailing policy 
paradigm. Changes to context, ideology or perceived political and economic realities 
can eventually lead to a conviction by custodians of public policy thinking that changed 
priorities demand new responses with shifts in policy to match. Any subsequent re­
definition of the challenges and dilemmas to be surmounted can also lead to ‘new 
realities’ that not only require changes to mindsets but even to existing employment 
relations institutions. By this stage, policy thinking becomes so altered that old policy 
prescriptions lose ground in favour of new ones such that any new policy bundle heralds 
a radical departure from one strategic pathway and the magnetic pull towards another.
Thus, what is thought pragmatic, even sensible, in policy terms begins to change as the
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logic and associated values underpinning an old orthodoxy give way to a different 
starting rationale that culminates in the emergence of a replacement policy paradigm. 
What happened to South African employment relations illustrates this point quite nicely 
for us.
The reasoning behind apartheid labour relations is in stark contrast to the one that
provides the impetus for today’s policy reform. Whereas previously it was appropriate
for employment relations to be racially segregated and for policy measures to reflect
this, prevailing political orthodoxy upholds the exact opposite -  from one of racial
dualism and institutional separation to one of social inclusion and integration. The bitter
history of apartheid labour relations has led to the incarnation of a new mindset that
colours all subsequent policy-thinking around employment relations in terms of the
form to be taken institutionally and of the transformational goals to be pursued
politically. As will become apparent, political reform and liberation in the early 1990s
imposed new realities on policy-shakers and makers alike, all with vested interests in
seeing apartheid employment relations forever dismantled. A view had formed by this
time that a Grand Apartheid rationale for workers to be racially differentiated in terms
of their employment, reward and development was not only economically and socially
dysfunctional but also morally abhorrent. Moreover, by successfully opposing apartheid
authority, labour had come to be viewed as such a powerful player within the political
realm that it could no longer be sidelined when it came to a settling of differences
between the various protagonists post liberation. Consequently, South Africa’s policy
movement towards collaborative behaviour and ‘mutualism’ is best seen as a classic
‘crisis response’ by a fledgling democratic state to an anticipated organised opposition
that could potentially derail any progress towards a final political and economic
settlement. Thus, a more enlightened form of corporatism than envisaged under
apartheid was perceived to be an acceptable political response to counteracting possible
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threats and incorporating potential opponents into a consolidating nation-building 
project (Habib 1997: 68-72). Unifying employment relations practices, 
institutionalising independent worker representation and addressing past workplace 
iniquities became important drivers for those bent on bringing regime change to a 
system that could then be conscripted to the grander cause of wholesale political and 
economic transformation (Webster and Adler 2000: 1-19).
Given the above, South Africa serves to illustrate how making policy choices tends to 
be a constrained and contingent exercise in practice. When it came to amending 
apartheid employment relations, the architects of reform were unambiguous in their 
resolve to put considerable distance between a repressive apartheid past and a more 
enlightened future. In official policy circles, the gravitational pull has always been away 
from elite relations to something more democratic, articulated and organised with multi­
tiered institutions to match. But this changed outlook has stopped short of any official 
endorsement for anything too fragmented and pluralistic in institutional terms. The 
allure of market-influenced relations may now be much stronger than that of state- 
dominance but not such that (labour) markets are to be completely uncoordinated nor 
bargaining outcomes nor bilateral actors unorganised. Of political necessity, militancy 
has had to be placated, employer fears assuaged and social pacting made amenable to 
both. Institutional reform has had to reflect this perceived imperative. As a 
consequence, the incorporation of organised business and labour into nation-building 
projects was thought to be indispensable to any purging of an apartheid legacy. 
Foremost, the policy preference has been for employment relations to be more 
organised than not but with the bipartite actors retaining their freedom of action. For 
now, ‘democratic’ or ‘bargained’ corporatism is held to be foremost in public policy 
circles (Baskin 1993a and b). Building institutions that supposedly foster cooperative
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relations between workers and employers and reinforce their interdependence on each 
other becomes the natural accompaniment to such settled policy thinking.
But the question arises as to what the future might hold for South African employment 
relations, should the promise of the new fail to materialise? Policy choice can be 
precarious and prove difficult to sustain, especially when the conditions under which 
South African neo-corporatism is meant to prosper are far from ideal to start with {After 
Goldberg 1994: 10-14). Were corporatist experimentation with social pacting, sectoral 
bargaining and workplace governance to be found wanting in terms of improved 
productivity, job, wage and skills growth then the likelihood is that South African 
reformers will be forced to re-think their options. Yet in reality, the alternatives appear 
to be equally precarious and limited. Given its political pre-eminence within a fully 
enfranchised parliamentary democracy and the ruling party’s (ANC) formal alliance 
with the leading labour federation in the country (COSATU), the state could feel the 
magnetic pull of elitism once more, should current neo-corporatist experimentation 
begin to falter. While forcibly conscripting both labour and business into delivering 
some grand economic growth plan always remains an attractive possibility for a near 
one-party state like South Africa, it is unlikely in this instance -at least for the 
foreseeable future. This is largely because we have a liberationist state anxious to avoid 
rekindling a groundswell of grassroots militancy first formed as a reaction to the 
‘apartheid workplace regime’ (von Holdt 2002) and being fully cognisant of 
independently minded actors reluctant to forego any hard-won autonomy of action. The 
prospect of economic and political instability repeating itself should prove sufficient to 
deter even such a well-placed ruling party as that in South Africa from defaulting to this 
elitist pathway, given the apartheid state’s record in imposing authoritarian rule. The 
experience of elite oligarchic labour relations is still too fresh in the memory for its 
reinstatement to be contemplated seriously.
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Similarly, gravitating towards ‘atomism’ and unorganised employment relations may 
prove to be equally hazardous and demanding for a fledging democratic government, as 
yet reluctant to act with force, as would likely be required. In order to succeed, this 
young democratic state would be obliged to confront head-on a powerful labour 
movement bent on protecting a recently enhanced political status. Advocating policies 
designed to deregulate labour markets and decentralise bargaining could force 
government into a test of strength with labour that it would be far from certain of 
winning and thereby would wish to avoid at all costs. Moreover, the ruling party (ANC) 
would also need to demonstrate a certain political robustness, not yet apparent given its 
strong affinity to, and formal alliance with, organised labour arising from its shared 
struggle against apartheid.
2.7 Conclusions
Having first identified what occupies the policy thinking of those charged with 
transforming national employment relations systems, a framework was devised for 
identifying four possible pathways to reform that are claimed to be observable in the 
field. Each represents an idealised type in terms of a desirable set of structural 
properties and outcomes, the choice of which supposedly reveals the policy preferences 
of state reformers and, thereby, their ideological orientation towards employment 
relations in general. Moreover, these policy orientations are often resonant of 
contrasting ‘capitalisms’. At one end of the spectrum is posited market-dominant 
relations and, at the other, lies state-driven relations with a couple of intermediate 
arrangements lying somewhere between the two {after Hall and Soskice 2001 in 
Ludlam et al. 2003: 611). With the former, the primacy of individualised and 
contractual relations operating within highly deregulated labour markets is the chosen 
path. With the latter, the preference is for the employment relationship to be collectively 
organised and repressively managed through the auspices of an elite leadership
operating under licence from an oligarchic state. Changing a country’s particular policy 
trajectory likely entails movement towards one extreme or the other. The question then 
arises as towards (and from) which extreme employment relations type does a country’s 
specific policy bundle gravitate when implementing institutional reform of its 
employment relations system. Is it to be towards one that is essentially market-driven 
or towards some state-imposed alternative?
Despite their extreme policy differences, both orientations act as powerful magnetic 
force-fields, especially on those contemplating employment relations reform in 
countries that are experiencing simultaneous political and economic transitions {after 
Adler and Webster 1995). Navigating a State's overall public policy direction by 
reference to these polar extremes also becomes important to us when trying to fathom 
future policy trajectories for such countries. But, equally, we also need to acknowledge 
how policy discretion is constrained when it comes to states choosing the overall policy 
direction they wish their employment relations system to take. South Africa serves as a 
good example. Here, a policy trajectory has been chosen that is highly ‘path dependent’ 
for a set of historical reasons that is specific to South Africa (Pierson 2000). Such paths 
are taken because ‘critical junctures’ are reached and contingent choices made that lock 
the primary actors into particular courses of institutional development that subsequently 
prove difficult to reverse. As subsequent chapters reveal, the notion of ‘path 
dependency’ provides us with a powerful raison d'etre for the policy trajectory followed 
by South African reformers as well for an explanation for those ‘paths not taken’ 
(Scokpol and Pierson 2002: 665-6).
policy constraint and South Africa
World opinion holds South Africa’s transference of power from apartheid rule to 
parliamentary democracy to be a model of peaceful political transition. This shift from 
racial authoritarianism to racial pluralism was thought bold, enlightened and 
demonstrative of how political conflict might be reconciled. But, a comparable
transformation from racial to bargained corporatism is equally deserving of our esteem.
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Indeed, for Anstey (2004), South Africa’s model of co-determination may even stand as 
an exemplar for a more profound ‘African Renaissance’. In terms of its ambition and 
visionary sweep, the new dispensation for employment relations matches that envisaged 
for the polity as a whole, yet was similarly founded on pragmatic compromise and 
negotiated settlement. One way of looking at this is to regard such accords as being 
South Africa’s equivalent of ‘the third way’. The question now arises as to whether 
those employment relations regimes that lie midway between the rule of the market and 
that of the state can endure in countries like South Africa that are semi-industrialised yet 
progressively subject to the discipline of the global marketplace. Whatever else, South 
Africa is a country where employment relations is still likely to occupy centre-stage in 
public policy circles and contribute to wider debates concerning the viability of 
organised employment relations for transforming economies in a context of neo-liberal 
orthodoxy (after Traxler 2003 a,b and c). These issues alone should ensure a continuing 
interest in the South African ‘story’ for some time to come.
But there are also other conclusions to be drawn from this analysis of constrained policy 
choice for developing countries like South Africa committed to instigating wholesale 
changes to their national employment relations systems. First, even though exercising 
choice is always an uncertain and constrained affair, the discretion afforded to reformers 
becomes even narrower when business is perceived by them to be economically strong 
and labour politically powerful, with both capable of acting independently of the state. 
Second, and as a consequence, the likely preference is for employment relations to be 
somewhat organised in character but without outright control by the state. Thus, 
choosing ‘mutualism’ as the favoured policy route is seen to be the least problematic 
option for newly democratised states wishing to steer a middle course between the polar 
force-fields of either statist or marketplace employment relations. What happened
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institutionally to post apartheid to South African employment relations bears testimony 
to this.
Third, there is a conjunction of historical forces and changed political and economic 
realities that place South African reformers in a policy bind such that any new 
employment relations regime will be required to consolidate democracy whilst 
simultaneously helping to restructure industries and workplaces (after Webster and 
Adler 2000: 1-17). Hence, ‘mutualism’, as the blueprint for an overall reform strategy, 
continues to serve as a useful expedient in overcoming inherent policy dilemmas arising 
from the aftermath of apartheid labour relations. It seems that policy discretion is 
frequently constrained by historical happenstance and structural forces such that 
decisions concerning the choice of policy bundle remain somewhat circumscribed, as in 
the case of South Africa. Thus, there are credible reasons to explain why South African 
reformers chose ‘mutualism’ ahead of all other pathways and why their discretion to do 
otherwise remains limited for the time being.
Finally, and given the constraints of recent history, we can reasonably assume that the 
custodians of policy are committed to making neo-corporatism work as originally 
conceived, especially in terms of its stabilising capabilities -  at least for the foreseeable 
future. Nevertheless, acknowledging its continuing appeal from a policy perspective 
only gives rise to another set of concerns regarding its future prospects. Most notably 
this relates to how and why such corporatist experimentation remains problematic 
within a South African context and what has to transpire before it can become 
institutionally embedded as a consequence. The danger is that should employers and 
unions choose not to co-operate with ‘mutualism’ and disengage from its institutions, 
then the possibility always remains of any subsequent official disillusionment with 
corporatism provoking a slow policy slide into one of two polar extremes: ‘elitism’ or
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‘atomism’. The next part of this doctoral thesis (chapters three and four) not only helps 
us to appreciate why alternative stratagems appeared unattractive to the new South 
Africa but also why neo-corporatist structures and social concertation processes became 
its preferred policy route along with the risks inherent in this. Only after chronicling the 
recent institutional history of South African employment relations can we focus on the 
thorny issue of employer associability (and corresponding collective action problems) 
and explain its pivotal importance to those wishing to see this new employment 
relations endure.
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Chapter 3. The rise and fall of apartheid labour relations and its 
legacy for the New South Africa
3.1 Introduction (overview)
In this first part of the thesis* we continue to explore the development of South African 
employment relations from apartheid through to post apartheid times as a way of 
contextualising the issue of employer associability and other related collective action 
problems that might undermine public policy reforms. In the preceding chapter, we 
reviewed alternative strategies for state reform of employment relations and identified 
South Africa’s preferred route to transformation. Next, using a path dependency 
approach, we explain the reasoning behind this predisposition, describe how it was 
made (institutionally) manifest and identify the challenges and impediments to be 
addressed before new and revised institutions can flourish as intended. In order to 
understand what was introduced and why requires us to first appreciate the true 
character of apartheid labour relations. This we now set out to do but not before first 
explaining why South Africa is a ‘country case’ of special interest to us from a broader 
comparative perspective.
1994 saw the official ending of apartheid in South Africa. This was achieved by means 
of a political settlement reached between the main protagonists: the ruling National 
Party (NP), the African National Party (ANC) in alliance with the South African 
Communist Party (SACP) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). Together, they formed 
an ANC-led Government of National Unity (GNU). Power sharing continued until the 
1999 elections when the ANC, in partnership with the SACP, took office outright 
having won an absolute majority of seats in Parliament and having canvassed two thirds 
of the total country-wide vote. In addition, this alliance took effective control of seven
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of the nine state provinces that constitute regional government in South Africa (eg: 
Harcourt and Wood 2003:89-90). All importantly, however, freedom from apartheid 
was only achieved by virtue of a political compromise brokered between political 
adversaries rather than through any outright military victory on the part of an exiled 
liberation movement. As such, dismantling apartheid structures amounted to a 
‘negotiated revolution’ from within the country (Adam and Moodley 1993: 59-70). A 
similar fate befell apartheid labour relations when a series of bargained reforms 
undermined the whole character of the apartheid labour regime even prior to its official 
demise. Succeeding agreements reached between organised labour and capital, and 
facilitated by the new Government of National Unity, have formed the backdrop to a 
programme of legislative reform that now frames all subsequent institutional 
arrangements (eg: Du Toit et al. 1996 3-39).
Following liberation, policy concern has focused on a programme of nation building 
that has centred on democratising and normalising society as well as on restructuring a 
previously closed economy that has subsequently become open to international markets 
and trade liberalisation (for example, Donnelly 1999: 217-218; Macun and Webster 
1998: 36-42). The introduction of a new legal dispensation for South African 
employment relations has proved crucial to this whole reconstruction project. Breaking 
with the past and addressing new realities continues to be of paramount importance for 
the architects of employment relations reform given its past prominence under apartheid 
and its discredited status internationally. Ten years on from the ending of apartheid and 
it would seem timely to reflect upon what has happened to South African employment 
relations in the interim. Three aspects of the post-apartheid system would appear to be 
of primary interest to us.
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First, unlike other transforming countries elsewhere (for example, the Soviet bloc, 
Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa), South African trade unions, specifically 
those organising black workers, have retained their political and economic influence 
beyond transition. The black union movement’s reputation is derived from its 
mobilisation of resistance to the white regime in both workplace and community, 
especially in the latter days of the old system (see, for example, Baskin 1991; 
Hirschsohn 1998; Kraak 1993: 209-240; Wood and Harcourt 1998). During this phase, 
it acquired membership, resources and organisational skills, winning concessions from 
both the state and employers (Baskin 1996: 22-30; Bezuidenhout 2002: 99-112; Macun 
2000: 58-65). It gained for itself a strong voice that could not be ignored in building the 
new nation (Baskin 2000: 45-47; Friedman and Shaw 2000: 203-210). Yet, after initial 
success, many such labour movements find it difficult to satisfy their supporters’ 
expectations in any post-authoritarian era. Will the same be true for organised labour in 
South Africa? Any union movement that has been in the forefront of a successful 
struggle to remove an oppressive regime then faces the dilemma of finding a new role 
for itself. But have South African trade unions found that role? This question is 
especially pertinent given their opposition to a programme of economic liberalisation 
espoused by the ANC as the ruling party in power and their close political ally.
The second aspect is related. Partly under trade union influence (De Villiers and Anstey 
2000: 25-27, 32-34; Webster and Adler 2000: 17-18), public policy decisions made 
initially by the GNU and after 1999 by the ruling ANC and its SACP ally flew in the 
face of received wisdom about what a transforming economy should do. During the 
1990s, International Monetary Fund, World Bank and World Trade Organisation 
orthodoxy was that such economies should free their labour markets through 
deregulation, decentralisation and privatisation. Instead South Africa looked in part to
Northern Europe for inspiration when it came to employment relations policy solutions.
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It set up institutions to promote social dialogue at national level, through legislation it 
encouraged sectoral or regional collective bargaining, and within the workplace it 
sought the establishment of bodies analogous to works councils. This contrasts sharply 
with the rush to liberalise and deregulate labour markets elsewhere as in various Eastern 
Europe and Anglo-Saxon countries. This kind of neo-corporatism with social 
concertation features to it (Baccarro 2002a: 3-4; Baskin 2000: 47-49), introduced at a 
time when, with the removal of sanctions, the economy was being exposed to free trade 
and needed to attract inward investment, would seem perilous. The successful neo- 
corporatist economies of northern Europe are buttressed by social and institutional 
norms that nurture associability, co-operation and compromise (eg: Crouch 1993; 
Lehmbruch and Schmitter1982; Traxler 2003 a, b and c). Given South Africa’s deeply 
troubled history, building such norms, especially after the euphoria of democratisation 
has worn off, would seem to be a long and painful process with no guarantee of success. 
How much progress might reasonably be expected and on what time scale?
The third aspect concerns employers. For the most part they stand as economic
representatives of a white business elite and, as such, major beneficiaries of a dualistic
and exploitative apartheid labour regime - whether complicit or not (eg: Lipton 1992;
Nattrass 1999). Yet, even though they had long borne the brunt of black union militancy
and were tarred with the brush of the old regime, employers and their managers were far
from being usurped. Indeed, the opposite may be stated. Not just labour but organised
business has been placed centre-stage in terms of its anticipated participation in new
institutional arrangements (for example, Donnelly 2001; Nattrass 1998). So it is
important to ask how employers see their role in this transitional period. To what extent
can they be expected to put the antagonisms of the past behind them? Moreover, can
they adapt to the requirements of a new employment relations system that is designed to
both consolidate extended workplace rights and freedoms as well as help in the
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structural adjustment of a recently liberalized economy. For example, in all the neo- 
corporatist systems of advanced Europe, employers operate within a framework of 
strong associations, which involve a willingness to collaborate with fellow employers in 
bargaining policy. To what extent are South African employers likely to do this and, if 
not, what future for the public policy initiatives that have emerged in the last ten years. 
Their willingness to engage with this new institutionalism becomes a precondition for 
the longer-term success of this newly organised employment relations system.
In light of these aspects of South African employment relations, this review is organised
into various sections spread over these next two chapters. The intention is to examine
what has changed institutionally post apartheid, understand the motives and origins that
have helped shape these reforms and to identify new problems and tensions that have
arisen subsequently. Accordingly, this chapter starts with a description of those
institutional features that have helped define apartheid labour relations and then
proceeds to identify those developments that led to its demise. The more important
historical landmarks to be noted are the rise of organised black labour and workplace
militancy, the organised challenge to apartheid authority that followed and the latter’s
attempts at reform that together proved apartheid’s undoing. This chapter then ends with
an assessment of the apartheid legacy that reformers have been forced to take on board
when contemplating how to restructure the employment relations system. Building on
this historical account, the next chapter sets out the terms of the post apartheid
settlement that help define South Africa’s new employment relations along with the
principles and motivations that underpin its design. Particular attention is paid to the
institution-building aspects of the new employment relations regime and its multi-tiered
character. By chronicling what has been dismantled and rebuilt post apartheid and
explaining the rationale behind this new institutional framework we can gauge how far
South Africa’s employment relations has come post apartheid but also how much is still
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left undone. Equally, reviewing what changed and why helps us to explore the essential 
character of this recast system and the response of the actors in terms of their 
engagement with it. To this end, the final section of this next chapter is devoted to 
identifying a number of contemporary debates apropos the overall impact of these 
reforms. This then allows us to reflect upon the challenges facing South Africa’s 
experiment with social corporatism and so better contextualise the terms of the debate to 
follow regarding the centrality of employer behaviour within this new paradigm. But 
first, we need to delineate the defining characteristics of apartheid labour relations, all 
the better to appreciate the contemporary debates to come.
3.2 Suppression (1948-1990)
Official apartheid rule began with the rise to power of the National Party in 1948 and 
only effectively ended in 1990 when political opponents were unbanned and talks on 
power sharing initiated. The repeal of key race laws in 1991 including those most 
closely associated with apartheid’s authoritarian system of labour relations quickly 
followed (Adam and Moodley 1993: 39-58; Bendix 1996: 101; Ohden and Ohlson 
1994: 231-5). Prior to this, apartheid had become associated with a set of race laws and 
policies that were threefold in intent: to segregate society along explicit race lines, to 
secure white supremacy and to ensure parity for Afrikaners with their English 
counterparts. Under the guise of separate but parallel development for both white and 
black communities, Grand Apartheid instigated a series of measures over a forty year 
period that were intended to confine the majority black population to areas segregated 
from those of a white minority. Officially, residency for non-whites was restricted to the 
bantustans (homelands) or to townships within prescribed urban or industrialised zones. 
Thus, white minority rule and privilege was to be secured through the expediency of 
imposing an inferior status for non-whites who were to be precluded from any
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substantive purchase on South Africa’s economy or even meaningful access to its polity 
(Ohden and Ohlson 1994: 214-17).
segregation
Such inferiority in the labour market took several forms and amounted to systemic 
control, even coercion, of black workers regarding their employment, pay, conditions 
and skill acquisition (Bendix 1996: 75-101: Kraak 1995 and 1996; Standing etal 1996: 
381-418; Webster 2002: 179-186; von Holdt 1995: 19). Indeed, basic worker 
protections were denied to the majority of the working population in ways that formally 
sanctioned a de facto racial duality in the labour market first observed under colonial 
rule (Kraak 1993: xxv-xxvi; Webster 1999: 30-35). Such colonial regulation laid the 
foundations for an apartheid regime that would endeavour to preserve a labour 
aristocracy for its white minority by transposing the black majority into ‘a cheap and 
rightless workforce’ (Webster 1999a: 36). Consequently, for most of the last century, 
but especially from the 1940s through to the early 1980s, the ability of Africans ‘to seek 
work of their choice, to live where there was work and to have their families with them’ 
was severely restricted under apartheid labour controls (Kraak 1993: 3). Accordingly, 
legal measures were introduced that codified a white worker privilege in, and protection 
of, employment in ways that created highly stratified labour markets to the detriment of 
all non-white workers (see, for example, Bendix 1996: 72- 101). More specifically, 
government controls were extended in the 1960s and 1970s for the purposes of 
suppressing freedom of movement, of job choice and of association for Africans (Kraak 
1993: xxv). In combination, these three particular restraints on worker freedoms 
epitomised the severity and reach of apartheid labour regulation as characterised below. 
influx control
Immobility for black workers arose out of a system of ‘influx control’ first consolidated
in the 1930s and 1940s, then extended throughout the 1950s and 1960s and only finally
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terminated in 1986 (Kraak 1993: 20-5). Such measures were designed specifically to 
control the flow of labour into areas outside of the bantustans (Bendix 1996: 420). Job 
seekers were recruited by agencies under licence from the state and were directed into 
the ‘least skilled, worst paid and most arduous categories of work’, including farming, 
mining, construction, forestry and domestic service (Kraak 1993:4). The extensive use 
of contract labour proved pivotal to this system of racial job control and none more so 
than with the deployment of migrant labour down the mines and its confinement to 
compounds on site (Finnemore and Van Der Merwe 1987:3-4; Webster 1999a: 31-35 
and 2002:182). By 1980 for example, official estimates had the proportion of those 
Africans working outside the bantustans on a contractual basis at one-third (Kraak 
1993: 12). Meanwhile, daily or weekly commuters became another important source of 
contracted labour for (white) employers as the authorities actively reduced housing 
stock in townships outside of the homeland areas. Consequently, two discrete categories 
of black worker emerged between the 1960s and 1980s. A small number of approved 
urban dwellers residing and working permanently outside of the bantustans became 
dwarfed by a much larger group of migrants and commuters from inside the homelands 
who were allowed to work precariously in prescribed areas (Kraak 1993: 4-12).
job reservation
However, where they worked and under what contractual status was not the only
prescription placed on black workers in the apartheid era. Additional controls decreed
the types of employment and skill that the majority of job seekers could hope to access
(Kraak 1995). As embodied in the Labour Relations Act (1956), a formal process of
‘job reservation’ was also instituted whereby particular occupations were officially
classified as belonging to a single race group (Bendix 1996:87). Furthermore, this
codification of job segregation was augmented by the practice of white trade unions
reaching closed shop agreements with employers that effectively excluded black
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workers from holding down particular jobs or, at least, rationing their access to them 
(Kraak 1993: 78). The deployment of a work-based colour bar continued right up until 
the 1980s and ensured that both work and skill became highly segmented (Kraak 1995). 
Certainly, the majority of skilled, supervisory and managerial positions were held to be 
the preserve of Whites whilst unskilled and insecure jobs those of African migrant 
workers and the urbanised poor. Meanwhile, intermediate semi-skilled posts tended to 
be filled by a mix of Whites, Coloureds and Indians (Webster 1985 cited in Kraak 1995: 
664). Processes of work segmentation not only exacerbated racial division but also class 
ones as well.
union exclusion
Statutory disqualification on race grounds also ensured that union organisation 
conformed to a similar duality. This is because the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 
had previously decreed that only registered trade unions could be recognised for 
bargaining purposes and so participate in centralised (ie: sectoral) bargaining, courtesy 
of newly-founded Industrial Councils. Because the Act decreed that only employees 
could belong to such unions but withheld this legal status from ‘pass-bearing natives’, 
Africans were effectively denied any registered trade unions rights (Bendix 1996: 81; 
Kraak 1993: 114; Wood 1998:28-29; Webster 1999a: 36). Eventually, this formal 
exclusion from formal bargaining institutions was extended to most Coloured and Asian 
workers by means of the Labour Relations Act (1956) which proscribed the registration 
of any mixed unions with White, Indian and Coloured members (Wood and Harcourt: 
1998:77).
By explicitly prohibiting any union representing black workers from gaining 
recognition through registration, the Act conveniently deprived the majority working 
population of access to a centralised collective bargaining process that formed the
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centrepiece of all apartheid labour policy until the early 1980s (Bendix 1996: 8). 
Moreover, through this bargaining system, white unions and employers also started to 
fix low pay rates for African workers as a way of offsetting the cost of awards afforded 
to white skilled workers. Consequently, real wages for Africans were calculated to be a 
fifth of that of whites by the early 1970s and still a third by the early 1990s when most 
apartheid labour law had already been abandoned (Wood and Harcourt 1998:78). 
Curiously, the apartheid authorities stopped short of denying black workers the right to 
associate out of some warped sense of voluntarism. Instead, measures were introduced 
that excluded those unions organising black workers from sitting in Industrial Councils 
(the apartheid state’s forum for centralised bargaining) as well as denying to them any 
workplace recognition from white employers. (Bendix 1996: 82; Kraak 1993:14; 
Webster 1999a: 37).
As a consequence, the labour movement became a divided one. On one side, registered
(mostly white) unions were co-opted into a type of ‘racial corporatism’ designed to
contain worker unrest and moderate pay (eg: De Villiers and Anstey 2000: 25; Standing
et a/. 1996: 14). By the 1970s, a corporatist exchange had evolved whereby white labour
enjoyed the privileges of job reservation, decent pay and consumerism whilst organised
business that of industrial peace, healthy profits and tariff protection leaving the state
with the guarantee of political support from both industrial constituencies (Schreiner
1994:10). In contrast, excluded independent unions struggled to secure legitimacy from
the state, recognition and gains from the employer and the support of suppressed
workers (eg: Baskin 1991:6-33; Catchpowle et al. 1998:271-273; Kraak 1993:127-
173;). Meanwhile, workplace governance and labour control often manifested itself in
one of two ways (Webster 1999b: 31-33). The first amounted to a type of despotism
whereby physical and economic coercion and racial dominance became the basic form
of job control as exemplified by the compound system within the mining industry
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(Buroway 1995 and Moodie 1994 cited in Webster 1999a: 35-40 and 2002: 182-3). The 
second came to be described as ‘racial fordism’ by which whites monopolised the 
skilled and supervisory positions in most workplaces whilst non-whites were 
simultaneously excluded from mass consumption ‘norms’ as a consequence of apartheid 
regulation (eg: Gelb 1987 and 1991). Both these facets of white managerial control 
underscored much of what transpired under an ‘apartheid workplace regime’ (von Holdt 
2000: 106-8 and 2002: 287).
In short, apartheid labour relations was based on a system of racial authoritarianism that 
operated across labour markets, inside workplaces and within industrial relations 
institutions, leading to a sustained exploitation and oppression of the black majority by 
a white minority. Even so, South African labour history cannot simply be characterised 
in terms of the harm done to black workers contrasted with the protected privilege 
afforded to white counterparts and their managers. Equally important has been the 
defiance that this subjugation provoked within the black working community and that 
contributed to the eventual downfall of apartheid labour relations. Such opposition 
manifested itself in particular forms of worker resistance that were both formal and 
informal, organised and unorganised and that led to adversarial relations taking root in 
workplaces held to be hotspots of low trust and shopfloor militancy (Webster 1999a:
29).
3.3 Defiance (1972-92)
Hostility towards apartheid labour relations became apparent through a combination of
workplace resistance and union militancy directed at an oppressive management inside,
and a repressive authority outside, the workplace (Bendix 1996: 80-99; Kraak 1993 and
1996; von Holdt 2000 and 2002; Webster 1999a and b and 2002; Wood and Harcourt
1998). These two distinctive but linked forms of opposition best illustrate the overall
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antipathy felt towards both employer and state. The first relates to diverse forms of 
black worker hostility that culminated in certain workplaces becoming off limits for 
managers and supervisors alike (eg: von Holdt 1991: 38). For many, the workplace 
became a contested terrain within the broader struggle to render apartheid rule itself 
‘ungovernable’ (von Holdt 2000: 106-8 and 115-20). The second and more formal 
outlet for black worker resentment came with the emergence of a radicalised black 
labour movement in the 1970s. Not only did it become an institutional force within 
mainstream employment relations but also evolved into a significant political actor in its 
own right (eg: Adler and Webster 1995: 77-83; Hirschsohn 1998: 644-659; Kraak 1993: 
209-248; Webster 1999a: 40-45; Wood and Harcourt 1998).
resistance
The denial of formal voice for black workers led to an array of unorganised and 
informal work-centred opposition that first emerged amongst migrant workers in 
colonial times. This defiance ranged from sabotage, pilferage and the creation of a 
‘contra-culture’ designed to insulate black workers from their white managers through 
to a reliance on informal social networks that eventually help spawn a more organised 
mobilization of the workplace from the 1970s onwards (Webster 1999a: 30-34). In the 
decade to follow, organised struggle evolved into a wholesale ‘culture of resistance’ that 
took the form of work stoppages, general strikes, go-slows and overtime bans and even 
extended to breaching agreed procedures and disrupting disciplinary hearings (von 
Holdt 2000: 102-106). In extremis, this hostility could spiral into violent confrontations 
between militants and scabs, even leading to loss of life in some notable instances 
(Webster 1999a: 42; Webster and Simpson 1991).
Increasingly, management prerogative itself came to be seriously questioned by black 
workers who held their place of work in little regard other than as an extension of
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apartheid authority. Overthrowing the government became the superordinate goal for 
organised black workers and rendering the workplace unmanageable a legitimate target 
on the way (von Holdt 2002: 188). Indeed, the apartheid workplace has been noted for 
its overall sense of ‘ungovernability’ whilst workplace organisation became known for 
its ‘militant abstentionism’ from negotiating any semblance of order and stability (von 
Holdt 2000: 106-8; Webster 1999a: 50). However, organised black labour refused to 
confine its challenge to apartheid authority to the workplace but sought to re-invent 
itself as an institutional force within a broader insurrectionist project.
the rise of labour
Ever since mining was first developed under colonial rule in the late nineteenth century, 
the fortunes of South Africa’s labour movement have waxed and waned in accordance 
with changes to the political dispensation -  not least with the very rise and fall of the 
apartheid state itself (Bendix 1996: 76). Not surprisingly, the composition of the overall 
union movement has reflected deep racial and political divisions as a consequence. This 
fissure mirrored the racial duality found in the workplace with exclusively white trade 
unions prospering from their incorporation into a corporatist bargaining system and 
adopting a vigorously protectionist stance within workplaces. This left black labour 
organisations struggling to discard their second-class status with both an intransigent 
state and a retaliatory employer alike. However, simply categorising organised labour 
by reference to totally separated ‘white’ and ‘black’ labour constituencies is misleading. 
There has always been an element of the unregistered labour movement prepared to 
adopt a non-racial constitution and so organise along multi-racial lines since the 1930s 
(Bendix 1996: 82-84; Webster 1999a: 38).
That apart, industrialisation provided the spur for the emergence of black trade unions 
that acted independently of the mainstream industrial relations system despite their
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exclusion from any formal apartheid institutions and processes such as industrial
councils. Moreover, a growing number of black workers, who could still legally
associate but were barred from membership of registered trade unions, sought to
establish shop-floor based trade unionism for themselves. These organising efforts met
with mixed fortunes until the early 1970s (Baskin 1991: 1-53; Bendix 1996: 84-92;
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Kraak 1993: 127-173; Webster 1999a: 41). Indeed, 1973 is commonly held to be a
watershed year for apartheid labour relations following the spontaneous (and largely
unorganised) strike wave that took hold in Durban and other centres early on in that
year (eg: Baskin 1991: 17-18; Bendix 1996: 92; Kraak 1993: 128; Webster and Adler
2000:1). One estimate has over a hundred thousand black workers taking to the streets
in protest against deteriorating conditions and demanding wage increases in defiance of
laws prohibiting such unlawful action (Wood and Harcourt 1998: 78-79). Hereafter,
employment relations changed markedly in three major respects.
First, this demonstration of shop-floor mobilisation gave impetus to an already 
rekindled black worker consciousness that sparked the rebuilding of a more radicalised 
union movement. Indeed, the very launch of new industrial unions further fuelled black 
worker militancy and union organising (Baskin 1991:18-26; Bendix 1996: 92-93;
Macun 2000: 59-65). As a consequence, a renewed union movement emerged in the 
1970s and 1980s that became markedly different from that which had struggled to 
survive previously. Hence, ‘black’ unions were formed directly and explicitly around an 
expanding industrial African workforce and stayed independent of employers, the state 
and a registered (white dominated) union movement (Wood and Harcourt 1998: 79). 
They also began to organise along lines similar to those of the British shop steward 
movement (Bezuidenhout 2000: 5). Moreover, many of these unions provided the 
nucleus for the largest and most powerful of South Africa’s (six) labour federations to
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be formed in 1985 along explicitly non-racial lines - the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU). This federation now accounts for some forty per cent of all 
union membership (Hirschsohn 1998: 644-645; Macun 2000: 60-61) and, ahead of all 
others, continues to be at the forefront of the labour movement’s engagement with 
political and economic transition, post apartheid (Adler and Webster 1995; Baskin 
2000: 45-49).
Second, having failed to suppress this growing movement, the apartheid regime set up 
the Wiehahn Commission of Enquiry in 1977 as a means of placating this new wave of 
militancy. Concessions granted under the ‘Wiehahn reforms’ (1979-82) enabled 
independent unions to engage with employers at sectoral and enterprise levels by the 
mid-1980s (Baskin 1991: 26-28; Bendix 1996: 94- 99; Kraak 1993: 116-123; Wood and 
Harcourt 1998: 79-82). As a result, these unions were absorbed into the institutional 
mainstream of apartheid labour relations whilst simultaneously promulgating 
mobilisation, protest and challenge beyond the workplace and into the wider community 
(Webster 1999a: 41-42; Webster and Adler 1999: 359). In addition, their formal 
incorporation into an officially sanctioned and statutorily entrenched bargaining system 
coincided with the advent of ‘unofficial’ plant bargaining as they began to force more 
and more individual employers into recognition as a consequence of their former 
exclusion from multi-employer bargaining proceedings. This, in turn, has led to a 
duality in the bargaining system (see, for example, Bendix 1988: 358-71).
Third, this combination of expanding recognition, organisation and militancy now 
allowed independently organised labour, with COSATU as its spearhead, to identify 
with a broader struggle against the state in pursuit of national liberation. This extended 
remit has been categorised as ‘social movement unionism’ by such commentators as 
Scipes (1992), Seidman (1994), Waterman (1993) and Webster (1988). The term is
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intended to denote a type of trade unionism that is ‘oriented towards radical social 
change and the struggle for human rights, social justice and democracy’ (Hirschsohn 
1998: 636) and, in South Africa’s case, was crucially forged beyond the confines of the 
union itself (von Holdt 2002: 285-293). To this end, the black union movement was 
prepared to ally with grassroots community networks as well as national political bodies 
and so engage in a variety of protest actions, mass mobilizations and political 
campaigns (Hirschsohn 1998: 655-658). Henceforth, for many black workers, union 
membership and activism were to be seen as a counterweight to their lack of citizenship 
(Macun 2000: 63).
3.4 Challenge and apartheid reform (1990-1994)
Crucially, by the late 1980s, black worker interests had become the central focus of 
apartheid labour relations rather than those of their white counterparts. Employers were 
now forced to respond to workplace dissent by negotiating directly with independent 
trade unions rather than, as previously, relying solely on sectoral bargaining processes 
to resolve conflicts largely associated with the white worker interests of registered 
unions. This development also meant that enterprise bargaining began to feature 
prominently alongside sectoral bargaining and led to the creation of a two-tiered system 
not previously observed under apartheid labour relations (Bendix 1996: 100). On a 
broader front, worker militancy linked up with township unrest to confront apartheid 
authority itself with a ‘molotov cocktail’ of strikes, rent boycotts, consumer boycotts 
and political stay-aways (Webster 1999a: 43). Meanwhile, COSATU formed the 
vanguard of political campaigning over the abandonment of official apartheid and the 
holding of free elections, through its alliance with popular opposition movements such 
as the United Democratic Front (UDF) and its launch of the Mass Democratic 
Movement (MDM) in the late 1980s. With the ANC banned and its leadership in exile,
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COSATU filled the ensuing political vacuum by becoming the very embodiment of 
political opposition itself.
This political and industrial turmoil provoked a crisis of authority for employers and the 
apartheid government such that the latter, under pressure from the former, sought to 
contain the unrest (Webster 1999a: 44). An employer-endorsed Labour Relations 
Amendment Act (1988) epitomised this return to repression by both repealing and 
restricting key trade union rights acquired previously through favourable judicial 
rulings. In addition, the Act weakened job security and union representation through the 
codification of unfair labour practices, outlawed certain categories of strike and 
secondary action and made unions liable for unlawful striking by their members (Baskin 
1991: 261-265; Bendix 1996: 100; Bezuidenhout: 2000: 7; Wood and Harcourt 1998: 
82). By 1989 these strictures had only provoked, rather than curbed, more conflict and 
simply goaded organised labour (notably COSATU) into invoking collective defiance 
against the legislation in the form of three general strikes (Baskin 1991: 385-393 and 
404-421). Matters were further brought to a head that same year when a National 
Defiance Campaign (NDC) was mounted that once again endorsed civil unrest and mass 
protest against all unjust and discriminatory legislation (Bendix 1996: 100; Wood and 
Harcourt 1998: 82-83). Such use of force and counter-force had quickly escalated into a 
final stand-off that could only be resolved by one or other of the protagonists conceding 
ground. As a consequence, the following year saw the apartheid regime reverse its 
policy of repression and, for the first time, make conciliatory overtures to labour, given 
the absence of a credible political alternative.
This took the form of an historical Accord that was reached with the two biggest labour 
federations as both government and the business community attempted to signal 
rapprochement and an end to hostilities (Baskin 1991: 437-440; Bezuidenhout 2000: 7;
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Friedman and Shaw 2000: 194-195). Through this ‘Laboria Minute’, apartheid authority 
and organised business not only agreed to revoke the contested elements of the revised 
legislation but to concede further political and industrial space to Labour. Specifically, 
bargaining rights were extended to those previously excluded (eg: agricultural, domestic 
and public sector workers). Thereafter, government agreed to act only with the 
agreement of the labour movement when contemplating changes to its labour 
dispensation (Adler and Webster 1995: 82-83; Baskin 1991: 439-440; Catchpowle et al. 
1998: 273; De Villiers and Anstey 2000: 33-34; Hirschsohn 1998: 659; Webster 1999a: 
45; Wood and Harcourt 1998: 85). In return, trade union affiliates agreed to abandon 
further planned action and to participate in a reconstituted National Manpower 
Commission (NMC) that, as a statutory body, had been charged with formulating public 
policy on labour matters. This particular aspect of the Minute held great significance for 
the broader transition from racial authoritarianism to political liberalisation. Henceforth, 
the majority of organised labour (primarily COSATU affiliates) resolved to partake in 
corporatist-style consultation and negotiation that organised business welcomed and to 
which the state readily conceded.
This Accord represented the high watermark of the resistance years and the ending of
formal apartheid labour relations. But, more importantly, it also showed ‘democratic
transition and reconstruction’ to be achievable and policy deadlock resolvable through
recourse to negotiated settlement (after Adler and Webster 1995: 83). As such, it
became the forerunner to a tripartite structure that afforded independent trade unions
both authoritative voice and a forum for shaping the whole democratisation agenda -
not least employment relations itself (Friedman and Shaw 2000: 190-203; Webster and
Adler 1999: 360). Apartheid reform of its labour relations set in train a process of
political exchange between state, labour and business that formed the mainstay of post
apartheid employment relations. Indeed, the very replacement of the labour dispensation
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is itself the product of political compromise (for example, Du Toit et a\ 1996: 29-32; 
Habib 1997: 64-65). To appreciate why this political denouement is so significant from 
an historical perspective requires us to first assess apartheid’s overall impact on South 
African employment relations. Reviewing the apartheid inheritance in this way 
provides a basis for understanding more fully what has been reformed, why and to what 
end. Such a review also allows us to identify the enormity of the challenge awaiting the 
architects of reform and to critique their blueprint for it.
3.5 Apartheid’s legacy 
powerful labour movement
The most striking aspect of this legacy concerns the political and industrial status 
enjoyed by Labour post apartheid and its subsequent role in helping transform 
employment relations from one racially divisive and oppressive to one socially inclusive 
and co-determinist (for example, Adler and Webster 2000: Baskin 2000; De Villiers 
and Anstey 2000; Wood and Harcourt 1998). By moving from outright opposition to 
conditional engagement with apartheid authority, Labour guaranteed for itself a leading 
role in the liberation and reconstruction of the country (Adler and Webster 1995: 98- 
100). This happened because independent unions had secured for themselves 
institutional access to state policy-making under late apartheid such that they could not 
simply be eased aside when it came to transforming the employment relations regime 
and consolidating democracy (Webster and Adler 2000: 1-4). For the new polity, 
organised labour had become integral to this whole transformation project. Perhaps 
COSATU’s entry into a ‘Tripartite Alliance’ with the ruling parties of the ANC and 
SACP has come to symbolise best this new political reality (Eidelberg 2000: 129-157). 
Usually, in such cases, civil rights movements first open up the political franchise 
before raising labour standards overall. It appears the reverse has happened in South
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Africa’s case such that ‘gains in workplace democracy preceded gains in the 
parliamentary arena’ (Lawrence 2004: 203).
Labour’s wherewithal ensured that South Africa’s ‘double transition’ towards 
simultaneous political democratisation and economic liberalisation was to be negotiated 
by means of social pacts that amounted to a ‘bargained liberalization’ of the economy 
(Webster and Adler 1999 and 2000). Labour proved to be sufficiently powerful enough 
to temper the pace of restructuring and ameliorate the social costs of economic 
adjustment. Moreover, Webster and Adler (1999: 347-349) argue that such social 
pacting can continue to be used to generate sustainable jobs, protect living standards 
and facilitate skill acquisition in return for all parties agreeing to prioritise on growth, 
flexibility and international competitiveness. This is because the institutional means 
now exist for such exchanges to take place (after Webster and Adler 1999:378-379). 
Labour’s political power also meant that South Africa’s adaptation of European-style 
social corporatism was itself the product of the negotiated compact (Baskin 1993a).
But this union power is also derived from an organisational strength that has grown 
constantly over the course of the last twenty-five years or more (Bezuidenhout 
2002:110; Macun 2000: 58-65). Illustrative of this is the fact that between 1980 and the 
mid-1990s, union membership quadrupled, having doubled in the first five years and 
then again by 1996 (Lawrence 2004: 201). Over this period, both union membership 
and density were seen to increase. For instance, membership expanded from a base of 
673, 000 in 1976 to 3.8 million by 1998, out of a paid workforce of just under 8 million 
in 1998. Of these, 1.7 million (45%) were members of COSATU whilst the number of 
registered trade unions also rose over this same period from 173 to 248 (Bezuidenhout 
2002:100). Meanwhile, between 1985 and 1998 union density in the non-agricultural 
formal sector of the economy rose from eighteen to fifty one percent {after Naidoo
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1999: 16-17). This growth was mostly attributable to successful organising activity in 
three notable sectors of the economy -  manufacturing in the 1970s and 1980s, mining 
from the early 1980s and the public sector in the 1990s. Together, these organised 
sectors account for nearly eighty two per cent of total COSATU membership 
(Bezuidenhout 2002: 101). As a result, union structure is characterised as ‘an island of 
large unions, dominating within particular sectors of the economy, within a sea of 
many, smaller unions’ (Macun 2000:66).
Organising success on this scale also translates into an increased rise in the ‘union wage 
premium’ for members compared to non-members, most notably for urban African 
males (Butcher and Rouse 2001: 11-12; Hofmeyr and Lucas 2001: 713-715; Moll 
1993). However, caution needs to be exercised at this point. According to Department 
of Labour data, the beginning of the new century looked promising for organised labour 
with a rise in the number of registered unions from 464 to 504 between 2000 and 2002 
and a comparable increase in membership from 3.6 million to 4.1 million over the same 
period. Yet there now appears to be a reversal to fortune underway for union organisers, 
largely attributable to rising job loss and negative job growth in the formal sector 
associated with trade liberalisation and the removal of trade tariffs in exposed industries 
such as clothing and textiles. Latest returns for 2004 suggest a fall in both union 
registration and membership down to 341 and 3.1 million respectively, amounting to an 
estimated overall union density of some 42 per cent (Annual reports 2000-2005). 
Interestingly, Lewis (2004: 191) makes a useful observation regarding these trend 
figures. Arguably, independent unions were still able to make substantial gains and 
force concessions from the state through sheer market and workplace power rather than 




Another legacy to have left its mark is the persistence of a ‘low trust dynamic’ and 
adversarialism in racially divisive workplaces (eg: Goldberg 1994: 11-13; Macun and 
Webster 1998:43-44). As yet, a return to ‘ungovernability’ cannot be discounted 
because the racially fractured workplace relations that helped stoke have yet to be 
repaired post liberation (von Holdt (2000: 123-7 and 2002: 293-5). Any analysis of 
strike trends and behaviour provides confirmation that the workplace can still harbour 
much unrest This is because many workers and their representatives still consider 
industrial action integral to their struggle for improved conditions inside the workplace 
and for fundamental freedoms outside it (after Backer and Oberholzer 1995: 31). 
Despite methodological shortcomings, the historical record consistently shows there to 
have been a strong association between political upheaval and strike activity and none 
more so than in the turbulent 1980s and 1990s (Anstey 1999: 61; Backer and 
Oberholzer 1995: 30). As the struggle for political liberation intensified, the number of 
annual working days lost due to strike action reached a high watermark of some four 
million plus between 1990 and 1994. But even this characterisation may understate the 
level of industrial unrest for two further reasons. First, strike impact is likely to have 
been under-recorded for this period, especially as political stayaways (that amounted to 
full-blown general strikes) were never fully taken into account (Anstey 1999: 60-1). 
Second, the incidence of violence and intimidation progressively worsened as strike 
activity intensified during the transition from confrontation to dialogue (Backer and 
Oberholzer 1995: 17-19).
But, South Africa’s reputation for strike proneness remains even post apartheid. For
instance, Wood and Psoulis (2001: 301-302) discovered from a national survey of
COSATU union members that almost two thirds reported themselves to have
participated in some form of strike action during 1998. Somewhat sardonically, Anstey
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(1999: 63-64) claims South Africans to have become ‘world class strikers’ over the last 
two decades when compared to countries in the EU and OECD but also confirms a 
decline to more modest levels as new and revised democratic institutions and processes 
take hold. Yet national data for the last decade continued to show reasonably high levels 
of strike activity when measured in terms of both work days lost and workers involved. 
More dramatically, however, data for the beginning of this decade shows a fall in strike 
incidence - seemingly as a consequence of the union decline alluded to earlier. For 
instance, the total number of working days lost due to action plummeted from 3.1 
million for 2000 to 0.5million for 2001 {after A Levy and Associates Annual Report 
2002).
distorted markets
Three features closely associated with apartheid-run labour markets have dominated the 
thinking of those charged with rebuilding employment relations in ways intended to 
complement economic reconstruction, political democratisation and racial cohesion. 
First, society is still one stratified by pronounced racial and class divisions that are 
themselves the direct product of white oligarchic rule (Donnelly 1999: 199-201; Kraak 
1995: 657-687). Specifically, extreme (mostly urban) wealth exists alongside extreme 
(mostly rural and township) poverty despite South Africa’s official standing as a 
‘middle income’ country (ILO 1999: 6). Second, apartheid has accentuated the gap 
between developed and developing parts of the economy such that South Africa fits into 
neither category easily. This is further exacerbated by a growing disparity between 
urban and rural levels of economic activity (ILO 1999: 9; Kraak 1995: 668-670; 
Standing et al. 1996: 236-287). Third, this combination of pronounced racial division 
and strongly defined labour market segmentation has produced a highly skewed jobs 
market with a burgeoning informal employment sector that accounts for anything 
between a fifth to well over a third of all economic activity (Standing et al. 1996: 83-
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85). Indeed, current estimates report one third of all those eligible for work being 
employed in this sector alone (Statistics SA 2002). In part, its size is the direct product 
of an apartheid rule that forced black enterprise and employment into the informal 
economy and further compounded the problem of under-representation for black 
workers (Standing etal. 1996: 86-87).
Such market distortions also led to capital formation being highly concentrated in the 
hands of an economically powerful white business community that was small in number 
(Savage 1987: 10-11; Douwes Dekker 1988: 18-19; Uys 1996). Consequently, business 
ownership has been highly distorted within South Africa with just five ‘white-owned’ 
corporations controlling more than eighty per cent of quoted shares by the mid -1990s 
(Michie 1997: 156). By contrast, African ownership or control accounted for only one 
tenth of those companies quoted on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange by the end of the 
century. Such concentration persists despite a policy of ‘black economic empowerment’ 
that has encouraged a transfer of ownership and control to an embryonic Black business 
community (ILO 1999: 9)
systemic inequality
In sum, state-controlled racial inequality polarised society such that a small affluent 
elite and a large disenfranchised majority of poor households lie either end of a highly 
skewed wage spread (see, for example, Leibbrandt et al. 2001: 73-86; Michie 1997: 
156). Such inequality is shown to be extreme, persistent and of the highest by 
international standards {after Leibbrandt et al. 2001). Indeed, South Africa’s Gini 
coefficient has always powerfully measured the extent of this income inequality. 
According to McGrath and Whiteford (1994), the coefficient stood at .68 when using 
1991 census data and .65 when using 1993 census data and is comparable to that for 
Brazil and the Russian Federation. Apartheid profoundly influenced the country’s
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earnings distribution given that racial and gender discrimination, along with 
geographical and economic immobility, has been shown to determine earnings ahead of 
other factors such as education and experience more so than in other countries (Fallon 
and Lucas 1998 cited in ILO 1998:8). Not surprisingly, wage compression continues to 
be at the forefront of a labour movement’s redistribution agenda and likewise impacts 
on sectoral and enterprise pay determination.
Similarly, unemployment effected whites as opposed to all other racial groupings less 
severely, irrespective of whatever definition is used. For example, with the ending of 
apartheid in 1994 total unemployment stood at just under a third of the active 
population with whites accounting for a mere six per cent of the total compared to 
Africans’ two fifths (Standing et al 1996: 116; table 4.9). Ever since, unemployment 
levels have remained comparable to those under apartheid, with the rate fluctuating 
between twenty nine to thirty two per cent on a narrow definition and forty five per cent 
on a broader one (Statistics SA 2002). Equally disappointing has been the failure of job 
creation to keep pace with targets set by government (Macun and Webster 1998: 45). 
This labour market inactivity continues to preoccupy policy reformers concerned with 
its fall-out effect in terms of economic crime and the threat to social stability 
(IL0.1999: 7; Standing et al 1996: 1).
Likewise, inequalities of opportunity continue to impede entry into, and advancement 
within, labour markets, most notably for African youths and females. Apartheid 
systematised discrimination such that Africans and other non-whites are still seriously 
disadvantaged in terms of access to quality schooling and training compared to white 
counterparts (Standing et al. 1996: 386-389). For instance, the amount spent on African 
secondary education in 1990 was half that for White secondary education and 
differences in educational attainment have reflected this imbalance (ILO 1999:9).
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Meanwhile, vocational training has been ‘low, declining and maldistributed’ (Standing 
et al. 1996: 66). Such discrimination has not just contributed to an earnings inequality 
(ILO 1999: 9) but also impeded the formation of a skill base that meets the requirements 
of an aspiring knowledge economy (Standing et al 1996: 449-450).
failing economy
Finally, shortcomings in apartheid labour markets merely compounded deficiencies 
present in the economy overall. The two decades prior to the ending of apartheid had 
seen the economy stagnate, growth decline, net investment fall, average real wage rates 
decline, and productivity growth disappoint (Habib and Padayachee 2000: 246-7; ILO 
1999: 3-11; Michie and Padayachee 1997: 9-25; Nattrass and Seekings 2001: 45-55). In 
addition, the provision of a physical and social infrastructure in terms of housing, 
health, education, transport, telecommunications and public utilities had proved 
inadequate for the majority of the population, both rural and urban (Michie and 
Padayachee 1997: 12-17). A policy of import protectionism for key industries such as 
agriculture, chemicals, textiles and car manufacturing had further contributed to this 
sluggish performance whilst trade and investment sanctions not only added to South 
Africa’s pariah status but also its economic woes.
Equally troubling was the fact that an under-performing industrial sector, and its 
dependence on import-substitution, had led to a considerable deterioration in its 
international competitiveness. The requirement now was for this previously semi-closed 
economy to be made ready for trade liberalization and conversion to export-driven 
industrialization (Bhorat et al. 2002: 1-6; ILO 1999: 1-3; Standing et al. 1996: 38- 41). 
However, the economy’s vulnerability to such global exposure placed an enormous 
burden on an incoming liberation government already ideologically and politically 
committed to addressing past wrongs through redistribution policies and institutional
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reform. Increasing the economy’s ability to compete openly now became as much of a 
priority for the state as dismantling the apartheid paradigm.
3.6 Conclusions
This chapter has provided us with an historical account as to what characteristically 
constituted apartheid labour relations, how it came to be challenged from below and 
what legacies it managed to bequeath. Bearing in mind our interest in contemporary 
employer associability and its link to bargaining reform post liberation, there are three 
highly relevant attributes that carry across from late apartheid into the early post 
apartheid period. First, there is the institutional norm of centralised bargaining as 
encapsulated in an apartheid state-sponsored industrial council system. Here, registered 
employer associations became the bargaining agents for white-owned businesses in 
reaching industry-wide agreements with ‘established’ (primarily white) trade unions 
that then encompassed both ‘party’ and ‘non-party’ employers and their employees. 
Eventually, and as a consequence of the Wiehahn reforms, coverage eventually 
extended to black workers as their ‘independent’ union leaders successfully agitated for 
access to this racially exclusive bargaining forum. Second, the labour movement, as 
personified by the COSATU union federation, has become a strong political, economic 
and institutional force within the country. This means that, when it comes to issues of 
bargaining reform and voice regulation, its views can neither be discounted nor its 
preferences sidelined. Third, and as a direct consequence of the rise of a labour 
movement that felt increasingly empowered to challenge apartheid rule and employers 
head on, changes have occurred to the very bargaining structure itself. This has taken 
the form of a gradual switch from essentially single (that is, industry) to multiple level 
bargaining over the course of the apartheid era. This entailed experimentation with 
political bargaining at peak level, the consolidation of multi-employer pay bargaining at
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industry or sector level and growing employer recognition of union bargaining at the 
shop-floor level- all in the late apartheid era. However, constitutional and legal 
structures had yet to reflect the new institutional realities behind these changes to the 
overall bargaining structure.
How South Africa set about addressing this legacy and righting past wrongs forms the 
centrepiece of the chapter to follow. As will be seen, making amends for what 
transpired under apartheid labour relations and ensuring an equality of treatment across 
races has been the driving force behind all subsequent reform. This resolve has taken 
the form of a bargained legal dispensation founded on general political exchange that 
would lay the foundations for a new employment relations system intended to transform 
both workplace and economy. The historical narrative, as set out in this chapter, helps 
explains how and why such steadfastness has taken root. It provides an account of a 
dual labour relations regime that decreed employment, pay and skill acquisition be 
racially segregated and of its impact in terms of provoking worker retaliation, 
workplace ‘ungovernability’ and economic stagnation that culminated in its eventual 
demise, despite ill-conceived attempts at state reform. Confronting this legacy set the 
tone for what was to come following a transfer of power to those charged with the 
rebuild of South Africa’s new employment relations. The next chapter outlines what 
exactly has supplanted apartheid labour relations, what new demands on the system 
command our attention and what problems are beginning to emerge that might 
jeopardise its institutional well being.
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Chapter 4. Ten years on from apartheid: taking stock of South 
Africa’s new employment relations
4.1 Introduction: an agenda for change
The apartheid experience, as set out in the previous chapter, obliged reformers to 
confront certain realities when finally putting paid to apartheid regulation. The 
challenge was how to replace it with a labour regime that would prove palatable to all 
parties. These realities took shape in a set of entrenched norms that had come to define 
apartheid labour relations by the time of political hand-over in 1994. First and foremost, 
racially defined pay, job and training disparities had spawned acrimony, discord and 
mistrust between minority white managers and majority black subordinates. Black 
worker dissent then found its political voice in the shape of an expanding, if 
fragmented, labour movement that developed independently of both state and political 
party. As a result, union leaders, with the support of a highly politicised (mostly urban 
black) membership behind them, eventually become important community leaders in 
their own right. Meanwhile, grassroots labour movements had also earned a fearsome 
reputation for exerting militancy in the workplace and for notching up notable victories 
against their employers.
In truth, COSATU, in becoming the main focus of dissent against apartheid authority 
for both township and working people had adopted a dual strategy of ‘radical reform’ 
by the end of the apartheid reform era. (Adler and Webster 1995: 80-83 and 92-94). The 
underpinning logic was for ‘social movement’ trade unionism to combine negotiation 
with mass action as a way of pressing the authorities to abandon their apartheid 
programme completely. As a consequence, affiliated unions and their members had 
grown accustomed as much to negotiating with organised business and government as
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to undermining their authority. A similar response could be expected from organised 
labour when it came to partaking in the institutional overhaul of the whole employment 
relations system.
Moreover, two landmarks of apartheid reform further contributed to the agenda for 
regime change following political emancipation. First, under force majeure, a powerful 
and independent labour movement that had always lacked legal status became 
incorporated into official employment relations, following the Weihem reforms of the 
early 1980s. However, these same unions still struggled to win recognition from 
recalcitrant employers at both enterprise and industry bargaining levels. Second, this 
incorporation led to union demands for, and participation in, embryonic corporatist 
structures such as the National Economic Forum (NEF) and the National Manpower 
Commission (NMP). These bodies had been formed in the early 1990s for consensus- 
building purposes and as political expediency on the part of a state anxious to appease 
robust union-led opposition. Nevertheless, the precedent had been set for a more 
inclusive policy-making process at the national level and this now formed part of the 
discourse as to what was to happen to employment relations come political liberation. If 
nothing else, these developments demonstrated how far South Africa’s independent 
labour movement had come under authoritarian rule and how much more political space 
needed to be conceded to it in the context of a fledgling democracy (Freedman and 
Shaw 2000: 199-203).
These advances for the union movement apart, two further considerations helped shape 
all subsequent policy thinking regarding institutional reform of South African 
employment relations. First, as a political ally of the new ruling party, the views of the 
most powerful union federation (COSATU) could be expected to carry considerable 
weight. When it came to drafting any new legal dispensation, organised labour’s
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presence had become an absolute prerequisite for both business and government (eg: 
Baskin 2000: 44-47; Webster and Adler 2000: 1-9). This explains why labour was such 
a ‘force to be reckoned with’ when it came to determining the future of South African 
employment relations and its very involvement, a precondition of success (Wood 
2000:11). Second, any reconstruction of the employment relations system had also to 
facilitate the broader transition from elite rule to universal political franchise through 
strengthening the institutional voice of non-white workers and their unions (Macun and 
Webster 1998: 45-47).
Both these political imperatives ensured that regulatory reform of employment relations 
became a necessary adjunct to any broader settlement between apartheid authority and 
its political opponents. Thus, there was need for a form of ‘voice regulation’ that could 
steer some middle course between an employment relations heavily prescribed by the state and 
one wholly disciplined by the marketplace (see chapter 2) and in which collective bargaining 
would prove integral (the Presidential Labour Market Commission 1996: 3-4; Standing et 
al 1996: 10 and 155-66). Clearly, the apartheid experience made fundamental reform of 
employment relations (and collective bargaining) not just obligatory but urgent and that this 
would entail dismantling old structures, introducing new ones as well as radically overhauling 
those institutions and processes worth retaining. Such an enterprise amounted to more than a 
cosmetic makeover (see chapter two). It became equally apparent that regime change could only 
occur by means of a concordat involving the bilateral parties on die one hand (primarily 
COSATU and Business South Africa, respectively) and the incoming Government of National 
Unity (Ministry of Labour) on the other. In short, transforming employment relations was 
considered fundamental to the dual task of consolidating democracy and reconstructing the 
economy (Adler and Webster 1999:358-65). But other realities also required that any reform be 
brokered between labour, business and the state as part of the wider political settlement that 
ushered in liberation, (eg: Baskin 2000: 44-47; Habib 1997: 65-72; Webster and Adler 2000: 1- 
9). Received wisdom was for a form of re-institutionalisation that eased past antagonisms
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through facilitating political exchange and cooperative relations at national, industry and 
workplace levels (after Du Toit et al 1996: 20-21). The question now arose as to how this 
shared aspiration was to be made tangible.
4.2 Regime change
Accordingly, this new beginning was marked by the introduction of a new legal 
dispensation intended to simultaneously empower and constrain unions and employers 
alike in pursuit of this embodiment of cooperative relations. In short, the new 
framework heralds a shift towards a form of regulation that enables, but not compels, 
bipartite parties to engage with institutional structures and practices held to be more 
democratic than those experienced under apartheid (Adler 2000: 17; Donnelly. 
1999:205).. As such, it presented the risk that reform would develop piecemeal, 
whereas the logic of its design required a comprehensive, encompassing integration. 
Unions and employers were encouraged, rather than compelled, to involve themselves 
in the offered negotiating, co-determination and dispute resolution mechanisms (Adler 
2000: 17; Donnelly. 1999: 205; Du Toit et a l 1996: 33-4; Habib 1997: 65-8). This 
shared determination to break with such an adversarial and discredited past further 
illuminates the demand for all reform initiatives henceforth to comply with a 
Constitution that itself conforms to the International Labour Organisation’s conventions 
on core labour standards. Not surprisingly then, fundamental rights to associate, 
organise, bargain and strike have all been enshrined in law (Du Toit et al 1996: 20-21).
In addition, new and revised institutional processes were agreed upon that allowed for 
both economic and social agendas to be addressed in seemingly balanced ways (Du Toit 
et al 1996: 38). Desirable outcomes were to be twofold: a process o f ‘redistributive 
justice’ that addressed inequalities in employment, pay, training and security along with 
the pursuit of a ‘dynamic efficiency’ that improved labour productivity and flexibility
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whilst rewarding performance more equitably {after Standing et al. 1996: 1-5). 
Henceforth, institution-building would be shaped as much by the need to reconstruct the 
economy, industry and enterprise as to right past wrongs perpetrated in workplaces. In 
this respect, policy intent was unambiguous: equity demands as much as efficiency 
imperatives were to be given at least equal prominence within new and revised 
institutional arrangements (Donnelly 1999: 206; Du Toit et al. 1996: 39). Patently, South 
Africa’s new employment relations would be required to resolve tensions arising 
between the two competing reform agendas of improved security and well-being for 
workers and enhanced flexibility for employers (Standing et al. 1996: 6-9). The 
ensuing institutional framework would make possible a system of ‘regulated flexibility’ 
in which both sets of demands could be realised through evenly-balanced dialogue and 
exchange {after COSATU -  Douwes Dekker and Johnson 1998; Standing et al 1996: 
12-16).
Equally, other constraints weighed heavily with those tasked with drawing up a
blueprint for reform of the national employment relations system. Paramount was the
unification of the system in ways that made it explicitly non-racial and socially
cohesive within the broader transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Henceforth,
a single and all-encompassing system of interest representation became an overriding
factor for policy-makers (Donnelly 1999: 202-204). As a result, previously marginalised
groups of workers such as public servants, farm labourers and domestic workers now
joined the mainstream of employment relations for the first time (Webster and Adler
1999: 360). Reforming the very institutional framework itself was also considered to be
a priority and altering the way that business, labour and the state were expected to relate
to each other became an important guiding principle for what followed. Consensus, not
antagonism, between the actors was considered to be a desirable attribute of all
subsequent reform (Macun and Webster 1998: 36). In short, institutional reform was
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intended to help move the employment relationship away from distrust towards 
cooperation, from makeshift towards more enduring engagement and from distributive 
towards more integrative interaction between bargaining agents (Baskin and Satgar 
1996:103).
‘Normalisation* was similarly held to be cardinal for those policy reformers seeking to 
rehabilitate employment relations, post apartheid (Macun and Webster 1998: 36). 
Affording organised labour access to customary political and employment relations 
discourse was held to be a vital component of this process as were stabilised and 
predictable relations between parties and reduced workplace conflict. Equally, making 
employment relations less politically charged requires bargaining settlements to become 
more responsive to changing economic circumstances, such as unemployment and 
inflation. On the one hand, normalisation seemed to require making employment 
relations and politics overlap. On the other, it required the relationship to be less 
‘political’, in terms of being part of a national struggle, and become more economically 
driven to the pursuit of national prosperity. Normality also called for social partners to 
develop an organisational capacity and strategic sophistication that went beyond 
immediate interests and their adversarial past (Macun and Webster 1998: 40-41).
It follows that strengthening institutional voice for a previously disenfranchised 
majority of workers and increasing their representational opportunities was held to be 
mandatory for a country determined to regularise a turbulent society and consolidate a 
hard won democracy (Adler 2000: 15-17; Macun and Webster 1998:47; Schreiner 
1994:16-18). Within the context of this negotiated transition, peak representation 
appeared to be a necessary compliment to political emancipation. However it also 
needed to be both encompassing of constituencies formerly excluded (eg: women, rural 
communities, the poor and unemployed) and sufficiently power-balanced between those
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organised interests, already enjoying institutional legitimacy (Schreiner 1994: 18-21; 
Standing et al 1996: 10). Thus, a form of ‘voice regulation’ was to be promulgated that 
stood midway between market discipline and state interventionism and that placed 
various multipartite bargaining and consultative forums centre stage (Macun and 
Webster 1998: 45-46; Standing et al. 1996: 10). As a consequence, those overseeing the 
reforms settled on a form of social corporatist ‘architecture’ that precluded any return to 
state authoritarianism and elite oligarchy (Douwes Dekker and Johnson 1998: 21). 
Promoting voluntary, self-regulated, multi-level dialogue, upholding the independence 
of labour market parties, and encouraging their (and others’) entry into policy debates 
that would help shape the future was considered to be a better guarantee of industrial, 
not just political, democratisation {after Douwes Dekker and Johnson 1998:18). 
Similarly, any subsequent multipartite and multi-tiered engagement should not just 
restrict itself to wage setting and the like but be extended into the realm of broader 
social and economic policy-making (Baccaro 2002a: 4 and 2002b: 7-10; Gostner and 
Joffe 2000: 77-78; Webster and Adler 2000: 3). In short, a multi-layered, articulated 
system that roughly followed the European pattern was chosen to compliment political 
emancipation. Fragmented, decentralised and market-orientated arrangements along 
Anglo-Saxon lines were deemed not fit for the purpose.
In sum, this resolve to learn from past mistakes and start making amends informed the
whole drive for what was to follow. Reconfiguring employment relations along neo-
corporatist lines demonstrated a policy determination to sever any associations with
racial corporatism and to introduce a regime change that would transform South
Africa’s discredited employment relations system. However, institutional change also
appears to have been as much the product of pragmatic conciliation between bilateral
negotiators over the detail of the legislative reform as of ideological bias on the part of
state-endorsed policy-making circles (Adler 2000: 15; Freedman and Shaw 2000: 206-
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209; Du Toit et al 1996: 26-32). Thus, new arrangements are now codified within an 
enabling legislation (Labour Relations Act 1995 as amended in 1996 and 2000) that 
gives substance to both policy preferences and pragmatic compromises. Thus, the 
legislative framework functions as a politically nuanced corporatist compromise. As 
such, it represents an agreed response to a crisis of expectation anticipated in the wake 
of political liberation but also to potential worker discontent arising from the economy’s 
sudden exposure to internationalised markets (Habib 1997: 70-72).
4.3 Institution-building
In harness, the NEDLAC Act (1994) and the Labour Relations Act (1995) provide the 
basis for new legal framework by which four distinctive neo-corporatist structures were 
to be made manifest and co-determination made possible (Adler 2000: 1-4). The earlier 
Act officially established the first of these - the National Economic Development and 
Labour Council- and is commonly referred to as the NEDLAC forum. Tripartite 
representation within NEDLAC is organised across four chambers: the first three focus 
on matters of mutual concern to do with public finance and monetary policy; trade, 
mining, agricultural and industrial policies; and labour market issues. Representation in 
the final chamber was broadened to include those organisations emblematic of 
traditionally disadvantaged groups from the wider community (for example, rural poor, 
women, youth and the unemployed) and interested in issues around civic reconstruction 
and development (for example, water, health, education and housing). Uniquely, 
opportunities are provided for representatives of the informal employment sector and 
socially excluded to impact on key government policies. The intention has been to 
promote a more ‘augmented’ form of dialogue rather than restrict it to a ‘narrow insider’ 
one (Casey and Gould 2000: 120-121). However some still express concern that this 
fourth constituency might be outmanoeuvred by ‘the big three’ within the chamber due
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to persistently weak representational capacity (for example, Webster 1995: 26-29). This 
worry apart, extending interest representation and mediation in this way is considered to 
be innovative from a comparative perspective, especially given a world-wide growth in 
neo-liberal deregulation and the fact that South Africa is widely classified as a semi­
industrialised economy (Adler 2000: 14; Webster 1995: 25).
NEDLAC’s goal is to facilitate peak social dialogue so that government, labour, 
business and community organisations can reach accords and produce policy 
frameworks that ostensibly sustain growth, advance social equity and create 
employment. By such means, the ‘big three’ are also meant to shape socio-economic 
policy and oversee labour market institutions in ways that ‘consolidate national unity, 
reconciliation and development’ (Habib 1997: 65). In short, NEDLAC provides a venue 
for policy bargaining between the parties and, to this end, is empowered to consider any 
legislative proposal or policy amendment that falls within its remit ahead of any 
parliamentary scrutiny. The expectation is that any agreement, concordat or policy 
recommendation agreed within NEDLAC is to be proclaimed by Parliament (Gostner 
and Joffe 2000: 77-78). To date, NEDLAC has devoted considerable time and energy to 
producing agreed legislative drafts covering organising, employment protection, 
discrimination and training rights as well as the Workplace Challenge Initiative that is 
designed to help restructure work, organisation and industry (Gostner and Joffe 2000: 
84;Webster and Omar 2003:195). Indeed, it was this very NEDLAC process that helped 
produced the Labour Relations Act of 1995 -  the framework for industry bargaining, 
workplace consultation and dispute resolution that, together with the NEDLAC 
chamber, are meant to provide the institutional means by which cooperative relations 
are expected to flourish. Reaching consensus over such controversial and complex 
legislation has proved to be one of its most enduring achievements to date (Habib 
1997:66)
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Accordingly, this second piece of major legislation provides for a voluntary centralised 
bargaining system whereby the bilateral parties can elect to establish a bargaining 
council provided that it is ‘sufficiently representative’ of a designated sector or industry 
(Du Toit et al. 1996: 34; Labour Relations Act 1995, chapter 111). Once registered with 
the Department of Labour, such a body is authorised to conclude and enforce 
agreements (including pay), resolve disputes (under accreditation), establish (and 
administer) training schemes and confer on workplace forums additionally agreed 
matters for consultation. Additional powers also enable it to determine, through 
agreement, when and where strikes and lock-outs are to be precluded; to submit 
proposals for consideration by NEDLAC on matters affecting its industry or sector and 
to administer funds relating to pension, insurance, medical aid, sick pay, holiday or 
unemployment schemes. All importantly, there is also the means to legally extend, 
through ministerial approval, industry agreements to non-signatory employers and trade 
unions. As a counter-balance, the Act also allows non-party employers to apply for legal 
exemption from the terms of any such agreement -  the equivalent of ‘hardship clauses’ 
in German sectoral agreements (Bhorat et al. 2002: 51-3; Du Toit et a/. 1996: 34; Klerck 
1998: 92; Stapelberg 1999: 30-32).
Whilst the scope remains for centrally determined pay, terms and conditions to be 
extensive, the reality may prove to be otherwise. First, participation in industry 
bargaining is voluntary rather than compulsory on the parties. This means that 
Bargaining Council coverage across and, even within, sectors is variable although it 
continues to operate in key industries such as clothing, textiles, engineering, metal and 
chemicals. In contrast, enterprise bargaining appears to be the norm in other sectors 
such as food, paper and retail whilst any form of collective bargaining is absent from 
yet others such as agriculture and domestic service (Klerck 1998: 99). It seems that dual
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bargaining has only emerged where unions are both strong on the ground and 
representative across industry and this has yet to become widespread (Bezuidenhout 
2000: 6).
Second, even where sectoral bargaining occurs, agreements often only establish pay and 
conditions minima leaving the parties free to negotiate additional terms by way of 
enterprise bargaining, should they so choose (Harcourt and Wood 2003: 93-96). For 
sectors such as clothing and construction, this narrow scope to multi-level bargaining is 
commonplace with industry-wide restructuring, investment or training agreements 
remaining a rarity (Klerck 1998:99). Nevertheless, one estimate has sectoral bargaining 
agreements covering just under half of all those in formal employment for 1997 and is 
more likely an underestimate given that most agreements are extended to the employees 
o f ‘non-party’ employers (ILO 1999: 33). Indeed, this coverage rises to slightly less 
than two-thirds for manufacturing alone, according to Nattrass (2000: 133). Such 
bargaining coverage is considered to be relatively high when compared to many other 
middle-income countries. It also appears that bargaining councils perform a dual 
function in both standard-setting on pay and conditions for key industries and sectors as 
well as in fulfilling a meso-welfarist role in providing a number of social benefits that 
would otherwise fall to the state to provide (ILO 1999: 34).
As originally conceived, statutory-endorsed workplace forums (WF) are meant to be the 
functional equivalent of German works councils in guaranteeing co-determination rights 
to workers. Indeed, this model of social governance is the one institution that has been 
imported from outside South Africa and into a national employment relations that has 
no tradition of shared decision-taking to call on {after Anstey 1995 and 1997). 
Bargaining councils enjoyed a head start insofar as South Africa enjoyed a tradition of 
industry-wide negotiation and the concept was widely understood by both employers
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and unions. Workplace forums, on the other hand, were radically new and targeted the 
inherent problem of autocratic management and reactive shop floor defiance. The law 
allows for their introduction into all enterprises with more than a hundred employees, 
the object being to enhance both workplace democracy and productivity.
However, these Forums are far from being compulsory but crucially require a union to 
trigger their formation. Application by a majority representative trade union is made to 
the appropriate authority who then explores whether there is sufficient agreement 
between the parties (as to its desirability and constitution) to warrant its establishment. 
Representation is through workforce election, with seats allocated in accordance with 
the relevant occupational weighting (Habib 1997: 67; Wood 2000: 9). The intention is 
for Forums to formalise the way managers are expected to consult with union 
representatives, provide employees with a say in their working arrangements and begin 
making inroads into an apartheid legacy of ‘militant abstentionism’ and ‘workplace 
ungovemabilty’. By such means are the prospects for workplace stability and industrial 
peace to be enhanced, even against a backdrop of structural adjustment linked to market 
deregulation and trade liberalisation (Satgar 2000: 65). Unfortunately, legislative 
negotiators have produced a form of co-determination that epitomises an uneasy 
compromise between two competing policy agendas: boosting productivity, flexibility 
and ‘world-class’ competitiveness for employers whilst providing workers with a say as 
to how these are to be achieved. The fear is that any Workplace Forum can easily 
deteriorate into a ‘site of contestation’ rather than advance the grand cause of 
partnership relations (Wood and Mahabir 2001: 233).
An institutional separation of powers is also expected to operate such that Forums focus 
exclusively on non-wage matters whilst registered trade unions continue with their more
traditional remit of pay and conditions bargaining (both in and out of the workplace).
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But unlike Germany, there is little or no legislative attempt at separating bargaining 
from co-determination processes. It would appear that these processes are not meant to 
be mutually exclusive but, rather, to compliment each other such that they become 
indistinct in practice. Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether Forums are meant to 
augment or replace enterprise bargaining, given the variety of form possible in law (see, 
for example, Adler 2000: 9; Klerck 2000: 18). Less ambiguously, legislators wish 
Workplace Forums to be formed only at the request of a trade union and for the latter to 
then act in a spirit of codetermination.
Hence, Forums have rights of information, consultation and joint decision-making as 
with other European ‘second channel institutions’ of representation {after Rogers and 
Streek 1994 and Streek 1992). Employers are expected to consult with Forum 
representatives on, amongst others, matters relating to workplace restructuring and work 
re-organisation, plant closure and redundancies, mergers and ownership transfers, job 
grading and merit pay schemes, training and education. They are further required to 
make joint decisions on appropriate grievance and disciplinary procedures (unless 
covered under a collective agreement), the rules of misconduct, anti-discrimination 
policies and practices, and changes to company welfare schemes. Finally, employers are 
obliged to disclose to Forum representatives all information relevant to their proper 
functioning (Adler 2000: 7-8; Habib 1997: 67; Wood 2000: 9). However, unlike their 
German counterparts, it is unclear whether Forums are expected to function as 
consensus-seeking, problem-solving bodies or as negotiating committees that resolve 
traditional conflicts of interest. As matters presently stand, there is little to prevent 
Forums from being incorporated into existing enterprise bargaining arrangements given 
the absence of any ‘peace obligation’ and the retention of a right to strike (Anstey 1995: 
39-41 ;1997: 117-118; Klerck 2000: 18).
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The final construct addresses the institutional overhaul of a state-sponsored dispute 
resolution system that became seriously compromised under apartheid. The burden of 
this work now falls on another new body called the Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) that is funded by the state but governed by a 
tripartite body appointed by NEDLAC. Its role is to be ‘pervasive and fundamental’ in 
that virtually all disputes are to be automatically referred to the CCMA prior to 
adjudication (Du Toit et al. 1996: 37). This revised remit also extends to resolving 
particular issues of procedural injustice such as discriminatory treatment and unfair 
dismissal as well as to settling collective disputes over organising rights, the jurisdiction 
of Bargaining Councils and the establishment of Workplace Forums. Such an extended 
system of arbitration and consultation is innovative within a South African context, but 
is also deemed fundamental to good order, given the potential for organised conflict 
arising from the voluntarist nature of the system, the current strength of labour and the 
history of maltreatment of workers.
Expanding dispute resolution in this way is the product of two particular influences. 
First, there evolved under apartheid a relatively successful private-sector body (IMSA) 
that earned credibility with disputants compared to its state counterpart, namely the 
Industrial Court. Secondly, notions of ‘good practice’ have been imported from Britain 
(ACAS), Australia (Arbitration Councils) and the United States (state arbitration for 
public service bodies). The hope is that it can become the cornerstone for all co­
determination processes by acting as an automatic reference point for deadlocked 
parties. Given this remit, there is concern that the CCMA may be overwhelmed by a 
caseload burden that produces backlogs, given heightened demand and some unrealistic 
expectations from policy makers (for example, Baskin and Satgar 1995). To help with 
this, the CMAA has powers to delegate dispute handling to accredited bodies such as
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bargaining councils. After considerable delay and sustained pressure, forty four of the 
seventy two registered Councils are now taking on an internal dispute resolution role 
under the auspices of the CCMA (SALB 2003).
This brief account of the new institutional lay-out for South African employment 
relations emphasises the co-determinist nature of the system with business, labour and 
government empowered to settle matters between them over such issues as legislation, 
pay, work disputes, industry restructuring, education and training. The intention has 
been for these neo-corporatist structures to permeate the various institutional layers, 
mollify previously antagonistic relations and accommodate competing agendas around 
flexibility and security (after Standing etal. 1996: 6-9; Standing 1997a: 19-26). But 
their evolution over the subsequent ten years prompts the question as to how well 
current realities match this early promise. Any review as to what has happened to 
employment relations in South Africa over the last decade shows a number of 
developments to have taken place that cast shadows over the prospects for South 
Africa’s experimentation with neo-corporatism over the longer term.
4.4 Reform after ten years
After a decade of supposedly transformed employment relations and certain structural
problems have begun to surface. It seems that various multi-layered institutions and
processes have not always functioned as required. In part, such unintended
consequences are due to certain design flaws that are the product of muddled policy
thinking. But they also arise as a consequence of how the parties reacted to what was
expected of them under the new dispensation. It may be that in making employment
relations reform negotiable for, and agreeable to, all parties has entailed some loss of
coherence in a way that undermines its overall fitness for purpose. Equally, the actors
have shown a mixed response to what has been placed on offer. Far from
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wholeheartedly embracing the new dispensation, elements of both business and labour 
have taken positions ranging from guarded approval through to outright opposition. In 
part, this ambivalence is testimony to a mutual disregard for, and distrust of, each other 
that is a left-over from apartheid days. But such wavering commitment is further 
compounded by the voluntarist nature of the new labour regime itself and by the 
susceptibility of employer and worker representative bodies to weak institutional 
capacity. This becomes even more apparent when assessing the chances of new or 
revised institutions becoming embedded, concertation processes made robust and an 
organised and articulated employment relations system enduring over time (after Adler 
2000: 17-32).
NEDLAC, for example, has been unable to capitalise on its early success as a facilitator 
of social legislation and address concerns over social welfare policy, economic 
adjustment and industry restructuring. For Gostner and Joffe (2000: 90), this means that 
NEDLAC is not being used ‘optimally’ by the social partners, missing the opportunities 
on offer. In particular, it has disappointed as a potential broker of Labour Accords that 
allow unions to exchange industrial peace, support for government policy and wage 
restraint in return for more worker-friendly policies and initiatives around training, 
employment and welfare provision (after Harcourt and Wood 2003: 87). Why this 
should be so are indicative of the deep problems undermining both tripartite and 
bipartite engagement with neo-corporatist structures and co-determinist processes at all 
levels.
First, the government’s role has changed from being reactive to proactive in tripartite 
settings and vice versa for labour, post liberation (Friedman and Shaw 2000: 207). The 
government drives the agenda for NEDLAC, not least by unilaterally determining what 
is to be excluded from tripartite discourse (Adler 2000: 25). Even where it welcomes
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NEDLAC ‘s input into aspects of social legislation, it often prefers to formulate policy 
from a distance, only presenting it to fellow NEDLAC partners when practically the 
finished article. But, above all, it seeks to dilute NEDLAC’s influence over the shaping 
of broader macro-economic policy (Adler 2000: 17-18). Crucially, government’s 
attachment to a market liberal strategy known as GEAR (Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution) is held to be a ‘non-negotiable’ and ‘non-contestable’ feature of the 
NEDLAC chambers, despite opposition from organised labour- most especially the 
government’s triple alliance partner, COSATU (Gostner and Joffe 2000: 89). One 
consequence is that sceptical labour members on NEDLAC are more frequently at odds 
with government representatives than are their business counterparts who prefer to 
withdraw into the shadows whenever potentially divisive issues materialise (Adler 
2000: 24-25).
Second, the bilateral representatives themselves have demonstrated ambivalence
towards the NEDLAC process, even choosing to by-pass it when proving convenient for
them to do so. For COSATU-affiliated unions, the ‘alliance route’ to the ruling party
(ANC) is considered to be more productive on occasion than being bound by decisions
reached in chamber that might limit future options. Equally, it is not unknown for
employers to retreat from formal NEDLAC processes and approach government ad hoc,
informally and directly, especially over changes to macro-economic policy. It seems
that both partners are not averse to using venues other than NEDLAC for overturning
potentially unfavourable decisions. By contrast, both appear more comfortable with
NEDLAC proceedings when blocking policy initiatives instigated by government and
when defending their respective secular interests rather than establishing their own
agenda (Adler 2000: 16-18). But choosing to defect from the tripartite process at critical
moments only reduces NEDLAC’s authority and status within the overall employment
relations framework. Behind this caution and selective engagement with NEDLAC lies
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a cultural legacy of suspicion and distrust between protagonists that colours all their 
dealings with each other, not least those at national peak level. In turn, this leads to a 
narrow sectionalism that often places positional bargaining centre stage at the expense 
of more collaborative styles of discourse (Freedman and Shaw 2000: 208-209; 
Grawitzky 2002: 50-51). Finding the right balance between confrontational and co­
operative behaviour within NEDLAC exchanges is proving elusive for social partners.
Third, NEDLAC’s problems are further compounded by difficulties arising from weak 
capacity and limited strategic cohesion. As resources become depleted so 
representatives struggle to cope with the whole gamut of NEDLAC activity and with the 
sheer volume of meetings and complexity of issues that this gives rise to. In addition, 
the partners seem unable, even unwilling, to devote sufficient resource to ensuring that 
the NEDLAC dialogue informs efforts made at industry and enterprise levels. 
Furthermore, both sides seem handicapped by disunity within their ranks such that they 
struggle to speak authoritatively for their respective constituencies within NEDLAC 
chambers and to the detriment of any overall coordination (Adler 2000: 26; Sellars 
2000: 508-511; Wood 1998: 44-45). For organised labour, a multi-federated and 
fragmented union movement exacerbates old rivalries that can only undermine its 
capacity to speak with a powerful and unified voice (after Macun 2000: 68-74). This 
capacity problem is further compounded by inter-rivalry amongst the affiliated 
COSATU leadership, decline in the service standards to members, inadequate training 
for union representatives, depleted resources for research and education and a growing 
careerist instrumentality amongst union staff (eg: Buhlungu 2002: 25-28; 2000a: 75-97; 
2000b: 187-199; 1997; 1994: 26-32).
For organised capital, serious ‘fault lines’ run through the business community such that 
rival employer federations compete to speak convincingly at the national level. This is
111
because the propensity for South Africa’s business community to associate strongly at 
the national peak level is hampered by a lack of industrial, racial and ideological 
homogeneity that weakens its representational authority (Nattrass 1998: 21-23). 
Difficulties with stretched resources, fragmented representation and uncoordinated 
activity only impede the development of a more strategic focus as to how the NEDLAC 
parties are to make better use of their opportunities for influencing public policy 
outcomes (Gostner and Joffe 2000: 88). Reluctance by social partners to challenge and 
debate openly the more controversial features of policy further exacerbates a decline in 
the status of tripartite dialogue. So long as decisive leadership, strengthened capacity 
and strategic focus are missing, NEDLAC will continue to be seen as a forum that 
responds to external policy initiatives rather than as one that enjoys a reputation for 
agenda-setting in its own right (Gostner and Joffe 2000: 100). Nevertheless, come the 
millennium and NEDLAC partners still felt themselves able to reaffirm their 
commitment to ongoing dialogue and to mobilising investment, adjusting the economy, 
providing decent jobs and improving the skill-base of the workforce (NEDLAC 2001 in 
Anstey 2004: 58).
Bargaining Councils also struggle to fulfil their potential in helping to adjust the 
economy, restructure industry and redistribute employment, training and reward. A 
crucial element in the transformation of South African employment relations has been 
the reform of its bargaining system with a view to developing a form of articulated 
bargaining that both produces framework agreements and facilitates pattern bargaining 
within and across sectors and industries (Klerck 1998: 104). Indeed, Bargaining 
Councils are likely to prove pivotal to any long-term success, in terms of an articulated 
system, given that industry bargaining is thought to be the linchpin of a system like 
South Africa’s where coordinated bargaining is thought desirable, (eg: after Sisson and
Marginson 2002; Soskice 199land b; Traxler et al.2000; Traxler 2003a and b).
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Unfortunately, articulation is far from guaranteed when parties can choose either to 
evade or avoid any central bargaining imperative, as in South Africa (after Silvia 1997). 
Voluntarism in this system sanctions a level of employer defection from the central 
bargain such that any potential coordinating effects can easily be undermined (Donnelly 
2001: 2-3; Klerck 1998: 107).
Already, some observations indicate that bargaining councils might have lost their 
appeal for some employers in some areas of the economy. First, a few large companies 
are ideologically opposed to their involvement in multi-employer bargaining in the 
conviction that it perpetuates internal market rigidities, encourages excessive regulation 
and impedes local flexibility. Next, some regional bargaining councils, notably in 
construction and clothing manufacture as well as some in the paper and leather sectors, 
have already collapsed due to employers withdrawing their support (Klerck 1998: 100; 
Harcourt and Wood 2003:93; Webster and Omar 2003: 200). Meanwhile, other 
employers exhibit a blatant disregard for agreed terms and even pay wages below set 
minima despite the existence of industry agreements. Increasingly, other employers feel 
driven to circumvent the terms of any such agreement and so side-step their legal 
obligations to employees by re-classifying them as ‘independent contractors’. This 
already appears to be the case for parts of the footwear industry, some small firms and 
certain greenfield sites (Webster and Omar 2003: 205; Wood 2000: 139). However, the 
hope is that this legal nicety has now been largely foreclosed by an amendment to the 
Labour Relations Act in 2002 whereby such employer strategies are no longer tenable in 
law.
There is also growing evidence to show employers choosing enterprise ahead of 
industry bargaining and so bypassing Bargaining Council proceedings altogether 
(Webster and Omar 2003: 195; Wood 2000: 138). Equally, some (by no means all)
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trade unions have made strenuous efforts to secure local recognition rather than 
campaign to establish bargaining councils in those sectors unfamiliar with multi­
employer bargaining arrangements (Wood 2000: 138). Meanwhile, according to 
Webster and Omar (2003: 207-208), there are also employers in such growth sectors as 
the call centre industry who appear wedded to the supposed virtues of individualised 
contracts and performance management. What might help explain this trend is a 
growing employer demand for enterprise-level autonomy in wage-setting that 
underscores firm-specific flexibility strategies as in other parts of the world (for 
example, Klerck 1998: 102-103; Webster and Omar 2003: 210). Finally, there is some 
dismay at the persistent narrowness of the bargaining scope within many Bargaining 
Councils (for example, Klerck 1998: 99; Macun 2000; Macun and Webster 1998: 43).
In part, this is due to industry negotiators being guarded in not extending their remit 
beyond conventional bargaining agendas for fear of censure from their respective 
constituencies. (Smith 1997:75).
Confidence as to the future of coordinated bargaining is further shaken by the fact that
neither business nor labour appears capable of much unity of purpose in certain industry
circles despite their need to do so. The resolve of union and employer representatives to
make bargaining councils credible is damaged when ‘strategic cohesiveness’ is lacking
{after Adler 2000: 11). Solidarity is too often fragile and prone to fragmentation for
strong coordinating capacity to be apparent. For organised labour, tensions between
leaders and the grassroots can frustrate attempts at imposing discipline and making
industry agreements stick whilst inter-union rivalry within confederations only ensures
that the best equipped affiliates gain the most from Bargaining Councils at the expense
of those less favourably resourced. Likewise, within employer associations, the interests
of large corporations predominate over those of the smaller enterprise who then try to
undermine costly agreements by opposing their legal extension, seeking exemption,
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forming breakaway interest groups or simply absenting themselves altogether from 
industry bargaining processes. Meanwhile, large corporations sometimes defect from 
the central bargain, if considered necessary, by lobbying government directly when 
strongly opposed to a position held by their own association. The cause of coordinated 
bargaining is helped even less when South African employer organisations behave, 
more often than not, as ‘lowest common denominator’ bodies (Baskin 1993: 62). This 
implies that collective agreements are easily reached over more straightforward matters 
but prove difficult to achieve once more demanding and complex trade-offs, around 
industry restructuring, are to be sought as the price of settlement.
But it is not all gloom, by any stretch of the imagination. These setbacks are to be offset 
by some notable advances. First, as previously observed by the ILO (1999), sectoral 
bargaining enjoys has a certain presence within the formal sector and even manages to 
impact on the informal sector to a limited extent, mainly through a shadowing effect. 
Second, both employers and unions in such key sectors as manufacturing continue to 
find virtue in sectoral bargaining processes. Indeed, opening up their domestic markets, 
post apartheid, has prompted clothing and vehicle manufacture to strengthen, rather than 
weaken, their commitment to national bargaining structures, albeit with mixed results 
(Anstey 2004: 64-68). Third, other sectors such as chemicals (in 1998) have introduced 
multi-employer bargaining chambers across the whole sector for the very first time. By 
no means all sectoral parties have set their minds against taking the opportunity for 
centralised exchange that bargaining councils can bring.
Based on these observations and industry findings, the supposition is that only 
selectively do sectoral agreements in South Africa inform the cut and thrust of 
supplementary enterprise bargaining in practice and that only partially is pattern 
bargaining firmly in place within and across sectors (Webster and Macun 2000: 151-
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152). This is to suggest that bargaining in South Africa is to be characterised as multi­
tiered rather than coordinated, given that industry and enterprise bargaining can 
mutually co-exist with little impact either way in terms of a patterned bargaining effect 
(for example, Klerck 1998: 103- 107). The central contention is that dual bargaining 
with weak coordinating effects appears to be the dominant pattern within South Africa 
rather than one that is highly centralised, coordinated and encompassing. Whilst the 
potential for industry bargaining to become a significant medium for negotiated change 
remains, there is a general presumption that bipartite bargainers (even less those they 
represent) remain unmoved as to its coordinating and transformational possibilities. As 
yet, there is scant empirical work that attests to the validity of such conjecture. 
Accordingly, this thesis, and associated fieldwork, is best seen as a first attempt at 
rectifying this oversight -  at least as it relates to employers and their associations. But 
for now, on this evidence, we can assert with some confidence that although legal 
revision to industry bargaining has had a variable and uneven impact across sectors, it is 
still institutionally significant, if not yet robust..
Workplace Forums have similarly struggled to match their early promise. The
numbers speak for themselves. Only a handful of workplace forums have been
established since their enactment in 1995 and none in the manufacturing sector. Two
years on from their inception, Macun and Webster (1998: 43) found only eight
workplace forums to have been formally ratified under the legislation, rising to just
seventeen by the end of the decade (Kirsten and Nel 2000: 47-49). Meanwhile, Wood
and Mahabir (2001: 230) consider no more than six of these to be ‘currently
operational’. Not surprisingly, there has been considerable debate from the outset as to
their credibility when, constitutionally, forums require a ‘union trigger’ followed by
employer acquiescence (Adler 2000: 7; Anstey 1995 40-41; Kirsten and Nel 2000: 53).
Consequently, their formation is conditional upon the goodwill of employer and worker
116
representatives alike and this is far from certain given the inherent misgivings they 
share over the virtues of co-determination and joint problem-solving.
First, union activists are concerned that any representation in forums might undermine 
existing union structures and that traditional union roles become eroded as a 
consequence. Their fear is that their representatives may become side-lined as Forum 
representatives and managers collude to marginalise the union’s agenda {after Buhlungu 
2000b: 180-2; Wood and Mahabir 2001: 239-241; von Holdt 1995: 61). Many also 
worry that domestic bargaining may become weakened should a Forum be granted 
access to a union’s bargaining territory and so triggering unhelpful demarcation disputes 
{after Wood and Mahabir 2001: 239-241; Wood 1998: 138). Equally, there is a rump of 
employers concerned that their prerogative to make unilateral decisions will be 
compromised and that unwelcome rigidities will occur as a result (Macun and Webster 
2000: 156). Meanwhile, local union leaders remain fearful that their engagement with a 
Forum may simply be perceived as ‘collaborationist’ by a rank and file ever distrustful 
of partnership relations, originating from apartheid days. This culture of non­
collaboration leaves workplace representatives with little room for other than public 
opposition to problem-sharing overtures from local managers (Wood and Mahabir 
2001: 239). Finally, we need to recognise that the legal threshold (of one hundred or 
more employees) renders such forums automatically off limits to a majority of workers 
and is therefore held to be a serious impediment to any future growth in their number 
(for example, Anstey 1997: 101-112). Thus, three-quarters of all workplaces in the 
formal sector are estimated to employ less than this minimum requirement whilst vast 
numbers employed in the informal sector remain excluded given this legislative 
threshold (Kirsten and Nel 2000: 40; Klerck 2000: 9-10; Wood and Mahabir (2001:
240).
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To date, the extension of enterprise bargaining, rather than workplace co-determination, 
appears to be the more significant institutional development. Perhaps this is only to be 
expected given how badly conceived Forums were in the first place and the fact that 
their value for the parties is frequently underestimated or misunderstood (Kirsten and 
Nel 2000: 28). Unfortunately, this institution has been grafted onto a system in which 
workplace organisation and distributive enterprise bargaining are the norm and shared 
problem-solving the exception. Indeed, what experiments of this kind there have been 
have tended to be non-statutory and instigated under local agreement rather than 
statutory-endorsement. It seems that, under voluntary arrangements, employers feel 
temperamentally better suited to seek a change agenda whilst workplace representatives 
feel more comfortable in opposing it (Wood and Mahabir 2001: 240-241). Widespread 
approval for Workplace Forums will continue to be withheld so long as unions and 
employers alike remain convinced that their introduction undermines the authority of 
each (Kirsten and Nel 2000; Klerck 2000; Mapadimeng 1998). Again, this lack of belief 
is fuelled by a Tow trust dynamic’ that has been the hallmark of most South African 
workplaces to date (Webster and Macun 2000: 153-154).
4.5 The state’s response
These problems are further compounded by a certain official disregard towards their
resolution. This suggests a growing ambivalence on the part of government towards the
plight of both centralised bargaining and co-determination processes and is assumed to
be the product of a growing preoccupation with market liberal-orientated policy-making
(for example, Wood and Mahabir 2001: 241). This official unconcern is due in part to a
rapid shift in the basic ideology that informs broader economic policy. Ironically, the
‘decade of liberation’ between the mid-eighties and the mid-nineties brought a
remarkable change in the philosophy of the ANC. It shifted from neo-marxism towards
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market liberalism. Fear of ‘capital flight’, pursuit of free trade, pressure from 
international lending institutions to observe fiscal rectitude and the perceived need to 
reassure corporate South Africa help to explain the ruling party’s ideological drift from 
its socialist moorings (Donnelly 1999: 194-197; Michie 1997: 157 and 160; Williams 
and Taylor 2000). Easing aside its neo-Keynesian inspired reform package known as the 
‘Reconstruction and Development Programme’ (Adelzadeh and Padayachee 1994), the 
ANC has promoted a market-orientated policy called the Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution Programme (GEAR), first sponsored by the Department of Finance 
(1996). At its core are a number of supply-side (fiscal and monetary) measures that are 
held to be ‘non-negotiable’ by the state (Padayachee 1998). Such manoeuvrings only 
help to confirm this shift in the ideological leanings of the ruling party.
Nowadays, the ideas behind COSATU’s original reform programme (RDP) provide a
focus of opposition to the State’s own neo-liberal policy inclinations rather than the
blueprint for any ‘progressive’ revival of the economy (Gotz 2000: 188). For
government, macro-economic policies are not intended to preclude social dialogue
taking place between the partners. Rather, outcomes from the process are expected to
compliment the workings of the economy in ways that reinforce growth, job creation
and development but neither at the expense of financial market stability nor overseas
competitive advantage {after Natrass 1996: 29). Seemingly, nurturing
entrepreneurialism and galvanising business are of more concern to South African
policy-makers than contemplating substantive reform of a still evolving employment
relations regime. In short, there has been little by way of policy developments to bolster
neo-corporatist structures and processes since their inception post liberation. However,
this tenth anniversary of political emancipation for all South Africans serves as a timely
reminder for us to take stock as to what new employment relations has come to mean in
South Africa. Following a decade in which various institutional weaknesses have come
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to light, it is perhaps incumbent upon us to identify what these might be with a view to 
how these might best be remedied. Reflecting on what has been achieved to date and 
what still remains undone becomes the focus of attention in the concluding section.
4.6 Conclusions
When marking the tenth anniversary of political liberation from apartheid it is apt that 
we reflect on what has happened to South African employment relations, given its 
original prominence within a broader political landscape. There have been few other 
places in recent times where employment relations played so large in the struggle to 
both liberate and transform society. Post apartheid South Africa is just such a country 
and so warrants our continued interest from a comparative perspective. This is because 
a re-institutionalisation of its employment relations was placed centre-field when it 
came to nation-building. Apartheid’s legacy and labour’s political and industrial 
strength made this an inevitable consequence. As a result, a number of demands are now 
made of this new employment relations regime. The hope is that such regime change 
can help transform the country by contributing to political democratisation, economic 
adjustment and racial assimilation. As a result, this transformed system is also meant to 
alleviate tensions arising from a ‘triple transition’ towards improved workplace 
efficiency, worker rights and racial equity (after Webster and Omar 2003: 211). This 
weight of expectation is enormous and its prospects of success uncertain but I have tried 
to show through this review how far South Africa has progressed, not just how far it has 
yet to travel.
In trying to mitigate class and racial conflict first structured under apartheid and re-
institutionalise society alpng more democratic lines, South Africa has chosen to
reconstitute its whole system of employment relations. This reconstruction takes the
form of a tripartism that is corporatist in terms of its institutional structure but one that
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is also infused with co-determinist characteristics and social concertation processes 
{after Adler 2000: 3-4; Baccaro 2002a: 4; Baskin 2000: 47-55; Schreiner 1994: 15-21). 
As with its European predecessors, this particular form of neo-corporatism was borne 
out of perceived necessity and in response to crisis (Habib 1997: 70-72). Accordingly, 
collaborative processes have been installed at the macro, meso and enterprise level as 
the means by which interactions between the parties are to be regularised, workplace 
relations normalised and union voice legitimised. Such re-institutionalisation is 
especially significant for the majority of those previously excluded on racial grounds 
from having any kind of rights-based relationship with their employer. Tripartite 
dialogue within NEDLAC chambers, agreements reached in bargaining councils, the co­
determinism of workplace forums and the dispute resolution processes of the CMAA 
provide the institutional means by which South Africa’s employment relations is to be 
recast - away from contestation and towards concertation. The ambition is for a system 
of articulated bargaining to emerge that has, at its heart, a set of interlocking institutions 
that are designed to compliment each other in regulating South Africa’s new 
employment relations {after Dore 1997: 26-27).
However, doubts persist as to how institutionally robust this neo-corporatist system of
interest representation may eventually prove to be. Ten years on and problems have
already surfaced around defective design, bipartite ambivalence, weak capacity and
official complacency towards this new institutionalism. These unintended consequences
have raised questions as to its expected durability. Developments over the next decade
may well determine whether South Africa’s experimentation with social corporatism
remains institutionally sound or merely operates as some kind of structural ‘hollow
shell’ {after Hyman 1997: 318 in Millward et al. 2000: 138). Another reason for caution
regarding future prospects lies in the nature of the legal dispensation itself. Participation
in corporatist structures of interest mediation is essentially voluntary on trade union and
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employer alike, given that framework legislation is more enabling than compulsory in 
character. This requires them to demonstrate both a capacity and propensity to engage 
with social dialogue, sectoral bargaining and workplace consultation. For this to 
happen, both parties have to overcome certain organising problems that are best 
characterised as the twin challenges of engagement and capacity-building. In short, they 
have to be willing to engage fully with collaborative institutions and processes and 
possess the wherewithal to use them as intended.
These prerequisites are crucial to organised business and labour becoming strong 
corporatist actors in their own right. It seems that social corporatism works best when 
organised actors become powerful and disciplined such that they exchange freely within 
given processes. It appears that we still await a full-blooded, strategic (rather than 
tactical) commitment to the cause of social concertation and consensus-seeking 
behaviour. For Adler (2000:20), the fundamental problem lies in the fact that neither the 
state, business nor labour have yet to declare themselves ‘unambiguous champions of 
engagement’ with this re-regulated employment relations system. Until that happens, 
partnership relations as the new normative framework will forever remain more 
aspiration than reality. This gives rise to a number of questions that in themselves 
ensure an ongoing interest in South Africa’s experimentation with enlightened 
corporatism. Are unions sufficiently adept at conforming to the demands of social 
partnership, given their ‘social movement’ roots? To what extent are employers 
prepared to defect from the central bargain as in other (European) countries? Will the 
state strengthen co-determinist institutions, should this prove necessary? Answers to 
these questions will tell us the chances of South African employment relations 
remaining ‘organised’, bargaining ‘articulated’ and corporatism ‘enlightened’.
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For labour, being a strong corporatist actor obliges the movement to develop a strategic 
capacity that relies on a unity of purpose as well as on a strong political and workplace 
organisation that can act as both opponent and social partner as circumstances dictate 
(after Adler 2000: 24-25; Friedman and Shaw 2000: 206-210; Wood and Psoulis 2001: 
310-11). This approach means unions developing more centralised structures that forge 
closer links between union leaderships and shop steward movements as well as 
promoting inter-union (and inter-federation)) coherence and the establishment of mutual 
long-term goals (eg: Macun 2000: 72-75). The ideal is for unions to exercise a ‘strategic 
engagement’ that is collaborative when apposite, but still holding in reserve more 
confrontational and combative methods that accord with its ‘social movement’ roots 
(after Adler 2000: 24-25; Adler and Webster 2000 18; Harcourt and Wood 2003: 94-98 
and 101; Macun and Webster 1998: 46). This allows Labour to retain its potential for 
industrial unrest whilst maintaining support for a corporatist compromise that 
constitutes the means by which the movement formalises its relationship with 
government and business.
For business, associability4 becomes a crucial determinant of corporatist strength as 
employers remain potentially the weakest link in the whole corporatist chain (Donnelly 
2001: 553). Low associability undermines the claim of employer representatives to be 
authoritative negotiators within multi-employer bargaining processes and it is the latter 
that form the centrepiece of any coordinated bargaining system, (eg: Traxler 2003 a and 
b). Until a critical level of associability is achieved, employers will always be prone to 
defect from any central bargain and free-ride as a consequence, leaving their 
representatives to struggle to exercise voice within tripartite and bipartite structures. The
4 Within the South African context, this refers to the propensity for an employer to belong to an 
employers’ organisation that, in turn, is a ‘party’ to agreements reached through the bargaining council 
process.
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extent to which this constituency sees social dialogue, industry bargaining and co­
determination as help or hindrance when ‘restructuring’ the enterprise will prove to be 
fundamental in making neo-corporatism successful in a South African context.
Equally, the state has a significant role to play in assisting bipartite partners to engage 
meaningfully with these multi-layered processes and public policy needs to reflect this 
commitment. An overly concern to appear even-handed towards bipartite parties has led 
the state to downplay its responsibility for ensuring that peak dialogue, sectoral 
bargaining and workplace consultation remain robust processes supported by strongly 
co-ordinated institutions and committed actors. Maintaining neutrality and seeking the 
middle ground between the interests of Business and Labour is no longer sufficient. The 
state needs to champion the cause of South Africa’s new system of employment 
relations more explicitly than has perhaps been the case to date. This is to imply that 
public policy should concern itself less with brokering pragmatically-driven 
compromises between social partners and more with protecting the institutional 
integrity of an organised employment relations system.
These issues aside, it appears that all parties continue to see virtue in this new
institutionalism for the present, albeit for different reasons but also because it helps
smooth the transition towards racial harmony, full democratisation and an open
economy (Adler 2000: 15-17). So, some (but by no means all) employers continue to
find advantage in a system that allows issues around economic adjustment, industry
restructuring and work re-organisation to be addressed but at some cost to their
decision-making powers. Equally, independent trade unions have secured for
themselves an official standing that was previously lacking due to their incorporation
into new structures, but, again, at some expense to their autonomy of action. Likewise,
the relationship the state has with Labour and Business has become more entrenched
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and regularised institutionally and, as a result, less turbulent in terms of political and 
industrial stability. Finally, through negotiated settlement, the new South Africa has re­
equipped itself with a legal framework that is neither explicitly auxiliary to, nor 
restrictive on, the collective actions of these social partners. Rather, the new 
dispensation is intended to be enabling on both unions and employers in ways that 
facilitate their attempts at forging a relationship more organised than disorganised, 
should that be their preference. A strategic choice that is neither free nor forced for the 
parties remains the hallmark of a new institutional regime designed to dispel forever the 
legacy of apartheid labour relations. As a consequence, there is a perceived advantage 
from a public interest viewpoint in having such enabling arrangements enshrined in law, 
not least in guaranteeing a role for the bilateral partners when it comes to influencing all 
future employment relations policy-making.
However, within each constituency, there are still those that regard any engagement
with this type of organised and coordinated relationship with some suspicion and not a
little distrust. Even those participants deriving benefit from it seem motivated to act
from narrow sectarianism rather than from any heartfelt conviction that South Africa’s
pursuit of ‘mutualism’ in employment relations is an enlightened experiment worth
preserving (see chapter two). For the most part, this makes any commitment to current
arrangements by the parties appear largely tactical and superficial. Until standpoints
change, the institutional resilience of South Africa’s employment relations over the
coming years remains far from certain. Such a critique calls for all parties to adjust their
bargaining behaviour and thereby acknowledge that ‘the shadow of the future’ hangs
over their deliberations when preferring their formal relationships to be, by and large
collaborative rather confrontational as in the past. Appreciating this more strategic
perspective can then lead state, employer and worker representatives to commit more
fully to the various multi-tiered processes on offer {after Standing et al 1996: 10). For
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changes to outlook to occur, there first needs to be a discourse that acknowledges 
deficiencies in both the design and practice of this emerging employment relations 
regime. This debate further requires consideration to be given to new policy measures 
that might help consolidate social dialogue, industry bargaining and workplace co­
determination, as presently constituted.
Central to this argument is the requirement for institution-building to take place in ways 
that forces state, capital and labour to engage more fully with the formal structures and 
processes on offer (after Donnelly 2001: 564-566; Klerck 1998: 109). Otherwise, there 
is risk of a new duality in South African employment relations arising (in terms of 
highly organised and unorganised zones) such that lean corporatism and weak economic 
coordination appear as an inevitable aftermath {after Traxler 2003b: 206-7; Traxler et 
al. 2001: 298-305). Whether such diversity of practice can impede the emergence of 
South Africa’s new enlightened corporatism as originally intended, only time will tell. 
Indeed, it is this next decade that will more likely confirm whether this institutional 
rebuild is to stand the test of time or fall into some state of disrepair5. Perhaps what is 
needed is for a debate that throws into sharp relief possible trajectories for the future 
and associated threats and opportunities confronting those wanting to persist with this 
more articulated bargaining system. It is in this vein that this author uses the next couple 
of chapters to investigate the whole issue of employer associability and to explain its
5 There is one overriding consideration ahead of all others that demand such policy deliberations take 
place (Arndt and Lewis 2000: 886-87; Crothers 2001). Perhaps nowhere is a more co-operative 
bargaining behaviour urgently required than in South Africa given the extent to which the aids pandemic 
has taken hold in the workplace and given the parlous state of welfare and public health provision {after 
Homer-Long and Ortlepp 1996). One estimate already has eighteen per cent of the workforce currently 
HIV positive, rising to over a quarter by 2005/6 with 190,000 deaths already recorded for 1999 and 2000 
(P.e.o.p.l.e. 2001). If nothing else, this humanitarian crisis should, of itself, provide the catalyst for social 
partners to adopt a form of dialogue that addresses the colossal social and economic impact of aids 
beyond simply the level of the firm. How well South Africa’s new employment relations copes with this 
catastrophe provides a true measure of how far it has been transformed in practice. How compassionately 
‘democratic corporatism’ helps ameliorate the ‘costs’ of this human tragedy not only allows us to re­
evaluate its claim to superiority over less explicitly organised and co-ordinated systems but once again to 
re-assess its institutional durability. The next decade will more than likely tell us.
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centrality to arguments surrounding the robustness of this evolving system. To this end, 
an established European literature is first deployed as a means by which to explore key 
concepts and dilemmas surrounding an employer’s decision to associate with others or 
not. Next, an important and recent debate is rehearsed to explain why present-day 
employers need even more convincing as to the merits of associability and centralised 
bargaining in light of new issues and dilemmas. Finally, discourse upon the problematic 
nature of collective action for employers is then specifically contextualised within a 
contemporary South African setting. This then allows for a more informed discussion 
over the course of the remainder of the thesis concerning the design and nature of the 
fieldwork prior to embarking on an account of survey findings and their wider 
significance in public policy terms.
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Chapter 5. Why employers matter when it comes to South African
bargaining reform
5.1 Introduction: an employer agenda for employment relations
To date, we have undertaken a country review of how South African employment 
relations came to be transformed following political settlement and rejection of ‘racially 
based corporatism’ (after De Villiers and Anstey 2000: 25). We took the opportunity in 
chapter two to locate the preferred public policy destination for those charged with 
developing an alternative employment relations regime to that which had prevailed 
under apartheid. This was followed in chapter three by an account of what constituted 
apartheid labour relations and what impact this has had on the actual policy thinking of 
those charged with the responsibility for replacing the country’s employment relations 
system. The preceding chapter has also attempted to explain the nature of this regime 
change by reference to a new institutional framework that is meant to exhibit certain 
neo-corporatist characteristics such as social concertation processes and an articulated 
bargaining structure. This same chapter advanced a number of reasons to explain why 
social dialogue, co-ordinated bargaining and co-determination have yet to materialise to 
any meaningful extent within South Africa but that the potential to do so is still within 
grasp. Prominent amongst these impediments was the fact that the capacities and 
motivations of the participants was found wanting in certain key respects. But, in 
addition, what this analysis also illustrates is the following.
For fledgling democracies like South Africa, radically reforming its employment 
relations can prove to be a difficult business, in terms of unintended consequences, and, 
thereby, problematic for those charged with overseeing its transformation. This is 
because transition often entails a policy stratagem for moving from one undesirable
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policy paradigm to another more in keeping with the idealised vision of its reformers. 
However, for countries like South Africa, such stratagems tend to be ‘contingent’ rather 
than ‘prescriptive’ and ‘emergent’ as opposed to ‘deliberate’ -  to borrow from a 
management literature on strategy (for example, see Mintzberg and Waters 1985). This 
is further exacerbated in South Africa’s case by its actual implementation being 
contingent upon a form of co-determination that has to accommodate conflicting 
ideological and material interests, political compromise and unforeseen happenstance. 
Moreover, this suggests that any blueprint for institutional reform that empowers the 
bipartite actors can only be made concrete through the joint determination of those other 
than the policy-makers themselves- namely, South African workers, employers and 
their respective representative bodies. It is their preparedness (not the state’s) to engage 
with the various neo-corporatist processes on offer that will help determine whether 
new, as well as revised, institutions such as social dialogue, industry bargaining and 
workplace co-determination take hold or not.
For reasons outlined in the first chapter, the natural focus of attention for this thesis is 
centred on the employer constituency rather than that of labour. A natural starting point 
for this new-found interest in the employer arises from the theoretical contribution made 
by the likes of Kochan et al.(1986 and 1984) in arguing for employers and their 
strategic decision-making to be placed at the heart of any (national) industrial relations 
systems model. Given the need to nuance this argument, we now consider the 
importance of employers deciding whether to combine collectively with a view to joint 
bargaining or whether to evade such collective arrangements completely and to conduct 
negotiations with unions on their own. Within a South African context, these choices 
refer to an individual employer’s6 decision to partake in an industry bargaining forum
6 I readily concede Wedderbum’s observation that, in reality, an employer ‘is a fiction endowed with 
personality by the law’ below whom stand managers empowered by their Boards of Directors (or
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(namely a bargaining council) and thereby help realise the ambition of those wanting to 
see an inclusive form of employment relations evolve that is both organised and co­
ordinated. The central argument here is that the fate of any revised bargaining institution 
like that to be found in the new South Africa ultimately rests on employer strategies that 
help determine attitudes towards employer associability and its identification with 
multi-employer bargaining- the very focus of this thesis.
Accordingly, the next couple of chapters are organised around four key themes that are 
deigned to examine various aspects surrounding the relationship of employers to their 
associations and their significance for employment relations generally. The first 
explains, from a public policy viewpoint, the centrality of the employer to the eventual 
maturation of South Africa’s radically revised organised employment relations system -  
one that aspires to both economic co-ordination and to a form of (multi-tiered) 
articulated bargaining, best characterised as essentially semi-voluntarist but still 
enabling on the parties. To this end, the remainder of this chapter is devoted exclusively 
to an explanation as to why employers have had to be rehabilitated into any 
contemporary analysis of employment relations but especially when it comes to 
discussing countries like post apartheid South Africa that are built upon corporatist 
compromises or accords and that are also intended to be organised and co-ordinated 
(see, for example, Thelen 1994; 2000; 2001). The significance of both employer co­
ordination and cross-class coalitions forms the backbone to this part of the analysis.
This leaves scope for the three remaining themes to be explored in more detail in the 
proceeding chapter. Thus, the next topic for consideration contemplates the changing
equivalents) to develop views and make decisions consistent with their best interests (1971: 41 cited in 
Sisson 1987: 192). Nevertheless, for the purposes of advancing arguments, testing hypotheses and 
interpreting findings, I prefer to deploy this ‘fictional’ shorthand throughout this thesis.
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temper of the relationship between employers and their associations in a more 
contemporary setting and its relevance for this particular thesis.
Discussion also centres on received ideas as to why employers may rationally choose to 
associate or not but also updated to account for the impact globalisation might be 
having on employment relations strategy. By this means, the challenges and dilemmas 
facing associations in first attracting and then retaining membership are brought into 
sharper relief. This treatment allows us to locate more deep-seated elements of employer 
associability within the specific context of a South African economy in transit from 
being closed and protected to one open and liberalised as well as of a polity once 
racially exclusive, now pluralistically inclusive. Established ‘European’ and ‘South 
African’ literatures that are both conceptual and empirical in scope are drawn upon as a 
means of delineating for us the fundamental terms of the debate that is germane to this 
thesis. Such groundwork allows us in the final section to identify for ourselves what 
might be thought an appropriate research agenda, given the impetus behind this country 
study. However, the structure of both chapters is also driven by the need to address all- 
important questions concerning employer intentions towards, and their affinity with, 
associations that can protect and advance their interests as their bargaining agents within 
South Africa’s centralised bargaining process known as the bargaining council system.
First, why are employer motives now thought to be fundamental to the genesis and
sustainability of social corporatist systems, its institutions and processes, rather than
those of labour as first thought? After all, conventional thinking traditionally places
strong labour movements centre stage when it comes to identifying the historical
determinants of corporatist systems- at least in Europe- see, for example, Korpi (1983)
for a classic account of ‘union driven’ corporatism. What has now changed that makes
the employer become a primary focus of attention for this debate? To some extent, this
131
question refers to the part played by ‘employer co-ordination’ within advanced 
economies generally. Specifically, employers acting (more or less) cohesively lies at the 
heart of those economies exhibiting co-ordinated market characteristics and thereby its 
significance for emerging countries like South Africa that prefer seeing their own 
economies manifest similar attributes (Hall and Soskice 2001; Soskice 1990b and 
2000). But it also highlights the crucial role played by employers in choosing to enter 
into ‘cross-class coalitions’ with labour, as evidenced through political settlements 
reached at critical historical junctures such as that brokered in South Africa in 1995 
{after Bowman 1985; Fulcher 1991; Swenson 1989 andl991). This dichotomous agenda 
examines both political and economic rationales behind employer preferences to 
become collaborative and associational.
Second, what contemporary challenges to their standing have employers’ associations 
had to endure when trying to attract and keep employers in membership? This question 
refers to a growing propensity for employers in various North European settings to 
defect from the central bargain through either ‘disassociation’ when the opportunity 
presents itself or by forcing the association, as their bargaining agent, to withdraw from 
a central bargaining forum. For some, notably Pontusson and Swenson (1996), this 
phenomenon amounts to an ‘employers * offensive' against more organised forms of 
employment relations generally and centralised bargaining in particular. Others, namely 
Traxler, have observed a more nuanced position taken by other European employers 
whereby they stop short of a complete withdrawal from centralised bargaining 
arrangements but rather continue to engage with more diluted forms that amount to an 
‘organised decentralisation ’ of the whole bargaining structure (1995: 3-16). In this 
instance, employers are prepared to tolerate the demands of associability in return for 
increased discretion when it comes to implementing the terms of any centralised 
agreement.
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Such developments are held to be yet one more consequence of ‘globalisation’ and the 
resultant pursuit by governments and employers of ‘world-class competitiveness’ and 
are presumed to apply wherever multi-employer bargaining is to be found such as in 
South Africa itself. Of primary concern to us here is whether these same tendencies are 
present in a business community like that in South Africa that is obliged to operate 
within the context of a radically altered social, political and economic landscape. If so, 
does this amount to a comparable shift in attitude on the part of South African business 
both towards associational membership and centralised bargaining in the form of 
bargaining councils? To what extent, then, are South African employers prepared to 
engage with industry bargaining processes or to disengage themselves completely from 
this revised institution?. In short, given the South African scenario, which is the more 
likely outcome: ‘disassociation’ or ‘association’?
Third, can we assume that certain innate and elemental dilemmas and issues also 
confront South African employers when contemplating whether to subscribe to 
membership of an employers’ association and so empower it to act as their agent in 
bargaining council proceedings? After all, as with all organisations founded on 
voluntary subscription, members can always reserve for themselves the right to choose 
between ‘exit’, ’ voice ’ and ’loyalty ’ when it comes to the kind of relationship they wish 
to establish with their employers’ association (Hirschman 1970). The types of universal 
predicament that commonly face employers pondering associability are conventionally 
referred to as ‘collective action problems’ and have been especially well documented 
within the context of highly developed economies of the Northern Hemisphere (for 
example, Offe and Wiesenthal 1981; Olsen 1965; Streek 1991; Traxler 1993). But how 
widespread are these problems across the world? Are we right to assume their presence 
in emerging countries like South Africa that are simultaneously evolving economically, 
culturally and politically?
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Certainly, some commentators would wish to suggest that inherent dilemmas over 
associational membership can have a more idiosyncratic meaning for employers when 
exercising choice within the semi-voluntarist context of South Africa (for example, 
Bendix 1996; Donnelly 2001; Nattrass 1997). This requires us to familiarise ourselves 
with the kinds of ‘rational choice’ problem confronting South African employers when 
deliberating whether to become party to bargaining council proceedings through their 
membership of a registered association. But before doing this, we first need to remind 
ourselves of more conventional explanations as to why individual employers have 
preferred to act collectively in the first place and forego any autonomy and 
independence of action from that of their association.
Fourth, having established the general terms of the debate regarding employer 
associability, we turn our attention to more specific characteristics of organised business 
as they apply to South Africa and its distinctive history (for example, Nattrass 1998). 
This prompts the question as to how associational business in South Africa is structured 
and what significance this holds for us when examining its role in industry bargaining? 
Finally, given such particularisation, what are the main strengths and weaknesses of 
South Africa’s associational system, especially given the opportunity for employers to 
distance themselves from centralised bargaining processes? This especially refers to its 
capacity to industry bargain and to engage in other co-deterministic forums more 
generally. In short, does it have the wherewithal to become a leading corporatist 
institution in its own right or will it remain in the shadows, being confined to playing 
some peripheral role in any future developments? Reflecting throughout this and the 
proceeding chapter on these particular questions concerning employers and their 
associability should allow for the identification of a research agenda that can then 
inform the basis for my own study into a manufacturing employer’s disposition towards
association and industry bargaining from a South African standpoint.
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5.2 Employers and co-ordinated economies
Through a mixture of policy preference and pragmatic compromise, the new South 
Africa has shown desire for a type of corporatism that aspires to transcend a narrow 
remit of wage moderation and low unemployment (as characterised by earlier European 
prototypes) to one that helps transform both the economy and society. To this end, 
multi-tiered institutions have been put in place that are not merely intended to address 
‘distributional issues’ arising from apartheid’s legacy but also ‘production’ ones linked 
to recent trade liberalisation (after Streek 1992a in Thelen 1994: 116-8). Thus, South 
Africa’s conception of European-style social corporatism is tasked with helping to re­
distribute wage, jobs and skill acquisition from whites to non-whites as well as to 
adjusting the economy, restructuring industry and re-organising work in pursuit of 
economic advancement. Moreover, this type of employment relations is not just thought 
integral to this whole nation-building project but fundamental to reconstructing and 
developing the whole economy in a more unified and re-distributive way than had ever 
been conceived under apartheid. Seemingly, this imperative not only requires South 
African neo-corporatism to be ‘democratic’ and employment relations ‘organised’ but 
that the very economy itself behave in a ‘co-ordinated’ fashion across both labour and
product markets. But what exactly has this term come to mean and, more importantly,
«
what is its relevance for us when contemplating the nature of employment relations 
reform along corporatist lines as has occurred in the new South Africa.
This conception of economic co-ordination has been made manifest in certain North
European countries (notably Germany and Sweden), and is to be contrasted with Anglo-
Saxon counterparts such as Britain and the USA who favour their economies remaining
‘non-coordinated’ (Soskice 1990b: 174). This dichotomy is also thought crucial to
explaining the ‘varieties of capitalism’ as observed by others such as Albert (1993) and
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Hall and Soskice (2001). The former are to be categorised as ‘business-coordinated 
market economies’ (CMEs) in which ‘non-market co-ordination’ between firms figure 
prominently with the state setting the institutional framework into which labour 
becomes ‘incorporated’. In contrast, the latter, as ‘liberal market economies’ (LMEs), 
tolerate little collusive co-ordination between companies with the state kept at arm’s 
length and labour excluded as much as possible (Soskice 2000: 103). Under such 
circumstances, the logic is for employers to minimise forms of collective representation 
and regulation above the level of the firm and to maximise ‘managerial freedom’ down 
in the workplace, as is readily observed in certain Anglo-Saxon countries (Thelen 2001: 
99).
By comparison, business co-ordination has a strong presence in certain North European 
countries and tends to operate predominantly at the sectoral level. Here, employer 
associations and industry unions are seen as key actors but with worker and employer 
representatives incorporated into them and an ‘institutional framework’ (of incentives 
and constraints) in place that sets ‘the rules of the game’. These frameworks supposedly 
encourage the development of long-term co-operative relations between companies, 
workers and their owners as well as between the companies themselves (Soskice 2000: 
106). This is of particular interest to us given the case of South Africa where industry 
bargaining is meant to play such a fundamental role in terms of multi-tiered co­
determination. Indeed, there have even been attempts under the new dispensation for 
(tripartite) industry accords to be struck over policies that are intended to facilitate 
restructuring and productivity coalitions. As yet, however, these are far from being 
commonplace, seemingly restricted to highly exposed industries such as clothing, 
textiles and vehicle manufacture, and with mixed results (for details see Anstey 2004: 
64-68; Hirschson et al. 2000: 128-132). Just as importantly, we know little as to the
strategic thinking of South African employers when choosing between the competing
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behavioural ‘logics’ o f ‘business coordination’ and ‘non-coordination’ {after Thelen 
2001: 72-4).
Thus co-ordinated market economies are to be characterised by non-market institutions 
that aspire to provide certain ‘public goods’ considered beneficial from a policy 
perspective. These are to provide companies with access to long-term financing; as well 
as affording unions a key role in maintaining co-operative relations in the workplace 
and in co-ordinated wage bargaining across companies. In addition, these 
‘complimentary institutions’ are meant to encourage meaningful company investment in 
vocational training for young workers and sustain inter-company co-operation on 
technology development and industry standard-setting (Soskice 2000; 106-108). 
Arguably, the market co-ordination that these ‘institutional interconnections’ engender 
leads to superior economic performance and to improvements in overall international 
competitiveness (Soskice 1990b: 171-2 and 176-95). Moreover, as firms take root in 
these broader (politico- economic) institutions of finance, technology transfer, 
vocational training and education and even welfare, so do they appreciate more fully the 
virtues of bargaining co-ordination and to favour institutional processes that enhance it 
(Thelen 2002:384).
This is because such employers start to adopt a strategic outlook that sees strong unions
and centralised wage-setting as resources rather than as constraints on employers’
attempts to control unit labour costs, provide workers with appropriate skills and
consolidate co-operative relations with workforces (Thelen 2002: 387). Indeed, given
time, such employers come to realise that workplace co-operation can only become
sustainable through employment relationships that are ‘collectively managed’ above the
level of the firm (Thelen 2001: 73). For instance, within a contemporary European
context, it is assumed that some employers are increasingly drawn to the attractions of
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bargaining co-ordination through a shared pressure to adopt ‘best practice’ solutions as 
regards just-in-time’ technology, work organisation and employment terms (Sisson and 
Marginson 2002: 207-8). Co-ordinated standard-setting through industry agreement has 
its appeal for some from a restructuring perspective despite the continuing pull of 
decentralised bargaining. But how well do these same motivations play with their South 
African counter-parts plagued by an apartheid legacy of labour unrest, under­
capitalisation and labour-intensive production regimes?
But of equal concern to us is the fact that such synergetic advantages only accrue to 
employers when there is a high degree of employer co-ordination in place across all 
these realms, not just industry bargaining itself. Indeed, how effectively corporatist 
bargaining integrates with these other ‘interlocking complimentarities’ now becomes of 
central interest for anybody wanting South Africa to evolve a business co-ordinated 
market system of its own {after Soskice 2000: 109). Thus, strong employer co­
ordination provides a better chance of non-market co-ordination taking hold in ways 
that render emerging market economies like South Africa more, as opposed to less, 
coordinated. For industry bargaining reasons in particular but also in support of peak 
social dialogue (concertation), it is the numerical strength of employer associations that 
begins to matter in terms of determining employer co-ordinating capacity. The 
following set of reasons explains why this is an important precondition of employment 
relations systems becoming organised and, hence, co-ordinated in practice.
It seems bargaining co-ordination is strongly predicated on the institutional presence of 
multi-employer bargaining in a designated sector or industry. Indeed, the two appear to 
be positively correlated to one another in that the more organised multi-employer 
bargaining becomes the greater the degree of employer co-ordination across that sector 
(Traxler 2003a: 8). Obviously, the more employers that become incorporated into any
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central bargaining process the greater the number of employees covered by the terms of 
that same agreement and thereby the more likely we are to observe ‘horizontal co­
ordination’ appearing across that sector or industry (Traxler 2003b: 197-8). Meanwhile, 
the probability of such employer co-ordination occurring ‘vertically’ is further increased 
when there is also multi-level bargaining in situ that takes on an ‘articulated form’ such 
that higher-level agreements frame and inform those at lower levels (Crouch 1993 cited 
in Traxler 2003a: 8). What then becomes crucial under both ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ 
co-ordinated systems are the numbers of employers prepared to allow their association 
and peak bodies to act as their bargaining agent within the prescribed domain.
Thus, bargaining co-ordination and, by extension, both macro-economic co-ordination 
are heavily dependent on a ‘critical masse’ of employers being willing to combine 
together to form an employers’ organisation that represents their interests in their 
dealings with labour (Traxler 2003b:206). This I now refer to as ‘critical associabilty ’ 
by which is meant that a particular density of ‘associated’ employers is needed to 
ensure that bargaining co-ordination is the likely outcome from any centralised 
bargaining process. Of course, the reverse also holds: a certain level of disassociation 
(or defection from the central bargain) by employers seriously undermines the co­
ordinating capacity of any centralising bargaining mechanisms and, thereby, the 
emergence of social concertation itself (Vatta 1999: 248). Since South Africa’s 
transformed employment relations system aspires to co-ordination and social 
concertation, then ‘critical associability’ must become a central public policy concern 
and attention paid to the capacity of employer organisations to recruit, retain and govern 
potential and existing members. However, if associational membership levels begin to 
carry weight in this way, even more do the individual decisions of employers to 
associate voluntarily given that their automatic co-option into membership can no
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longer to be taken as read within a South African context of enlightened corporatism 
{after Thelen 1994: 120).
This line of argument is important for us to take for the following reasons. For Soskice 
(1990a), it is employer co-ordination, rather than labour strength and centralisation as 
portrayed in the more conventional corporatist literature, that now becomes the key 
variable in determining whether modem social corporatism succeeds in terms of 
desirable‘re-distributional’ and ‘growth’ outcomes. This is because the underlying basis 
for corporatist compromise has changed from one predominantly demand-orientated to 
one now supply-driven such that, for example, the ability of firms to compete in new, 
more dynamic internationalised markets commands our attention ahead of issues around 
wage distribution (see, for example, Streek 1992 b). This is as true for South Africa as 
anywhere else in light of its re-entry into a world economy best epitomised as 'global’. 
In light of these changes to the corporatist agenda (Thelen 1994: 109-110), the focus of 
analysis now properly switches towards the interests and strategies of employers and 
away from those of unions, as previously upheld by such as Cameron (1984); Korpi 
(1983) and Schmitter (1981). In short, it is the very capacity of employers to co­
ordinate themselves that secures wage restraint and that encourages necessary 
production innovation and adaptation to changing and volatile markets rather than the 
ability of trade unions to be affiliated, solidaristic and powerful. As a consequence, it is 
the business association that has become the most prominent corporatist actor in open 
economies, whether advanced or not. Moreover, the capacity of associations to organise 
and represent employer interests now becomes the central focus of attention, especially 
when it comes to their helping establish ‘wage co-ordination’ within institutionalised 
forms of pay determination (Soskice 1990a: 41-43).
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In pursuing this particular line of reasoning, it becomes necessary for us to place 
business associability, along with the very organisability of employer associations, 
centre-stage in any examination of the response of business to South African bargaining 
reform. This requirement is even more apparent if we acknowledge employer co­
ordination to be fundamental to concerted bargaining taking hold in ways auxiliary to an 
even broader economic co-ordination (Soskice 1990a: 58-60). This implies that the 
tendency for businesses to enter into association with each other (ie: their 
‘associability *) is dependant upon the perceived merits of co-ordination for employers. 
Unfortunately, the gains to be derived from membership are not self-evident given 
certain ‘collective-action’ problems for employers that appear detrimental to their 
interests (more on this later). They need to see virtue in an ‘institutional framework’ that 
equalises pay across skill levels (so as to discourage poaching); that promotes 
bargaining across sectors (in pursuit of wage restraint); and that also gives independent 
voice to workforces (in order to enhance flexibility and high-performance production) 
{after Soskice 2000: 116-7). But any benefits that employers might derive from taking 
collective action are counter-balanced by perceived drawbacks that primarily relate to 
their foregoing an autonomy and independence of action. This part of the analysis is 
held over for more detailed discussion in the chapter to follow.
As a consequence, an employer association’s capacity to convince prospective members 
of the merits of ‘associability’ and so draw them into associational membership (ie: 
their ‘organisability’) becomes an overriding consideration for those believing 
employer co-ordination integral to the sustainability of labour and product market co­
ordination. Equally significant are the preferences and concerns of employers when 
deliberating upon the attractions of a type of associational membership that ties them to 
industry bargaining processes. Put simply, exercising rational choice over associability
in the South African context not only reveals how predisposed employers are towards
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the revised centralised bargaining system but also their standpoint on grander notions 
concerning bargaining and marketing co-ordination. And yet, although acceptance of 
this economic rationale may prove to be a necessary condition for employer co­
ordination taking off, it is certainly not a sufficient one. There is also a parallel body of 
work that emphasises the political reasoning behind employers’ preferences for entering 
into alliances with organised labour that further the cause of corporatist bargaining 
institutions. This work, unlike that on the ‘varieties of capitalism’ as above, emphasises 
the importance of ‘agency’ rather than ‘broader institutional arrangements’ when it 
comes to making coalitions happen. In particular, this refers to the significant part 
played by elements of capital or labour in determining whether corporatist coalitions are 
likely to occur in the first place (Thelen 2002: 382).
53  Employers and ‘cross-class’ coalitions
As previously noted, conventional wisdom portrays neo-corporatist employment 
relations to be the product of labour movements that were both organisationally and 
politically powerful at the historical moment of its formation. In such cases, highly 
centralised union confederations are conceived of having converted a political and 
economic strength into a commanding institutional presence such that employers were 
then ‘pushed back’ into the shadows (Thelen 2002: 377). But others, notably Bowman 
(1985), Fulcher (1991) and Swenson (1989 and 1991) challenge this reading of labour 
history and argue the need for ‘bringing capital back in’ when discussing the origins of 
neo-corporatist bargaining structures (Swenson 1989: 513). For them, establishing the 
norm of centralised bargaining has just as likely rested on the support of key elements 
of the business community as on the presence of a strong labour movement. Indeed, 
using the example of post-war Denmark and Sweden, Swenson wishes to make the case 
for bringing the employer back into prominence more than ever before.
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Here, he demonstrates how a centralisation of bargaining occurred more at the behest of 
those employers finding advantage in promoting the institutional strength of labour 
rather than as the product of any significant shift in power from capital to labour (1989: 
515-542). Similarly, using game theory, Bowman shows us how, under certain 
conditions and constraints, employers can collusively promote the union’s pursuit of the 
Common Rule in sectors where intense market competition prevails (1985: 37-64). He 
then illustrates this tendency with an example drawn from the bituminous coal industry 
in the United States at the turn of the last century (65-77). In this case, organised 
employers actively promoted unionisation and industry bargaining as a means of 
standardising labour costs and even went so far as to give support to strikes aimed at 
forcing defectors back into the central bargain. A similar ‘cross-class alliance’ was also 
held to be at the heart of the development of Germany’s famed system of co-ordinated 
industry bargaining, but this time within sectors rather than across them.
Both these historical examples highlight the crucial part played by a critical ‘political’
element of the employer constituency in bringing about a centralised bargaining
institution, whether at national or sectoral level. Employers, not unions, seemed to be
the driving force behind such institutionalised arrangements, and, far from being
reluctant or passive participants in such cross-class coalitions, appeared supportive,
even pro-active. In short, they are better characterised as ‘regime makers’ rather than
‘regime takers’, as commonly pre-supposed, given their preparedness to help construct
and maintain corporatist bargaining in its various forms (Thelen 1994: 114). But does
this not also make them ‘regime consolidators’ in the sense of ensuring the
sustainability of centralised bargaining institutions, rather than their erosion, when
placed ‘under strain’ as witnessed recently in certain North European countries (see, for
example, Hassel 1999 but also Pontusson and Swenson 1996 and Thelen 2000)? It is
equally valid to ask this question of a country like South Africa where a significant re-
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regulation of centralised bargaining now underscores the semi-voluntarist nature of the 
system. At the time of political liberation and democratic reform in the mid 1990s,
South African employers were forced to confront dilemmas and make choices similar to 
those faced by their European counter-parts from a previous era (Donnelly 2001: 552).
Nonetheless, to argue that the employer warrants our attention ahead of that of the union 
movement is much more debatable when it comes to South Africa given the distinctive 
history and development of its labour relations as outlined in preceding chapters. A 
conventional narrative has independent ‘black’ labour, rather than ‘white’ business, as 
playing the more decisive role in ending apartheid labour relations and replacing it with 
a ‘bargained’ corporatism’ that formed the centrepiece of a negotiated settlement 
between the parties (Baskin 1993a). Yet, elements of both ‘white’ labour and capital, 
are commonly depicted as having acted in a combined ethnic and class alliance to help 
forge and maintain apartheid in the first place (eg: Lipton 1985: 256-364).
However, business was far from unanimous and whole-hearted in its collusive support 
for an economic apartheid that condoned job segregation, labour market duality and 
separate ethnic development and became increasingly opposed, on ‘cost benefit’ 
grounds, to measures that helped sustain it (Lipton 1985: 227-255). However, although 
the record shows ‘progressive’ employers helping to erode the worst features of 
apartheid labour market policy it was only a highly mobilised ‘black’ labour movement 
that could muster the necessary political and industrial might to dismantle the whole 
apartheid labour relations edifice (Donnelly and Dunn 2006: 3-8). The irony for us is 
that a strong labour aristocracy, as part and parcel of the white oligarchy, appears to 
have been instrumental in establishing apartheid labour relations and an increasingly 
powerful ‘black’ labour militancy, as the locus of internal political opposition, in its
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eventual removal. But this is not to deny that fragmented business interests were 
reactively, if also uneasily, both complicit in, and averse to, these labour developments 
but at different stages depending upon where the various political and economic drivers 
were taking them at any one time (Lipton 1985).
Labour strength, relative to that of capital, also crossed over into the era of reform that 
followed. It was the solidaristic power of organised labour, rather than that of business, 
that proved pivotal in forcing through corporatist reforms under late apartheid that were 
advantageous to its interests, most notably the Weihahn reforms of the early 1980s and 
the ‘Laboria Minute’ of 1990 (for example, Donnelly and Dunn 2006: 8-9). Likewise, 
many accounts (notably Adler and Webster 1995 and 2000; Baskin 2000; Harcourt and 
Wood 1998) place the labour movement at the forefront of a regime transformation that 
has taken place in employment relations, post liberation. The epitome of its status lies in 
a brokered legal dispensation that is considered to be relatively ‘labour-friendly’, not 
least in conferring on labour a political space in which to contribute to policy 
formulation (see, for example, Donnelly and Dunn 2006: 10-11). Labour also continues 
to exert influence over public policy beyond the realm of employment relations and 
labour markets, through its formal alliance with the ruling parties of the ANC and 
SACP (eg: Eidelberg 2000; Harcourt and Wood 2003: 91-2; Maree 1998; Southwall and 
Wood 1999: 73-4).
Indeed, the likes of Webster and Adler (1999) further maintain, albeit tentatively, that 
the institutional means are now in place to allow for the emergence of a new ‘class 
compromise’ to be formed around the twin demands of economic liberalisation and 
redistribution (347-9). Here, a ‘central compromise’ is supposed to form around the 
need to prioritise economic growth and adjustment in ways not just supportive of 
business but also in terms of generating sustainable jobs and rising living standards for
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workers across both formal and informal sectors. In return, labour would be required to 
forego its demand that all receive high wage, security and welfare guarantees (371-3). 
Such a general political exchange for South Africa amounts to a ‘bargained 
liberalization’ whereby ‘a new balance (is) to be struck between market and society’ in 
a transitional era of democratisation, reconstruction and globalisation (378-9).
Similarly, others like Harcourt and Wood (2003: 99-101) consider the prospects for a 
Labour Accord taking off not to be unreasonable, albeit subject to some qualification on 
their part. Just like Webster and Adler, they envisage union support for industrial peace, 
state (macro-economic) policy and wage restraint in exchange for ‘pro-labour public 
policies’ around training, unemployment insurance, social welfare and health schemes 
to lie at the heart of any such accord (2003: 87). But, again as with Webster and Adler, 
they readily accept that for it to materialise there needs to be a certain level of 
institutional capacity and degree of willingness from the parties that is currently lacking 
for reasons outlined in the preceding chapter.
Casting labour in the lead role when explaining the advent of ‘democratic corporatism’
in South Africa appears somewhat anomalous in comparison to a ‘North European’
interpretation of events that has the employer centre-field when it comes to the forging
and maintenance of corporatist coalitions {after Baccaro 2002a: 4 and 15). But
circumstances change and the conjunction of forces that gave rise to labour’s strength
under apartheid and its immediate aftermath may no longer prevail, to the detriment of
organised workers’ interests. The world-wide internationalisation of markets and
liberalisation of economies make this possibility ever more certain, given South
Africa’s recent entry into this new economic order. Issues around fiscal and monetary
discipline, free trade, export-led growth, world-class competitiveness and
modernisation, even privatisation, of public utilities and services are at the forefront of
most policy debates (eg: Bhorat et al. 2002: 1-6 and 14-16; Nattrass 1996; Padayachee
146
1998; Williams and Taylor 2000). These changed priorities for both state and business 
ensure that labour’s agenda around distributive justice and welfarism in and around 
work is of less prominence than inward investment, employment growth, labour market 
flexibility and skill development (eg: ILO 1999; Nattrass 2001).
Organised labour may well have proved to be the deciding factor in dismantling South 
Africa’s warped apartheid labour relations regime at the moment of political liberation 
(see chapter 3), but is this still the case, post liberation? Arguably for some (for 
example, Donnelly 2001: 553; Donnelly and Dunn 2006; Harcourt and Wood 2003: 92- 
4), the future foretells organised business to be evermore decisive in determining 
whether this new employment relations becomes institutionally robust and enduring 
against a backdrop of economic adjustment and industry restructuring. The questions 
remain however: are South Africa’s organised employers themselves still prepared to 
enter into further coalitions with labour both at peak and sectoral level as they have in 
their recent past? Will they continue to find virtue in appeasing a strong labour 
movement through centralised bargaining and labour accords as much as in times of 
past crisis or does the hegemonic ‘Washington consensus’ they now encounter set new 
agendas whereby political bargaining is perceived to be an inadequate response?
5.4 Some concluding thoughts
In sum, comparative studies regarding the extent to which centralised bargaining relies
upon the strength and centralisation of unions has now been superseded by a more
contemporary concern regarding the important role played by employers in helping to
first establish and then sustain it (Thelen 2002: 380). Perhaps this changed focus merely
reflects the times we live through and would apply equally to. South Africa as to
anywhere else. However what these country studies on ‘the varieties of capitalism’ and
‘cross-class coalitions’ also confirm is the fallacy of assuming that all employers always
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oppose either the introduction or continuation of neo-corporatist bargaining 
arrangements. Their views matter and can prove pivotal to the robustness of any multi­
employer bargaining system. What employers decide to do can but determine whether a 
coalition with labour holds and whether corporatist compromises are first likely reached 
and then maintained over time. Equally though, the particular ‘behavioural logic’ 
exhibited by employers towards centralised bargaining and their associability is likely to 
be influenced by the ‘variety of capitalism’ at large within the political economy of the 
country (after Thelen 2001: 102).
On both counts, there is sufficient historical evidence for Thelen to assert that the 
durability of centralised bargaining in some countries can be attributed as much to an 
employer’s attachment to such institutional arrangements as to labour’s defence against 
any attempts to undermine it (2002: 387). That said, employer co-ordination does not 
just evolve ‘organically’ but requires a framework of state support. Such cohesive 
behaviour is far from self-perpetuating, often being the likely product of political 
interplay between key actors. This also allows labour to be brought back into more 
contemporary analyses. Union strength can still play a decisive role in consolidating 
employer associability and co-ordination, especially in co-ordinated market economies 
(Thelen 2002: 396-7). For example, the need for employers in Sweden and Germany to 
dampen conflict and maintain peace in the workplace appears to have motivated their 
return to a centralised bargaining table (albeit with less enthusiasm than previously).
The relationship would seem to be symbiotic: ‘employers’ dependence on labor co­
operation shores up the power of unions which in turn keeps employers focused on 
strategies that depend on labor cooperation’ (Thelen 2001: 101-2). Nonetheless, what 
this recent example also reaffirms is that employers’ views on centralised bargaining 
and on the part to be played by their representatives (ie: employer associations) cannot
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be discounted when formulating employment relations policies that favour more 
organised employment relations systems, as in post apartheid South Africa.
Moreover, public interest concerns oblige policy-makers to discover and respond to 
such views, not least because of the trend towards economic liberalisation world-wide, 
and the concomitant rise to prominence of employers in both national and international 
labour markets, predominantly to the detriment of union power. This policy caution 
applies equally to South Africa as to any other country where there is a fragile policy 
consensus for a corporatist compromise to prevail, for employment relations to remain 
organised and for multi-employer bargaining to lie at the heart of both. In short, any re­
assessment of employers and their role confirms them to be pivotal actors in any neo- 
corporatist system that embraces centralised bargaining, economic co-ordination and 
social pacts. But, a policy preference for business (and labour) to be ‘organised’ is no 
guarantee of itself that this will happen given that the associability of employers is a
right, not a requirement of the constitution. So, the question that now comes to mind is
1/
how willing are South African employers to combine together on a voluntary basis 
within employer associations that then negotiate on their behalf? Indeed, how prone to 
collective action will employers prove to be under South Africa’s revised centralised 
bargaining system?
Equally germane to this discussion is the organising and negotiating capacity of South 
African employer associations themselves. But in order to start answering these 
questions we first need to understand the fundamental reasoning that lies behind an 
individual employer’s decision to belong to an association or not before looking closer 
to home at South African employers and their relations with their associations. 
Meditating upon an employer’s rationale in this way should help us to identify the 
attributes employer organisations themselves need to possess, the better to fulfil their
149
multi-employer bargaining obligations to their members. Hopefully, such analysis can 
lay the foundations upon which to construct a research agenda for ourselves that can 
then usefully inform the design of the fieldwork. This next chapter, therefore, attempts 
to discover what attracts and repels employers contemplating whether to associate or not 
as well as providing both contemporary and classical explanations as to why such a 
dichotomy might exist in the first place. We will also reflect upon the implications such 
analysis has for South African employer organisations and the overall bargaining 
council system with a view to problemitising employer associability for empirical 
purposes.
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Chapter 6. Employer solidarity and collective action: an agenda
6.1 Introduction: employers and their organisability into associations
We now go beyond general accounts of why communities of employers are showing 
themselves to be all-important actors in any contemporary employment relations scene 
into why individual employers might choose to combine (or not) with others and help 
establish an employers association in the first place. This preference is far from obvious 
given that some commentators, notably Windolf (1989), have already identified a 
trajectory that has enterprise bargaining on the rise in response to more flexible forms of 
work organisation and decentralised ‘productivity coalitions’ as the product of changed 
markets and technologies. In addition, the likes of Lash and Urry (1987) have even 
suggested a convergence towards ‘disorganised capitalism’ that is characterised by a 
secular decline in employer associability generally, the result of an internationalisation 
of capital and of a concomitant erosion in solidaristic ‘mass unionism’. As a 
consequence, this chapter is organised into various sections that, together, address a 
couple of questions of paramount interest to all those interested in the collective 
behaviour of employers.
Why is it that the logic of taking collective action can still outweigh the attractions of 
individual employer autonomy, especially in light of this more pessimistic prognosis? 
Conversely, what underlying factors might deter employers from acting collectively 
when given the option do otherwise? In short, what makes a decision to associate or not 
such an idiosyncratic one for employers and, thereby, difficult to determine in advance? 
In seeking answers, an established literature is drawn upon that identifies for us some 
defining issues regarding the ‘logic’ of collective action for employers (most notably 
that of Offe and Weisenhall 1980; Olsen 1965; Sisson 1987; Streek 1992b; Swenson
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1989; Traxler 1993 and 2003a,b and c; van Waarden 1995). But we first need to identify 
the potential benefits that are said to accrue to employers from acting collectively within 
the framework of an employers association before enquiring into why they might 
equally find associability less than appealing and so effectively defect from any 
subsequent central bargain. Finally, such an exercise sets the parameters for a more 
specific discussion of employers and their associability in a South African context as a 
means of identifying for us a research agenda more appropriate to this particular country 
case. Implicitly, this also requires us to examine the part to be played by employer 
associations themselves, both in terms of their ability in drawing employers into 
membership ( ‘organising capacity *) and in effectively representing their interests to 
organised labour ( ‘negotiating capacity1).
6.2 What drives employers into acting collectively?
By a ‘logic of collective action’ is meant the rationale that lies behind an employer’s 
decision to combine with their peers within an employer association that then acts as a 
single bargaining unit on their collective behalf. This presupposes a rational choice to 
be made by the employer, having first undertaken a kind of cost/benefit analysis that 
weighs the potential payoff for prospective members from associational membership 
and collective action against any possible drawbacks. The choice is often reduced to a 
preference between having an association mediate on behalf of oneself and others and 
subsequently act as the bargaining agent or having to negotiate directly with the 
union(s) oneself and consequently act independently of any other (associated) employer. 
Reasons why employers find virtue in being collectively organised in this way are 
invariably linked to their own perceptions of their organisational and labour market 
power relative to that of workers and their representatives. Equally important are those 
cognitions that are often themselves the product of historical country-specific ‘patterns
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of industrialisation’ (Sisson 1987; 10-16). However, the most frequently cited reasons 
as to why employers prefer to see their association representing their bargaining 
interests at sectoral or industry level appear to be threefold as follows.
The first two relate to an employer’s desire to exercise two contrasting methods of 
control from both inside (‘managerial *) and outside ('market ’) the workplace 
(Chamberlain and Khun 1965). It seems that where a union is considered a force to be 
reckoned with, employer sovereignty can only be maintained through the employer 
making alliance with it and regularising the formal relationship between the two of them 
(Flanders 1974: 355-6). This means that the bargaining structure from an employer’s 
perspective is best viewed as a system of control that defines the nature and extent of 
union involvement in ‘rule-making’ (Sisson 1987: 190). Meanwhile, the third concerns 
itself with certain administrative efficiencies that are to be derived from the actual 
multi-employer bargaining process itself (Pierson 1961).
Taking this ‘efficacy’ explanation first, small employers are commonly thought not to 
possess the necessary resource to handle the complexities routinely associated with 
managing contemporary relationships with their trade union counterparts (Pierson 1961:
41). It is commonly assumed that industry bargaining and associational membership 
generates economies of scale to the benefit of hard-pressed employers in terms of time, 
effort and staff savings (Sisson 1987: 188). These resource gains arise from their 
associations acting as specialist centres of expertise for their members. As such, 
employer organisations can provide full-time officials dedicated to working closely with 
elected representatives from member companies in determining policy, advancing 
employer interests and fire-fighting on their behalf whenever necessary (Watson 1988 
cited in Famham 1993: 42). In taking out membership with an association, each 
employer not only accedes to the authority of ‘professionally equipped people’ to
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handle shared problems but also, along the way, acquires an improved professionalism 
in the management of their own employment relations, albeit at one remove (Pierson 
1961: 41). All told, associability supposedly compensates individual employers for 
shortfalls in resource and expertise and so enhances their capacity for managing their 
labour relations effectively. But this type of ‘utility’ justification is unlikely of itself to 
prove sufficiently attractive in tempting larger employers into associational 
membership. The prospect of enhanced control over both labour markets and 
workplaces is also thought to play its part in drawing employers, irrespective of their 
size and capacity, towards the attractions of collective action through formal 
association.
Market control for employers is achieved through their participation in cartelizing 
behaviour within labour markets jointly regulated by industry agreements. The shared 
intention is clear. Such agreements are meant to facilitate ‘the regulation of competition 
in both labour and product markets’ by taking wages out of competition (Sisson 1987:
42). The premise at work here is that by negotiating a fairly standardised set of pay and 
conditions with a trade union across an industry or sector, employers can effectively 
remove from competition a vital cost element of production, namely wages (Sisson 
1987: 5 and 1991: 265). The theory underlying this assumption is that extending multi­
employer pay agreements to all employers across an industry allows those companies to 
compete in product markets other than on the basis of undercutting each other’s labour 
costs. Such self-regulation is predicated on joint adherence to the ‘Common Rule’ as 
observed by the Webbs whereby minimum labour standards are imposed under industry 
agreement on employers, below which no one employer is permitted to fall. This is 
because:
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‘when the associated employers in any trade conclude an agreement with the Trade Union, 
the Common Rule thus arrived at is usually extended by the employer, as a matter of 
course, to every workman in their establishment, whether or not he is a member of the 
union’ (Webb and Webb 1913: 209 cited in Farnham 1993: 274).
The hope is that, in this way, competitive wage cutting can be circumvented, a ‘race to
the bottom’ thwarted and labour unrest subdued. A corollary to this is that collective
action by employers also, protects individual employer organisations against being
‘picked o ff in turn by unions during trade disputes. Likewise, where unions are able to
exercise strong bargaining power against single-employer negotiators, individual
employers may feel themselves vulnerable to ‘whipsawing tactics’ on the part of union
negotiators such that they become fearful of industry wage norms being pushed up
above that established under a multi-employer bargaining regime. In such
circumstances, industry bargaining becomes attractive to those employers seeking
protection from strong unions able to deploy leapfrogging tactics in pay negotiations.
As a consequence, they are drawn to the notion that restrained wage-setting behaviour
and pay moderation are more likely outcomes under industry bargaining than under
single-employer bargaining processes. The presumption is that the affordability
arguments of individually weak employers are more likely to prevail once they choose
to act solidaristically. Their propensity to act collectively presupposes the negotiating
hand of employer representatives to be strengthened relative to that of labour in any
industry-wide pay bargaining forum.
Finally, another ‘negative incentive’ besides that of protectionism from powerful labour 
movements, may also play its part in driving employers to combine. This occurs in 
cases where legally enforced ‘extension rules’ operate such that the terms of any 
industry agreement apply equally to all employers in that specified sector or industry. 
Despite individual employers being neither party to such agreements nor members of 
the relevant ‘contracting’ employer association, they may still find themselves legally
155
bound by agreed terms reached in their absence. Often the policy thinking behind such 
‘ergo omnes’ rules is that non-party employers then become incentivised to partake in 
centralised bargaining processes and, thereby, hopefully influence bargaining outcomes 
to which they will be tied regardless. The likelihood of this occurring decreases in the 
absence of any legal extension (Traxler 2000: 313).
In sum, the espoused attractions of multi-employer bargaining lie in the possibilities it 
offers to individual employers. It can buttress their individually weak bargaining 
position (viz a viz a union counterpart), put a floor under wage competition, 
institutionalise labour conflict and, in so doing, mount a ‘collective defence’ against 
powerful unions (Silvia 1997: 190). Indeed, Streek (1992b cited in Thelen 1994: 119) 
goes further in arguing that such macro-bargaining produces certain ‘collective goods’ 
that deregulated markets and fragmented bargaining find some difficulty in 
guaranteeing -  namely, ‘social peace’ and ‘skills’. But, how well does this exclusively 
(North) European viewpoint strike a cord with South African employers having 
experienced their shortage under apartheid (chapter three) and having to develop 
strategies appropriate to markets and institutions in transition, post apartheid (as 
documented in chapters two and four)? Certainly the implication from Sisson (1987: 43) 
is that employers are universally afforded some measure of market control through such 
means. And yet, once again according to Sisson (1987: 188-91 and 1991: 260-1 and 
265-7), there is something even more important that multi-employer bargaining can 
offer employers seeking to placate strong unions other than just market control. This 
relates to their ultimate desire to exercise a ‘managerial control ’ over their workers in 
the actual workplace and it is this aspect of multi-employer bargaining we turn to next.
Sisson claims unambiguously that it is ‘the neutralisation of the workplace from trade 
union activity’ that is uppermost in the minds of those employers contemplating
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collective action solutions to their problems of managing alongside unions (1987: 188). 
By neutralisation is meant the possibility for employers of counteracting union power 
and influence in the workplace, if not confining it (1991: 265). Some employers may 
come to feel that adherence to industry agreements better insulates the workplace from 
union interference by limiting the freedom of action available to worker representatives. 
The reasons why negotiations that take place outside of the workplace are commonly 
thought to bolster managerial control inside it are held to be threefold. First, in return 
for conceding that certain substantive issues can now be subject to industry-wide 
agreement, employers seek to bind unions, either implicitly or explicitly, to the idea of 
the former reserving for themselves the right to have the final say over all other 
(workplace) matters (1991: 267). Second, it is commonly thought that reaching industry 
agreements provides individual employers with the wherewithal for extending the scope 
of managerial unilateralism even further. This is because the terms of such settlements 
are often meant to establish norms or minima across an industry that domestic 
negotiations can then likely build upon to the advantage of the local employer. Besides, 
they still afford employers considerable leeway when it comes to their implementation 
locally. What additional workplace negotiations (if any) that take place, are merely 
‘administrative or supplementary’ in nature to industry agreements already struck 
(1987: 188).
Finally, given the fixed-term and comprehensive nature of many of these multi­
employer deals, it often proves problematic for unions and their members to mount 
selective action against individual employers during the lifetime of such an agreement 
in support of broader claims and grievances beyond the workplace (1991: 261). Thus, it 
is the very structure of multi-employer bargaining itself that can be used to ‘neutralise’ 
the overall influence that any union might be able to exert within individual workplaces.
Moreover, rather than wages being taken out of competition through industry-wide
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bargaining it is the very ‘mode of regulation’ itself (that is, individualised contracts and 
company agreements) that is to be removed from the competitive field for rival firms. 
Crucially, this means that the way the employment relationship is to be managed 
becomes an overriding consideration in itself for employers. Indeed, the suggestion is 
that, in the final analysis, it is this aspect of ‘control capacity’ that can prove invaluable 
to an employer when it comes to improvements in productivity or performance (Traxler 
2003a: 6-7).
Meanwhile, what past experience also tells us, according to Pierson (1961: 622-3), is 
that some circumstances are more likely to induce employers into associability than not. 
This likelihood increases when there is intense product market competition between 
firms, where direct labour costs form a high proportion of total costs and where unions 
correspondingly exercise a strong presence within their own and rival firms. Any one 
circumstance may prove sufficient to draw employers into collective action but when all 
three are in play, then associability is thought to become ever more desirable. Under 
such conditions, collective action undertaken through association is aimed as much at 
employers who might break ranks as at overbearing unions seeking to divide and rule. It 
is worth asking whether South African employers recognise themselves to be similarly 
placed to that described above. This is especially the case given the uncertainties they 
face following a change in regime that bestows a prominent institutional voice and 
pronounced political status on an already powerful labour movement still in formal 
alliance with a new and popular ruling party?
Taken together, the three dynamics to collective action outlined above are assumed to 
be powerful forces at work in driving employers into associational membership 
generally. But the question bears repeating as to how compelling are these arguments 
for South African employers who are not only obliged to adjust to regime change in
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their relationships with labour but also to the double transition of economic 
liberalisation and political democratisation. This requires them, amongst other things, 
to acknowledge an apartheid legacy of workplace militancy, of exploitative non­
competitive wage fixing through industrial council agreements but also of the rise in 
enterprise bargaining and workplace organisation (see chapters 3 and 4).
But to what extent do they perceive themselves facing similar opportunities, and not just 
threats, in their ability to exercise control arising from South Africa’s own recent 
historical (corporatist) compromise as enshrined in the new legal dispensation regarding 
a re-institutionalised multi-employer bargaining system, namely Bargaining Councils? 
Fundamentally, do the conventional explanations as to why employers elsewhere have 
shown a preference for taking collective action in the past still resonate with 
contemporary South African businesses when confronting the challenges and dilemmas 
of an employment relations system undergoing transition? Alternatively, how aware are 
they of divergent trends and developments taking place in both European and Anglo- 
Saxon countries regarding the degree to which the bargaining structure is centralised or 
not? And, all-importantly, how much do these public policy debates taking place in the 
Northern Hemisphere over the appropriateness of the bargaining level resonate within a 
South African business community being forced to adjust not just economically but also 
politically and socially? It is these more contemporary debates that now command our 
attention.
6.3 What deters employers from acting collectively nowadays?
For Sisson, employers often consider a particular bargaining structure to be ‘a system of 
control that defines the nature and extent of union involvement’ in any overall rule- 
making process. But this is also to suggest that the structure is more often than not a
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matter of historical compromise rather than one of rational choice exercised by 
reasonable parties with near power equivalence (1987: 190-91). Indeed, the prevailing 
market conditions that confront employers can readily explain their preference for a 
particular bargaining level. For example, we might expect to see employers being more 
welcoming of centralised bargaining in industries such as printing, building and 
clothing where competition is intense, capitalisation relatively low, profit margins 
narrow and themselves relatively weak negotiators in comparison to union counterparts. 
Conversely, single-employer bargaining is more to be expected in less competitive 
industries such as heavy engineering that contain employers who are relatively large, 
capital-intensive and immobile and have highly-integrated work processes that employ 
large numbers of workers with firm-specific skills (Sisson 187: 6-7 cited in Klerck 
1998: 90).
Thus, it is left to individual employers to seize on any favourable opportunities that
might come their way and to effect, within given contextual constraints, alterations to
bargaining structures, notably changes to bargaining levels that better suit their interests.
For instance, increased employer opportunities to exploit favourable labour market
conditions is said to explain the recent rise in bargaining decentralisation, as does a
corresponding decline in the incidence of centralised bargaining for some of the
advanced economies of Europe and the OECD over the last two decades or so (see, for
example, Katz 1993; Traxler et al. 2001). Crucially, it seems that, from the late 1970s
onwards, union power has waned as structural unemployment has grown and as the
state, in abandoning Neo-Keynesian policies and adopting monetarist measures, has
chosen to become less responsive to organised labour’s plight. These trends have only
encouraged employers to exploit the resultant competition for jobs amongst workers to
their advantage in a contest with labour over the preferred bargaining level. Whereas in
the 1960s and 1970s, strong unions generally agitated for less centralised bargaining
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and employers for more, the reverse has occurred subsequently with organised labour 
having to defend multi-employer bargaining arrangements in the teeth of growing 
employer opposition (Traxler 2003a: 1-2). It appears from the evidence for twenty 
OECD countries that many employers are drawn to decentralisation (in the form of 
individualised contracts and single-employer bargaining) in pursuit of an extended 
managerial control over employment terms rather than from a determination to improve 
productivity performance and competitiveness (Traxler (2003a: 18-19). The question 
now arises as to whether these same tendencies can be observed amongst those 
employers who have to strategically manage their employment relations in emerging 
and transforming economies like South Africa where there is a sustained public policy 
support for multi-employer bargaining to take place.
Furthermore, this same evidence also points to some employers in advanced economies 
seeking to regain managerial control through a decentralisation of bargaining down to 
the enterprise level as a consequence of their disenchantment with industry bargaining. 
This is because the original reasons that made industry bargaining appear so attractive 
to individual businesses are no longer considered to be as alluring. First, the ability to 
take wages out of competition has been somewhat undermined by a growing 
internationalisation of markets. Second, neutralising unions in the workplace is more 
difficult to achieve given the increase in rights for workplace representatives across 
Europe generally. Third, employers’ fears of whipsawing tactics being deployed by 
strongly placed unions have diminished somewhat as the latter’s pay bargaining powers 
have waned overall (Traxler 2003a: 19). Also, the effect of legally extending 
agreements to non-participating employers has been somewhat tempered by increasing 
recourse to ‘hardship’ or ‘opening’ clauses (see above).
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But these same conditions can also be said to have arisen in post apartheid South 
Africa. Its re-entry into a globalised competitive environment has forced employers in 
the exposed sector of the economy to make a company’s market performance its highest 
priority. Privatisation, marketisation and outsourcing in conformance with ‘value-for- 
money’ norms have all led to a comparable impact on public sector employers. How 
convinced are such employers that wage costs are now a source of heightened inter-firm 
competition, especially given how labour intensive their markets are and how much 
does this influence their thinking towards macro-bargaining generally as reflected in 
their support or otherwise for bargaining councils? The degree to which South African . 
employers perceive industry bargaining to be a help or hindrance in their endeavours to 
catch up with overseas competitors has yet to be established. Moreover, the new 
legislative dispensation, together with a re-drafted constitution that now concurs with 
ILO labour standards, enshrines the right of association in ways that can only strengthen 
the organising capacity of unions in the workplace, not least when it comes to 
workplace forums.
Finally, some would also wish to argue that the existence of a large informal economy 
and the high rates of unemployment in the formal sector can only militate against the 
bargaining power of unions despite their past and present strength. Accordingly, a 
dampening effect on the union premium can only be a matter of time despite 
contemporary evidence to the contrary. But do employers hold to similar views? In 
short, how discouraged are South African employers from participating in multi­
employer bargaining and thus drawn to the virtues of single-employer bargaining as has 
been the case with employers in some (but not all) advanced countries of the Northern 
Hemisphere?
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The question also arises as to whether South African employers, in having to ‘manage’ 
their labour relations in a period of racial, political and economic upheaval, perceive 
similar opportunities to decentralise opening up for them as has been reported for other 
employers in certain OECD countries by such as Crouch and Traxler (1995) and Traxler 
et al. (2001). At the extreme, this disenchantment with multi-employer bargaining has 
already been made manifest through an ‘employer offensive’ against peak bargaining 
arrangements in both Sweden and Denmark throughout the 1990s (Pontusson and 
Swenson 1996; 2000). Most notably, Sweden’s export-orientated engineering 
employers took the lead in dismantling well-established centralised bargaining 
machinery once this framework of centralisation was perceived to have failed them in 
terms of eliminating restrictive wage rigidity and delivering highly-prized flexibility 
(Pontusson and Swenson 1996: 235-9; 2000: 103). Might South African exporting 
companies be expected to adopt similar attitudes when exposed to international trade 
liberalisation?
Primarily, it would seem to be the pursuit of new ‘flexibility-driven production
strategies’ that lies behind much of the pressure for more firm-level autonomy in wage
bargaining. However, it is also worth pointing out that this campaign to decentralise
bargaining has not been without opposition from within the ranks of other employer
groups (notably public sector interests), sparking only further division within an already
‘heterogeneous’ employer constituency (Pontusson and Swenson 1996: 239-42). What
this case demonstrates, and what recent studies from Germany also confirm (for
example, Behrens and Jacoby 2004: 98-100; Thelen 2000; Thelen and Kume 1999), is
that a serious debate is taking place between employers in those countries where
centralised (either industry or peak) bargaining has a significant institutional hold. The
norm of centralised bargaining appears to have become a contested arena for European
employers generally. At its core lies the appropriate balance to be struck between
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‘centrally-bargained parameters’ and ‘plant-level flexibility’ (Thelen 2001: 83). Two 
camps have become prominent within this debate, each holding directly opposing views 
to the other when it comes to their institutional preferences for bargaining: the 
disengaged and the re-engaged. I will now deal with each in turn.
First, there are those of the disengaged who consider it to be in an employer’s ‘natural 
interest’ to be campaigning for the abandonment of multi-employer bargaining 
generally because of its one-size-fits-all approach and, if not forthcoming, to 
disassociate themselves from any central bargain, when able to do so. Why industry 
standards established under agreement are best avoided is because they are thought by 
defectors to be dysfunctional since they interfere with an employer’s ability to respond 
flexibly to new requirements in the marketplace for product diversity and quality -  most 
likely on a ‘just-in-time’ basis (Thelen 1994: 119). Standardising employment terms 
through peak or sectoral agreements acts as a drag on employers as they struggle to 
cope with the uncertainties surrounding growing market volatility and intensified 
competition. For Silvia (1997: 187-8), this disengagement reveals itself, in the case of a 
recently unified Germany, either through ‘association flight’ (members exiting their 
association) or through ‘association avoidance’ (new employers declining offers of 
membership). Seemingly, either tactic enables German employers to enjoy a status that 
is ‘association free’ and, by inference, industry bargaining-free to boot.
Meanwhile, there are those who still favour a type of re-engagement with ‘connective 
bargaining’ (Behrens and Jacoby 2004: 112) but on terms that now take account of their 
desire for flexibility and the associated agenda for bargaining reform that logically 
follows. Re-engaged employers continue to find virtue in a bargaining system that can 
generate a number of collective goods that they have come to rely on in the workplace -  
an ample supply of skilled labour, wage restraint, labour peace and, above all, some
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labour market predictability. Although they may remain ambivalent about completely 
abandoning super-firm level bargaining, nevertheless, this has not stopped them from 
wanting to renegotiate the terms under which it takes place. The goal has been to create 
a ‘controlled flexibilisation’ of the workplace by loosening the imposition of any central 
agreement (Thelen 2001: 84-5).
In the case of Germany, this has been achieved through the introduction of ‘opening (or 
‘hardship’) clauses’ into industry agreements that allow for variations from the latter 
favourable to the employer. Such clauses enable individual firms either to exempt 
themselves from certain terms on grounds of adversity or to use them as a basic 
framework for further local negotiation that more adequately reflect local 
circumstances. By such means can ‘exceptions’ and ‘derogations’ at the enterprise level 
be tolerated at industry level but only at risk of an ‘institutional fragmentation’ setting 
in whereby agreed industry norms effectively become agreed industry minima (Grahl 
and Teague 2004: 565-6). On the other hand, wholesale defection from the central 
bargain is averted by introducing a form of ‘organised decentralisation’ that 
pragmatically, if uneasily, builds some flexibility into the institutional framework 
without completely forsaking bargaining co-ordination at the multi-employer level 
(Traxler 1995: 7-8). The question that begs an answer is whether this same phenomenon 
is discernible closer to home in South Africa? In short, how strongly does this 
European-led debate over the appropriateness of the bargaining level resonate within 
South Africa’s own business community?
It would certainly seem worthwhile asking whether South African employers similarly
wish themselves to be identified with this debate by reference to their own revised
bargaining system. If so, to what extent does the contested nature of this bargaining
structure intrude on their thinking when reflecting upon the merits or otherwise of
165
having their associations make joint (industry-wide) settlements with trade unions on 
their behalf? Can we detect a similar schism opening up within the South African 
business community over the relative utility of decentralised bargaining as has already 
been observed in certain Northern European countries? Will South Africa’s newly- 
created bargaining council system be placed under similar strain from the outset to that 
in Germany and Sweden, previously held in high regard as exemplars of centralised 
bargaining regimes? The concern here is that its introduction is to be characterised 
initially by employers seeking to nullify industry bargaining, either through ‘flight’ or 
avoidance’, to the extent that it’s overall co-ordinating capacity is undermined severely. 
What are the chances of South African employers exhibiting similar traits to those 
found in parts of North Europe with similar results? As will be shown later in more 
detail, the legislation allows for this very possibility through the requirements 
surrounding their registration with a bargaining council. Equally, and contrary to 
decentralisation trends noted earlier, South African employers might consider their 
circumstances to be so objectively different that shifting the gravity of bargaining away 
from industry to enterprise level could be thought ambiguous and risky in comparison to 
businesses operating in Europe, North America and Australasia.
In short, how much of a bearing does this euro-centric debate have on South African
employers deciding whether to associate or disassociate and, thereby, to endorse or
embargo multi-employer bargaining? Are the arguments in favour of more enterprise-
level activity at the expense of industry negations as attractive to South African
employers as for those from the more advanced economies? Or is there a similar
propensity to associate conditional upon there being sufficient leeway afforded to
individual firms at the enterprise level to make associability and engagement with
industry bargaining still worthwhile? Certainly the way that bargaining councils are
presently constituted under the legislation (Labour Relations Act, 1995, s 30 (1)), allows
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recipients of industry agreements to seek ‘exemption’ from their implementation on 
grounds of hardship. How significant is this aspect of the bargaining council system in 
drawing employers into a type of associational membership that also makes them 
‘party’ to industry bargaining proceedings? Seeking answers to these and other 
questions regarding employer views and intentions towards employer associability and 
industry bargaining must feature as an integral part of any research inquiry into what 
helps mould their thinking when it comes to bargaining reform in the new South Africa.
However, what is also missing from this account of associability is some deeper 
understanding of the more fundamental reasoning commonly assumed to underpin 
employer decisions to associate or not. Unlike the preceding analysis, this refers to a 
presumed overriding ‘logic’ at work that is inherent in the minds of most employers 
when rationally choosing between alternatives, irrespective of whatever political and 
economic contingencies predominate (Traxler 1995: 23). Thus, the innately rational 
thought processes that are said to inform employer choice over taking collective as 
opposed to individual action also need to be incorporated into any contemporary 
analysis of associablity. Accordingly, an account of what is classically thought to 
preoccupy employers and the dilemmas they face when deliberating upon associability 
matters is set out below.
6.4 What ‘collective action’ dilemmas confront employers?
Fundamentally, there are three kinds of ‘collective action’ problem that can impede the
organisation of employers into associations. First, the free-riding tendencies of potential
members may undermine the overall appeal of associabilty. Second, having insufficient
interests in common (ie: ‘weak interest homogeneity’) may only encourage a tendency
in members not to comply with (parts of) industry agreements they do not like- that is,
to ‘cherry-pick’ only what is agreeable to them. Third, a specific power disparity that
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favours individual employers (potential members) at the expense of their associations 
only exacerbates this problem of associability (Van Waarden 1995: 69-71). From an 
associational perspective, these three obstacles to collective action can be separated into 
the dual problem of membership avoidance and non-compliance with agreements.
These issues, though obviously inter-connected, are not the same. The willingness of 
employers to belong to an association is not a sufficient condition of their willingness to 
fully comply with the terms of any agreement brokered by their association (Traxler 
1995: 25). This distinction has important repercussions for associations struggling to 
both recruit and regulate employers within their domain and renders ‘employer 
organisability’ intrinsically problematic (Tolliday and Zeitlin 1991: 22). Each of these 
more fundamental issues is now discussed in turn.
‘free-riding'
Essentially, rational-choice theorists, notably Olsen (1965), have challenged the explicit
link between collective organisation and an employer’s pursuit of shared interests with
others. The success of collective action generally presupposes a group members’
rational pursuit of their predetermined economic interests that is not necessarily
forthcoming in practice. This unpredictability happens because the very notion of acting
collectively is itself subject to countervailing pressures arising from both an individual
and collective rationality pulling employers in opposite directions simultaneously
(Traxler 1995: 24). Indeed, even when associational members see themselves as having
interests in common around the production of such collective goods as wage
moderation, labour peace, restructuring and training, individual employers may shrink
from contributing to the upkeep of these ‘collective goods’ through refusing to pay their
fair share for them. At the extreme, this can result in such ‘free-loaders’ successfully
avoiding having to pay their way altogether should the opportunity present itself
(Tolliday and Zeitlin 1991: 18-19). The nature of this ‘free rider’ problem is thought to
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be two-fold in essence. Any benefit to be derived from such collective goods cannot 
simply be restricted only to those ‘loyal’ members that pay for them but automatically 
extends to ‘disloyal’ members as well. However, to compound the problem even 
further, the latter not only manage to take a ‘free ride’ but also save on any costs 
incurred by those individual employers willing to pay the price for any action necessary 
to ensure the collective good. The former, as ‘free -riding’ individuals optimise their 
interests by maximising the gains and minimising the sacrifices to be made but at the 
expense of those who remain steadfast within their associational group (van Waarden 
1995: 70).
Famously, this creates a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ (or double bind) for every individual
employer able to make the above calculus regarding their associational membership
(Olsen 1965). Should an individual employer choose not to succumb to temptation but
stay true to the group then the expectation must be that others will not be so
circumspect, free-ride and, hence, ‘play foul’. Fear of being taken for a ‘sucker’ -
having to ‘pay’ for what others can obtain ‘free’- motivates otherwise loyal associates to
behave similarly, even in a pre-emptive fashion. Such thinking encourages rational
individual decision-making to produce ‘irrational collective results’ (Van Waarden
1995: 70). Moreover, this ‘collective action’ paradox is further compounded by the fact
that employers, for the most part, are well equipped to identify the options available to
them and their consequences. More than any other interest group, they can call on a
ready supply of resources (finance, staff and expertise) to inform their choice -making
and to conduct a cost-benefit analysis for each alternative. Even more problematical is
the fact that most, if not all, employers are used to operating within competitive
environments of one sort or another in ways that condition them to take the most
rational course of action that guarantees their survival and maximises their interests. In
addition, such an outlook is buttressed by business norms that condone legitimise and
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even value one competitor outwitting another (Van Waarden 1995: 71). In short, we 
should not be surprised if associability inherently goes against the grain for many 
employers, at least in the first instance. Not surprisingly then, the temptation to free ride 
is much greater for employers than, say, workers and so reduces their general 
‘organisability’ into associations overall.
Thus, employer associabilty (when narrowly defined as the propensity of employers to 
associate) can only really be guaranteed under exceptional circumstances even when 
group interests are fairly homogeneous. The first set of circumstances takes the form of 
a coercion that obliges beneficiaries to contribute to the common good in some way. In 
public policy terms this frequently refers to the use of legal extension to industry 
agreements and explains their presence in many centralised wage-fixing systems 
(Traxler 2003c: 152-3). The second arises when compliance becomes the norm for 
members of a small group tempted by the allure of various social and economic 
incentives (for example, networking opportunities). The third emerges when employer 
solidarity is underscored by the provision of such ‘selective incentives ’ for associated 
members as low-cost insurance, or expert advice and representation. The fourth and 
final circumstance transpires where individual employers are sufficiently (well) 
resourced as to provide some measure of the good themselves (Olsen 1965: 141-8). For 
these reasons, any offer of collective organisation from employer associations becomes 
inherently problematic for employers generally. But, more importantly for our purposes, 
the likely prospect of free-riding occurring (whether initiated by themselves or others) 
acts as a deterrence against individual employers subscribing to associational 
membership. Whether it remains a sufficient deterrent against membership-joining 
overall is more open to question. As earlier analysis has demonstrated, the actual 
context in which an employer’s dilemma to freeload or associate is worked through will
also have its part to play in determining the eventual outcome.
170
‘govemability’ and non-compliance
Equally problematic is the matter of compliance by businesses with the wishes of their 
associations. Belonging to an employer organisation for employers does not necessarily
*7
equate with abiding by its rules or conforming to its goals - and vice versa . At* heart lies 
the problem of employer associations struggling to unity members’ diverse interests 
(Traxler 1993: 678). This divergence arises because each and every member firm has its 
own distinctive characteristics in terms of its size, production methods, markets, capital 
formation, organisational structures and decision-making processes to name but a few. 
Such differences between members may well lead to sectional, if not opposing, 
interests. ‘High interest heterogeneity’ across a membership can only hinder the search 
for ‘common ground’ within an association (van Waarden 1995: 70). For instance, 
membership tensions may arise between large and small firms, exporters and home- 
producers or between close rivals in labour, capital and product markets that make any 
resolution of differences difficult for an association to achieve.
Charged with the complex task of unifying associational goals, an employers’ 
organisation is likely forced into ‘filtering out irreconcilable interests’ in the process 
and so increasing the propensity for dissenting members to defect from compliance with 
any terms of an agreement with which they disapprove (Traxler 1993: 678). This 
problem is compounded given the absence of any unifying ideology (as with labour) 
and the fact that the ‘central life interests’ of employers can mostly be resolved either 
below or above the level of industry-wide association (Offe 1985: 190-1 cited in 
Nattrass 1998: 26). Indeed, the more intense the competition between the various 
interest groups within associational structures the more difficult it becomes for that
7
The opposite also holds true: an employer may identify closely with whatever associational policy 
position has been adopted and abide by whatever is agreed subsequently without feeling obliged to 
formalise this ‘shadow’ relationship and take out membership.
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association to achieve any worthwhile ‘interest unification’. The less that happens, the 
greater the incentive for members to withhold their support for whatever the association 
proposes given the higher ‘payoffs’ to be made through behaving less than co­
operatively.
It is for these reasons that employers are thought to be more receptive to the idea of 
neither complying with associational goals nor upholding the terms of agreements and 
thereby appearing to be less 'governable’ when compared to workers in (union) 
membership. Thus, an individual pursuit of self-interest allows employers to frustrate 
the attainment of collective goals in ways that impairs their overall ‘govemability’ by 
their associations (Traxler 1993: 687-8). In fact such logic dictates that employers are 
more prone to forsake adherence to associational goals and agreements than forego 
membership itself since defection from the former affords them a higher return than 
avoidance of the latter. For instance, choosing not to uphold industry pay agreements 
may simply strengthen an employer’s competitivess relative to that of conforming 
members unless there are counter-balancing costs to be taken account of. In contrast, the 
financial savings to be had from withholding membership dues are more than likely to 
be negligible in comparison given that the cost of membership should be relatively low 
whilst that for compliance relatively high (Traxler 1995:32). If ‘govemability’ becomes 
an issue for an association then, as with free-riding, individual employers are faced with 
the dilemma of having to weigh up the opportunity costs of conforming against not 
conforming to the terms of industry-wide pay agreements. But this always begs the 
question as to how many of these associated employers actually perceive an advantage 
to lie in not complying with the terms of such agreements. It is not only the proportion 
of employers in a designated sector or industry prepared to associate that critically 
matters but also their propensity to comply with agreements brokered in their name.
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‘power disparities9
What compounds the twin problems of free-riding and non-compliance even further is 
the fact that employers also enjoy a resource-derived power advantage over all other 
parties (that is, workers and consumers) in ways that only further militates against their 
acting solidaristically. This distinct ‘power advantage’ for employers also places 
employer associations at a relative disadvantage when it comes to their capacity for 
organising employers into membership (Van Waarden 1995: 69-70). This is because, in 
comparison with labour, individual employers have many sources of power at their 
disposal that equip them with the wherewithal, other than collective action, for 
defending, even advancing, their interests. Thus, employers are not only more powerful 
in comparison with workers but, crucially, in relation to their own associations. This 
power imbalance gives rise to a ‘structural asymmetry in available resources’ for 
pursuing their shared interests that characteristically represents relationship between 
them (Traxler 1995: 32).
The reasons for this comparative power advantage to the employer over the association 
are thought to be three-fold. First, employers exercise considerable power in labour 
markets simply through the way they invest in, organise and control production -  so 
indispensable to overall employment and economic growth. As a consequence, this vital 
power resource already enables them, as individual entities, to influence the behaviours 
of workers, consumers, suppliers, competitors and government without instinctively 
having to draw on the collective power of associational membership as a first response. 
Indeed, it is a source of power to which the associations themselves have no access. 
Moreover, those very same resources that employer associations have at their disposal 
(for example, wage determination and lobbying) can also be mobilised, at a pinch, by 
individual employers, independently of any proposed collective action. Second, and
173
particular to those sectors where employers remain small in number, much reliance may 
be placed on informal and interpersonal contacts that amount to a substantive network 
being in situ. Such informal and ad hoc structures may mimic much associational 
activity through de facto collaboration and co-operation between ‘networkers’ but 
without the necessity of ever having to formalise the process yet yielding similar results 
in the form of favourable cartelizing market behaviour.
Finally, employers derive benefit from a ‘structural power’ in which they are invited to 
take up a privileged position within capitalist society as those largely responsible for 
wealth accumulation and for which the state remains indebted. Consequently, ‘even 
before it begins to put explicit political pressure and demands upon the government, 
capital enjoys a position of indirect control over public affairs’ (Offe and Wiesenthal 
1980:179). This presupposes that individual employers enjoy a political and societal 
status that guarantees them their interests through a structural bias in the political 
system and that, again, should render collective action somewhat unnecessary. Once 
again, the particularistic strength of employers converts into a comparative weakness for 
their associations (Traxler 1995: 32). As employers have more alternative power 
resources at their disposal than do either employees or consumers we might expect them 
to be more resistant to notions of collective action. Presumably, the inclination of 
employers to associate abates the more robust they perceive their ‘structural power’ to 
be. To make matters worse, this asymmetrical power enjoyed by employers also makes 
associations less capable of strong governance. As their capacity to unify members’ 
interests and to get them to observe agreements diminishes, so the resolve of members 
to pursue their own exclusive interests autonomously grows.
174
6.5 Conclusions
If nothing else, these observations on employers’ collective behaviour confirm for us 
the following. Whatever the reasoning behind individual compared to collective action 
for employers might be and whichever tendency appears to be in the ascendancy the 
final outcome can never be pre-determined (Tolliday and Zeitlin 1991: 22). But we. also, 
need to remember that employer collective action, although intrinsically problematic, 
has been empirically found to occur in practice and often in a sizeable way and for long 
periods of time. Nor should it be forgotten that collective action always has the potential 
to exert a decisive influence on the thinking and behaviour of individual members from 
one period to the next. Associability is not always relegated to a level of secondary 
importance for employers, despite the claims of Offe and Weishental (1980) to the 
contrary. Thus, the protective impulse for employers to combine together remains 
strong when problems seem intractable and their capacity for handling them 
independently appears limited. How accurately does this describe the situation facing 
South African employers in having to cope with the uncertainties arising from a re­
institutionalisation of the whole labour relations system in a context of economic, social 
and political transformation? Is there a similar urge on the part of South African 
employers to seek protection in numbers? And is limited capacity an issue for them 
when it comes to their own handling of this re-defmed employment relations agenda?
It is also worth noting the degree to which associations are inherently political 
organisations forever striving to construct solidarity amongst its members in the face of 
potentially conflicting interests. Their policies are often the product of compromises 
and coalitions intended to resolve these internal conflicts and tensions. Such contingent 
factors as organisational structure, leadership and ideology will also have a considerable 
bearing on the way associational policies are to be shaped and on their relationships
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with external actors such as organised labour and the state (Tolliday and Zeitlin 1991: 
22). Employers, either as potential or current members, will be well versed in these 
‘political’ realities as they struggle to resolve their ‘collective action’ dilemmas. Above 
all, however, this account of the ‘collective action’ difficulties facing employers only 
goes to confirm the fact that sectional interests are likely be to the fore and their group 
solidarity subsequently contingent and wavering for primarily rational reasons (after 
Tolliday and Zeitlin 1991: 20).
It is for these sets of reasons that it becomes appropriate for us to revisit the whole issue 
of collective action as it relates to the new South Africa and its reformed centralised 
bargaining system. After all, given the semi-voluntarist nature of the bargaining 
arrangements, employers are required to choose between acting as either ‘parties’ or 
non-parties’ to bargaining council proceedings by subscribing to membership of a 
registered association or not. The general purpose behind any such exploration would be 
to ascertain whether the ‘collective action’ problems and dilemmas that confront South 
African employers remain similar in kind to those deduced in the literature as above. Is 
it the case that free-riding and non-compliance with agreements weighs as heavy with 
these employers as has previously been foretold? Indeed, the same fundamental 
questions need to be asked of South African employers that could by asked of 
employers generally. Namely, whether they are more inclined to compete than 
collaborate within labour markets, to individualise than collectivise employment 
contracts and to free-ride than associate and so not comply with industry agreements. In 
short, how strong is the propensity to associate within the South African business 
community?
Equally important for us is to discover whether their general disposition towards
associability is in any way conditioned by ‘European’ debates concerning the merits or
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otherwise of decentralisation. Thus, what becomes paramount in any inquiry into South 
African associability is to identify those factors that help determine an employer’s 
decision whether to associate and partake in bargaining council processes or to 
disengage altogether. Drawing on what has been discussed in this chapter helps us to 
establish an analytical framework that compliments such a study. However, we have yet 
to place this country case review of associability within the specific context of post 
apartheid South Africa. What follows in the next chapter, therefore, is a brief account of 
how associability and centralised bargaining is organised within that country along with 
any collective action problems that have been observed to date. This should help to 
identify for us the more context-specific issues facing South African employers that 
presumably colour their views when it comes to acting collectively and participating in 
multi-employer bargaining arrangements at the meso-level. Thus, the intention with the 
ensuing chapter is to further refine the research agenda for this thesis through describing 
what commentators and observers of the South African scene suggest collective action 
signifies for employers (and policy-makers) within the more concrete setting of the 
country’s whole bargaining council system.
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Chapter 7. South African employers and bargaining councils
7.1 Introduction
In an attempt to describe employers’ experiences of, and responses to, South Africa’s 
ongoing experimentation with centralised bargaining, this chapter is organised along the 
following lines. First there is a brief account of the origins and development of this 
bargaining institution, not least its precursor in the form of the industrial council system 
first introduced under apartheid rule. This brief historical overview is intended to 
emphasise the pedigree of current arrangements, their continuity and discontinuity with 
the past and the fact that, given this history, multi-employer or industry bargaining has 
now become a de facto part of the ‘web and weave’ of modem South African 
employment relations. By implication, it is difficult to envisage, at least for the 
foreseeable future, an employment relations regime in South Africa that does not have 
industry bargaining in some institutional form or other (however weak). But this is not 
to deny that such a system is unproblematic for organised actors and policy-makers 
alike, as what follows clearly demonstrates.
More specific to our interests, bargaining council processes certainly appear not to 
command the unanimous support of the wider business community on the basis of the 
available evidence. Indeed, the record to date acts as a useful point of reference for us 
when it comes to the observed behaviours and espoused misgivings of both employer 
participants and defectors alike. To this end, we resume with a section of the chapter 
devoted to reviewing the whole bargaining council system from a largely legal 
perspective as a way of identifying for us its defining characteristics. This sets the 
platform for a discussion as to how it has evolved over the interim and what unintended 
consequences this has given rise to that render bargaining councils somewhat
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problematic for those more supportive of centralised bargaining processes.
Identification of such issues allows us next to emphasise certain collective action 
problems facing employers within the bargaining council system generally. This 
account allows us to conclude the chapter with a discussion of the strategic options 
available to employers under the bargaining council system and set against the backdrop 
of the new statutory framework. Such discourse is in aid of contextualising the analysis 
of the field studies that constitutes the rest of the thesis.
7.2 Bargaining councils and their antecedents
From an historical perspective, bargaining centralisation has always had a significant 
role to play within South African employment relations ever since industrial councils 
were first introduced into the system under the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924. This 
legislation conceived of a bargaining institution that, through restrictive registration, 
would remain the preserve of white business and trade unions but one that would also 
be fundamentally voluntarist in character. However, what was determined between the 
parties could, on occasion, even be extended to cover not just high-status white 
employees but also to non-registered black workers (as Councils and the Labour 
Minister saw fit). As a consequence, the vast majority of the workforce was denied 
access to any representation within the official bargaining structure. Thus, for the next 
half century or thereabouts, the industrial council system, as the forerunner to 
bargaining councils, found itself to be the only officially sanctioned forum for collective 
bargaining in the country and, as such, became exclusive, centralised and bureaucratic. 
In most cases, agreements reached were automatically extended to. ‘non-party’ 
employers and workforces. By 1980, there were estimated to be 105 industrial councils 
that had managed to broker 250 agreements between them although just ten of these
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councils alone accounted for 80 per cent of all workers covered by industry agreement, 
thereby re-affirming the high centralisation of the system overall (Bendix 1988: 358).
However the Weihahn reforms of the early 1980s ushered in an era of apartheid reform 
such that independent (black) unions were now enabled to legally register and so 
partake in this statutory-endorsed bargaining process. The architects of this new 
dispensation fully expected emerging black workers and their representative unions to 
become incorporated into an established bargaining structure that had served white 
workers well for so long and so felt little need to abandon the voluntarist principle 
underpinning it. This caused problems initially. First, the independent labour movement 
persisted with a successful strategy of gaining enterprise recognition from individual 
employers and appeared reluctant to forego the bargaining dualism this gave rise to. 
Eventually, however, these newer unions overcame their resistance to apartheid’s 
established bargaining system and developed a liking for, even attachment to, the 
industrial council system generally (Bendix 1988: 362). Meanwhile, established (white) 
unions began to adjust attitudes and pay considerably more attention to workplace 
agendas and plant bargaining. As a consequence by the time of the new dispensation 
introduced post apartheid in 1995, many unions (whether established or independent) 
had become accustomed to both industry and plant-level bargaining carrying out dual, 
rather than separated, functions. Increasingly too, employers were beginning to learn 
that there were choices available to them when it came to dealing with unions having 
first resisted the right of independent (black) unions to bargain in industrial councils 
even to the extent of contemplating their dissolution (Jowell 1989; Toerien 1989; SALB 
1989).
Given such past developments, South Africa’s bargaining structure is probably better 
characterised as already being multi-layered, even dualistic, rather than highly
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centralised at the point at which we see a formal transference of political power in 1994 
(Bendix 1996: 296-9). Accordingly, trend figures published by the Department of 
Labour indicate some decline in terms of numbers of Councils and workers covered 
although some slight improvement was noted for the early 1990s. Nevertheless, by 
comparison with the high of 1980 for example, The Department of Labour published 
figures for 1993 showing 86 councils in existence, covering 20,700 employers and 
855,500 workers that purported to represent only about a tenth of the whole South 
African workforce (Standing et al. 1996: 151-2). Meanwhile, the ILO (1999: table 22) 
is able to show considerably more than a doubling in the numbers of employers entering 
enterprise agreements (from around 21 thousand to over fifty thousand) and of workers 
covered by these registered agreements (from around 315 thousand to 775 thousand) 
between 1993 and 1997. On this evidence, it would appear that dualism within the 
bargaining structure has become more, rather than less, pronounced in this early post­
apartheid era.
As a consequence, the new dispensation introduced under the Labour Relations Act of
1995 that restructured the bargaining council system simply helped ratify a structural
reality already firmly entrenched in the practice. Indeed, it gave official sanction to the
idea of employer choice over the bargaining level. Thus, legislative reform not only
continues to make bargaining voluntary on the parties but also confers organisational
rights on unions that help them to establish a direct bargaining relationship with
individual employers and reach local agreements accordingly. Indeed, for the very first
time, the Act also makes workplace agreements as equally binding as those negotiated
at industry level (Bendix 1996: 277 and 282). Moreover, workers enjoy similar
protections from summary dismissal for taking strike action either in support of plant or
industry bargaining. Indeed, these same safeguards even extend to secondary action and
political ‘stay away s’ (Baskin 1996: 112). The upshot is that there is currently a
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legislative environment in South Africa that promotes both bargaining centralisation 
and decentralisation simultaneously but without showing particular favour to either. 
Problematically, this appears tantamount to an institutional reinforcement of the dualism 
that had already developed organically under apartheid.
Nevertheless, what choices are now open to employers under the Labour Relations Act 
(LRA) of 1995 as regards the bargaining council system itself? First, bargaining at 
whatever level is fundamentally voluntary on both employer and union in the absence of 
any legal compulsion for them to do so. Thus, from a judicial viewpoint, there is both 
the freedom to bargain or not for either party. However, strengthened organising rights 
under the legislation and enhanced labour market power for unions provides the latter 
with more possibilities than ever before for forcing employers to concede recognition. 
Moreover, although there is no explicit duty on employers to bargain with unions, either 
at workplace or sectoral level, nevertheless in instances where disputes involve a refusal 
to bargain then they may be subjected to arbitration under the provisions of the Labour 
Relations Act 1995 (hereafter known as the LRA). Such refusals commonly relate to the 
rejection of unions as bargaining agents or of union requests for employers to help 
establish or sit in bargaining councils (amongst other rebuffs). Employers are expected 
to fully concur with the declarations of arbitrators. For these reasons, South Africa’s 
renovated bargaining system is better thought of as being so enabling on unions as to be 
semi-voluntarist for employers. But there are still choices to be made by each individual 
employer when deciding upon what the preferred relationship might be with a 
designated bargaining council. What these options might be in practice will be 
examined more thoroughly later in the chapter. But, for now, we first need to acquaint 
ourselves with the way the bargaining council system supposedly operates within the 
confines of the new legal framework and, second, how it has evolved subsequently and 
with what difficulties.
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7.3 The legal framework
Certain questions regarding bargaining councils come to the forefront when reflecting 
on the impact of the new dispensation, following its implementation post apartheid. For 
instance, what legally constitutes a bargaining council? What exactly is its jurisdiction 
and scope and how are they to be determined? What are its statutory terms of reference? 
How extensive are its statutory powers but also what statutory limitations apply? Thus, 
under the Labour Relations Act (1995), and as subsequently amended in 2000 and 2002, 
it is the primary purpose and function of collective bargaining, not least industry 
bargaining, to determine what is appropriate in terms of pay and conditions. Indeed, for 
Du Toit et al., the legislation goes further in attempting to place collective bargaining 
mechanisms in the service of ‘labour peace, social justice, economic development and 
employee quality’ (2000: 159). Apparently, a lot is to be expected of a bargaining 
system that refrains from placing any overt duty on the parties to bargain.
Nonetheless, this lack of compulsion is subject to certain legal provisions that strongly 
encourage and prescribe industry bargaining procedures through the granting of 
organising rights to registered trade unions. Indeed, a Constitutional right of unions, 
employers and their associations to bargain collectively further reinforces this 
legislative endorsement of industry bargaining. Du Toit et al would even contend that 
there is a duty placed on a ‘contemplated bargaining partner’ under the LRA (s.23) to 
avoid ‘bad faith’ bargaining in the form of unacceptable negotiating behaviour (2000: 
167). It seems that associations and unions, in their capacity as bargaining agents for 
employers and workers respectively, are obliged in law to conduct council proceedings 
in good faith, once they become registered in accordance with the legislation.
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Despite the above proviso, bargaining councils are still essentially voluntary bodies 
under the LRA given that their very formation is dependent upon the willing co­
operation of one or more trade unions with one or more employers’ organisations. But 
the Act is less prescriptive in terms of the structural form this should take. Thus, it 
enables bargaining councils to evolve different types of centralised bargaining 
arrangement, depending on the nature of industrial organisation that exists in any 
particular sector (ILO 1999:34). Thus, councils, when acting as bargaining units, may 
be individually defined by some particular combination of occupation, industry and 
geography (Butcher and Rouse 2001: 355). This can make bargaining centralisation 
appear structurally diverse, if not fluid, overall. For instance, the number of councils in 
total continues to show decline annually from 1994 onwards as evidenced by the 
‘official returns’ recorded by the Department of Labour in its Annual Reports for 1994 
to 2004. However, this is due primarily to amalgamations that have taken place of 
regional or sub-sectoral bargaining councils in clothing, motor transport, electrical 
engineering and chemical sectors to form more centralised national bodies (Fallon and 
Lucas 1998: 19). But equally, under the legislation, a bargaining council can also 
restructure itself into separated chambers (or sub-sectors) as occurred in the Chemical 
sector in the late 1990s.
De-registration of a council by registered parties is also permitted under the Act (s.30
and 59) as a means of curtailing industry bargaining for that designated unit. Thus,
although certain industries such as wood and paper and fisheries may have preferred to
centralise their bargaining arrangements nationally, yet others like building and
construction have overseen the dismantling of their own bargaining council operation.
Meanwhile other sectors, such as maritime, transport and security, are in the throes of
establishing and registering their own national bargaining forums for the very first time.
Also, and for the first time, the Act allows for the establishment of a bargaining council
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covering the whole of the public sector known as the Public Service Co-ordinating 
Bargaining Council (PSCBC) that can negotiate on issues common to all public service 
employees (for example, pensions). This super-council is further empowered to 
establish bargaining councils and chambers for specific sectors within the public service 
that then enjoy an exclusive jurisdiction over that designated sector. Thus, there appears 
to be no one model of what industry bargaining might mean in structural terms within 
the South African context.
Prior to establishing industry bargaining, whether along national, sectoral or regional 
lines, the Act (s.27) stipulates that two formal requirements need to be fulfilled. First, 
both parties (union(s) and employer association (s)) must register the bargaining council 
with the Industrial Registrar who will only grant such registration when satisfied that a 
proper and fair constitution is in place (s.30) and that the proposed bargaining unit is 
appropriate as adjudicated by NEDLAC. That is, there is no such other council that can 
make legitimate claim to the sector, industry or region and that the registered parties are 
‘sufficiently representative’ of employers and workers in that bargaining unit so 
designated by NEDLAC (s.29). Clearly, the Act stops short of demanding that a union 
(or coalition of unions) demonstrate a clear majoritarian threshold of representation for 
workers employed in a designated industry or sector. Indeed, registration may still be 
permitted even when total union membership levels amount to less than fifty per cent 
but where those in membership still constitute a significant minority of an industry’s 
workforce (Wood 2001: 7). It is only through meeting these preconditions that the 
council’s ‘registered scope’ comes to be determined in terms of its designated 
bargaining territory.
The LRA (under s.28) further states that a bargaining council can exercise the following 
four broad-based powers. First, councils are constitutionally obliged to conclude and
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enforce binding collective agreements. Second, they can also be charged with regulating 
and administering various welfare matters of mutual interest to all those in the industry 
such as pensions, insurance, medical aid, sick pay and unemployment benefits and, not 
least, training amongst other jointly-regulated schemes. Third, The LRA now authorises 
councils for the very first time to prevent and resolve disputes arising both between the 
parties themselves and between those they represent through procedures outlined in its 
constitution. And finally, they can choose to refer items upward to NEDLAC for its 
consideration as well as to confer on workplace forums additional matters for 
consultation as deemed appropriate (Klerck 1998: 92). When it comes specifically to 
bargaining, the Act allows for the possibility of comprehensive agreements that not only 
specify minimum pay rates, pay scales, job grading, piecework rates and pension, 
insurance and sick pay contributions but also restrictions on ‘paying- in- kind’, 
contracting, piece- and overtime working. Should the parties wish it, such agreements 
can even stipulate the normal hours to be worked, maximum weekly hours per week, 
overtime to be paid and at what rate (including Sunday working) and entitlements to 
holiday and sick leave. This list of possible agreed items demonstrates how extensively 
bargain council negotiators can jointly determine substantive conditions of employment, 
should they so choose. Given these powers, bargaining councils have the potential to 
perform a crucial institutional role within corporatist structures beyond standard-setting 
on pay and conditions at sectoral level. In theory, they can also evolve into being 
significant providers of welfare provision at the meso-level, acting as co-ordinating 
linchpins between peak and enterprise levels and even settling workplace disputes.
These aspects of their remit are worth bearing in mind when investigating what 
employers make of the bargaining council system overall.
In reality, what is agreed in council often amounts to ‘basic conditions regulations’ for
specific industries and sectors. Of course, individual employers (whether ‘party’ or
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‘non-party’ to council proceedings) remain free under the Act to offer a set of pay and
o
conditions more favourable than those settled upon in council (Bendix 2000: 274). 
Consequently in practice, although bargain council agreements tend to be largely 
substantive through setting basic pay and conditions standards for the industry, they 
might also address procedural issues around job evaluation, grading and retrenchment 
and even (albeit advisedly) grievance and discipline. Meanwhile, the Act (under 
amendments to s.33 introduced in 2000 and 2002) empowers designated agents of 
bargaining councils to promote, monitor, inform and enforce compliance with any 
agreement by either issuing compliance orders, publishing their content or pursuing 
complaints and conducting investigations. If a dispute over compliance remains 
unresolved, a council may refer the matter to final and binding arbitration that may 
order any outstanding amount to be paid, impose a fine on the wrong-doer or set aside 
the compliance request.
Agreements concluded in council may be extended legally by the Minister of Labour 
under s. 32 of the amended Act so as to cover all employees within the council’s 
registered scope including those working for non-party employers. The policy 
justification is twofold. First, such encompassing agreements set labour standards on 
parties that choose not to negotiate them, for whatever reasons. Second, granting a legal 
extension can also prevent ‘a race to the bottom’ in terms of these same standards.
There is also the suggestion that the very existence of extension provisions stimulates 
associational membership given the potential loss in comparative advantage that follows 
(OECD 1994 cited in ILO 1999: 33). However, before such requests are granted, the 
Minister must first be satisfied that one or more registered parties in council voted in 
favour of the extension and that they themselves constitute a majority of the workers/
8 Essentially, there are four wage-setting mechanisms in South Africa: sectoral bargaining with legal 
extension to non-parties; minimum wages by sector (see next footnote); plant or enterprise negotiations, 
employment contracts (IMF 2005: 55).
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members represented in that council. Indeed, the Minister may still choose to extend an 
agreement even when the parties are unable to show that they represent the majority 
within the council’s registered scope. Provided they are ‘sufficiently representative’ in 
the area for which the extension is sought and the Minister genuinely believes non­
extension of the agreement would undermine bargaining at the sectoral level, then an 
application for extension may still be granted.
Accordingly, in 2005, the Minister has seen fit to extend 92 council agreements to non- 
party employers covering some 623, 000 workers and setting wage increases and 
council levies on sick-, benefit-, pension- and insurance fund benefits (Department of 
Labour 2005: 16). Nevertheless, this right is hotly contested especially by smaller 
employers who argue that unwarranted powers are bestowed on councils in 
contravention of their freedom (not) to associate and that often the terms of extended 
agreements are too costly and so rendered unaffordable (Bendix 2000: 275). They also 
contend that non-party compliance through legal extension undermines their ability to 
compete against larger firms, leading to closures, fewer start-ups and overall job loss as 
a consequence (Moll 1996; Standing et al. 1996: 148). In short, the contention is that a 
heavy reliance on ‘overly generous labour market institutions’ may produce unintended 
consequences that only further inhibit job creation (IMF 2005: 57). Some would go so 
far as to require the potential impact on job creation to become a decisive factor in 
granting Ministerial extensions to non-parties. Thus, legally extending agreements is a 
highly contested area of debate when it comes to a public policy reform of bargaining 
councils.
Primarily in order to address this growing unrest from non-party small firms, an 
amendment to the Act was introduced in 2000 such that councils are now obliged to 
allow non-parties to make representations to them regarding any request of a Minister to
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extend the terms of their agreements. Furthermore, s.30 of the Act requires a bargaining 
council’s constitution to provide for the representation of SMEs on the council, giving 
them some scope to influence the final bargained outcome. Indeed, further amendments 
have obliged councils from 2002 to report annually to the Registrar the degree to which 
small enterprises are associated and thus subject to its registered scope as well as the 
proportion of those workers both in union membership and covered by council 
agreements. Councils are further required to provide data on exemptions received from 
small enterprises and the numbers rejected. In parallel, changes have also been made to 
s.28 whereby the registered scope of bargaining councils may be extended to include 
informal sector and home-based workers. Another 2002 amendment is designed to close 
a legal loophole whereby employers evade the scope of the council through re­
classifying their employees as ‘independent contractors’ (see next section). Legal 
measures are now in place that makes this employment status more difficult for an 
employer to achieve. But what are the policy motives that lie behind these recent 
changes in the legal dispensation?
There has certainly been widespread concern as to the growing number of non-party
employers refusing to engage with the bargaining council system since its inception in
1995. Linked to this is an observed decline in the associability of the smaller enterprise
within the system and their under-representation within council proceedings. The
apparent need is for this constituency’s interests to be incorporated into council
proceedings more explicitly. The belief within policy circles is that through making
statutory adjustments to the function, scope and duties of councils, an institutional
environment can be created within bargaining councils such that non-party and small
firm interests are better accommodated than has previously been the case. This policy
ambition takes the form of legislative amendments that enable small businesses to
exercise their voice more cogently, challenge legal extensions more readily and seek
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exemptions more widely. If nothing else, these reforms demonstrate an ongoing public 
policy commitment to the principles of centralised bargaining as contained in the 
amended LRA of 1995. Whether they prove sufficient to assuage the fundamental 
criticism of the bargaining council system as a repository of labour market rigidity and 
bureaucracy and win over the ‘hearts and minds’ of non-party employers and smaller 
enterprises alike only time can tell.
This controversy over the extension principle helps to explain why, under originating
legislation, bargaining councils are further obliged to provide ‘hardship mechanisms’,
notably with the purpose of enabling small business to gain exemption from the more
onerous parts of agreements (see next section). Certainly, the provision for legal
exemptions to be applied for under s.30 of the original 1995 Act was intended by the
legislators at the time to address directly this alleged shortcoming in the centralised
bargaining system and instil some flexibility into council proceedings. Indeed, the
‘exemption’ clauses of the Act are deliberately tailored to suit the needs of small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) so long as they can demonstrate, (ether as ‘party’ or
‘non-party’ employers) that the terms of council agreements will impact negatively on
their business. There is also a right of appeal to an independent panel should their
application fail. Although the granting of exemptions is not automatic, their occurrence
has become more commonplace over the years, despite their infrequency in some
selective industries (Butcher and Rouse 2001: 353) and even appears to be growing
(Bhorat et al 2002: 51). According to Stapelberg (1999: 30-1), for example, over 80 per
cent of those exemptions applied for had been granted by bargaining councils affiliated
to the National Association of Bargaining Councils (NABC) between 1993 and 1997.
However, this figure falls to some sixty per cent of all applications by 2005, albeit with
a majority being granted to the smaller firm, according to provisional data provided by
the Department of Labour. Furthermore a clear majority of councils have confirmed that
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small enterprises have seats on the council as well as the independent panel to hear 
exemption appeals (Department of Labour 2005: 16). In contrast, however, the ILO 
cites anecdotal evidence to suggest that (once again) smaller firms are only motivated to 
apply for exemption when defending a complaint lodged with the bargaining council, 
having first evaded registration and compliance with council agreements (1999:33).
But, more broadly, discussion of these amendments and their alleged impact also 
prompts questions as to how effectively they address the concerns of employers and 
make them look more favourably upon bargaining council proceedings generally.
Again, such reflections help form part of the research agenda for my own small-scale 
inquiry into employers’ views on bargaining councils.
7.4 Bargaining councils: trends and issues
Although the legal framework allows for all sorts of possibilities in terms of structure, 
scope and process, nevertheless ten years on from a substantive reform of centralised 
bargaining and there are beginning to emerge certain discernible trends within the 
bargaining council system that help define its variegated character. First, a well- 
established voluntarism explains a widespread diversity of bargaining structure both 
within and across industries and sectors. For instance, bargaining councils tend to 
operate as fairly strong bargaining mechanisms in their own right within sectors such as 
clothing, textile, chemicals, engineering and metal trades -  primarily and where 
independent unions have secured a strong foothold for themselves. Meanwhile, the all- 
important mining and extraction industry still retains some element of centralised 
bargaining (through the Chamber of Mines) post apartheid, yet technically remains 
outside of the bargaining council system despite the opposition of the powerful 
mineworkers union. It is not alone in this. Yet again, other sectors such as food, paper, 
retail and now construction (see above) tend to gravitate more towards enterprise
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bargaining and away from centralised structures. This leaves some sectors with large 
numbers of mainly insecure and informal workers, most notably agriculture and 
domestic service without practically any form of bargaining at all and subject only to 
imposed minimum wage determination (see footnote 9) (Klerck 1998: 99). As a 
consequence, some combination of bargaining levels prevails as a matter of course 
within many sectors of the economy. What appears to be happening increasingly is that 
enterprise-level negotiators attempt to use council agreements as the foundation upon 
which to build and improve on local wages and conditions. Indeed, many unions 
contend that councils tend to focus primarily upon the basic pay and conditions of 
skilled workers, leaving union workplace organisers to focus on the needs and interests 
of those categorised as unskilled and semi-skilled. This often means that ‘local’ union 
negotiators use council agreements as the basis on which to try to narrow the gap 
between the two and often in the teeth of local employer opposition (after Butcher and 
Rouse 2001: 353).
Not surprisingly therefore, commentators, such as Bendix (2000: 285-70), wish to
emphasise the dualistic nature of the bargaining structure overall and the tension this
gives rise to in terms of those wanting centralised bargaining to become more
institutionally embedded as against those preferring to see decentralised bargaining
becoming more prevalent. If anything, post-apartheid bargaining reform appears only to
have further exacerbated the inherent strain between industry and enterprise bargaining
that can render them contradictory to each other. This tension is further exacerbated
through a dispensation that caters for both a centralisation and decentralisation of
bargaining in equal measure rather than unambiguously favouring one over the other
(see, for example, Bendix 1996: 303-7; Klerck 1998: 106-7). Ironic as it seems, the
views of the bilateral actors on centralised bargaining appear to have come full circle
since apartheid times. Those very same (mostly COSATU-affiliated) unions that once
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opposed industrial councils are now powerful advocates of the bargaining council 
system with employers now apparently much more ambivalent towards the whole idea. 
Such observations are worth bearing in mind when we come to discuss findings from 
my own (small-scale) survey on employer attitudes to bargaining councils. Another 
discernible trend, even observable from the time of industrial councils, concerns the 
types of agreements brokered within the council forum compared to those reached at the 
enterprise level. Less and less agreements are now meant to be comprehensive and 
detailed in terms of their scope, as appeared to be the case under Grand Apartheid. More 
commonplace are framework agreements that establish a basic set of pay and conditions 
for the particular industry or sector and that can then function as a template on which 
enterprise bargaining may or may not take place9. This appears indicative of a general 
move away from standard to minimum wage setting within much industry bargaining. 
Questions arise as to how well this changed state of affairs chimes with the wishes of 
employers and ease any misgivings they might have regarding the efficacy and rigidity 
of the bargaining council system generally.
7.5 Bargaining council coverage
Also of interest to us are trend figures showing the reach of industry bargaining across 
the economy for the decade following its inception under the new dispensation. These 
reveal both a steady fall in the numbers of registered bargaining councils and a 
somewhat more fluctuating decline in the numbers of registered' employer’s 
organisations since 1995. For example, the Department of Labour estimates there to 
have been 79 registered councils in 1995 compared to the most recent figure of only 58 
for 2004 based on data taken from its Annual Reports and internal Labour Market
Unlike many other countries, there is no minimum wage provision in South Africa except for 
individual sectors considered to be highly vulnerable and lacking in bargaining and where Ministerial 
‘determinations’ regarding minimum pay and conditions may be set. Agricultural and domestic workers 
are those most directly affected by such determinations.
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surveys. This amounts to a reduction by a quarter in the course of a decade (Department 
of Labour 2004; Standing et al. 1996: table 5.1). Although these same sources reveal 
there to be a somewhat more erratic pattern for employer associations nevertheless, 
since the late nineties, their number has continued to shrink overall and even more 
recently from a high of around 270 in 2002 down dramatically to 238 by 2004 
(Department of Labour 2004). Part explanation for the latter may lie in the rise and fall 
in the numbers of ‘bogus’ unions and associations that have sought to gain a foothold in 
council proceedings for ‘bad faith’ reasons and one that the authorities have been 
increasingly keen to tackle through securing their de-registration. However, bringing 
together both trends for the purposes of analysis attracts discussion as to possible 
causation. Two contrasting explanations especially merit our attention, given our 
inherent interest in issues of associability within South Africa itself.
The first points to a growing disenchantment within the business community generally 
at the perceived rigidity of centralised bargaining compared to the assumed flexibility of 
decentralised bargaining, but particularly within those sectors that have become most 
exposed to trade liberalisation, post liberation. The growing incidence of enterprise 
bargaining over the years tends to confirm this as evidenced by data from the 
Department of Labour (for example, Annual Reports for 2000 to 2005) as does recent 
case study evidence of employers attempting to circumvent bargaining councils 
completely. A variety of stratagems appear to have been deployed that entail de- 
registration of councils and associations, direct non-compliance with agreements and 
converting workers into being self-employed and, thereby, statutorily unprotected (see, 
for example, Bhorat et al.2002; Harcourt and Wood 2003; Skinner and Valodia 2002; 
Webster and Omar 2003). Alternatively, reductions in the aggregate numbers of 
councils and associations are less the product of burgeoning employer defection from 
central bargaining and more an inevitable rationalisation towards a more streamlined
centralisation of the council system. Reduced numbers of councils indicates a desire by 
the parties to restructure their councils through merger and amalgamation in ways that 
gives them more of a national and industrial focus rather than one that is regionally and 
occupationally narrow (see above for examples). Interpreting trend figures in this way is 
to imply that foundations are being laid for strengthened coordinated bargaining to 
occur more explicitly on a coherent industry rather than on a historically spurious 
geographical basis. But how welcome has such restructuring been for employers 
generally?
Partial support for such views comes from data presented by the ILO (1999: table 22) 
that shows bargaining council coverage rising slightly from just over a quarter (26 per 
cent) to just under a third (32 per cent) of all total private sector employment (excluding 
mining) between 1993 and 1997. Unfortunately, the proportion of private sector 
workers covered by such agreements seems to have slipped back to that for 1993 in the 
interim (that is, 26 per cent), according to Labour Force Survey data cited in COSATU 
(April 2005). Nevertheless, this still represents a sizeable minority of around a fifth of 
all workers in the economy given the fact that those covered are assumed to be 
overwhelmingly in formal employment which itself accounts for eighty per cent of all 
those in work (October Household Survey 2004). In the absence of any updated trend 
data on centralised bargaining coverage, it is difficult to gauge more precisely how 
robust centralised bargaining appears to be.
The conventional view to take is to acknowledge bargaining centralisation to be an
institutional fixture but one that operates within a fairly weak multi-layered, articulated
bargaining system. However, it would seem sensible from a policy perspective for us to
know, in much more detail, which of these arguments is the more convincing in light of
the evidence. What are also needed besides robust data on bargaining council coverage
are some empirical studies that attempt to assess employer involvement or
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disengagement from the bargaining council system as a whole and the patterns of 
thinking at work either way {after Lawrence 2000: 128). Any data that can show in 
which direction employers are moving on this crucial issue can only help to clarify for 
us the size of the problem, if any, and which of the possible policy interventions 
available have the most to offer. Based on best evidence to date, all that we can say for 
now is that size of firm continues to be a decisive factor but with inevitable 
consequences when it comes to the data findings. Thus, not surprisingly given that they 
are easier for unions to organise, larger firms are inclined to be disproportionately over­
represented within the bargaining council forum ahead of SMEs. Indeed there is survey 
evidence to show the average party employer to be between two and four times larger 
than non-party firms (Boccara and Moll 1997 cited in Nattrass 2001: 19). As a result, 
there is a tendency for the larger capital-intensive firm to dominate council proceedings 
and agendas and influence the final bargained outcome to the detriment of the smaller 
labour-intensive one (Nattrass 2001: 15). For example, one estimate for the largest 
national bargaining council (for iron, steel, engineering and metal industries) has less 
than a third of firms (albeit accounting for 65 per cent of the total workforce) setting 
wages for this entire industrial sector (Standing et al. 1996: 143).
Yet, it is also worth reminding ourselves that over a quarter of all formal private-sector
workers (excluding mineworkers) are estimated to have some part of their pay,
conditions and benefits set directly through sectoral agreements and determinations.
Indeed, the proportion covered is estimated to rise markedly to a respectable three-fifths
for those working in manufacturing alone (Nattrass 2000: 133). But, such assessments
fail to take account of any shadow (‘trickle-down’) bargaining effect that might
indirectly impact on the remaining three-quarters in formal employment seemingly not
covered by any industry agreement. Moreover, Fallon and Lucas contend that time-
series data can even show industry agreements positively impacting on wages for non-
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whites compared to whites over and above that emanating from union pressure exerted 
at the lower bargaining level. When taking these two factors together, the estimate is 
that unionised workers employed in sectors covered by council agreements can expect 
to earn one and a half times as much on average as those in the informal sector (1998: 
18-9). Indeed, using 1995 data, Butcher and Rouse (2001: 259) are able to show that 
African non-union workers covered under council agreements earned a 10 per cent 
premium on those not covered whilst their equivalent white colleagues only managed to 
benefit by a couple of per cent.
Such findings demonstrate that whilst councils continue to operate robustly in relatively
high-wage industries and address the concerns of mainly skilled workers, nevertheless,
there is still sufficient evidence of them also increasing the wages of non-union
workers, particularly among the unskilled. Whatever else, this example also goes to
illustrate the redistributive role that bargaining councils continue to fulfil within the
employment relations arena. All of this is to suggest that this bargaining forum still
retains a substantial institutional presence within the bargaining system generally and
still manages to have a say in the overall determination of bargaining outcomes that
then impact on labour markets and the macro-economy more generally. More
controversially, this rather benign view of bargaining centralisation attracts heated
criticism from others. The central argument here is that the ‘ergo omnes’ rules that
extended bargaining council agreements generate only further exacerbate labour market
rigidities, burdens on business, slower growth and ‘disemployment’ (for example,
Boccara and Moll 1997; Moll 1995,1996; Schultz and Mwabu 1998). Crucially, such
critics maintain that councils enforce ‘wage standardization agreements’ that lead to
employment and wage levels being lower than need be, given the ‘monopsonistic
environment’ they help create (Butcher and Rouse 2001: 361). But this is to beg the
question as to how resilient will the bargaining council system be in the future in the
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face of assumed employer disquiet at the prospect of further centralisation rather than 
de-centralisation.
7.6 Legal extension and exemption
Mindful of the above, we now return to the twin issues of legal extension and................
exemption. Certainly, seeking to extend the coverage of agreements from party 
employers to non-party firms and their employees is becoming more widespread 
amongst bargaining councils. In response to greater use of legal extension, the overall 
incidence of exemption applications being submitted and granted is also on the rise, 
especially for the smaller firm (as evidenced above). Thus, legal extension and hardship 
clauses continue to be an institutional fixture of the bargaining council system as 
previously under apartheid, if not more so. But attempting to strike a policy balance 
between the requirement for councils to be both encompassing and flexible seems not to 
placate disaffected employers completely. It is not just the cost of compliance and wage 
rigidities associated with sectoral agreements that act as deterrents for employers. 
Rather, it is the perceived ‘hassle factor’ of having to deal with the overweening 
bureaucracy of a bargaining council (and the concomitant drain on resources) that 
inhibits businesses (especially smaller ones) from engaging fully with the council forum 
(World Bank Survey 2001 cited in Bhorat et. al. 2002: 47). It seems that the 
administrative and regulatory burden of council agreements could prove to be as much 
of a factor, if not more so, in explaining the smaller businesses’ disenchantment with 
bargaining centralisation. Clearly, the bargaining council system’s reliance on the twin 
principles of legal extension and exemption continue to be bones of contention within 
the organised business community.
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7.7 Employer defection
Equally unsettling for proponents of the bargaining council system has been the 
growing tendency for elements of South African business to take matters into their own 
hands and adopt employment practices that frustrate, if not undermine, the reach and 
authority of the centralised bargaining system (Webster and Buhlungu 2004: 235). 
Fundamental to this are attempts by some employers to redefine employment 
relationships with their workforces in ways that unshackle them from the perceived 
restraints of labour standards imposed through the proxy of sectoral agreement and 
extension (Bhorat et al 2002: 52). In practice, this involves them in deploying methods 
that enable them to ‘de-unionize and individualize’ their workplaces in pursuit of 
decentralisation (Harcourt and Wood 2003: 93). It seems that bypassing bargaining 
councils is achievable through employers managing to change the employment status of 
their workers such that the former no longer fall within a council’s jurisdiction and the 
latter forego their entitlement to industry-agreed pay, conditions and benefits. This 
casualisation of the workforce can take a number of forms and vary considerably across 
sectors10. Nevertheless, what they share in common is the reconfiguration of work into a 
type of ‘informalisation and flexibilisation’ that facilitates an employer’s disregard for 
institutionalised bargaining arrangements (Skinner and Valodia 2002: 72-3).
Thus, outsourcing, subcontracting, pieceworking, homeworking and labour brokerage 
are all used to restructure workforces, leading to an ‘extemalisation’ of the contractual 
relationship away from the employer to delegated (more elusive, less accountable) third 
parties (Theron 2004:23). Thus, casualisation, extemalisation and informalisation create 
‘a trinity of interlocking processes’ that, together, produces a serious diminution in the
10 Nevertheless, African and Asian workers are consistently more likely to be employed on this basis 
compared to their White counterparts in ways that contribute significantly to marked earnings 
differentials in favour of the latter (Hinks (2003)
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‘standard employment relationship’ upon which the bargaining council system is firmly 
predicated (Theron 2004: 26). Employer intent is unambiguous: to avoid as much as 
possible the ambit of the protective legislation. But of all these ploys, it is independent 
contracting that has seen the most growth and caused the greatest concern in sectors 
where bargaining councils have previously prospered (Theron 2004: 25; Webster and 
Omar 2003: 208; Webster 1999c: 8; Wood 2000: 7). Here, employers convert their staff 
into independent contractors such that the latter are deemed in law to have been re­
designated as self-employed and thereby prone to losing all entitlements and protections 
previously afforded to them as employees. Effectively, such manoeuvring on the part of 
employers allows them ‘to outsource all employment to self-employed people, turning 
31 staff into 31 businesses’ (Jarvis 1999 cited in Webster and Psoulis 1999).
Perhaps the most striking account of its impact on bargaining council affairs is that
provided by Skinner and Valodia (2002) in their regional case study of the KwaZulu-
Natal clothing industry. Firms in this region appear not to have introduced changes to
production techniques as a response to intensification in competition following import
liberalisation. Rather, they seem to have changed the manner in which labour is
deployed in order to circumvent the requirements of the LRA concerning their
registration with bargaining councils, amongst other legal loopholes. This region has
also bom witness to a considerable expansion in the use of homeworking and some
selective relocation to neighbouring countries to avoid South African jurisdiction
(Skinner and Valodia 2002: 57 and 62-3). But by far the most prominent strategy has
been that of non-compliance with council agreements through employers exercising an
opt-out. This has taken the form of restructuring their workforces into ‘ a system of
independent contractors’ for whom the provisions of the LRA and other protective
legislation no longer apply. Clothing manufacturers in the region have been ably aided
and abetted in this through the assistance of The Confederation of Employers in South
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Africa (from herein, COFESA) that acts as both a consultancy and employers’ 
organisation. What makes COFESA so different is that it provides a legal service to 
companies that is exclusively designed to help convert their workers into contractors 
and to whom production is then outsourced. The organisation would wish to claim the 
establishment of some 1.5 million contractors by these means across a number of 
sectors other than clothing ranging from footwear, leather and furniture to road freight 
and the metal industries. Indeed, as a new employers’ association, it claims to represent 
120 thousand member companies across a number of sectors, mostly in the small to 
medium category. It further declares itself mandated by its membership to secure 
evermore deregulation and individualisation of employment contracts through gaining 
occupancy of bargaining council seats. As yet, however, this ‘renegade’ body remains 
politically lightweight within policy circles and has been largely spumed by the bigger 
employer (Harcourt and Wood 2003: 93).
Certainly, COFESA’s intervention in the KwaZulu-Natal clothing industry has proved
catastrophic for both the major association and the bargaining council itself (Skinner
and Valodia 2002: 64-5). To illustrate, bargaining council coverage has fallen from
between 45 to 50 thousand employees in 1990 to only 12 thousand by 2002 with
membership of the association similarly dropping from a high of 450 down to just 65
over this same period. Meanwhile, an official estimate by the lead employer group has
over 300 clothing firms employing some 20,000 ‘contractors’ not complying either fully
or partially with some or all of its agreements. This example demonstrates how a
voluntarism for the employer can be transformed into a mass abstention from the whole
central bargain simply through choosing to disassociate from the employers’
organisation. Such rapid developments can seriously undermine an industry’s
bargaining system and lead to increasing informalisation of employment at the expense
of that of the formal sector (Skinner and Valodia 2002: 63). Perhaps it is this illustration
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of regional bargaining councils going awry that accounts for the pressure to establish a 
national bargaining council for the whole clothing industry that occurred recently.
This account also explains the perceived need by legislators to close down these legal 
loopholes and COFESA-style arrangements by introducing recent amendments to the 
LRA in 2000 and 2002. These are intended to expand the legal definition of employee 
and thwart labour consultancies in their attempts at registering as ‘bogus’ employer 
associations for the purposes of securing seats on bargaining councils and scupper their 
proceedings through undermining their centralising tendencies. Nevertheless, there are 
also some useful pointers for us to take from this case study example. Often the 
literature (for example Fallon and Lucas 1998) assumes high levels of employer 
compliance with the terms of legislative provisions and agreement and their strong 
enforcement through a combination of powerful state authority and unions (Skinner and 
Valodia 2002: 57). But this case study demonstrates something markedly different. The 
incidence of non-compliance with agreements has become significant in sectors like 
clothing, whether it be through legal avoidance as orchestrated by COFESA or through 
(unlawful) evasion and a weak enforcement of the law. Characteristically, it also seems 
that an enfeebled union appears unable to prevent employers from quitting their 
associations and deserting the bargaining council table. For the clothing industry in 
particular, it seems that a combination of trade liberalisation, disempowered institutions 
and legal enforcement can seriously undermine the concept of voice regulation given 
the way that employers can readily opt out of institutional bargaining arrangements 
(Skinner and Valodia 2002: 58). In short, high compliance within the overall bargaining 
council system cannot be taken for granted, especially when employers become subject 
to growing pressures emanating from trade liberalisation.
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7.8 Organising associability and collective action
Another issue for discussion regarding the durability of bargaining councils concerns 
the capacity of employer associations themselves to organise employers within the 
designated bargaining unit and to fully represent their interests in the council chamber. 
Their organising capacity is inexorably linked to employer perceptions regarding the 
proper role and function of associations and how effectively they are held to perform 
their remit on behalf of members. For commentators of the contemporary scene, the 
attractions of associability for South African employers appear to be similar in nature to 
those already identified in the preceding chapter as belonging to a European sensibility. 
Namely, employers engage with centralised bargaining out of pragmatic considerations. 
First, they perceive their giving consent to council negotiations as a means of 
foreclosing on any further union claims or threats of action on matters already covered 
under existing industry-wide agreements. In other words, they see these agreements as 
providing the means by which leapfrogging wage demands from unions can be 
circumscribed. Indeed, they may even feel that lead unions are able to exercise a more 
moderating influence on those more militant unions with seats in the council chamber. 
Second, they apparently see their involvement in the bargaining council system as 
helping to take wages out of competition in the sense that some important elements of 
labour cost are equalised across labour markets without disadvantage to either 
themselves or competitors (Klerck 1998:99). Third, it is presumed that the larger, more 
profitable, firm will favour sectoral bargaining given its propensity to set minimum pay 
and conditions based on notions of an ‘industry average capacity to pay’ that is still well 
below that which they themselves can afford. Similarly, industry-wide negotiations 
may also be welcomed by medium-sized firms anxious to prevent small, ‘informal’ 
firms from undercutting them through ‘sweating’ labour. Fourth, many party employers 
may have learnt to value the stability that ‘sectoral centralisation’ can bring in terms of
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‘discipline, order and predictability’ to a labour relations environment recently subject 
to political turbulence and economic uncertainty (Standing et al 1996: 179). Finally, 
there may also be a political explanation at work as well. Employers can possibly take a 
view that since the bargaining council system is likely to remain such a fundamental 
part of government policy for the foreseeable future then they are best facing up to this 
political reality and making existing arrangements work to their advantage. This 
viewpoint is assumed to extend even to some of those preferring their own bargaining 
relationship to remain decentralised for reasons previously outlined (Webster 1999c).
Nevertheless, the bulk of South African employers, especially SMEs, still choose not to
affiliate to any of the major associations. This may partly be explained by reference to
changes in labour market conditions, especially when compared to those prevailing in
the latter stages of apartheid. Crucially, for example, the levels of unemployment have
remained stubbornly high throughout the1990s and into the first decade of the new
century, averaging well over 30 per cent using a broad measure. The presumption here
is that the ready availability of surplus labour militates against any felt need for
employers to associate and bargain centrally in response to an increasingly tight jobs
market. Persistently high unemployment is assumed to favour the employer over labour
in terms of any bargaining climate -  especially in those sectors like clothing and textiles
rendered vulnerable to trade liberalisation and job insecurity. As a corollary to this, the
relative position of employers has also improved markedly over the early course of this
new employment relations regime in respect of other key economic measures. So,
whilst the incidence and duration of strikes has declined over time, pay settlements have
been relatively modest and now appear to shadow inflation rates much more closely
(Harcourt and Wood 2003: 93-4). As consequence it may reasonably be assumed that,
for some employers at least, the perceived pressure to associate diminishes as labour
market conditions improve in their favour. In other words, employer associations still
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have to work hard at inducing employers into associational membership despite 
recourse to a legislative framework that ably helps their cause.
Another reason why organising employers into associability can prove difficult in a 
South African context lies with the ‘fragmentation’ of employer associations themselves 
(Lawrence 2004: 202). Rather than referring to one unified business community it may 
be more accurate to differentiate between three discrete grouping that mirror clear 
ethnic and racial divisions within South Africa’s overall business community -  just one 
more aspect of the apartheid legacy (Nattrass 1998: 22-5). Traditionally, there appears 
to have been a dominant English-speaking constuency organised around the South 
African Chamber of Commerce (SACOB) and a politically influential Africaans one 
known as the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (AHI). These have now been joined in the 
1990s by a rapidly growing African business community under the auspices of the 
National African Federated Chambers of Commerce (NAFCOC) and an officially- 
endorsed black business empowerment programme (BEE). But to date, none of these 
umbrella affiliations feel themselves sufficiently enabled to wield the kind of authority 
over members that can help reduce the fragmented nature of employer associability 
overall (Harcourt and Wood 2003: 92-3). Nevertheless, there have been some serious 
attempts since the 1990s to address these ‘fragmentation’ issues, not least in the 
formation of one unifying employers’ body at national peak level -  Business South 
Africa- that represents business interests to government and union affiliations within 
NEDLAC chambers and other relevant corporatist/tripartite settings. More importantly, 
this organisation has also recently merged (2004) with NAFCOC to form an even more 
powerful, unified and representative national employers’ body known as Business Unity 
South Africa (BUSA).
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Unfortunately, associability appears not to be fragmented solely along racial/ethnic 
lines. There appear to be other ‘fault-lines’ that are the product of ‘regional, sectoral, 
material and ideological cleavages’ first developed under apartheid and that continue to 
dog all attempts at constructing a sense of unity capable of exercising a powerful 
corporatist voice.11 This especially appears to be the case at national peak level, most 
notably within the NEDLAC chamber. Given this fragility, organised business in South 
Africa can struggle on occasion to consult effectively with its constituents and secure a 
proper mandate for its proposals and actions. Thus, economic concertation and 
bargaining co-ordination are difficult to achieve in policy areas like economic 
adjustment where significant differences of principle and interest still can still dominate 
(Nattrass 1998: 28). However, forging a collective interest may not simply be 
undermined by ‘principled differences over labour relations policies’ but also through 
straightforward instrumentality. For instance, unions may be keen to exploit this fragile 
business unity whilst some employers may perceive competitive advantage to be had in 
seeming to take a principled stand or in allying themselves to the interests of ‘marginal 
firms’ (Douwes Dekker 1990: 19 cited in Nattrass 1998: 26).
Another ‘fault-line’ worth noting concerns the relationship between large corporations 
and the rest of the business community. Given the concentration of business ownership 
in few hands (see chapter 3), the views of corporate South Africa (especially in mining 
and manufacturing) carry substantial weight when it comes to influencing public policy 
outcomes. These all-important industrial actors appear able either to have dealings with 
the'state directly or to indulge in powerful networking and partake in informal
11 Contrary to Offe’s assertion of a lack of ideology (1985), the business community was riven with 
ideological splits as to the proper response to growing apartheid authority (Nattrass 1998: 26).
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gatherings such as the Brenthurst Group12. Whatever form such persuasion of 
government takes, the incentive for South African corporations to act through their 
participation in associability (and accept inevitable compromises to their position) is far 
from obvious (Nattrass 1998: 22). Nevertheless, the evidence seems to point rather 
curiously to their parallel engagement with associability and the bargaining council 
system through the fact that their various subsidiaries and business units continue to 
enjoy membership of these very same bodies. It presupposes that market self-regulation 
by sector is still an important driver behind their participation and the fact that the larger 
firm is more motivated to pursue the collective interest (despite the presence of free­
riders) because of the size of its stake in the economy (Nattrass 1998: 25). Alternatively, 
such large employers can always choose to act unilaterally and withhold their vital 
support for collective action in pursuit of narrow sectional interest. This fracture 
becomes even more apparent when taking account of the interests of the smaller rural 
concern compared to those of its often-larger urban counterpart. Searching for a 
commonality of interests between the two that might galvanise them into collective 
action can prove to be precarious.
But even if and when consent for associability and sectoral centralised bargaining is 
forthcoming, it presupposes a degree of organisation, self-discipline and centralisation 
in place that is not always easy for individual associations themselves to provide. These 
difficulties can be usefully illustrated by reference to a study conducted by Nattrass that 
investigated the collective action problems encountered by Eastern Cape employers in 
trying to establish regional (social) accords at the behest of NEDLAC. According to 
some of those interviewed there is a particular sense of frustration directed at national 
bargaining councils that ignore calls for regional wage flexibility to be brought into
12 This refers to a group of 15 chief executives formed at the request of Nelson Mandela to provide a 
business input into the constitutional negotiations and advise on other matters of interest to the incoming 
government.
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council proceedings -  ‘big business and big labour looking after Gautang’. It seems that 
‘geographical rivalry’ also contains the potential for undermining employer solidarity 
(1997: 107). Another finding relates to the discovery of free-riding within the region but 
which can be seemingly thwarted through organisational and social pressure. The 
occurrence of such social compliance in this instance only confirms Olson’s observation 
of the need for ‘selective incentives’ to apply in overcoming unwanted collective action 
problems (1965; 1986). Nevertheless, the study shows that the phenomenon of free­
riding is still possible even when the collective interest is not one easily susceptible to 
fracture but rather one with which all parties can readily identify (Nattrass 1997: 110). 
The utility of this study into employer solidarity -  one of only a handful undertaken in 
South Africa- is further confirmation of Olson’s original insights into the problematic 
character of associability.
Finally, Olsonian collective action problems might also be reappearing as a 
consequence of economic downturns and market upheavals that have affected the 
affordability and legitimacy of bargaining councils in the eyes of already sceptical 
employers. This can take the form of a vicious circle as follows. Business retrenchment, 
closure and restructuring can lead to significant falls in the ‘party’ membership of 
councils. This loss of members triggers corresponding rises in the levy to be imposed on 
the falling numbers of those remaining that, in turn, feeds through into increased 
incidences of free-riding that can only add to the growing financial burden of running 
councils on those left. This trend can only further exacerbate a growing polarisation in 
the system between large firms that remain party, and smaller ones non-party, to 
bargaining council proceedings. The sorts of difficulties experienced by associations as 
above may help to explain why employer representatives in bargaining councils for the 
public service and metal industries have recently taken to endorsing closed-shop
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1 ‘X(‘agency’) arrangements as a means of ensuring their future viability (SALB 2003: 20- 
1). Whatever the reasons for their difficulty in organising employer solidarity, it is 
certainly the case that South African employers’ associations have to work increasingly 
hard to retain membership and promote sectoral bargaining centralisation in the post 
liberation era compared to that which prevailed under Grand Apartheid. Time will tell 
whether their efforts are sufficient to ensure the durability of the bargaining council 
system. Meanwhile, collective action problems for employers can never be completely 
eradicated so long as there are mutual benefits to be gained from association whilst, at 
the same time, there is still advantage to be had in behaving in ways that undermine this 
very same collective interest. As a consequence, the final say must invariably rest with 
individual employers and their decision whether to associate and become party to 
bargaining council negotiations.
7.9 Conclusions: employer choice and associability
Given the above observations on employer solidarity in South Africa to date, the 
business community appears able to choose between various options when pondering 
how best to respond to sectoral bargaining reform. These strategic choices can be 
modelled conceptually by reference to how willing individual employers are to belong 
to employer associations that formally sit in bargaining councils. The possible courses 
of action to be taken are depicted in figure 3 whereby the direction chosen reveals their 
general realignment with the system. In particular, this refers to their overall level of 
engagement with bargaining council processes and the degree of tolerance extended to 
bargained outcomes. Whatever strategy employers choose holds consequences for them 
in terms of their registration status and the position taken as regards their compliance 
with, the legal extension of, and exemption from, encompassing agreements {action).
13 The proviso is that non-party employers pay a nominal fee in lieu o f helping to enforce a closed-shop.
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For instance, for those wishing to identify themselves strongly with industry bargaining, 
active participation in the appropriate employers’ association and being ‘party’ to 
bargaining council proceedings is paramount. The bounded logic of such commitment 
also foretells of a full compliance with the terms of any council agreement and of an 
unconditional endorsement for the principle of legal extension. Thus, fundamental 
approval for associability and industry bargaining is likely forthcoming on the grounds 
that ‘ergo omnes ’ rules still provide the best means of exercising a much-needed control 
of both labour markets and workplaces.
Less approving of sectoral bargaining is that body of employers who seek a more 
strategic detachment from the bargaining council system but, equally, prefer not to place 
themselves completely beyond its jurisdiction. These more detached employers are less 
enamoured than their committed counter-parts as to the perceived virtues of sectoral 
centralisation. The costs of associability appear to outweigh the benefits although the 
opposite might well apply in adopting a more free-riding perspective. As a 
consequence, their preference is to remain registered as a ‘non-party’ within the council 
system and abide by whatever has been agreed elsewhere. Adherence to the rules is 
probably made grudgingly given the presence of an accompanying inspection and 
enforcement regime. This lukewarm consent for bargaining centralisation also suggests 
a likelihood of such employers looking to gain exemptions from parts of agreements 
whenever possible on grounds of their general non-affordability.
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Figure 3 South African Employers and their strategic options regarding associability
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As a consequence such employers see little need to formally engage with collective 
action issues through associational membership or bargaining council proceedings. 
Consequently, they remain ‘semi-detached’ from this bargaining institution and are best 
viewed as passive recipients of its determinations yet ultimately tolerant of its 
jurisdiction. This is because they fundamentally acknowledge, as do their more 
associative colleagues, the legitimacy and authority of the council system and any 
subsequent constraint on their prerogative to manage their own employment relations as 
they see fit. In contrast, the same can hardly be said of those employers displaying a 
high intolerance, even hostility, both towards council processes and outcomes and who 
are even prepared to register their disapproval to the extent of disengaging fully from 
the bargaining system, as and when they can. At heart lie fundamental objections to the 
guiding hand behind centralised bargaining (that is, associations and their members) and 
a reluctance to be placed under the jurisdiction of a system that they retain little belief in 
and even less interest. This antipathy of employers towards centralised bargaining 
arrangements and a preference for their complete disengagement can take three forms.
First, there appears to be a growing body of employers who choose to reorganise the 
running of their businesses in ways that places themselves and their workers beyond the 
remit of any bargaining council. Crucial to any such avoidance strategy is the removal 
of workers from bargaining council coverage through an unopposed but lawful re­
writing of their employment contracts. The process involves changing the legal status 
of workers from that o f ‘employees’ with legal access to council-agreed terms and 
conditions to that of ‘independent contractors’ who are then automatically denied any 
such entitlement. A strategy of marginalising workers through their casualisation 
enables this type of employer to avoid having to register with the relevant bargaining 
council, either as ‘party’ or non-party’, and so lawfully bypass its jurisdiction
altogether. As a consequence, the need to associate through membership of an employer
212
organisation that sits in council is negated. By contrast, the peripharelisation of 
workforces is not so fundamentally important to those employers prepared to forsake 
their legal obligations to comply with council agreements as a means of gaining 
competitive advantage over those still choosing to abide by the law. Such evasion 
requires employers to maintain their ‘paper’ registration with the relevant bargaining 
council, and even retain membership of their association, but not to meet the full cost of 
compliance with extended agreements either through ‘underpayment’ or its recuperation 
by other means. Certain risks accompany this strategy given the uncertainty of exposure 
through disclosure and inspection (albeit weak) and of a council’s enforcement of its 
agreements. Where detection occurs then it likely prompts errant employers into 
applying for exemption from agreed terms on hardship grounds.
Ironically, activating the exodus option involves employers exercising a warped form of 
employer solidarity whereby they take concerted action designed to erode an already 
established bargaining council. Their motivation for doing so can be twofold. It might 
first arise out of a collective sense of frustration with current arrangements and lack of 
belief in its credibility and sustainability. Their perception is that the misbehaviour of 
other (‘non-party’) employers in undermining the authority and reach of the council is 
such that it makes their own position, as shrinking ‘parties’ to council dealings, no 
longer tenable. The view may then form that the best way out of this predicament is for 
an orderly end to be brought to centralised bargaining through de-registration of the 
council such that any further ‘withering on the vine’ is then avoided. Alternatively, 
employers may simply become converted to the virtues of bargaining decentralisation 
and of self-managing their own labour relations. Of course, these two sets of reasons are 
not mutually exclusive to each other. Whatever the motivation, de-registration is 
preceded by disassociation. To achieve this outcome requires employers to resign en
masse from membership of their association and so bring about its final demise.
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Voluntarily dismantling employer associability in this collective way guarantees the 
ending of an organised employer voice on the bargaining council and so precipitating its 
collapse through insufficient representation. The ethos underpinning employer solidarity 
and approval of the bargaining council system provides the focus of the field study that 
follows. But this empirical investigation into associability and employer preference is 
also one that is set within the context of a country experiencing fundamental 
transformation in economic, political and cultural terms, rather than in the abstract as 
above. The design of the study needs to reflect this important aspect of South Africa’s 
contextualisation and not just how the institutional structure of the bargaining council 
system affords employers the choice to engage or otherwise with it through their 
associability.
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Chapter 8. South African Manufacturers and Associability: 
a research agenda
8.1 Introduction: the central argument
The gist of the argument, as developed so far within this thesis, is as follows. South 
Africa has undergone a significant policy re-orientation away from racial 
authoritarianism under apartheid labour relations and towards an enlightened form of 
social corporatism, thereafter. This regime change places an articulated bargaining 
system at its institutional centre. Whilst policy reform on employment relations has 
peak dialogue, industry bargaining and workplace consultation occurring between 
labour and business, nevertheless, the evidence for these happening to any significant 
extent and in any highly co-ordinated fashion is found wanting. Ten years on from 
apartheid and it appears that South Africa displays characteristics more redolent of 
‘weak’, rather than ‘strong’, corporatism on the evidence available to date. However, we 
are still at a formative stage with much still to play for. Nonetheless, employers and 
worker representatives appear wedded to entrenched adversarial behaviours habituated 
under apartheid and thus struggle to adopt co-operative and co-ordinated strategies that 
chime better with the requirements of this new co-determination system.
For both organised business and labour to take advantage of revised corporatist 
institutions requires a critical majority within each constituency to be acting in concert. 
But this level of ‘critical associability’ cannot simply be assumed and relies heavily on 
sufficient individuals preferring themselves organised. None more so than for 
employers in deciding whether to associate and become party to bargaining council 
proceedings that are deemed integral to any future articulation of the country’s 
employment relations system. Thus, the impetus for delving into employer thinking on 
collective action arises from a conviction that what businesses choose to do matters at
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least as much, if not more, as that of labour. Primarily this is because collective action 
between employers is always deemed less likely to occur than between unions and 
workers since the logic for doing so remains less compelling for the former than the 
latter. Much now depends upon the commitment shown by South African business to 
the country’s experimentation with social corporatism and organised labour relations. 
The decisions of individual employers to act collectively -  not least when it comes to 
one of its pivotal institutions, the bargaining council system, proves crucial to whether 
multi-tiered bargaining becomes embedded or not. This issue of employer engagement 
with centralised bargaining becomes even more pressing in light of evidence from 
Europe of an ‘employer offensive’ against comparable arrangements. The question 
arises as to whether South Africa’s own model of centralised bargaining faces a similar 
fate.
These concerns place employers and their collective actions at the heart of any study
into the robustness of South Africa’s model of social corporatism. Measuring their
propensity to associate and act solidaristically within a centralised bargaining forum not
only tells us something of their views on bargaining centralisation but on these reforms
generally. Testing the validity of this claim and examining its public policy implications
provides the central focus for the remainder of this thesis. Reasons as to why employers
and their associability need bringing out of the shadows and back into the spotlight in
the context of centralised bargaining reform have already been given in the three
preceding chapters. This earlier account has been structured in ways intended to raise
key issues, pose relevant questions and underscore a research agenda around the central
issue of employer associability. Taken together, these various arguments can now be
converted into a set of propositions that inform the design of the field study to follow.
Primarily, the study consists of work undertaken in the field on two separate occasions,
either side of a hiatus of five years. Subsequent fieldwork takes the form of two cross-
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sectional surveys of manufacturing employers supported by interviews conducted with 
informants pre-selected for their ‘insider knowledge’ of the bargaining council system. 
More detailed descriptions of these research activities follow but not before clarifying 
what the proper focus for this field study should be.
8.2 Research focus
The centrepiece of this doctoral thesis has become an investigation into the response of 
South African manufacturers towards a revised centralised bargaining system. It is also 
one that places employer associations centre stage and makes individual employer 
decisions over collective action pivotal to its success as a bargaining agent. The research 
focus as outlined below encapsulates this central tenet and, as with this thesis generally, 
is primarily orientated towards adopting a political economic perspective overall. Two 
important methodological repercussions result from adopting such an outlook. First of 
all, this country case study is undertaken with a view to examining the importance of 
employer associability, primarily from a public policy perspective and, as such, tends to 
be multi-faceted both in terms of its scholarship (politics, economics and law) and 
methodology (mostly quantitative with some qualitative work). This research approach 
has three distinctive features to it.
(i) Some ideal-type modelling, as depicted in diagrams 1 (chapter two) and 2 
(chapter seven), is conceived of as the means by which we may readily 
identify a range of strategic options open to both the state and employer, 
regarding choices over public policy stratagems and employer associability 
respectively.
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(ii) Two survey instruments have been devised and deployed within five years 
of each other as way of unearthing the sampled views of manufacturing 
employers towards both associability and bargaining councils.
(iii) Unstructured interviews have been conducted with leading lights of the 
organised business community, academics in the field and public officials 
acting as observers of the bargaining scene. These informants are thought to 
be sufficiently well-placed to comment knowledgeably upon how the 
bargaining council system might be evolving in practice and how well other 
aspects of reform are being received within the wider employer constituency. 
The intention is for insights gained from the latter to inform and compliment 
the analysis and interpretation of findings arising from the former.
With specific reference to bargaining councils, a number of research issues present 
themselves for incorporation into the field studies and take the form of three specific 
options that confront our sample of South African manufacturing employers.
(a) Whether to comply with centralised bargaining arrangements, either as a 
‘party’ or ‘non-party’ to bargaining council proceedings (loyalty);
(b) Whether to exercise their voice from within their own associations and 
fully partake in bargaining council negotiations (voice);
(c) Whether to defect from the entire bargaining council system and try to 
evade its jurisdiction altogether (exit).
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These issues connect with another set of fundamental questions concerning the 
willingness of employers to transfer their ‘bargaining authority’ to employers’ 
associations at some cost to their own prerogative and in pursuit of an enhanced 
collective power and control (Zagelmeyer 2005: 1627). But might there not also be 
levels of employer engagement with bargaining councils that are more provisional, 
circumspect and cynical? This suggests disassociated but compliant employers 
registering as ‘non-parties’ to agreements and being prepared to challenge their 
extension and seek exemption from them at every opportunity. Alternatively, how 
proactive are employers in seeking to unhitch themselves completely from the 
bargaining council system? To what lengths are employers prepared to go in order to 
escape the attentions of bargaining councils? Are avoidance, evasion and abstention 
from the central bargain serious considerations to be borne in mind by this sample of 
employers? Thus, the fundamental question to be asked is how attractive withdrawal 
from the council through disassociation and non-compliance with extended agreements 
remains for the typical manufacturing employer in South Africa.
Registering all these research issues in this way translates into a research agenda for 
ourselves that seeks answers to four pivotal research questions as set out below.
First* to what extent does the South African manufacturing community either approve 
or disapprove of the post apartheid employment relations regime in general and the 
bargaining council system in particular?
Second* in which direction is the balance o f opinion thought to lie in respect of 
employers’ associability (ie: propensity to associate and industry bargain)? That is, are 
those who approve sufficient in number to consolidate these centralised bargaining 
reforms and ensure their durability?
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Third. what helps to mould employer opinion when it comes to the question of 
associability? In other words, what rationales or constructs influence their thinking 
when deliberating upon whether to associate or not? In sum, what factors, if any, are 
deemed to play their part in helping determine the propensity of South African 
employers to associate or not and, thereby, engage or disengage with industry 
bargaining?
Fourth. how constant have these factors been in the minds of employers? Alternatively, 
are these factors thought to have changed in any significant way over this transitional 
period and, if so, for what possible reasons? Do such changes in thinking have any 
bearing on the way that employer opinion might tend to shift from one time period to 
the next?
A second (methodological) consequence arises from taking this more pronounced 
political economic stance towards the issue of employer associability. For Hakim 
(1987), as cited in Strauss and Whitefield (1998: 12), the ultimate use to which research 
findings are put directly impacts on the strategy to be adopted in the first instance. And 
so it is with this piece of work and other research of this kind. The ultimate purpose 
behind this country study is to develop knowledge and understanding that can hopefully 
address established policy concerns as well as to inform relevant policy thinking. 
Consequently, this empirical work has more affinity with the ‘policy-based’ model of 
research as opposed to something more theoretically conceived (Strauss and Whitefield 
1998: 12). This means that the research questions, as outlined above, are not intended to 
translate into general hypotheses that are then to be rigorously operationalised and 
tested for out in the field in pursuit of ‘theory development’. Rather, they are designed
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to provide focus for an empirical inquiry that can generate insights and some indicative 
answers through the use of summarising data and statistical analysis.
Thus, the primary goal behind both sets of survey work is to make some attempt at 
indicating the feelings that South African manufacturing employers might exhibit both 
towards associational membership and industry bargaining (that is, their ‘associability’) 
and at identifying a possible wellspring for such feelings. Without apology, the central 
purpose behind this work is neither to prove nor disprove the validity of certain 
contestable hypotheses. Rather it is to deepen our understanding of what manufacturing 
employers might be thinking when deliberating over their associability, how favourably 
disposed they might be towards it (if at all) and what implications this might hold for 
those responsible for employment relations policy-making. To this end, their views have 
been canvassed on two separate occasions over a crucial five-year period in order to 
gauge their general level of engagement (commitment) with the new South Africa’s re­
institutionalised national employment relations system and to discover whether this 
might have changed and why. The insights of informants are then used to shed further 
light on the statistical significance of the registered responses to issues addressed 
through these two surveys. Thus, qualitative findings derived through interview are 
intended to deepen the interpretation and analysis of quantitative findings by means of a 
broader contextual filter.
In empirical terms, what now matters to us has two dimensions.
(i) The first relates to the weight of employer opinion (favourable or otherwise) 
towards both Bargaining Councils (industry bargaining processes) and 
employer associations (as their designated bargaining agents). This entails 
using statistical methods such as frequency and cross-tabulation analyses in
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order to ascertain some overall approval rating from employers for these 
bargaining reforms.
(ii) The second concerns the pattern of employer thinking underpinning such 
opinion formation. What matters here is the shape of employer opinion as 
revealed through rational constructs that inform their thinking when 
reflecting upon the virtues of associability (or otherwise) in a South African 
context and whether opinion formation might be changing over time.
In short, the purpose of the field work is to generate data that can indicate how 
employers might be feeling towards South African bargaining reform generally, can 
identify those factors that help explain these feelings and can also inform us as to how 
strongly they are held by sampled respondents and whether they might in fact be 
changing.
8.3 Research design
When inquiring more specifically into the status of employer associability within South 
Africa the first question to ask is how willing employers are to partake in industry 
bargaining through membership of registered employers’ associations that sit as their 
representatives in bargaining councils. In other words, what is the overall approval 
rating amongst employers for bargaining centralisation as embodied in the authority of 
the bargaining council system? It is also worth finding out the degree to which these 
employers identify with state goals that prefer such agreements to be generally co­
ordinated. In other words, how appreciative of multi-layered bargaining are South 
African manufacturing employers in practice? Indeed, is there a predominant view 
amongst employers that sees virtue in what the bargaining council system does and the
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role an employers’ organisations may play in it and, if so, what helps to explain this 
approval rating or otherwise? Alternatively, is the strength of feeling one of general 
hostility or resistance to the idea of a centralised bargaining forum or of a growing 
disenchantment with having employers’ groups acting as their surrogate bargaining 
agents?
A good way to proceed at this point is to try to compare employers’ views on the 
attractions of collective action to those of acting autonomously and independently of 
association. To do justice to this idea, we might start by testing for the presence of those 
motives presumed to draw employers into associational membership compared to those 
presumed to deter them from ever associating in the first place. Thus, it would be useful 
for us to know the degree to which their capacity to manage their own labour relations 
independently has a bearing on whether sampled manufacturing employers ultimately 
choose to associate or not. Equally, how motivated is our sample of manufacturing 
employers in wanting to neutralise a strong union presence in the workplace by means 
of the protections afforded through associability? Indeed, how politically significant is it 
for the South African business community that the most powerful labour affiliation and 
the new ruling party in government are in formal alliance with each other? And do such 
considerations as these have any bearing on an employer’s decision to associate in 
reality? Arguably, given the political and economic uncertainties surrounding 
transition, employer access to a certain collective provision such as wage moderation, 
training or industrial peace should also prove decisive for South African employers 
when having to choose whether to be party to new industry bargaining arrangements or 
not. Certainly it would seem sensible for us take this opportunity to gauge their views 
on such matters.
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It would also be worth us knowing whether there is an ‘employer offensive’ underway 
in South Africa similar to that currently experienced in certain parts of North Europe. 
Querying the degree to which ‘associational disengagement’ remains a serious option 
for manufacturing employers can give us some understanding as to the strength of 
feeling within South Africa’s own manufacturing community towards this ‘hot topic’. 
Moreover, how significant is the whole issue of labour flexibility for this same 
community and does it colour their views on associability and centralised bargaining to 
the extent of actually deterring them from associational membership and involvement 
with the bargaining council system? In short, to what extent do manufacturers consider 
industry bargaining to be a help rather than a hindrance in restructuring the workplace 
as presupposed from wider ‘European’ debates? Similarly, is the controversy within 
Europe over what constitutes the most appropriate bargaining level one that sampled 
employers are likely to recognise in a South African context? Similarly, and given the 
way that encompassing agreements (through legal extension) and their exemption (via 
‘hardship clauses’) have figured so prominently in public policy debates on industry 
bargaining generally, it is vital to test for their popularity with South African 
manufacturers. In short, we need to verify whether these same issues resonate with our 
sample of South African manufacturing employers as much as they appear to do with 
their counterparts in the Northern Hemisphere.
But it is equally important for us to substantiate whether well-chronicled collective
action problems permeate throughout our sample of South African manufacturers as
much as they appear to do elsewhere. It is certainly worth discovering how strongly
tempted to free-ride they are through, say, remaining a ‘non-party’ within an industry
bargaining unit. Equally, it is worth us knowing how tolerant of others’ free-riding
tendencies they are prepared to be, especially when being party to agreements
themselves. Similarly, it is worth canvassing their views on the equally controversial
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issue of non-compliance with agreements. More precisely, it would be good for us to 
know whether sampled employers see mounting advantage in choosing to bypass the 
authority of employers' associations. Hopefully, answers to these questions will tell us 
how problematic or not employers find free riding on the back of industry agreements to 
be compared to defections from the central bargain. How they see such matters also tells 
us how they view a bargaining council’s right to self-regulate and ‘police’ their 
industry, sector or region on important labour market matters and the right of 
employers’ associations to govern their members. Finding answers to such questions 
forms the nub of this research agenda and acts as the design blueprint for both sets of 
fieldwork that follow. Investigating the propensity of South African employers to 
associate, become party to industry bargaining and comply with whatever is then jointly 
agreed goes some considerable way to telling us how disposed they are towards the 
bargaining council system generally.
8.4 Field work
Field studies were conducted over the course of two short trips to South Africa covering 
a four year period from the mid -1990s onwards and organised at different times from 
Cape Town, Johannesburg and Pretoria. Some limited but invaluable administrative 
resources and facility were provided by Pretoria Technikon on the first occasion (under 
an international treaty arrangement with my university employer) but, most notably, by 
the Sociology of Work Unit (SWOP) at the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg 
for both trips. As will be seen, however, the help, advice and facilities afforded most 
generously by colleagues in this research centre proved invaluable in ensuring that that 
the fieldwork remained reasonably robust throughout. The first study took place in the 
summer of 1996, lasting six weeks whilst the second occurred in late Autumn 1999, 
extending to two months, thanks to the award of a small bursary from the Industrial
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Relations Department of the LSE that covered basic costs of study. A postal survey was 
conducted on each occasion with arrangements made for completed questionnaires to be 
forwarded on to me in the United Kingdom. In addition, a supplementary interview 
schedule was arranged and carried out over the course of an intensive two-week period 
following the posting of the second survey. Its primary purpose was to gain update 
information from key informants in the field as to the reaction of employer 
constituencies to employment relations reform introduced four years previously.
In short, both studies were carried out in a highly concentrated fashion over an 
extremely compressed time period. Reduced opportunities to work overseas in the field, 
the absence of a supportive and familiar research infrastructure compounded by various 
cultural and language difficulties handicapped efforts at sustaining a standard of 
fieldwork more than this researcher would have ideally liked. Nonetheless, and despite 
unpreventable empirical imperfections, two short trips were undertaken that have 
proved to be ultimately research-productive in terms of the scope of this thesis. In 
short, the fieldwork has still managed to generate statistically reliable field results from 
two national surveys underpinned by qualitative findings from an interview schedule 
that captures the views of some key observers of South African industry bargaining and 
its reform. A fuller account of these methodological shortcomings is held over for 
discussion later.
For now, it is important to state that there was little or no opportunity to pilot either 
survey instruments or interview schedules for their robustness prior to implementation, 
given the obvious limitations on time. Nevertheless, some common-sense precautions 
were taken to ensure that sufficient credence could be placed on their use in the field, in 
terms of face-validity and reliability. All-importantly, this took the form of receiving 
useful feedback and taking sound guidance from both the Director (Webster) and
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Deputy Director (Macun) of SWOP, one of the most highly reputable research centres 
in the country and one of the few in the country that had been specifically funded to 
conduct industrial relations research. Fortunately, for this researcher, both of these 
senior academics were highly experienced researchers in the field, advisors to the 
incoming government and union movement, highly encouraging of my work and, most 
importantly, extremely familiar with the bargaining system and recent historical 
developments. Following their timely intervention, revisions were made to the wording 
of specific questionnaire items in order to reflect ‘local’ nuances of meaning and avoid 
ambiguities of interpretation. Confirmation was also provided for the structure and the 
relevance of most items for a South African audience. On advice, some items were 
removed for their lack of resonance with South African employers. A similar exercise 
was undertaken for the follow-up survey, but, on this occasion, extended to an even 
wider audience of academics, employers and their representatives attending a national 
conference in Cape Town and others subsequently interviewed later in the industrial belt 
of Johannesburg and Pretoria. In short, the absence of piloting these surveys in the field 
was compensated for to some limited extent through the taking of ‘insider’ advice and 
guidance that further informed the design of these survey instruments in ways intended 
to improve their credibility with respondents.
sample frame
Sampling for each survey was drawn from lists of companies first supplied to SWOP at
Wits University and generously made available to this researcher subsequently. Both
samples had been originally compiled by the Bureau of Market Research (BMR), a
research arm of the University of South Africa (UNISA), in preparation for nationwide
survey work conducted by SWOP researchers under the auspices of the International
Labour Office (ILO) with a view to providing background information for its own
review of South Africa’s labour market (Standing et al. 1996: 330). This study, known
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as the ‘South African Labour Flexibility Survey’ (SALFS for short) compares 
favourably with similar national surveys conducted in twenty other countries around the 
world and looks into the development of various employment and labour flexibility 
practices within the South African workplace (Standing 1997b: 1-2). The fieldwork 
actually took place over two rounds with the first (SALFS 1) conducted in 1995 and the 
second (SALFS2) in 1996 (Macun 1997: 1-2; Stryker et al 2001: 58-9). The British 
WIRS series was an acknowledged influence on their survey methodology to the extent 
of both questionnaires being devised in ways that sought a combination of factual and 
attitudinal responses from, primarily, managerial respondents.
The sample range for each round of this national survey was drawn from an industrial
register maintained and regularly updated by the BMR which ‘comprises a universe of
approximately fourteen thousand establishments from all the main divisions of the
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) and all the main regions of the country’ (Macun
et al. 1997: 25). Thus, firms sampled from this register were intended to cover the main
manufacturing sectors in the country - primarily metal goods and engineering, textiles
and clothing, food, beverage and tobacco, chemicals, minerals and plastics, wood, paper
and printing. Likewise, those metropolitan areas renowned for their high density of
manufacturing concerns (most notably Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban but also
Pretoria, Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage and East London) were also targeted. Sampling size
for the first round (SALFS 1) amounted to some five hundred firms compared to one of
four hundred and fifty for the second (SALFS2) (Macun 1997: 2). The original intention
had been for researchers to merge both sets of data in ways that permitted longitudinal
analyses to be undertaken through matching serial numbers to firms. In the event, this
proved impossible to carry out and was compounded by the need to add new firms to
the original sample given the demise of firms surveyed in the first round and the refusal
of others to partake in the second. In effect this meant that any comparisons to be drawn
228
between both surveys can only be aggregated and made in the round rather than, as is 
more methodologically desirable, through tracking changes occurring to a single cohort 
of firms over time (Macun 1997: 2; Standing 1997b: 2). In short, these two national 
surveys amount to cross-sectional studies of manufacturing firms and thus preclude the 
possibility of conducting any kind of longitudinal analysis due to methodological 
shortcomings that proved difficult to control for.
sampling strategy
As a consequence of the above, my own survey work inherits the same strengths and 
weaknesses as the original SALFS fieldwork by reference to probability sampling. On 
the one hand, access to a highly regarded manufacturers’ register has enabled this 
investigator to undertake national survey work on two separate occasions in an all- 
important sector of the newly exposed part of the economy in terms of export, 
employment and union growth as well as overall contribution to Gross National 
Product. In other words this sector, as one of two bedrocks of the economy (the other 
being mining), has been deliberately chosen for survey purposes for its strategic value 
from a nation-building perspective and for providing a good test bed from which to 
assess the overall sustainability of South Africa’s experimentation with centralised 
bargaining and, at one remove, social corporatism. On the other hand, statistical 
methodology is constrained and analytical power reduced through reliance on two 
‘convenience’, as opposed to ‘random’, samples drawn from the same sampling frame 
of firms (Bryman and Cramer 1999:104-5). Although such a sampling process makes 
for little difference in terms of their relative representativeness within populations, 
nevertheless, it impacts considerably on the degree to which statistically-sound 
comparative analysis between these two surveys remains valid.
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The above refers to the generic nature of cross-sectional studies compared to those 
designed to be longitudinal. Thus, the sorts of statistical test and procedure permitted 
under the former are invariably of a more limited kind than those permitted in the case 
of the latter. Because both these survey samples are best regarded as being different 
from each other for statistical purposes under cross-sectional analysis, the ability to 
track changes in employer attitudes towards associability over time becomes more 
limited as a consequence. This is because we are measuring differences of view between 
two distinct samples at two different points in time rather than the same random sample 
through time. As a result, the comparisons to be made and the conclusions to be drawn 
regarding changes in employers’ views are required to be more modest in turn. 
Nonetheless, cross-sectional analysis from both surveys can cast considerable light on 
what might be changing from one time period to the next when it comes to a 
manufacturing employer’s experience of centralised bargaining reform either side of 
such a crucial transitional period. Unfortunately, the nature of both the sampling frame 
to be used and the process to be undertaken precludes this being done in more dynamic 
and transformational terms than would ideally prove to be the case. These sampling 
limitations aside, both surveys are still perfectly capable of measuring manufacturing 
employers’ views towards their associability and, when cross-referenced against each 
other, of helping to explain any changes to them from one period to the next. This is 
because the necessary precautions have been taken to ensure that such comparisons can 
be made at both points in time for the population of employers from which both samples 
were drawn. Namely, the survey structure remained constant across both surveys and a 
large core of questions remained unchanged from one survey to the next (Millward et al 
1998: 153).
response rates
For both surveys, self-administered questionnaires were addressed and posted to the 
most senior manager within the company deemed responsible for policies in the area of 
Human Resource Management and Employment Relations in late 1995 and 1999 
respectively. Completed returns were arranged on each occasion to be collected in
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South Africa and forwarded for analysis to the UK in early 1996 and 2000 respectively. 
The number of respondents submitting completed questionnaires in the first survey 
round amounted to some hundred and seven out of a total distribution of some five 
hundred of which the first four hundred and fifty had been successfully canvassed as 
part of the first SALFS survey. The remainder were randomly selected from renowned 
company registers. Thus, the number of completed returns (where n=107) amounted to 
a 21 per cent response rate overall and not accounting for some twelve returned 
uncompleted due to non-delivery (either through closure, relocation or wrongly 
addressed). Reducing the sample population accordingly raises the response rate to 22 
per cent in total. It appears from canvassing the views of various senior academics ‘on 
the ground’ that this level of response represents a fairly respectable one for company 
surveys of this type that are conducted on a national basis across the main industrial 
regions of South Africa. More disappointing, however, is the response from those 
manufacturing employers sampled in the second round of this postal survey. Here, the 
numbers returning completed questionnaires amounted to some one hundred and twenty 
six in total (n=126). However, this amount of completed returns only accounts for some 
fourteen per cent of the total number of nine hundred originally canvassed by post as 
derived from the full list of companies used in the second SALFS survey and as sourced 
by the BMR from their original register at UNISA. However, it is also worth noting 
that, on this second occasion, some ninety eight questionnaires were returned unopened 
for the same combination of reasons as above and accounting for some twelve per cent 
of the total sample of 900 companies originally surveyed. Discounting these returns 
from the original sample population produces an effective response rate of some 16 per 
cent in total.
Whilst details of the structural composition of respondents for each completed sample is
held over until the next chapter, the following are worth noting for now. First, about
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twice as many respondents report themselves to be members of an employer’s 
organisation as do not whilst just over half believe themselves to be party to agreements 
reached by bargaining councils for each of these two surveys. Meanwhile, just under a 
third of respondents in both surveys consider themselves to be either wholly or partly 
foreign-owned. Likewise, over a fifth of respondents identify themselves to be on the 
large size in each instance, using a workforce threshold of a thousand or more. In 
contrast, a similar proportion identify themselves on both occasions as being in the 
small to medium-sized category, using a threshold of less than a hundred employed per 
establishment. Meanwhile, less than one in ten companies report itself to be ‘union free’ 
in the first survey compared to a slightly improved ratio of one in eight for the second 
whilst a majority union presence is acknowledged by roughly two out of every five 
surveyed on either occasion. Finally, the vast majority of respondents for both surveys 
consider themselves to be facing increasingly hostile competitive environments. Having 
reviewed the sampling strategy underpinning the survey work and the level of response 
this provoked on both occasions, we now turn our attention to the design of each 
questionnaire in turn prior to their distribution across each sample range.
survey instruments
A perennial challenge for those conducting surveys is to devise instruments that make
concepts underpinning the research topic operational within the chosen field of study.
The central task becomes one of ensuring that the composition of individual
questionnaire items preserves the integrity of the basic ideas under scrutiny yet remains
meaningful to the target audience (Millward et al 1998: 146). For example, within this
study, ‘associability’ may hold different meanings and signify different levels of
importance for different employers. Clearly, the complexity of thinking behind most
concepts and variables like centralised bargaining or free-riding cannot simply be
encapsulated in just the one single questionnaire item. Commonly, researchers in the
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field can often only realise such a concept through asking potential respondents a 
cluster of specific questions designed to elicit their views on each particular aspect of it. 
This survey work is no different.
Both postal surveys have been structured along similar lines with each being organised 
classically into two sections (see appendix 1 for examples of each). The first 
concentrates on certain structural characteristics of targeted employing units that are 
considered useful when generating descriptive statistical analysis. The preference in this 





• unionisation and recognition,
• workforce morale
• amount o f competition.
The presumption is that such characteristics also help to explain variations in responses
to individual items that might reasonably be anticipated in advance, given the reading of
an existing literature on both associability and the South African bargaining system and
the heterogeneous nature of the population in general {after Millward et.al. 1998: 148-
9). Within the first survey, these items number twenty three in total and fall under the
heading of ‘company data’, being structured to provide data on the current workforce,
on industrial relations arrangements (including involvement with associations and
bargaining councils) and on company performance (including workplace morale).
Following analysis of the results from this first survey, the opportunity was taken to
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reduce their number to seventeen but without loss of any key characteristics as 
identified above. The purpose in foreshortening the number of those items eliciting 
relevant company data was to improve the robustness of the second survey instrument 
in the follow-up study.
The second part of both surveys is devoted to seeking attitudinal responses from 
manufacturing employers towards a number of issues surrounding membership of 
employers’ associations and engagement with bargaining councils. More specifically, 
this final component of the questionnaire is structured in such a way as to try and 
identify the general orientation of responding manufacturing employers towards the 
authority of both bargaining councils and employers’ organisations. As a consequence, 
items have been produced with future exploratory analysis in mind. Once again, ideas 
emanating from a critical literature reviewed in the preceding chapters have greatly 
informed the phrasing of all questionnaire items for both surveys. It is the configuration 
of this attitudinal content within the survey that we now focus upon. Accordingly, the 
remaining twenty items of this forty-three-item questionnaire were specifically 
deployed in this first survey round as a means of testing five discrete dimensions that 
were hypothetically assumed to be significant in determining an individual employer’s 
attitude towards associability and bargaining centralisation as embodied in the 
bargaining council system. Brief descriptions of each are provided in the next chapter 
prior to testing for their reliability.
In short, seeking confirmation for the existence of these five hypothetical dimensions 
has greatly informed the design of this first questionnaire. Unfortunately, as it 
transpired, these ‘a priori’ factors held little resonance with our sample of employing 
respondents when tested for in the field other than for the first one (a more detailed 
account follows in the ‘results’ chapter to follow). Nonetheless, ten of the original
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twenty items were found to be statistically robust and could form the focus for further 
exploratory investigations the second time round. Furthermore, additional (frequency) 
findings from this first survey pointed to the sense of retaining a small number of items 
for a second survey, most notably concerning free-riding behaviour and resort to the use 
of legal exemptions (‘hardship clauses’). This meant that remaining items were no 
longer considered to be essential for inclusion in this second survey instrument, given 
the need to incorporate within it replacement items that better reflected some of the 
newer public debates to have emerged in the interim and as discussed in the preceding 
chapter. These seven lost items had addressed issues regarding the capacity of the 
bargaining council system to enhance workplace flexibility, productivity and training as 
well as in moderating labour market behaviours (‘market control’) and in handling 
anticipated ‘crises of expectation’ following on from the ending of apartheid.
Now, the opportunity was taken on this second occasion to augment the original thirteen
‘core’ questionnaire items with additional ones that reflected the emergence of newer
debates circulating within the wider South African business community (and beyond)
primarily over the sense in persisting with a two-tiered bargaining system. Again,
various pieces of advice from academics in the field, public policy documents and
journal publications helped inform this part of the exercise {after Millward et al. 1998:
154). This meant that employers’ views were now sought regarding the contribution that
bargaining councils could make towards restructuring industry, reducing workplace
conflict and co-ordinating employers sectorally as well as on the role of legally
extended agreements. In addition, cognisance is now given to the question as to how
effectively bargaining council agreements reflect the interests of smaller firms as
opposed to larger ones and of rural employers compared to those of their urban
counterparts. The result is that, for this second round of the survey, twenty-four items in
total were deployed within the follow-up instrument as a way of testing whether there
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are more contemporary reverberations surrounding South African employer 
associability as have been reported within business, governmental and some academic 
circles (see preceding chapter for details). Nonetheless, the primary purpose remains 
that of either confirming or disconfirming the presence of these same ‘de facto’ factors 
that once again are assumed to be influencing the thinking of those employers choosing 
to reflect upon their associability and disposition towards collective action. Whatever 
the outcome, contextualised findings from both instruments, and their broader 
interpretation, are intended to inform policy discussion over any future associability and 
centralised bargaining reform. The more qualitative aspects of this fieldwork are also 
intended to assist in this endeavour and we now turn our attention to the structure and 
purpose of those interviews conducted in the course of the second field trip.
interview schedule
The slightly extended length of the second field trip compared to the first allowed for
the possibility of conducting interviews in addition to organising a second postal survey.
To this end, a number of interviews were arranged over the course of a month between
mid-November and December 1999. As with the corresponding surveys, the purpose
behind this more qualitative study was to ascertain from interviewees their perceptions
as to how employers were feeling towards collective action generally and the bargaining
council system specifically and whether these views were undergoing any changes in
response to perceived transformations in employment relations and against a backdrop
of broader racial, political and economic transition. As a consequence, ‘purposive
interviewing’ was undertaken with a view to identifying three distinct types of
informant that, in combination, were thought capable of shedding light on what
manufacturing employers might be currently experiencing in the wake of centralised
bargaining reform and employment relations regime change {after Neuman 1997 cited
in Saunders et al. 2000: 174). Thus, pre-selection criteria for cases was based on
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whether informants were knowledgeable, authoritative and intimate observers of the 
bargaining council system, directly engaged as individual employer representatives in 
bargaining council proceedings or took responsibility for representing employer 
interests in bargaining councils in their capacity as officials in employers’ associations.
interview sample
Given the nature of this fieldwork and limitations on time, any pre-selection of cases
proved impossible, especially given the additional handicap of identifying in advance
sound representatives of these various populations and the smallness of the sample in
question. Thus, ‘snowball sampling ’ was the method deployed to identify cases across
all three interview categories (Saunders et al 2000: 175). An initial contact was made
with one or two cases in each category who were then asked to identify further cases in
their own and other categories (when appropriate) and so on. In this way, the interview
schedule evolved over the course of the month, primarily on the basis of personal
recommendation. Details of the schedule and of those interviewed and their status are
provided in appendix 2. As a result, seventeen interviews were conducted in total with
each no less than an hour in length and many considerably in excess of this. Of the total
interviewed, four were corporate-level HR Directors of large business concerns , two
being South African subsidiaries of larger European-based conglomerates and the other
two South African companies (one involved wholly in mining extraction) with
extensive operations abroad. Only one of the four directors represented a company not
currently ‘party’ to any industry bargaining agreements. The remaining three were each
‘leading lights’ within their respective bargaining councils as well as being ‘party’ to
the employer peak body -  Business South Africa (BSA), now Business Unity South
Africa (BUSA). In addition, interviews with five officials of employers’ associations
were arranged, all bar one (from the Chamber of Mines) with direct responsibility for
negotiating across the bargaining council table. Of these five, two headed regional
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employer groups in sectors (Clothing and Building) where the break-up of associations 
and the termination of councils proved to be a constant threat. This left two officials as 
convenors of negotiating teams in extremely high profile national employer bodies, one 
of which is held to be the lead group within the whole metal manufacturing sector (steel 
and allied industries) and the other the most significant industry to centralise its 
bargaining arrangements nationally since the implementation of the new dispensation 
covering bargaining centralisation (Chemical and pharmaceutical industries). Together, 
these officials head up associations that, in one way or another, represent the interests of 
significant numbers of manufacturing employers across the whole country.
Building on this, interviews took place with a number of individuals who were also 
thought to be extremely familiar with issues surrounding the operation of bargaining 
councils from the employer’s perspective whilst not directly responsible for their 
running. First, there are a couple of legal advisors who had been closely associated with 
Business South Africa (BSA) at a time when it represented the lead voice of organised 
business in joint talks with the labour movement over the shape of the new legal 
dispensation in 1995. Whilst the first interviewee, as one of its executive officers, had 
been a highly active member of the BSA’s negotiating team, the other had remained an 
important ‘behind-the-scenes’ advisor to it. There next followed a series of four 
interviews. The first two were with informants who had held important official positions 
in the lead government ministry and leaving two others who were currently in charge of 
high-profile non-governmental bodies.
First, this meant conducting interviews with the Director of the Collective Bargaining 
section of the Department of Labour with a responsibility for advocating and 
developing public policy in this area. Likewise, the opportunity was also taken to 
interview the past Director of Communications in this same Department as someone
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who had previously been head of research at COSATU and was also held to be a 
renowned and frequently cited commentator on Labour Relations matters. Similarly, the 
Executive Director of NEDLAC was also thought to be someone extremely well placed 
to comment upon the employers’ response to state encouragement of social dialogue 
and industry bargaining and other aspects of employment relations reform. Finally, the 
opportunity was also taken to interview the head of the National Association of 
Bargaining Councils, primarily a training and advisory body for bargaining council 
convenors and employer participants and who also had considerable experience in 
heading up bargaining council negotiations for a regional employers’ association. This 
left time for a final round of interviews with four academic commentators, all 
acknowledged to be authorities in their field and well capable of providing useful 
insights into the meaning and significance of centralised bargaining (and other) reform 
from an individual employer’s and organised business perspective.
Of course, such reliance on snowball sampling has led to some skewness as regards the
final composition of the interview sample that could not be compensated for given the
shortage of time available for arranging interviews. There was insufficient time and
means to identify alternative cases capable of articulating contrasting viewpoints to
those interviewed. Certainly, there appears to be a primie face case for supposing bias in
favour of employers and their officials holding likeminded views favourable to the
retention of the bargaining council system, albeit one reformed. In the event, this proved
not always to be the case. Indeed, as can be seen from subsequent interview notes, some
representatives of organised business remain healthily sceptical as to the virtues of
collective action and centralised bargaining. However, it must be said that most
interviewees revealed themselves to be ‘critical loyalists’ rather than outright opponents
of current public policy and institutional arrangements. Perhaps a more serious omission
from the interview sample is the absence of any union view on employers’ and their
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officials’ attitudes towards associability and bargaining councils. Failure to interview 
union representatives on bargaining council proceedings is a shortcoming in the 
interview methodology that is readily acknowledged and only excusable on grounds of 
restrictions on time availability. Certainly, the decision not to seek interviews with 
union officials was taken at the time on the grounds that opening up one more line of 
inquiry could prove resource-draining and a distraction from the central purpose of 
garnering the views of employers and those close to them. Methodological decisions in 
the field are often driven by similar considerations of risk-management and aversion in 
a context of paucity in research resources and invariably entail making compromises 
and trade-offs of this nature at the expense of validity (Strauss and Whitefield 1998: 13- 
14).
interview methods
Given the purpose behind this more qualitative dimension to the research and given the 
type of attributes possessed by most informants in this particular sample, the decision 
was deliberately taken to conduct all interviews using a virtually unstructured format. 
Thus, all interviews were held informally with a view to exploring at some depth a 
number of predetermined themes and issues, rather than work through a checklist of 
pre-ordained questions, associated with an overall interview agenda around employment 
relations and (centralised) bargaining reform and employers’ reaction to it. Accordingly, 
interviewees were encouraged to talk openly and freely about ‘events, behaviours and 
beliefs’ in response to occasional prompts (open-ended questions and statements) linked 
to this interview agenda (Saunders et al. 2000: 244). As a result, interviewee’s 
perceptions predominantly structured the course of most of these non-standardised 
interviews although interventions were made when necessary in order to ensure that 
discussions remained relevant to the topic at hand (Whipp 1998: 54).
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The justification for conducting such ‘informant interviews’ in this instance is three-fold 
(Healey and Rawlinson 1994). First, the exploratory (investigative) nature of this part of 
the study lends itself to such a technique given the aim of first discovering what might 
be happening ‘on the ground’ and what additional insights this might provide as a 
consequence. Second, this type of interview can even prove useful in helping to 
confirm or discount findings first obtained through survey work, as in this case (Wass 
and Wells 1994 cited in Saunders et a l2000: 246). Finally, the background, authority 
and experience of informants can be highly relevant in respect of their interviewing 
behaviour. Such interviewees can be sophisticated and ‘political’ performers under 
interview conditions when required to be and well versed in handling and manipulating 
the interview situation in ways that mask their true feelings and views on any matter 
under discussion. The danger in relying on a more structured approach to interviewing 
is that such a controlling format might well inhibit unguarded and insightful views and 
only engender more considered and neutral responses from informants.
Free-flowing narrative and discourse arising from unstructured but thematic exchanges
are likely to be more revealing in terms of what interviewees may truly be thinking. In
short, ‘fitness for purpose’ influenced the final decision to avoid any standardised
interviewing. A more fluid and informant-led approach to interviewing was thought to
be a more appropriate method in light of the particular circumstances and given the
characteristics of this particular interview sample. Similar reasoning explains the choice
of method in logging the data gained through interview. In order to encourage openness
and flow from informants, the decision was deliberately taken not to record interviews
on tape but rather to note-take contemporaneously followed by more rigorous and fuller
note-taking immediately following the interview. Once again, there are trade-offs
associated with such a practice in terms of accuracy. However, it is the firm conviction
of this researcher that the paramount need remained that of encouraging highly
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experienced and politically-sawy interviewees to ‘open up’ on organisationally 
sensitive issues rather than recording blow by blow accounts of proceedings. Most 
informants were made aware of their role as spokespeople for their constituencies and 
could censor their responses to suit the interview conditions they faced.
interview themes
In order to ensure some consistency across this highly compressed and unstructured
interview schedule, an interview agenda was established in advance of the schedule that
consisted of a number of themes and issues pursued in the course of each and every
interview. Accordingly, views were sought from interview subjects as regards two
discrete but linked aspects of employer collective action: changing attitudes and
behaviours of employers concerning their associability and any recent trends and
developments observed within the bargaining council system itself and the employers’
role in these. Thus, interviewees were first asked to identify the significance of the post
apartheid bargaining reforms from an employer perspective, their general acceptability
and commitment to them (as embodied in the labour Relations Act, 1995) and the
perceived level of engagement with them. Equally, subjects were also invited to
comment upon how they felt bargaining councils had been evolving subsequent to the
introduction of revised arrangements. Pursuit of this theme is tied in with a number of
issues thought to be of increasing importance regarding a changing bargaining agenda
for employers that is also beginning to impact on the very bargaining scope of councils
themselves. These employer concerns relate to such issues as wage setting, industry
restructuring and employment and the role of enterprise bargaining in securing
productivity and flexibility improvements. Encouraging discussion of these topics is
intended to be a way of soliciting the views of those interviewed regarding the prospects
of bargaining councils generally. Having now explained and justified the modus
operandi used to collect this data, we can, now at last, turn our attention towards the
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presentation of key findings, their analysis and interpretation and, finally, their overall 
significance for us from a public policy viewpoint.
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Chapter 9. South African Manufacturers9 views on 
associability and bargaining reform
9.1 Introduction
Both this chapter and the next review findings from manufacturing firms sampled 
through two cross-sectional studies conducted in 1996 (where n=107) and 2000 (where 
n=126). Results from both cross-sectional surveys reflect employers’ contemporary 
views regarding their participation in employer associations and engagement with 
bargaining councils. Findings are also presented by reference to well chronicled 
collective action problems and to an apartheid legacy that has the business community 
fractured along racial, sectoral and even ideological ‘fault-lines’ (Nattrass 1998:21). 
Nowadays, employers can choose between one of four options regarding their 
associability: to become ‘party’ to industry agreements through associational 
membership; to register with a bargaining council as a free-riding ‘non-party’ that still 
chooses to comply with agreements; to restructure its business in ways that avoids the 
necessity to register in the first place; to simply evade any kind of registration 
completely. These options hold special resonance when considering the long-term 
durability of bargaining councils. One rationale has employers inherently resisting the 
collective discipline of employers’ associations that sit on bargaining councils and so 
effectively undermining both. Such reasoning flows from Olsonian arguments that see 
individual employers inherently retaining their independence of action as the best means 
of safeguarding their interests and of optimising their flexibility and thus choosing to 
defect from any central bargain as a consequence ( after Olson 1965). This presupposes 
an employer preference for avoiding or evading ‘association’ in the first place (Silvia 
1996) and for non-participation in bargaining council negotiations.
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The onset of a revised central bargaining system provides us with an ideal opportunity 
to test the robustness of such Olsonian predictions within a South African context. This 
has been done through fieldwork that explores manufacturing employers’ general 
disposition towards associability through becoming ‘party’ to bargaining council 
proceedings when offered the alternative of either free-riding (as a ‘non-party’) or of 
directly defecting (through avoidance, even evasion). Field studies were conducted over 
this four year period with the express purpose of assessing employer endorsement of the 
bargaining council system through examining their associability. But also this work has 
been undertaken with a view to capturing any transitional changes in employer outlook 
that might have occurred between the two point-in-time surveys. Presentation of 
findings for both surveys is organised along the following lines across the next two 
chapters. First, there is a description of both sets of sampled employers by reference to 
their structural characteristics. This is followed by an analysis of their approval rating 
for various features of associability across both studies by reference to descriptive 
statistics (that is, frequency and cross-tabulation data) in order to evaluate the weight of 
opinion towards selected items and cross-referenced against selected company 
characteristics. Attention is drawn to any commonalities and differences that exist 
between the two sampled groups and to what might help explain such comparisons.
Next, having assessed their support (or otherwise) for key aspects of single-table
employer bargaining, we examine what particular drivers might lie behind an individual
employer’s decisions to act solidaristically or not. This part of the analysis draws
heavily on the use of exploratory factor analysis to identify key constructs that might be
influencing the thinking of sampled respondents. Finally, significance testing is used to
discover whether there have been any fundamental changes to such thinking in line with
the broader economic, political and racial transitions described in earlier chapters.
However, we need to be cautious in what we conclude from these findings. Although
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respondent firms in both studies are drawn from the same universal population on both 
occasions, nevertheless, the two samples still need to be treated as being distinct from 
each other when making comparisons between sample populations. For this reason they 
are best regarded as cross-sectional rather than longitudinal findings.
9.2 Structural characteristics of sampled firms
Responding firms were compared across both national surveys in order to see how 
similar (or not) they were to each other by reference to structural characteristics 
commonly acknowledged to be significant in fieldwork of this nature. Not only are 
these ‘classificatory variables’ valuable in descriptive statistics but they can also act as 
important influences on findings arising from more sophisticated analysis of the data set 
(Millward et al 2000: 149). Any significant shift in the structural composition of firms 
between the two surveys could potentially weaken any subsequent comparative 
analysis.
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Table 1: Frequency Scores for Structural Descriptors of Sampled Firms
Descriptor Survey 1 Survey 2
nos. (%) nos. (%)
Workforce size (n = 106) (n = 126)
SME (499 and less) 72 (68) 82 (65)
large (500 or more) 34 (32) 44 (35)
Foreign ownership (n = 105) (n = 126)
wholly/partly 31 (30) 44 (35)
not at all 74 (70) 82 (65)
Union density (n == 106) (n = 126)
more than half 68 (64) 76 (60)
less than half 29 (27) - 30 (24)
none 9 (9) 20 (16)
IR climate/ morale (n = 105) (n = 126)
average or less than average 30 (29) 67 (53)
better than average 75 (71) 59 (47)
Degree of competition (n == 107) (n = 126)
increased some / a lot 74 (69) 75 (60)
little or no increase 33 (31) 51 (40)
Table 1 above sets out frequency scores for both samples across a number of structural 
variables ranging from workforce size through to (self-reported) competitiveness and 
including degree of foreign ownership, union presence and IR climate (also self- 
reported). For both surveys, roughly a third or more of those sampled firms are deemed 
to be large (that is, 500 or more) for the purposes of this exercise.
Overall, the SME population of firms appears to be well represented with two thirds or 
more of them falling within this category for both surveys compared to the third of 
larger firms constituting the remainder. Similarly, a clear majority of firms sampled 
across both surveys appear capitalised from within the country leaving a third or less of 
responding manufacturers with some element of inward investment originating from
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outside the country. Also, extremely high levels of union presence are strong features of 
both surveys with well under a fifth of manufacturers reporting themselves union-free.
In comparing survey characteristics, there appears to be no significant change in the size 
ratio of firms across both samples - a descriptor commonly held to be important in 
explaining variations in industrial relations practice and policy across firms. A similar 
pattern of findings occurs when it comes to foreign ownership and membership density. 
In each case there appear to be slight increases second time around in the proportion of 
firms wholly or partly foreign-owned, or with out a strong union presence -but none 
such as to be noteworthy. On the other hand, perceived changes in the degree of 
competition faced and in the state of morale prevalent within the workplace appear 
more delineated when comparing responses across both surveys -  but in contrasting 
ways. Whilst the intensification of competition appears to have eased, the state of 
morale appears to have worsened with over half of those sample in the second survey 
reporting the IR climate to be at best average if not worse compared to under a third 
first time round. Otherwise, there is nothing particularly striking to note as regards the 
remaining descriptors. In sum, the sample composition is sufficiently similar in most 
(but not all) key respects across both surveys for them to be comparable with each other.
9.3 The associability of sampled firms
A number of items were deployed across both surveys with the purpose of determining 
the overall approval rating within each sample for associability and related features 
commonly cited as being significant for South African employers when deciding 
whether to act collectively though membership of an association. For our purposes, 
‘approval’ translates into ‘commitment’ and thereby ‘engagement’ with the centralised 
bargaining system whereas ‘disapproval’ lapses into ‘defection’ leading to
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‘disengagement’ from the bargaining council process. This part of the analysis entails 
measuring and comparing the weight of opinion for both samples towards each facet in 
turn. To this end, frequency scores on responding firms are presented in table 2 overleaf 
on selected items covering five particular aspects of their associability as follows.
associational membership
On this showing, at least two out of three manufacturers belong to an employers’ 
association for each sample, with twice as many reporting themselves in membership as 
not. Indeed, if anything, slightly more of the second sample appear to be in membership 
(69 per cent) compared to the first (66 per cent) with a correspondingly inverse 
difference reported for non-membership (31 compared to 34 per cent).On this evidence, 
the incidence of membership appears to have held up surprisingly, well over the interim 
four years between surveys given emerging debates within the South African business 
community over such matters (as previously discussed in chapter 7). Meanwhile, just 
over three-quarters (77 per cent) of all those that belong to associations with seats in 
bargaining councils in 1996 were sufficiently satisfied for this arrangement to continue 
compared to under one in ten not so content (where n = 64). Intriguingly, of those not in 
membership, more than one in four were seriously contemplating taking out 
membership leaving a fifth to be won over (where n = 43).
Moreover, of those reporting themselves without representation on a bargaining council 
(n = 51) two in five would have approved of this happening in the first survey whilst 
under a third (29 per cent) remained opposed, leaving a similar number as yet 
undecided. In comparison, the new millennium saw just over half (53 per cent) of 
responding firms in the second sample (n = 126) registering themselves as being ‘party’ 
to bargaining council proceedings with a substantial minority (one in eight) classifying 
themselves as ‘non-party’. Alarmingly, just over a third of sampled firms either
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appeared not to know or understand their precise legal standing or preferred evasion as 
to their true status. This aside, it seems that the majority of manufacturers within both 
samples are ‘associated’ and ‘party’ to centralised bargaining arrangements and, prima 
facie, sufficiently content for such arrangements to continue. It seems from this 
headcount that strong disapproval of associability remains a minority view for the time 
being although similar numbers have yet to make their minds up either way.
compliance (with associational decisions)
When asked for their views on the principle of complying with decisions made by 
associations, exactly half of all responding firms (whether ‘associated’ or not) across 
both surveys reported themselves in favour of employers abiding by what their 
associations told them to do whether they liked it or not. However, this is not the whole 
story by any means. Whereas just under a fifth of those sampled first time round 
thought ‘non-compliance’ unproblematic for them, this view appears to have increased 
to just under a third of those sampled five years later. The explanation for this near two­
fold increase appears to lie with those unsure either way. Comparing frequency scores 
for this category across both samples shows there to have been the same proportionate 
decrease from the first to the second survey. In short, there seems to have been a 
hardening of views towards this item in favour of tolerating non-compliance that is 
indicative of an increasing polarisation of positions around this sensitive issue. This 
difference of view further suggests that whilst a majority of responding firms remain 
reasonably sympathetic towards the notion of associability this is less clear-cut when it 
comes to abiding by the terms of any centralised agreement and to accepting the 




Further evidence of a more circumspect view on associability comes from looking at the 
responses of sampled firms to two items that examine the same aspects of associability 
across both surveys. When asked how tempting free-riding appeared to be for those 
sampled first time round, slightly fewer considered the idea appealing than not with just 
under one in three acknowledging its allure compared to the less than two in five who 
did not. However, this harsh view of free-riding appeared to have softened slightly for 
the second survey. Thus, slightly more of those sampled on this occasion approved as 
disapproved of themselves free-riding in contrast to the first survey when the reverse 
applied. It seems that the passage of time might have rendered the prospect of 
abstaining from associability more tempting. The question next arises as to how tolerant 
of other (rival) firms defecting from the central bargain they might also prove to be. As 
the relevant item in table 2 illustrates, disapproval of others free-riding becomes less 
ambiguous and strengthens over time. Whereas half of those first sampled can tolerate 
the free-riding in others this falls to a ratio of just over two in five (44 per cent) second 
time round. In contrast, the proportion of those critical of others free-riding rises from 
one in three for the first sample to two in five for the second. Comparing samples 
suggests intolerance towards the free-riding of others growing markedly from survey to 
survey in contrast to more ambivalent views regarding their own free-riding behaviour. 
This inconsistency is seen in the growing proportion of sampled firms condoning their 
own free-riding in contrast to the mounting criticism of others for doing the same.
Nonetheless, around a third of those manufacturers sampled in 2000 prefer to stay true
to the ideal of the central bargain as evidenced by their dislike of themselves and others
free-riding. This proportion rises to one in two in respect of sticking to agreements and
is maintained, survey to survey. On the other hand, there appears to be some growth in
the numbers of sampled manufacturers prepared either to cherry-pick the gains derived
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from the collective action of others or not to comply with any agreed terms they dislike 
(or both). Approval for such behaviour ranges from over a half to a third of those 
sampled in either survey depending on the relevant item as specified in the above table. 
What is also worth noting is the extent to which manufacturers’ views towards 
employer alliances generally are mediated by the inclusion of legal exemption and 
extension into the centralised bargaining system.
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Table 2: Approval (frequency) scores for selected ‘associability items’
Item Survey 1 Survey 2
nos. (%) nos. (%)
Associational membership
Does your organisation already belong (n = 106) (n = 124)
to an employers’ organisation?
yes 70 (66) 86 (69)
no 36 (34) 38 (31)
Compliance with agreements
All members of EAs should be prepared to abide 
by decisions made on their behalf whether they (n = 107) (n =126)
like them or not
agree/ strongly agree 54 (50) 64 (50)
disagree/ strongly disagree 19 (18) 40 (32)
neither 34 (32) 22 (18)
Free-riding (self and others)
It is tempting to avoid membership of an 
employers’ organisation because of the (n = 106) (n = 126)
competitive advantage enjoyed by those 
remaining non-members.
agree/ strongly agree 33 (31) 47 (37)
disagree/ strongly disagree 39‘ (37) 44 (35)
neither 34 (32) 35 (28)
There is nothing wrong with non-members 
deriving the same gains as members from the (n = 107) (n = 126)
efforts of employers’ organisations dealing with 
unions
agree/strongly agree 54 (50) 56 (44)
disagree/ strongly disagree 23 (22) 41 (33)
neither 30 (28) 29 (23)
Legal exemption
The possibility of gaining exemption from industry 
agreements is a decisive factor when deciding to 
commit to an employers’ organisation (survey 1)
Being allowed exemptions from agreements is 
important when deciding whether to belong to a 
body that sits in a bargaining council (survey 2)
agree/ strongly agree 49
(n = 106)
(n = 126) 
(46) 62 (49)
disagree/ strongly disagree 15 (14) 27 (22)
neither 42 (40) 37 (29)
Legal extension
Legally extending industry agreements to non-parties 
is a welcome part of the bargaining council process
agree/ strongly agree n/a
(n= 126)
58 (46)
disagree/ strongly disagree n/a 32 (25)
neither n/a 36 (29)
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legal exemption and extension
Of those asked in the first survey for their views towards the possibility of gaining 
exemption from agreements, less than one in two (46 per cent) thought it ‘decisive’ in 
determining membership of an association that sits in a bargaining council compared to 
more than one in ten (14 per cent) who regard it as being negligible. However, the 
wording of this item was altered deliberately for the second survey in order to reflect the 
evolving nature of the debate. Nonetheless, both of these contrasting positions had 
grown proportionately stronger second time around due to an increased firming up of 
views compared to the first study with just under a half considering exemption 
‘important’ compared to just over a fifth regarding it as inconsequential. Clearly, over 
twice as many manufacturers considered ‘hardship clauses’ to be a significant feature of 
the system as did not, for both studies. However, once we incorporate the proportion of 
those unconvinced either way into the analysis then we see that the proportion of those 
firmly wedded to the provision of hardship clauses fell to just less than half. Equally, a 
similar proportion (46 per cent) believed that legally extending agreements to non-party 
employers should also become an integral feature of centralised bargaining. This same 
proportion was near double that for those indifferent to the idea (25 per cent). Results 
from both surveys suggest that for the (slight) majority of manufacturers neither legal 
exemption from, nor extension of, industry agreements are fundamental to their views 
on associability and collective action.
9.4 Cross-tabulations: company descriptors and associability items
Whereas more manufacturers across both samples report themselves more in favour of, 
than opposed to, compliance, legal exemption and extension and slightly more 
favourably disposed to free-riding than not, we have, as yet, little understanding as to 
the part played by the structural characteristics of manufacturing firms in shaping their
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pattern of response to individual ‘approval’ items. To what extent do associational 
membership, workforce size, overseas ownership and levels o f unionisation (etc.) have a 
bearing on whether individual firms in either sample find themselves fundamentally 
approving or disapproving of these same aspects of associability? Cross-tabulations can 
help answer this question for in the form of tables 3(a) to (e). Since these company 
characteristics are considered to be independent variables for the purposes of this cross­
tabulation exercise and, as such, positioned alongside the table whilst selected items on 
aspects of associability, as dependent ones, are placed along the top of the table, 
comparative analysis across both surveys is conducted by reference to column as well as 
row percentages as appropriate (Bryman and Cramer 1999: 167-8). Analysis and 
presentation of results is restricted to only those cross-tabulations that bear comparison 
and thus deserving of our attention.
9.4.1. Compliance with the association
A careful scrutiny of the cross-tabulated data set out below in tables 3 (a) tells us that 
respondents’ views towards associational governance is influenced in part by whether 
they are members of an association themselves (associational membership), are wholly 
or partly owned by an overseas concern (foreign-owned) and by whether workforce 
morale is currently high or low (company climate). Overall, it also seems to be the case 
that the relative weightings of most categories of firm have changed little from survey 
to survey.
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Table 3(a): Cross-tabulated Approval Scores for ‘Membership Compliance’
(both surveys)
“All members of employers’ organisations should abide by decisions 
made on their behalf, whether they like them or not.”
Characteristic Survey 1 (Q38) Survey 2 (Q32)
Associational
SA/A SD/D Neither SA/A SD/D Neither




















13 14 4 (n=31) 24 14 6 (n=44)
(ni=104 and 
n2=126)




































SA/A Strongly Agree/Agree SD/D Strongly Disagree/Disagree
associational membership
As might be expected, there is a considerable difference of opinion between members 
and non-members of employers’ associations when it comes to accepting the authority 
of an employer’s organisation and to virtually the same extent across both surveys.
Thus, in both instances, nearly twice as many members acknowledged a duty to observe 
associational rule as did not. In contrast, non-members showed themselves to be much 
more ambivalent when it came to observing the authority of an association. These 
findings suggest two things to us. First, the proportion of those in membership prepared 
to follow the lead of their association has changed little over the course of the two 
surveys as has the proportion of non-members who see little wrong in ignoring the 
determinations of their own association. Second, less than a third of associated members 
are prepared to breach an agreement if and when necessary whilst approximately one in
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four non-members surprisingly sees virtue in the governance of an employer 
association, even though not in membership themselves.
overseas ownership
Whether there is some overseas investment in a responding firm also contributes to how 
conformance to an association’s authority is to be viewed. Whereas in the first survey 
those manufacturers with an element of foreign ownership were just as likely to concede 
to the wishes of an association as not, ‘home-grown’ respondents appeared twice as 
willing to commit to an employer’s association. However, this pattern of observance 
changes slightly come the second survey. Here, over half of those firms with some 
element of foreign ownership felt compelled to abide by the collective decision of an 
association compared to a third not so well predisposed. This indicates a growing 
intolerance towards associations from this category of manufacturer across both 
surveys. Meanwhile, those manufacturers without any overseas investors have moved in 
the opposite direction with a growing proportion unwilling to abide by the decisions of 
associations. Whereas the majority accepted the delegated authority of an association 
first time round this fell to under half on the next occasion, with a third demonstrably 
opposed to the very idea.
company morale
Of all those manufacturers conceding to the authority of an association, three-quarters 
were from manufacturers reporting workplace morale to be reasonably high. However, 
this proportion fell to just over half by the time of the second survey. Meanwhile, the 
reverse is the case for those reporting morale to be relatively poor and governance from 
an association unwelcome. For this category, the proportion doubled from survey to 
survey and from being a minority to a majority of those rejecting associational 
governance. Interestingly, this suggests a growing convergence of views between those
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manufacturers with differing levels of morale such that associational authority becomes 
more acceptable than not and to more or less the same degree across both surveys.
9.4.2 Free-riding (by self)
Whether firms admitted in both surveys to the temptation of not belonging to an 
association seemed markedly influenced by whether they were already in membership 
or not, small or large in size, foreign-owned or not and experiencing high or low 
workplace morale. Moreover, there seem to be some interesting shifts in the pattern of 
response within categories from survey to survey that reveal some attitudinal changes 
towards the appeal of free-riding over time. Generally, it seems that the competitive 
advantage derived from free-riding non-membership has become slightly more 
appealing for some categories more than others as illustrated by the following table.
TABLE 3 (b): Cross-tabulated Approval Scores for ‘Free-riding’ [self] (both
surveys).
“It is tempting to avoid membership of an employers’ organisation because of the 
competitive advantage enjoyed by those who remain non-members.”
Characteristic Survey 1 (Q40) Survey 2 (Q34)





















































































































Reassuringly, the number of associational members admitting to being tempted into 
free-riding in this way remained a minority for both surveys with two in five reporting 
themselves resistant and around a third not yet convinced either way. The opposite 
applies in the case of non-members where a substantial minority were well aware of the 
advantages accruing to them in not taking out membership, from survey to survey. 
However, this still left a fifth to under a third of non-associated firms across both 
surveys for whom this particular free-riding advantage appears not to be a prime 
motivator behind their non-membership and thereby begs the question as to what is. Of 
equal interest is the fact that those members acknowledging themselves vulnerable to 
the allure of free-riding increased from a fifth to a third second time round whilst the 
proportion of non-members similarly seduced also increased but less noticeably. This 
suggests that the notion of free-riding is becoming less abhorrent to associated 
manufacturers over time and ever more appealing to an increasing rump of non­
members.
workforce size
In comparing the impact of workforce size on the pattern of responses across both 
surveys, there appears to have been a slight shift of position for the larger firm in 
comparison to the smaller one regarding the appeal of non-membership. Whereas in the 
first survey a majority of larger firms reported themselves as being resistant to the allure 
of non-membership they had become the minority by the time of the second survey. 
Meanwhile, the proportion of small firms reporting themselves drawn to non­
membership also increased from under a third to close to nearly two in five. The
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advantages of non-membership appear to be increasingly tempting to both size 
categories but none more so than the larger firm.
foreign ownership
Whereas ‘domestic’ manufacturers appear to be slightly more tempted than not across 
both surveys, the picture is less consistent for those sampled firms with some element of 
foreign ownership to them. Although twice as many of these ‘foreign’ firms reported 
themselves repelled as attracted to the temptations associated with non-membership in 
1996, they were more or less equally divided four years later. Once again, the appeal of 
non-membership is strong for both categories but becoming increasingly so for overseas 
firms.
company climate
Whereas well over a third of those tempted towards non-membership were 
manufacturers experiencing relatively low morale at the time of the first survey, this 
proportion increased to just under two thirds for the second surveyed sample. Likewise, 
having accounted for more than one in four of those firms not drawn to the attractions 
of non-membership first time round, this same category of manufacturer now 
represented just under half of all such firms sampled on the second occasion. Clearly, 
those firms with relatively low morale felt increasingly drawn to the free-riding benefits 
of non-membership than those where the shopfloor climate was reportedly better.
9.4.3 Free-riding (by others)
In testing for the tolerance of sampled firms towards the free-riding disposition of 
assumed rivals, it seems that, once again, associational membership, workforce size, 
foreign ownership and company climate can all have a bearing on the outcome as 
illustrated in table 3 (c). Once again, an analysis of changed response patterns within
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categories reveals some changes in attitudes. This time, however, rather than observing 
an increased attraction towards free-riding there appears to be a growing intolerance 
towards the free-riding behaviour of non-members across certain categories of 
manufacturer as demonstrated below.
TABLE 3 (c): Cross-tabulated Approval scores for ‘Free-riding’ [by others]
(both surveys).
“There is nothing wrong with non-members benefiting the same as members from the 
efforts of employers’ organisations dealing with unions.”
Characteristic Survey 1 (Q33) Survey 2 (Q26)
SA/A SD/D Neither SA/A SD/D Neither
associational yes 36 16 18 (n=70) 34 34 18 (n=86)
membership no 17 7 12 (n=36) 22 7 11 (n=40)
(ni=105 and (n=53) (n=23) (n=30) (n=56) (n=41) (n=29)
n2=126)
workforce size SME 36 15 21 (n=72) 38 27 17 (n=86)
(n1=106 and (below 500)
n2=126) large (500 17 8 9 (n=34) 18 14 12 (n=40)
plus) (n=53) (n=23) (n=30) (n=56) (n=41) (n=29)
foreign wholly/ 17 5 9 (n~31) 21 15 8 (n=44)
ownership partly
(ni=105 and not at all 36 17 21 (n=74) 35 26 21 (n=82)
n2=126) (n=53) (n=22) (n=30) (n=56) (n=41) (n=29)
company average and 15 4 11 (n=30) 34 17 16 (n=67)
climate below
(ni=105 and above 37 19 19 (n=75) 22 24 13 (n=59)
n2=126) average (n=52) (n=23) (n=30) (n=56) (n=41) (n=29)
associational membership
Associated manufacturers were twice as likely to be content for non-members to gain 
from the associability of member firms as to be intolerant first time round. Significantly, 
this perspective had changed come the second survey. Now, as many members 
approved as disapproved of non-members deriving the same gains from associability 
and had also increased their proportion of all those (in membership or not) clearly 
opposed to the idea.
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workforce size
Similar to the above, both larger and smaller firms have begun to harden attitudes as 
regards the idea of non-members gaining the same from associability as members. Here, 
the proportion of firms in either category expressing disquiet rises from marginally less 
than one in four to one in three, survey to survey.
foreign ownership
Interestingly, there is a slightly contradictory shift in attitude between domestically- and 
foreign-owned firms, from survey to survey. On the one hand, ‘domestic’ firms appear 
slightly more tolerant proportionate to those not so disposed when comparing the 
patterns of response as set out in table 3 (c). In contrast, the proportion of those firms 
with some element of overseas investment in them that consider it wrong for non­
members to benefit from associability the same as members has more than doubled over 
the course of the two surveys.
company climate
More marked has been the change in attitude towards the free-riding of others between 
those firms where shopfloor morale is relatively low compared to those where it is 
deemed to be relatively high. For the latter category, there is some evidence of a 
growing impatience with the idea of non-members benefiting the same from 
associability as members. Whereas half of such firms sampled in the first survey were 
prepared to tolerate this situation, this proportion fell to just over a third for the second 
sample with a comparable rise in the proportion not so favourably disposed towards 
non-members. Likewise, there appears to be a doubling in the proportion of firms 
operating in a poorer climate that have become less forbearing of non-members.
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In sum, it seems that whilst members are becoming less tolerant of the idea of non­
members deriving a comparable competitive advantage from associabilty as they 
themselves so too are overseas companies. On the other hand, this reduced tolerance 
towards non-members also appears to apply to all categories of workforce size and 
shopfloor morale, although more so for the larger firm and, rather surprisingly, for those 
companies with good workplace morale.
9.4.4 Legal exemption
When asked how decisive the provision for exemption from industry agreements might 
prove to be for them in deciding upon their associability, the different categories of 
sampled firms appear to respond in similar fashion survey to survey other than for 
workforce size, level o f unionisation and company climate, as set out in table 3 (d). 
Thus, proportionately, slightly more members than non-members value the provision of 
hardship clauses in the centralised bargaining system within both surveys. Curiously, 
however, a greater proportion of those in membership consider exemption less highly 
prized compared to the numbers of those without membership who take the same view.
TABLE 3(d): Cross-tabulated Approval Scores for ‘Exemption’ (both surveys).
“Gaining exemption from industry-wide agreements is decisive in deciding to belong to 
an employer’s organisation that sits in a bargaining council.”
Characteristic Survey 1 (Q34) Survey 2 (Q18)
workforce size SME 29 10 32 (n=71) 40 16 26 (n=82)
(n1=105 and (below
n2=126) 500) 22 11 11 (n=44)
large (500 20 4 10 (n»34) (n=62) (n=27) (n=37)
plus) (n=49) (n=14) (n=42)
unionisation less than 15 7 15 (n=37) 28 7 15 (n=50)
(n1=105 and half
n2=126) half or 34 8 26 (n=68) 34 20 22 (n=76)
more (n=49) (n=15) (n=41) (n=62) (n=27) (n=37)
company average 16 3 10 (n=29) 29 16 22 (n=67)
climate and below
(n1=104 and above 33 11 31 (n=75) 33 11 15 (n=59)
n2=126) average (n=49) (n=14) (n=41) (n=62) (n=27) (n=37)
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workforce size
Here, there appears to have been a slight shifting of views between the smaller and 
larger firm, survey to survey. The proportion of SMEs registering exemption to be 
important to them increased slightly from two fifths to a half whilst that for the larger 
firm fell slightly from three in five to about evens. Moreover, that proportion of 
respondents showing themselves less tied to legal exemption had also increased slightly 
for both categories. It appears that a consolidation of views has taken place between 
surveys with roughly twice as many attached to exemption as not, irrespective of the 
workforce size category.
unionisation
Similarly, contrasting changes of mind appear to have occurred between those 
manufacturers facing a strong union presence compared to those without. Whilst just on 
half of the former approved of exemption first time round, this proportion fell to well 
below half at the second time of asking. Meanwhile the opposite applied in the case of 
those experiencing low unionisation. The proportion of such manufacturers who also 
valued legal exemption increased from two in five to over half (56 per cent). The reason 
more of these manufacturers in the second survey should be more favourably inclined 
towards legal exemption compared to those more heavily unionised is not apparent.
company climate
Again, contradictory trends reveal themselves when comparing those firms in which the 
workplace climate is above average as opposed to just average or below. Whereas less 
than half the former thought exemption important to them in the first survey this 
proportion moved to a clear majority by the time of the second survey whereas the
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opposite seems to have occurred for the latter. Why firms with relatively lower 
shopfloor morale are proportionately less enamoured of legal exemption than those 
experiencing better workplace relationships is not obvious.
All told, it seems that if there have been any changes of heart towards the importance of 
legal exemption on the part of responding manufacturers from one survey to the next it 
has involved that category of firm which is smaller in size and has a weak union 
presence but where workplace morale also tends to be poor. What shifts of view there 
have been would appear to acknowledge legal exemption’s growing importance to the 
manufacturing community but not to any particularly marked extent.
9.4.5 Legal extension
One final measure of associability and collective action that is worthwhile 
disaggregating by type of responding firm is that of legally extending agreements to 
non-parties (as in the second survey only). As the results in table 3 (e) suggest, such 
structural characteristics as associational membership, workforce size and level o f 
unionisation help to explain the overall weight of opinion for and against making 
industry agreements encompassing or not.
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TABLE 3(e): Cross-tabulated Approval Scores for ‘Legal Extension’ (both 
surveys).
“Legally extending industry agreements to non-parties is 
a welcome part of the bargaining council process.” (Q37)
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Not surprisingly, there is a clear difference of view between members and non-members 
of associations towards legally extending agreements. Whilst over half of responding 
firms in membership wanted extension, only one in four non-members wanted the same 
with a third of them opposed outright to the idea compared to just one in five members 
of an association. Thus, approval for and against the legal extension of industry or 
regional agreements is likely predicated on whether manufacturers are in membership or 
not.
workforce size
Similarly, the larger the firm the more likely it is to favour, rather than oppose, legal 
extension as can be seen from the table above. Here, well over half of the larger firm 
population endorses the idea of legal extension compared to the quarter or so who do 
not. Thus, the larger firm is twice as likely to condone the practice as to oppose it. Then
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again, legal extension seems to find favour with four in ten smaller firms compared to 
the one in four critical of the practice and the one in three unsure either way. It seems 
that opinion points clearly towards an overall approval of legal extension although, not 
surprisingly, smaller enterprises more likely harbour reservations regarding its 
appropriateness than larger ones.
unionisation
Whereas those firms with a weak union presence (or none at all) appear to be or more or 
less evenly split over the issue of legally extending agreements to non-parties, this 
ambiguity is much less apparent amongst that population of heavily unionised firms. 
Here, over half of their number saw extension as a welcome feature of the system 
compared to the one in five not so enamoured and the one in four uncertain either way.
It would seem that as union density increases so legal extension of agreements becomes 
more inviting than not.
In sum, responding manufacturing firms that approve of legally extending agreements 
to non-party employers are more likely either to be in associational membership 
already, relatively large in terms of workers employed or heavily unionised or some 
combination of these three.
summary
Selective cross-tabulated analysis highlights the following. When it comes to a 
hardening or shifting of attitudes by respondents from one sample population to the next 
over various aspects of their associability then some structural characteristics seem to be 
more significant than others. Levels of approval or disapproval for the five associability 
items identified above are slightly more divergent between sample populations 
according to whether individual responding firms are already members of an association 
or not, manage relatively large or small numbers of workers and whether workplace
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morale is relatively high or low. Other company characteristics that also feature in this 
respect are levels of unionisation and the amount of inward investment from overseas.
From the cross-tabulated evidence on associational membership as presented above, it 
seems that manufacturers in membership are more sanguine towards the bargaining 
authority of an association than those choosing to spurn membership. Conversely, it 
also seems that the temptation to free-ride has become more of a consideration for both 
categories. Meanwhile, associated members were more likely to be intolerant of the 
free-riding of others compared to non-members and that such intolerance has increased 
from survey to survey. Predictably, the evidence points to those companies who are not 
in membership showing less approval for the principle of legal extension than those 
manufacturers already in membership.
With regard to -workforce size, the free-riding advantages of non-membership appear to 
be increasingly attractive to both size categories but slightly more so for larger 
compared to smaller manufacturers. By contrast, both size categories revealed a 
growing intolerance towards the free-riding of others. Meanwhile, attitudes towards 
legal exemption appear to have firmed up over time. SMEs have become increasingly 
attracted to the idea of legal exemption compared to larger manufacturing concerns 
whose views, if anything, have mellowed survey to survey. Whilst both categories 
endorse the idea of legal extension, it is the larger manufacturer who, proportionately, 
seems more favourably disposed than the smaller one.
As regards company climate, clearly more manufacturers accepted, rather than rejected, 
the bargaining authority of an employers’ association across both surveys, irrespective 
of the state of workplace morale. However, those manufacturers reporting their morale 
to be reasonably high became less enamoured of employer associations in the second
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survey whereas the opposite was the case for those manufacturers reporting themselves 
facing a poorer climate. Moreover, more of the latter category also admitted to being 
tempted to free-ride compared to those in the former. Nonetheless, both categories 
reported themselves as becoming increasingly less tolerant of others free-riding. Finally, 
it appears that the availability of legal exemption was of growing importance to those 
manufacturers experiencing reasonably good shopfloor morale but decreasingly so for 
those less fortunate.
As to foreign ownership, whilst the granting of authority to an association has grown 
proportionately for those manufacturers with some element of foreign ownership from 
survey to survey, ‘domestic’ manufacturers have seemingly become even less accepting 
of the need for such compliance. Meanwhile, the idea of not associating and benefiting 
from any subsequent free-riding benefits has become increasingly attractive for both 
categories of ownership but increasingly more so for those companies with some 
element of overseas stakeholding. As with other categories, however, the latter also 
exhibited an increasing intolerance of other firms doing the same compared to their 
‘domestic’ counterparts. As regards unionisation, increasingly less of those 
manufacturers with a strong union presence consider the availability of legal exemption 
to be a deciding factor for them when pondering on associability. In contrast, legal 
exemption has taken on a growing importance for those manufacturers with low levels 
of unionisation, survey to survey. As is to be expected, manufacturers that are strongly 
unionised see greater merit in having legal extension than those less heavily unionised 
or even union-free. From the above we can see that whatever changes of opinion have 
occurred across surveys have been neither dramatic nor surprising given the public 
policy debates that have sprung up subsequent to the introduction of bargaining reform 
in the mid 1990s. This cross-tabulated analysis largely confirms this for us.
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9.5 Approval ratings for selected items (both surveys)
Next, sampled manufacturers were also invited to respond to selected items thought to 
illustrate the more positive aspects for employers of having a centralised bargaining 
system. However, as can be seen from table 4 below, the criteria by which they might 
commonly evaluate whether bargaining councils are worth retaining appear to have 
changed from the time of the first survey conducted in 1996 to that carried out in 2000. 
Amendments to items were made explicitly out of a need to acknowledge changes in 
thinking over what exactly constitutes efficacy for employers in choosing to engage 
with the bargaining council system. These modifications simply reflect changes in the 
terms of broader debates over the value or otherwise of centralised bargaining for 
employers. For instance, given the uncertainties surrounding a formal transference of 
political power in 1994 and the introduction of a new legal dispensation for employment 
relations in the following year, efforts were made with first survey to seek out the views 
of South African manufacturing employers on whether they thought bargaining councils 
capable of helping them to manage these transitions. In contrast, the second survey 
deployed a number of items that invited respondents to pass judgement on the 
continuing appeal of the bargaining council system following the consolidation of 
political democracy, the liberalisation of the economy and the bedding in of new and 
revised new employment relations institutions. As a consequence, frequency scores for 
relevant items are presented separately for each survey but comparisons are drawn 
across both, when appropriate, in order to aid evaluation of approval ratings for selected 
aspects of associability and bargaining councils.
From the following table we can see that when it comes to managing heightened worker 
expectations arising from their political emancipation, nearly twice as many responding
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firms in 1996 thought bargaining councils had a role to play as did not. However, the 
largest proportion (just over two fifths) remained to be convinced either way. Overall 
then, bargaining councils were not anticipated to be significant institutions in helping 
handle any ‘crisis of expectation’ arising from the formal removal of apartheid labour 
policies. Conversely, by the time of the second survey in 2000, exactly two thirds of 
sampled respondents considered agreements emanating from bargaining councils to be a 
source of industrial peace across the manufacturing sector compared to just one in four 
choosing to differ. Yet again, a similarly favourable view was shown towards industry 
agreements and its help to the individual manufacturer in its management of workers 
with fewer than two in five of the sample seeing such agreements as impediments to 
good management compared to the majority (55 per cent) who viewed it much more 
positively. Moreover, the first survey also shows a majority regarding bargaining 
councils as useful in providing labour market stability through their incorporation of 
unions into their proceedings. Once again, just less than two out of every three of 
responding firms sampled (59 per cent) thought bargaining councils productive in 
helping to curb labour market excesses. This also means that less than one in ten of this 
same sample thought otherwise, leaving a third non-committal. Taken together, these 
two items suggest that the majority of sampled manufacturers uphold a commonplace 
view of bargaining councils as the means by which individual employers might 
strengthen both their influence over labour markets and the degree of management 
control they choose to exercise.
In looking at the state of relations between individual firms and employers’
associations, there were slightly more in the first sample (38 per cent) that demurred
from putting their complete trust in an association and allowing it a free hand than the
third or so of manufacturers apparently willing to do so. In contrast, by the time of the
second survey, there were a clear majority prepared to give some measured vote of
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confidence in favour of their association based on the latter’s overall performance to 
date. Here, nearly one in two (48 per cent) of responding firms adjudged employers’ 
associations to be sufficiently protective of their interests compared to the quarter or 
more who thought otherwise and the remaining quarter still undecided.
Conversely, responding manufacturers came across as much more forthright when 
asked their views on the possible contribution that bargaining councils could make 
beyond the furtherance of their own interests alone. Thus, only a quarter of those 
responding in the first survey thought bargaining councils could help improve overall 
economic competitiveness and productivity compared to the two fifths or more 
unconvinced or even the third agnostic. Nonetheless, proportionately, there were more 
respondents in the second survey believing bargaining councils capable of helping to 
restructure their industry generally although some three out of five respondents had 
either outright misgivings or remained, at the least, sceptical. Conversely, when asked 
to reveal their preferences regarding both bargaining scope and level, respondents in 
this same survey gave a sizeable endorsement to the notion of industry bargaining. First, 
just under two fifths (39 per cent) of them thought industry bargaining more important 
than enterprise bargaining whilst just over half of them (52 per cent) approved in 
principal of industry agreements setting the framework for further negotiations at the 
local level. Only a quarter of respondents appear to disagree with this more favourable 
view of industry bargaining although a comparable minority are unmoved either way by 
these particular facets of the centralised bargaining system. It seems from these findings 
that a majority of sampled manufacturers see little utility in bargaining councils beyond 
perhaps industry and/or the enterprise level.
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Table 4: Frequency Scores for Selective Items in Surveys 1 and 2
Survey 1 (n= 107)
Items
It is good for companies to have representatives 
working with union counterparts to moderate 
‘over-competitive’ labour practices (n = 107)
agree/strongly agree 
disagree / strongly disagree 
neither
Employers’ organisations can do a good job in getting 
agreements from bargaining councils on the provision 
vocational training helpful to business
agree/ strongly agree 
disagree / strongly disagree 
neither
Agreements reached in bargaining councils provide 
the best means o f managing ‘the crisis o f expectation’ 
post apartheid
agree/ strongly agree 
disagree/ strongly disagree 
neither
It makes sense for companies to trust their employer 
representatives and give them a free hand to negotiate 
on their behalf
agree/ strongly agree 
disagree/ strongly disagree 
neither
Agreements reached in bargaining councils will make 
a significant contribution to improvements in the 
economy’s overall ‘productivity performance’
agree/ strongly agree 


















Survey 2 (n= 126)
Items nos.
Industry agreements reduce industrial conflict and 
provide valued stability within my industry
agree/ strongly agree 75 (60)
disagree/ strongly disagree 29 (23)
neither 22 (17)
Employers’ organisations in my industry do not protect my 
company’s interests within the bargaining council process 
or equivalent
agree/ strongly agree 36 (28)
disagree/ strongly disagree 60 (48)
neither 30 (24)
I can see the bargaining council process helping to 
restructure the whole of my industry in the future
agree/ strongly agree 48 (38)
disagree/ strongly disagree 34 (27)
neither 44 (35)
Generally, industry agreements help, rather than hinder, 
my company’s management o f its workers
agree/strongly agree 69 (55)
disagree/strongly disagree 23 (18)
neither 34 (27)
The changing world of work makes bargaining much more 
important at industry than at company/workplace level
agree/ strongly agree 49 (39)
disagree/ strongly disagree 28 (22)
neither 49 (39)
The content o f industry agreements sets the framework for 
more useful negotiations to occur at the enterprise level
agree/ strongly agree 65 (52)
disagree/ strongly disagree 30 (24)
neither 31 (24)
Finally, one special attribute of bargaining councils that gains the highest approval 
rating from manufacturers concerns the provision of vocational training. Just under 
three-quarters of those responding to this item in the first survey considered employers’
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organisations to be doing a good job in obtaining agreements around industry training 
with just one in ten remaining critical of their associations in this regard. Certainly, this 
is one ‘collective good’ that attracts the least criticism and the highest approval rating 
from employers. Overall, it appears from the frequency scores recorded for selected 
items across both surveys that a majority of responding firms reported themselves to be 
reasonably satisfied with the ‘performance’ of their bargaining councils and employers’ 
associations. Indeed, even in these more turbulent times, a significant minority remain 
convinced that centralised agreements have something more to offer beyond market 
regulation in the form of a better management of workplaces, industries and the 
economy. Once again, however, we need to disaggregate some of these findings by 
reference to key characteristics of sampled respondents all the better to understand how 
these descriptors might be influencing their responses to some of these items. Once 
more, selected cross-tabulations can help to unravel this part of the story for us. Yet 
again, only the more significant cross-tabulations are chosen for commentary but, this 
time, analysis is conducted by reference to each survey in turn as in tables 5 and 6 
below.
9.6 Cross-tabulated analysis for Survey 1
To remind ourselves, individual items have been selected from both surveys on the 
presumption that they too embody important aspects of associability in addition to those 
discussed above. As can be extrapolated from the results below, there is no striking 
categorisation of sampled firms that crucially explains approval or disapproval for 
selected items as in tables below. What impact there is on the pattern of responses is 
modest in scale. Indeed, categorising responding firms by reference to membership, 
workforce size and company climate reveals little by way of impact on the pattern of
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response to the various ‘approval’ items discussed previously. The following 
presentation of findings confirms this.
TABLE 5: CROSS-TABULATIONS FOR SELECTED ITEMS (SURVEY 1)
1. ‘Moderation’ Item: “It is good for companies to have representatives working with union 






associational yes 41 5 24 (n=70)
membership no 21 3 12 (n=36)
(n= 106) (n=62) (n=8) (n=36)
foreign wholly/partly 22 1 8 (n=31)
ownership not at all 40 7 27 (n=74)
(n = 105) (n=62) (n=8) (n=35)
‘moderation ’ item
Surprisingly, associational membership seems to play little part in explaining the belief 
felt by a majority of respondents that employers’ organisations can helpfully moderate 
labour market competition. The pattern of response between members and non­
members for this item is striking in its similarity. Presumably, non-members perceive 
virtue in associability as much as members in this particular regard. Thus, reasons for 
non-membership must be found elsewhere. Likewise, neither workforce size, level of 
unionisation nor company climate appears to have had any marked effect on this 
particular item. However, this is far from the case when it comes to foreign ownership. 
Here, where there is some element of overseas investment in the company then there is 
a slightly improved probability of that firm believing in an association having a 




Similarly, associational membership or workforce size appears to have little bearing on 
the overwhelming approval from manufacturers for employer organisations reaching 
agreements with unions on industry-wide training provision. The same can be said for 
levels of unionisation and company climate but not for foreign-ownership. Here, a 
higher ratio of companies with overseas investment approve as disapprove of employer 
organisations’ efforts to negotiate over industry-wide training compared to that for 
domestically-owned firms.
2. ‘Training’ Item: “Employers’ organisations can do a good job in getting agreements 







associational yes 54 5 11 (n=70)
membership no 23 6 7 (n=36)
(n = 106) (n=77) (n = ll) (n=18)
workforce SME (Below 500) 50 9 13 (n=72)
size large (500 plus) 26 2 6 (n=34)
(n = 106) (n=76) (n = ll) (n=19)
foreign wholly/partly 25 2 4 (n=31)
ownership not at all 50 9 15 (n=74)
(n = 105) (n=75) (n = ll) (n=19)
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3. ‘Crisis’ Item: “Agreements reached in bargaining councils provide the best means of 






associational yes 29 12 29 (n=70)
membership no 12 9 15 (n=36)
(n = 106) (n=41) (n=21) (n=44)
workforce SME (Below 500) 26 10 36 (n=72)
size large (500 plus) 15 11 8 (n=34)
(n = 106) (n=41) (n=21) (n=44)
company average & below 15 4 11 (n=30)
climate above average 26 7 32 (n=75)
(n = 105) (n=41) (n = ll) (n=43)
‘crisis ’ item
A slightly higher ratio of associated members believe in the role of representation in 
helping to appease the expectations of emancipated workers post liberation compared 
to non-members who, proportionately, remain more sceptical than those in membership. 
Moreover, half of all smaller firms canvassed remained to be convinced as to the 
capabilities of business representatives in crisis-handling compared to the quarter of 
larger ones sharing the same conviction. Meanwhile, the proportion of the latter 
recognising the utility of bargaining councils in this respect was slighter greater than 
that for smaller concerns. Moreover, half of those manufacturers recording lower levels 
of morale in the workplace considered bargaining councils useful in dampening down 
expectations compared to the third of those reporting themselves experiencing relatively 
high morale.
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4. ‘Trust’ Item: “It makes sense for companies to trust their employer representatives and 






associational yes 25 27 18 (n=70)
membership no 11 14 11 (n=36)
(n =  106) (n=36) (n=41) (n=29)
unionisation below half 16 16 6 (n=38)
(n =  106) half or more 20 25 23 (n=68)
(n=36) (n=41) (n=29)
company average & below 8 14 8 (n=30)
climate above average 27 26 22 (n=75)
(n = 105) (n=35) (n=40) (n=30)
‘trust’ item
In regard to granting an employers’ association carte blanche as bargaining 
representatives there were some surprising results. First, firms belonging to associations 
were nearly as likely to agree as to disagree to the suggestion as were non members (but 
just slightly less so). Second, this same pattern of response more or less applies to SMEs 
as to their larger manufacturing counterparts. Third, those manufacturers with low 
levels of unionisation were equally divided as to the merits of fully delegating 
bargaining authority to their representatives unlike their more highly unionised 
counterparts of whom more were clearly prepared to withhold approval than not.
Finally, those companies citing reasonably good morale in the workplace are also 
evenly divided compared to those not so fortunate who appear to distrust associations 
nearly twice as much as they trust them.
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5. ‘Productivity’ Item: “Agreements reached in bargaining councils will make a 







workforce SME (Below 500) 16 33 23 (n=72)
size large (500 plus) 10 11 13 (n=34)
(n =  106) (n=26) (n=44) (n=36)
foreign wholly/partly 6 9 16 (n=31)
ownership not at all 19 35 20 (n=74)
(n = 105) (n=25) (n=44) (n=36)
unionisation below half 7 18 13 (n=38)
(n = 106) half or more 19 26 23 (n=68)
(n=26) (n=44) (n=36)
‘productivity ’ item
Workforce size appears to impact on how firms view the bargaining council system’s 
contribution to overall productivity. It seems that twice as many of the SME population 
believe bargaining councils incapable of contributing to any productivity agenda as are 
convinced of the possibility. In contrast, the larger firm population is more evenly 
divided on this issue. Meanwhile, over half of those manufacturing concerns with some 
element of overseas ownership are unsure either way compared to under half of the 
domestic firm population who remain agnostic. Finally, manufacturing firms with low 
levels of unionisation remain proportionately more sceptical of a bargaining council’s 
ability to contribute to overall productivity than those manufacturers that are heavily 
unionised.
summary
Manufacturers who are also members of employer groups are slightly more swayed than 
non-members as to the merits of representation in handling the potential crisis of 
expectation arising from the emancipation of black workers post apartheid. Similarly,
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manufacturers with larger workforces also appear to be more convinced of the part to be 
played by employer representatives in the post apartheid era than their smaller firm 
counter-parts. Smaller-scale manufacturers are also more prone to scepticism than 
larger-scale ones when it comes to the perceived contribution that bargaining councils 
can make to any national productivity agenda. Meanwhile, foreign ownership also 
appears to have a disproportionate impact on the way sampled manufacturers’ respond 
to selected ‘approval’ items in the first survey.
First, proportionately more manufacturers with some element of overseas investment 
believe their representatives capable of doing a reasonably good job in moderating 
market competition compared to their domestic equivalents. Second, they also appear 
more favourably disposed towards employer organisations negotiating on their behalf 
over industry-wide training. In addition, highly unionised manufacturers seem more 
appreciative of the contribution bargaining council agreements can make towards 
improved productivity than those with low levels o f unionisation despite being less 
trusting when it comes to giving their representatives a free hand. Finally, of all those 
manufacturers thinking bargaining councils useful in helping to manage worker 
expectations post liberation proportionately more were from those reporting relatively 
low rather than high workplace morale. Then again, this same category of employer was 
also less inclined to give employer representatives a free hand in their dealings with 
organised labour. Overall, however, the most striking, and perhaps surprising, feature of 
these cross-tabulations is the lack of impact that most of these categories of 
manufacturer have had on most of these selected items -  especially regarding the 
moderating influence of employer representatives and the amount of trust and autonomy 
to be afforded them.
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9.7 Cross-tabulated analysis for Survey 2
Responses to items in this second survey appear to have been influenced to variable 
degrees by some, but not all, descriptors. Company characteristics to do with 
associational membership, workforce size, foreign ownership and level of unionisation 
are the only ones to feature significantly in any cross-tabulated analysis of ‘approval’ 
items in the second survey. Thus, only response patterns to some items are influenced to 
varying degrees in ways best illustrated by the table below.
TABLE 6: CROSS-TABULATIONS FOR SELECTED ITEMS (SURVEY 2)
1. ‘Stability* Item: “Industry agreements reduce industrial conflict and provide valued






associational yes 57 16 13 (n=86)
membership no 18 13 22 (n=40)
(n=75) (n=29) (n=35)
workforce SME (Below 500) 50 16 16 (n=82)
size large (500 plus) 25 13 6 (n=44)
(n=75) (n=29) (n=22)
foreign wholly/partly 30 7 7 (n=44)
ownership not at all 45 22 15 (n=82)
(n=75) (n=29) (n=22)
‘workplace stability ’ item
When asked whether they felt industry agreements reduced workplace conflict and 
provided workplace stability, proportionately more associated firms concurred with this 
view than those unassociated (two thirds compared to under a half respectively). 
Similarly, a proportionately higher number of manufacturing firms with inward 
investors also recognised the value of industry agreements in this regard compared to
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those concerns lacking any overseas investment. In short, acknowledging how 
bargaining councils can reduce industrial conflict is partly contingent on whether they 
are in membership or not and are (even partly) foreign-owned or not.
2. ‘Interest Protection’ Item: “Employers’ organisations in my industry do not protect 






associational yes 19 52 15 (n=86)
membership no 17 8 15 (n=40)
(n=36) (n=60) (n=30)
workforce SME (Below 500) 20 43 19 (n=82)
size large (500 plus) 16 17 11 (n=44)
(n=36) (n=60) (n=30)
foreign wholly/partly 8 27 9 (n=44)
ownership not at all 28 33 21 (n=82)
(n=36) (n=60) (n=22)
‘interest ’protection ’ item
Associational membership, workforce size and foreign ownership all appear to impact 
on the extent to which sampled manufacturers see employer organisations doing a 
decent job in promoting their interests within the bargaining council system. Significant 
differences of view arise from respondents being in membership or not. Whilst three in 
five of all associated manufacturers are prepared to pass favourable judgement on their 
associations this falls to just one in five of those out of membership. This perceived 
failing on the part of associations may go some way to explaining the reluctance of non­
members to associate. Workforce size has a comparable effect in that at least twice as 
many smaller manufacturers believe employer associations look after their interests 
when sitting in bargaining councils as do not. By contrast, larger employers are more or 
less evenly divided over the issue. On this evidence, smaller manufacturers have more
confidence in associability than larger ones when it comes to protecting manufacturers’ 
interests. Likewise, three in five of those having overseas ownership believe employer 
associations capable of representing their interests effectively compared to the less than 
one in five who do not. Contrastingly, only two in five ‘domestic’ manufacturers 
believe their interests sufficiently well represented through association compared to the 
third that remain sceptical.
3. ‘Restructuring’ Item: “I can see the bargaining council process helping to restructure 






associational yes 34 24 28 (n=86)
membership no 14 10 16 (n=40)
(n=48) (n=34) (n=44)
workforce SME (Below 500) 29 25 28 (n=82)
size large (500 plus) 19 8 16 (n=43)
(n=48) (n=33) (n=44)
foreign wholly/partly 19 10 15 (n=44)
ownership not at all 29 24 29 (n=82)
(n=48) (n=34) (n=44)
unionisation below half 17 17 16 (n=50)
half or more 31 17 28 (n=76)
(n=48) n=34) (n=44)
company average or below 21 17 29 (n=67)
climate above average 27 17 15 (n=59)
(n=48) (n=34) (n=44)
4restructuring’ item
The number of larger manufacturers who think bargaining councils useful in helping to 
restructure industry is more than double those thinking otherwise. This is considerably 
more than the proportion of smaller manufacturers holding to the same view. Moreover, 
nearly double the numbers of manufacturers that are highly unionised see bargaining
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councils helping to restructure industry as do not whereas this difference of view is 
more evenly shared between those firms facing low unionisation levels.
4. ‘Utility’ Item: “Generally, industry agreements help, rather than hinder, my company’s 






associational yes 51 13 22 (n=86)
membership no 18 10 12 (n=40)
(n=69) (n=23) (n=34)
‘utility ’ item
When asked to acknowledge the utility of the bargaining council system in general, 
three in five of those responding manufacturers in associational membership thought 
councils helpful rather than obstructive compared to a smaller proportion of non- 
members (forty five per cent) holding to the same opinion. Interestingly, a further thirty 
percent of the latter felt unable to pass any kind of judgement as did a quarter of all 
associated manufacturers. Nonetheless, Based on this evidence, a good many 
manufacturers are prepared to pass favourable judgement on bargaining councils when 
prompted, whether associated or not. Perhaps even more significant is the fact that these 
cross-tabulations fail to identify any other structural characteristics that have such a 
marked bearing on how manufacturers respond to this all-important ‘approval’ item 
concerning the overall effectiveness of the bargaining councils
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5. ‘Importance’ Item: “The changing world o f work makes bargaining much more 






associational yes 35 30 21 (n=86)
membership no 14 19 7 (n=40)
(n=49) (n=49) (n=28)
foreign wholly/partly 15 19 10 (n=44)
ownership not at all 34 30 18 (n=82)
(n=49) (n=49) (n=28)
company average or below 20 30 17 (n=67)
climate above average 29 19 11 (n=59)
(n=49) (n=49) (n=28)
‘importance ’ item
The distinction between members and non-members of associations is even more 
marked when seeking their views on the importance of centralised bargaining relative to 
that at the enterprise level. Of those in membership, slightly more recognise the 
importance of industry bargaining than do not. The opposite is the case for those not in 
membership, only more so. This counter view explains why sampled manufacturers, 
regardless of membership status, were as likely to recognise the greater importance of 
centralised over domestic bargaining as the other way round. A similar situation applies 
when to foreign ownership. Whilst slightly more of those without any foreign 
capitalisation recognised the relative importance of industry over enterprise bargaining 
the same could not be said for those firms with overseas investors. Within this 
category, a fair number held workplace bargaining to be of relatively greater import 
than centralised bargaining. Once again, there appears to be as much approval for 
enterprise as industry bargaining generally but, when disaggregated, there is a slight 
bias towards the former from those manufacturers with overseas partners. Meanwhile,
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firms reporting relatively high morale appear more likely to favour industry over 
enterprise bargaining than not on this evidence whereas, intriguingly, those registering 
relatively low workplace morale more likely believe enterprise bargaining to be the 
more significant.
6. ‘Framework’ Item: “The content o f industry agreements sets the framework for more 






associational yes 42 22 22 (n=86)
membership no 23, 8 9 (n=40)
(n=65) (n=30) (n=31)
foreign wholly/partly 26 7 11 (n=44)
ownership not at all 39 23 20 (n=82)
(n=65) (n=30) (n=31)
unionisation below half 21 13 16 (n=50)
half or more 44 17 15 (n=76)
(n=65) (n=30) (n=31)
‘framework’ item
Only foreign-ownership and unionisation seem to have any bearing on the extent to 
which manufacturers recognise the coordinating capacity of industry-wide agreements 
generally. Thus, those manufacturers attracting foreign investors are more likely to 
believe industry agreements useful in setting the agenda for more localised bargaining 
compared to those without any such inward investment on the basis of the cross­
tabulated comparisons above. Similarly, whereas three in five strongly unionised 
manufacturers saw benefit in industry agreements setting the agenda for enterprise 
bargaining this ratio fell to two in five for more weakly unionised firms. On this 
evidence, manufacturers facing strong workplace organisation and handling overseas 
investors are more likely drawn to the agenda-setting potential of industry bargaining 
than domestically-owned firms with weak unionisation.
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summary
Overall approval for associability and centralised bargaining is derived from the 
favourable responses of sampled manufacturers to selected items in the second survey. 
These specifically addressed the effectiveness of employers associations by way of 
interest representation and of industry bargaining by reference to conflict management, 
industry restructuring, agenda-setting and all-round utility and importance. Without 
doubt, the most important characteristic that propels manufacturers to take a positive 
view towards employer associations and bargaining councils is the very fact of 
associational membership itself. Certainly, those in membership tend to hold 
associability and centralised bargaining in higher regard than those not in membership 
especially when it comes to associations safeguarding the interests of manufacturers and 
to industry settlements in being generally useful and important and in keeping the 
(industrial) peace. Associational membership aside, only foreign ownership seems to 
have impacted positively on sampled employer attitudes towards these institutions as 
does the fact that a manufacturer has a relatively large workforce or that the workplace 
is highly unionised.
Thus, having overseas shareholders involved seemingly makes manufacturers better 
disposed towards associations as protectors of their interests than those without any 
foreign investment in the company. Similarly, they tend to appreciate the value of 
industry agreements in providing some sense of order more than do ‘domestic’ 
counterparts. On the other hand, they appear less sanguine as regards the importance of 
industry compared to enterprise bargaining but recognise how such agreements can 
usefully set an industry-wide bargaining agenda for local negotiators. Meanwhile, 
although smaller manufacturers believe more than larger ones that associability makes a 
decent fist of representing their interests, the opposite is the case when it comes to
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industry agreements helping to restructure the sector. Finally, manufacturers who are 
highly unionised are more likely to recognise the potential for centralised bargaining 
restructuring industry compared to those with relatively low levels of unionisation as 
well as being more likely to value the coordinating potential of industry agreements.
Having now established there to be a substantial minority (even occasionally a majority) 
of sampled manufacturers who unambiguously approve of taking collective action with 
the remainder divided fairly evenly between outright opposition and agnosticism, the 
question arises as to whether there is anything other than structural characteristics that 
might help explain the various positions adopted towards associability. Might there be 
some deep-lying concepts in play that inform their thinking and, if so, are they the same 
within and across our sample populations? In other words are they universal or might 
they change over time in light of broader transitional changes? The next chapter 
addresses these fundamental questions through undertaking an exploratory analysis of 
the survey data in order to establish what might be happening to associability in the 
minds of employers and whether this might be changing.
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Chapter 10: What matters to employers when thinking about their
associability
10.1 Introduction
Having reviewed the general orientation exhibited by our sample of South African 
manufacturers towards employers’ organisations and bargaining councils the focus of 
this chapter now switches to the deep-seated thinking that underpins this outlook and 
whether it might have changed from survey to survey in line with any broader 
transformations under way. Various statistical tests have been deployed to this end and 
their analysis is organised in the following way. We start with reliability measurements 
undertaken to test the validity of various hypothesised (‘a priori’) constructs previously 
deduced from the work of others in the field and precised in preceding chapters (after 
Cronbach and Meehl 1955 cited in Bryman and Cramer 1999: 68). Examining the 
reliability scores for these presumed components has led on to an exploratory factor 
analysis on the interrelationships between items from the first survey. Interpretation of 
extracted factors leads to the same exercise being repeated for the second survey and 
then comparing findings from both.
This comparative exercise allows us to reflect upon whether there have been any 
alterations to the factor structure from one time period to the next and whether any of 
the broader themes and issues raised earlier in the thesis can help to explain any 
changed thinking on associability. Finally, independent-samples t-tests are conducted 
for the purpose of identifying any measurable differences between the mean scores of 
the two samples. Detecting any significant differences in this way confirms changes in 
the strength and direction of feelings towards these constructs from sample to sample. 
Significant variations in mean scores for factors may very well indicate a growing
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sensitivity by South African manufacturers to a transforming employment relations 
environment. Knowing what preoccupies South African employers in thinking about 
associability and collective action and how this might be changing has important policy 
implications for the future. Reflecting on findings from a public policy perspective is 
best left over for discussion in the concluding chapter.
10.2 ‘A priori’ factor analysis
Various individual items were selected from the first survey to form a number of 
components assumed on the basis of past work to explain the underlying thinking of 
employers towards associability and collective action. To this end, twenty items were 
specifically deployed as a means of testing five discrete constructs assumed by the 
author to be significant in determining an individual employer's position regarding 
membership of an employers’ association and its engagement with bargaining council 
processes -  both deemed to be a significant feature of state-sponsored institutional 
reform. Reliability scaling was then introduced to determine how well items might 
‘hang together’ to form these underlying ‘a priori’ constructs. Brief descriptions of each 
now follow.
• ‘Aptness’ reflects on the appropriateness of market rivals combining together 
and forsaking their ‘bargaining autonomy when confronting a powerful 
opposition in the form of an alliance between strong government and powerful 
unions.
• Equally, ‘utility’ addresses the overall competence of a delegated bargaining 
system in producing highly prized ‘public goods’ such as training and improved 
productivity.
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• ‘Discretion’ reflects upon the extent to which a bargaining council system still 
provides for independence of action and flexible implementation of agreements 
for participants.
• Meanwhile, ‘compliance’ explores the extent to which employers are prepared 
to conform to the authority of an employers’ association, and grant them a free 
hand (when bargaining) provided industry (or regional) agreements can be offset 
‘locally’.
• Finally, ‘abstention’ from associating considers the degree to which the free­
riding of others is tolerated by individual employers when members of an 
association but is attractive to them when not.
reliability testing
Alpha coefficients were first calculated for every hypothetical dimension so as to ensure 
that each construct was robust and showed high levels of internal reliability. All items 
used a five-point Likert -style score (ie: 1= strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = neither 
agree nor disagree; 4 = agree; 5 = strongly agree). Descriptions and identification of 
these items and their frequency counts for each of the ‘a priori’ factors are available 
upon request. Using SPSS 12.0 and Cronbach’s alpha scaling, reliability scores were 
obtained for each of the hypothetical dimensions. Given that an acceptable minimum 
alpha score for data analysis of this nature is normally 0.6, then these results prove 
disappointing. Only the ‘utility’ factor (with a score of 0.64) has some resonance with 
respondents whilst that of ‘aptness’ (at 0.58) may hold some significance at the margin 
but this is less than certain. Incontrovertibly, however, the other three dimensions fail to 
exhibit appropriate levels of internal reliability and, as such, do not tap a clear construct 
in respondents’ minds that consistently informs their views on association-belonging or
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multi-employer bargaining. Clearly, a rational and abstracted account of what underpins 
employers’ views on the state’s revision of the bargaining institution cannot be based on 
these ‘a priori’ factors.
The question now arises as to whether, in the absence of any ‘a priori’ dimensions at 
work in helping to influence individual employer attitudes towards bargaining councils, 
there exist ‘de facto’ constructs that are capable of capturing employers’ underlying 
views on these fledgling bargaining reforms. To determine whether this might be the 
case, a preliminary factor analysis was carried out on the original twenty attitudinal 
items. Exactly half were then retained for further analysis, having been identified as best 
capturing employers’ views in the most unambiguous and parsimonious way.
10.3 Factor Analysis for Survey 1
The results from the factor analysis (principal component with varimax rotation) are 
shown in table 7 overleaf. It is commonly held that scores for individual items greater 
than 0.4 significantly attach to each other to form a ‘de facto’ construct. As can be seen, 
the analysis yielded three well-delineated and clearly interpretable factors that, together, 
explain just less than fifty eight per cent of the variance in the sampled items. When 
scaled, all three factors exhibited acceptable levels of reliability. Each factor is now 
reviewed in turn.
*Autonomous Capacity*
The first factor includes four items and is labelled ‘autonomous capacity’ and, when 
scaled, registers an alpha score of 0.69. This factor could be said to capture employer 
perceptions concerning their competency in handling their own employment relations 
(given its centrality to company well-being), the potential for lost autonomy and a
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perceived need for productivity to improve. Crucially, it refers to a company’s 
evaluation of its ability to manage its own employment relations without reference to 
‘outside’ help and its preference for autonomy of action given changes to circumstance. 
This dimension encapsulates insights that employers have concerning their ability to 
‘cope’ with the newer demands placed on them post apartheid in maintaining workplace 
stability and in improving productivity performance. Consideration of this factor leads 
employers into assessing how self-reliant they can afford to be in a world of 
uncertainty, of unpredictability and of continuous change. This underlying concept ties 
in quite closely with Sisson’s (1989) notion of management control being a key driver 
behind any employer’s decision to associate and take collective action. Where the self­
perception is that such competence is missing from the organisation, then the capacity 
of associability to act as a proxy in this respect can become decisive for such 
manufacturers.
Conditional Association9
The second factor, with an alpha score of 0.54, comprises three items and is labelled 
‘conditional association’ on account of the employer’s interest in exchanging 
membership loyalty for some limited autonomy of action. The factor addresses concerns 
that some, but not all, employers have over the operation of a centralised bargaining 
system and relates specifically to the degree offlexibility permitted to those interpreting 
and implementing such centralised agreements. This dimension appears to tap a deep- 
seated worry that sectoral agreements produce rigidities in the way they are to be made 
operational locally without taking sufficient account of ‘domestic’ circumstances. 
Interestingly, however, it seems that such ‘footloose’ employer behaviour is still 
expected to conform within the spirit of industry agreements for those who are parties to 
them. At root is the notion that ‘association’ equates to an exchange relationship
between members and their organisation. In return for flexibility over the actual 
implementation of industry agreements, an employer considers foregoing autonomy of 
action. It is only on this basis that legitimacy is extended from the individual member to 
an association and its bargaining council. Employers’ organisations and their bargaining 
councils are expected to exercise restraint and to respect individual employers (and their 
particular circumstances) when effecting industry-wide agreements. It is in this sense 
that ‘association’ becomes conditional or negotiated. In some ways, this is reminiscent 
of a ‘live and let live’ relationship between local management and union workplace 
organisations as originally identified for an older British context (after Dunn, 1990). 
Here, the suggestion is that some employers are prepared to tolerate associational 
membership so long as these organisations, and the bargaining council processes and 
outcomes with which they are identified, are not excessively invasive.
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1. My company has the confidence and ‘know how* 
to manage its industrial relations without the need 
to be represented by an employers' organisation
.78 .21 -.14
2. These days, company industrial relations matters 
are too important to be left in the hands of 
employers' organisations and bargaining councils
.77 .00 .00
3. Too much autonomy is lost to a company through 
membership of an employers' organisation and its 
subsequent representation on a bargaining council
.67 -.21 -.23
4. My company fails to see how agreements reached 
in bargaining councils can lead to significant 
improvements in our 'productivity performance'
.60 -.23 .00
5. Any agreement reached in a bargaining council still 
provides enough leeway for the employer to 
implement it flexibly within the company
-.17 .75 .00
6. The way that bargaining councils and workplace 
forums operate in practice still leaves a company 
sufficient scope for managing its employment 
affairs as it sees fit
-.00 .69 .25
7. All members of employers' organisations should be 
prepared to abide by decisions made on their behalf 
whether they like them or not
.00 .66 -.23
8. It is natural for an employer to want to join an 
employers' organisation so as to protect its interests 
against a powerful union movement
.00 -.00 .83
9. It makes sense for a company to belong to an 
employers' organisation when a government 
strongly supports unions
-.00 .39 .72
10. It is unnatural for companies to collaborate with 
business rivals within an employers' organisation 
over employment matters effecting market 
competitiveness
.40 .12 -.59
% variance explained 
Eigen values 
Alpha scores
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaizer Normalization 






The third factor also comprises three reliable items (registering an alpha score of 0.58) 
and is labelled ‘external threat’. In some respects, this third factor is the least surprising 
given the political transition from racial authoritarianism under apartheid to democratic 
pluralism under a Government of National Unity. Employers have experienced the 
ascendancy to power of a liberationist ruling party in strong alliance with a previously 
politically mobilised labour movement who are both wedded to a transformation project 
that is intended to radically overhaul the existing labour relations regime. In these 
circumstances, we should not expect other than that employers recognise the virtues of 
‘association’ as a means of defensively protecting themselves against potentially 
threatening elements. This factor, then, taps some notion as to the desirability (or 
otherwise) of collective protection for individual firms. That this dimension exists 
proves that such apprehension figures large in employer calculations regarding the 
merits or otherwise of ‘association’. At heart, to participate in centralised bargaining via 
‘association’ is a political decision for the employer as much as anything. Employer 
perceptions’ concerning the value of such self-serving political protectionism 
underscores more pragmatic assessments as to the economic gains that accrue from 
‘association’ and industry bargaining. At the very least, political considerations appear 
to weigh as heavy as economic ones for employers deliberating whether to associate or 
not within the immediate aftermath of the apartheid era.
One interpretation of this factor structure is to see employers as having to resolve an 
inherent dilemma for themselves. Their preference is to stay independent when 
managing labour in ways consistent with their ‘free market’ outlook. Equally, they also 
perceive themselves to be under imminent threat from a powerful ‘political’ alliance 
between the state and organised labour. This establishes a tension at work within the 
minds of employers over the utility value of ‘association’. One compromise for
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consideration is to accept a type of associational membership (and so ‘delegate’ 
bargaining) that also tolerates a certain limited freedom of action through a number of 
caveats and conditions that are in place within the system. For reasons of political 
exigency, such employers are prepared to contemplate becoming ‘reluctant 
collectivists \ Thus, a political calculus may well override narrower economic 
considerations provided that the ‘economic exchange’ within the associational 
relationship remains sufficiently worthwhile.
further reflections
For employers, the certainty of how to respond to apartheid-inspired labour policies has 
been replaced by some uncertainty as to how to interpret post-apartheid institutional 
reform especially when the product of a strong ‘Tripartite Alliance’ between the new 
ruling party and a powerful labour movement. Given the potential for anomie in 
transitional industrial relations circumstances (Flanders and Fox, 1970), there would be 
little surprise were a population of employers to display somewhat chaotic patterns of 
response when revealing ‘normless’ attitudes towards employers’ organisations and 
bargaining councils. Unearthing a structured pattern of rationales that underpin such 
responses could prove somewhat elusive. Certainly, the disappointment over reliability 
scores for hypothetical constructs seems to justify these prior misgivings. However, 
factor analysis of a subset of items reveals something to the contrary. The three discrete 
factors to emerge from the analysis are shown to have some bearing on how 
respondents structure their feelings towards the establishment of bargaining councils 
and attendant associational membership.
Accordingly, employers who have confidence in managing their own labour relations, 
believe centralised bargaining too restrictive on their discretionary powers and remain 
unconvinced that association is a necessary response to a powerful state and labour
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movement, are least likely to participate in industry bargaining. In contrast, those firms 
lacking self-assurance and resources when handling labour relations but consider 
industry or regional-wide bargaining to be no barrier to their autonomy of action and 
‘association’ to be a strong antidote to powerful actors might well believe any support 
for bargaining councils to be worthwhile. Together, these ‘de facto’ dimensions confirm 
the presence of universal but distinct concepts that help inform the views of South 
African manufacturers facing decisions over their ‘association’ and participation in 
bargaining councils. With some confidence, we can say that such underlying constructs 
still play their part in determining the propensity to associate rather than to free-ride 
even when there is a potential for anomie to frustrate their very formation. But the 
above observations now give rise to another question for consideration. How powerfully 
do employers within this particular sample identify with each of our factors?
Frequency Analysis of Factors for Survey 1
Responding firms are now re-arranged into those displaying high identification with a 
factor and those with low identification as in table 8. This is obtained through the 
simple device of comparing the individual respondent’s mean score for that factor with 
the middle value on the original Likert scale. So, registering a mean score at or above 
3.00 denotes a strong presence of that factor in the respondent’s mind whilst a mean 
score below this value indicates a weaker presence. The results are generated by means 
of an SPSS 12.0 frequency table, as below, that enables direct comparison to be made 
between the numbers of firms where such a factor is held to be prevalent against those 
where it is less so. Overall, it appears that the issue of a company’s competency in 
handling its own labour relations and of a revived state and labour movement in 
combination potentially undermining employer interests strikes a cord with more or less 
three-quarters of the responding firms (depending on which factor).
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Table 8. ‘high’ v ‘low factor’ firms in Survey 1 (n=107)
auton. capacity (%) condit. association (%) ext. threat (%)
‘high’ firms 76 (71) 65 (62) 87 (81)
‘low’ firms 31 (29) 41 (38) 20 (19)
mean 3.27 3.10 3.42
Seemingly, the ideas that lie behind autonomous capacity are in marked contrast to 
those attached to external threat. However, when taken together, the large proportion of 
our sample of South African manufacturers who identify with both gives some credence 
to the earlier claim of employers being ‘reluctant collectivists’. Meanwhile, just under 
two thirds of responding firms recognise ‘conditional’ membership to be of serious 
consideration when deliberating upon associability. Clearly, these factors have become 
important points of reference for the majority of surveyed manufacturers and thereby 
directly influence their propensity to associate or free-ride.
A representative sample of South African manufacturing manufacturers was asked for 
their views on a number of matters to do with centralized bargaining reform. Factor 
analysis shows certain fundamental convictions to have a strong bearing on an 
employer’s predisposition towards associability, including their preparedness to 
participate in the revised bargaining system. Belief that institutional support helps 
manage one’s own labour relations better, belief that there is still enough flexibility 
within the reformed bargaining system to make participation worthwhile and belief that 
‘association’ is the best protection from an empowered state in alliance with powerful 
unions will all play their part. Combining these factors leads to perceptions by
summary
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employers of their associations and bargaining councils as political devices as much as 
economic agencies. An employer response to this broader political agenda will crucially 
determine the viability of sectoral bargaining and its institutional resilience over time. 
Critically, the feasibility of South Africa’s neo-corporatist experiment taking root rests 
upon the bulk of employers choosing to ‘associate’ rather than to ffee-ride or defect 
from the central bargain. This is best seen as much a political as an economic decision 
within the immediate post-apartheid era.
More generally, these findings confirm a major tenet of the European literature on 
employer associability. When deciding whether to associate, employers are pulled 
simultaneously in opposite directions. Their natural preference for individualism and 
autonomy of action conflicts with their instinctive need for collective security when 
confronted by potentially hostile actors in the system. This tension becomes more 
prevalent within the context of institute-building and legislative reform that constitutes 
part of a broader ‘normalisation’ project. However, exceptionally for South Africa, the 
‘triple transition’ of political democratisation, economic liberalisation and social 
inclusion {after Webster and Omar 2003) not only mirrors but further polarises this 
inherent dilemma for employers mulling over the merits of association and multi­
employer bargaining. In this particular sense, the ‘developmental’ context of South 
Africa renders employers’ experiences qualitatively different from those of European 
counter-parts.
This thesis now argues that the propensity to associate and engage in centralised 
bargaining within a transforming South African context is the product of three very 
specific constructs that hold meaning for employers when deliberating over the extent of 
their involvement in the state’s neo-corporatist experiment with an ‘articulated’ system 
of bargaining. Political as much as economic aspects appear to occupy their thoughts in
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this immediate post-apartheid era, if not more so. However it may well be that as 
problems of workplace political instability recede in the minds of employers so we 
might expect ‘globalisation effects’ to dominate employer thinking following economic 
liberalisation. The crucial question for further consideration is whether these same 
constructs will continue to inform manufacturers’ views towards associability and 
centralised bargaining or whether more parochial flexibility issues predominate. In 
short, will there be greater or lesser numbers of manufacturers prepared to be ‘reluctant 
collectivists *? This is the purpose behind repeating this same factor analysis for the 
second survey.
Thus, seeking answers to these questions structures the presentation of findings in the 
follow-up study. We re-visit the same employer constructs that have been found to 
inform their attitudes towards associability and centralised bargaining in this first 
survey. We do so as a means of testing their robustness in the face of a transitional 
context that now promotes the economic domain over the political one. More 
specifically, questions are directed at unearthing views on whether bargaining councils 
continue to hold utility for participating employers or whether the central focus for 
managing labour relations has now shifted more towards the individual firm as the 
‘flexibility’ agenda comes to the fore {after Bezuidenhout, 2000: 9-11). Hopefully, 
subsequent findings will help to clarify whether the European model, as exemplified by 
‘democratic’ or ‘bargained’ corporatism, still holds sufficient utility for South African 
employers or whether a more decentralised and deregulated ‘Anglo-Saxon’ version will 
become the more powerful ideal in the face of a growing international economic 
liberalisation. Whichever orientation predominates will help decide the institutional fate 
of South Africa’s attempt at social corporatism and its advocacy of coordinated 
bargaining.
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10.4 Factor Analysis Results for Survey 2
The precaution had been taken with the second survey to incorporate the same ten items 
that attached to each other first time round to form the three components discussed 
above. Exactly the same methods of factor extraction were deployed on the second 
occasion as the first (that is, principal component with varimax rotation). The results are 
shown in table 9 overleaf and, as previously, scores for individual items greater than 0.4 
were held to attach to each other in ways that constituted ‘de facto’ components. Once 
more, the analysis has generated three highly differentiated and comprehensible factors 
that, in total, were able to account for some fifty seven per cent of the variance in the 
sampled items and similar to that for first survey. Yet again, robust scores were 
achieved for all three factors, when scaled for their reliability. These three rationales 
were quite similar in composition to those extracted from the first set of data and their 
presence here reaffirms a certain continuity of employer thinking from one time period 
to the next. Nonetheless, there are also some distinctly changed features to this second 
factor structure that indicate some modification to their thinking as well. The second 
and third factors, as set down in the table below, comprise of just two items apiece (with 
alpha scores of 0.69 and 0.54 respectively) and, as previously, are best categorised 
under the rubric ‘external threat9 and ‘autonomous capacity \  However, one or two 
individual items appear to have detached themselves from the two original components 
and re-attached themselves to the first factor such that ‘conditional association * is 
reconstructed into something much bigger, more complex and intertwined. These 
modified rationales underpinning attitude formation towards associability and collective 
action are now updated in turn.
303
refinements to the factor structure
Previously ‘external threat’ incorporated the notion of employers deliberating upon 
the usefulness of associability and collective action in functioning as a source of 
‘market control ’ along with the ‘neutralisation ’ of union organisation both in the 
workplace and the political domain more generally (se chapter 6, pp.3-5). Now this 
revised construct comprising of just two items has crystallised into something that 
focuses more narrowly on the power of the labour movement within both the economic 
and political realm. Accordingly, our sample of manufacturers still seem preoccupied 
with the role of associability and collective action in acting as a practical counterweight 
to the threat posed by unions both on the shopfloor and in formal political alliance with 
the ruling party and Government through the ‘Tripartite Alliance’. It is these aspects of 
the apartheid legacy that continue to absorb the thinking of manufacturers six years on 
from the political emancipation of their workforces. Collective security within a labour 
market context is still held to be an option to be taken seriously by manufacturers.
Something similar seems to have occurred to ‘autonomous capacity’. Here, the
feasibility of handling one’s own employment relations internally without recourse to
any outside assistance or collective action still seems to preoccupy the thoughts of this
second sample of manufacturers. Likewise, the question as to whether local labour
issues and their management can so easily be delegated to employer associations
continues to bother them. Judging whether one has the means to manage employment
relations outside of associability and whether important labour relations matters can so
readily be left to outside associations to handle continue to play on the minds of our
sample of manufacturers second time round. Thus, the prospect, or otherwise, of
enhancing management control through associability seems to be an abiding
consideration for South African manufacturers when contemplating whether to act
collectively or not (see chapter 6, pp. 7-8). However, the dilemmas surrounding
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employer and associational competency and efficacy (see chapter 6, pp 2-3) are 
apparently no longer to be yoked to other agendas around an employer’s freedom of 
action and productivity performance as has been the case previously. These concerns 
have now become absorbed into a much broader and inclusive focus of interest for 
employers regarding their discretionary powers in the workplace generally and which is 
discussed next. Meanwhile, the spotlight on this construct has narrowed to a straight 
choice facing sampled manufacturers between managing workplace labour relations 
oneself and deferring to the authority of an association as the best means of retaining 
control.
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Table 9: Factor Analysis Results for Survey 2
ITEM FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3
1. Agreements reached in a bargaining council still provides 
enough leeway for the employer to implement it flexibly 
within the company (Factor 2 in Tl)
.71 -.01 .08
2. My company fails to see how agreements reached in
bargaining councils can lead to significant improvements in 
our 'productivity performance'
(Factor 1 in Tl)
-.70 -.11 .29
3. The way that bargaining councils (or similar) operate in practice 
still leaves a company sufficient scope for managing its 
industrial relations affairs as it sees fit
( Factor 2 in Tl)
.68 .37 -.02
4. Too much autonomy is lost to a company through
membership of an employers' organisation and its subsequent 
representation on a bargaining council
(Factor 1 in Tl)
-.65 .-29 .21
5. All members of employers' organisations should be prepared to 
abide by decisions made on their behalf whether they like them 
or not (Factor2 in T1)
.59 .12 -.04
6. It is unnatural for companies to collaborate with business rivals 
within an employers' organisation over employment matters 
effecting market competitiveness
(Factor 3 in Tl)
-.43 -.23 .34
7 It makes sense for a company to belong to an employers' 
organisation when a government strongly supports unions
(Factor 3 inT l)
.01 .84 -.03
8. It is natural for an employer to want to join an employers' 
organisation so as to protect its interests against a powerful 
union movement (Factor 3 in T l)
.16 .81 -.05
9. My company has the confidence & ‘know-how’ to manage its 
labour relations without the need to be represented by 
employers’ organisations (Factor 1 in Tl)
.08 -.22 .82
10. These days, company industrial relations matters are too 
important to be left in the hands of employers' organisations 
and bargaining councils. (Factor 1 in Tl)
-.26 .17 .75












Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization 
Component Scores (5 iterations)
‘flexible association*
Re-labelling ‘conditional association ’ as above is intentional and is meant to convey a 
change to the agenda for manufacturers from the time of the first survey. Then, concern
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mostly focused on the balance to be struck between members and their associations as 
to how much leeway was to be granted to those employers falling under the jurisdiction 
of bargaining councils when it came to enforcing their agreements. Crucially what 
mattered to sampled manufacturers at the time of the first survey was the amount of 
discretion to be afforded employers in the way industry agreements were to be 
implemented in the reality. Now, however, this concern has expanded into an interest 
on the part of manufacturers in whether associability and collective action might either 
inhibit or facilitate their pursuit of productivity gains in the workplace and their ability 
to compete generally. It is this broader flexibility agenda that has come to the fore more 
recently in South Africa as evidenced by the presence of this construct in this latter 
survey, now comprising of six items. Even so, a certain freedom of choice (and action) 
within an associability framework still remains a core component of any manufacturing 
employer’s rationalising of the matter, albeit one now more explicitly contextualised 
around the idea of labour flexibility than previously. Individual approval for 
associability is still on the proviso that a certain freedom o f action is tolerated but one 
that now also guarantees flexibility and competitiveness
Frequency Analysis of Factors for Survey 2
Once again, responding manufacturers are sorted into two categories denoting either 
high or low affinity with a particular factor. Results have been generated in exactly the 
same way as that described earlier for survey 1. The relevant frequency table is 
presented below and is to be used in conjunction with table 8 for the purposes of direct 
comparison. Contrasting the mean scores for each factor by survey reveals some 
significant changes in the extent to which respondents identify with components as 
follows.
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Table 10: ‘high’ v ‘low factor’ firms in Survey 2 (n=126)
‘flexible assoc (%) auton. capacity (%) ext. threat (%)
‘high’ firms 91 (72) 92(73) 106(84)
‘low’ firms 25(28) 24(27) 20(16)
mean 331 3.43 3.20
First, there appears to be mounting appreciation of ideas underpinning ‘flexible 
association’ as evidenced by the mean score for this factor rising from 3.10 to 3.31 from 
survey to survey. This finding chimes with observations made earlier as regards the 
changing composition of this particular construct. Second, employer interest in the 
issue of ‘autonomous capacity’ also appears to have grown, but less noticeably, given 
that the mean score for this component is now 3.43 compared to that of 3.27 first time 
round. Third, and seemingly in direct contrast to the other two factors, identification 
with ‘external threat’ is beginning to fade a little with the mean score for this construct 
falling from 3.42 to 3.20. It suggests that as the threat from the other actors recedes over 
time so more parochial concerns around control of one’s own workforce and a certain 
freedom o f action begin to loom much larger in the minds of this second sample of 
manufacturers. Undertaking a comparison of ‘high’ versus Tow’ firms only confirms 
the validity of this evidence. The proportion of responding firms who more readily 
identify themselves with the notion of a more liberal associability has increased 
markedly from under two-thirds to three-quarters whilst those for the other two factors 
have, if anything, marginally increased, but certainly not lessened.
The deeper significance of all this is threefold. First, as with the previous survey, these 
factors continue to hold large sway in the minds of most sampled manufacturers when 
deciding whether to associate and actively engage with the bargaining council system or 
not. Thus, they remain key determinants in an individual manufacturer’s propensity to
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either associate or free-ride. Second, security through collective action can still be the 
spur to associability for a majority of manufacturing employers. Fear of a dominant 
state and labour movement and concern over one’s own managerial competence still act 
as powerful pragmatic drivers for many of these employers when contemplating 
whether to become or remain ‘reluctant collectivists ’ as was discovered first time round. 
But, thirdly, this pragmatism has now expanded into a growing concern over how much 
discretion is to be afforded to associated employers and what effect this might have on 
their ability to enhance productivity and so compete in final product markets.
summary
An exploratory factor analysis for both surveys reveals three clearly distinguishable 
factors that apparently come to the fore whenever manufacturers are asked to review 
their position on associability and collective action. Although these ‘de facto’ constructs 
may have changed slightly in terms of their composition from one survey to the next, 
nevertheless, their defining characteristics are still sufficiently discernible for us to 
conclude the following. Certain immutable considerations are to be bom in mind by 
South African employers when deliberating on whether to associate and partake in 
multi-employer bargaining. These thoughts relate to whether unions and the state pose 
some kind of threat to the way manufacturers might choose to handle labour relations, 
whether the capacity to self-manage one’s own employment relationships is somewhat 
problematic for them and whether South African associability is sufficiently flexible to 
allow employers some manoeuvrability in the way they can operate within a bargaining 
council system. Their presence confirms assumptions made earlier in chapter six as 
regards the supposed motivations behind employers belonging to associations and 
signing up to multi-employer bargaining.
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Certainly, the prospects of anomie taking hold within the business community more 
generally would appear to have further receded with the march of time and especially 
given the re-occurrence of this structured pattern of thinking about associability. Yet, 
exploratory analysis of items from the first survey characterises any rationalisation over 
associability and collective action as one that is both politically and economically 
framed. Although this is still fundamentally the case for the second survey, nonetheless, 
there now seems to be a more pronounced economic agenda in the foreground that is 
beginning to preoccupy manufacturing employers ever more. Further confirmation of 
this comes from comparing the frequency scores for factors across both surveys. Whilst 
a clear majority of employers continue to admit that a desire for protection and security 
influences their decision-making so too are a growing proportion of them drawn to 
consider the labour market effectiveness of multi-employer bargaining when 
deliberating whether to associate or disassociate. Changes to aggregate mean scores for 
these three factors also demonstrates a shifting orientation away from reacting to what 
organised labour and government might be contemplating and more towards reflecting 
on what needs managing from within the organisation.
Even though associability and collective action remain political devices for employers 
as previously, a more explicit economic calculus has begun to move from the shadows 
and take centre stage. Nevertheless, it still seems that self-defence through associability 
can be the spur for many manufacturing employers choosing to act collectively. Finally, 
comparing exploratory results between surveys also suggests to us that any propensity 
to associate is a likely rejoinder to either perceived internal shortcomings or external 
threats. If anything, it is now the former slightly more than the latter that is beginning to 
occupy the thinking of the South African manufacturing community, according to these 
findings. Thus, rational choice over associability will more often than not be one 
conditioned by a self-serving instinct for survival. As we might expect, pragmatic
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instrumentality, not principled solidarity, more likely informs employer choice for the 
majority of both sample populations. But this begs the question as to whether this 
characterisation of associability and how it might be changing can be explained by any 
of the broader political (democratisation) and economic (liberalisation) transformations 
chronicled in earlier chapters. In seeking answers to this question, we now turn our 
attention to a particular statistical technique for comparing mean differences between 
the responses of sample groups to these factors commonly referred to as an 
independent-samples t-test.
10.5 Significance testing (independent-sample t-tests)
Given the slight modifications to thinking on associability that have taken place from 
survey to survey, the question next arises as to whether these marked differences hold 
any statistical significance for us and, if so, what interpretation is to be placed on such 
findings. To this end, an independent-samples t-test was conducted whereby the total 
mean scores for each factor were compared from one survey to the next in order to 
ascertain whether any discernible differences between them were statistically robust. To 
remind ourselves, each survey is based on a separate random sample, albeit drawn from 
the same population of manufacturers such that the composition of one has no effect on 
the other and therefore remains independent for the purpose of this analysis.
Significance testing in this way allows us to determine whether any changes in the 
strength of feeling towards a particular construct can simply be put down to chance or to 
what has transpired in the interim period between surveys. In short, this test tells us 
whether we are right in assuming any such variance in mean scores is likely due to a 
specific ‘time effect’ or simply to the randomness of both sample frames. For the 
passage of time to account for these mean differences between factors requires the t
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statistic to be larger than smaller with a probability less than 0.05. Once again, we look 
at each factor in turn before interpreting these results in the round.
autonomous capacity
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the ‘autonomous capacity’ 
scores for sampled manufacturers in surveys 1 and 2. As can be deduced from the results 
below, there was no significant difference for those in survey 1 (m=3.27, SD=.l 46) and 
those in survey 2 (m=3.43, SD=.623; t (231)=-1.824,p=.07). In short, there is no ‘time 
effect’ that can help explain the increased identification that sampled manufacturers 
have signalled for this particular factor.
Table 11: Independent-sample t-test score for ‘autonomous capacity’
Group Statistics
ID of company N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
factorl t1 107 3.2702 .74622 .07214
t2 126 3.4339 .62292 .05549
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means



































Thus, we are unable to declare with statistical certainty that the reason autonomous 
capacity resonates slightly more with manufacturers on this second occasion has 
something to do with changes to circumstance occurring in between field trips that
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subsequently trigger alterations in perception. Differences between mean scores may 
simply be arbitrary and not due to any contextual forces at work over the lapse of time.
flexible association
The opposite appears to be the case for ‘flexible association’ to that for autonomous 
capacity. Here, we can infer that as developments have unfurled in the period between 
surveys so perspectives have altered in such ways as to make the idea of individual 
employer ‘space’ within the confines of associability resonate more strongly for those 
sampled at the end of the decade rather than in the immediate aftermath following the 
political emancipation of workers.
Table 12. Independent-sample t-test score for ‘flexible association’
Group Statistics
ID of company N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
factor2 t1 107 3.0997 .75543 .07303
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As can be inferred from the table above, there was a statistically significant difference 
for those manufacturers in survey 1 (w=3.10, SD=.1S5) and those in survey 2 (m=3.31,
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5D=.701; t (231) =-2.117, £>=.03) when it comes to comparing mean scores for 4flexible 
association’. In short, there is a ‘time effect’ in play that marks the growing interest that 
sampled manufacturers have displayed towards the issue of how much discretion is to 
be afforded to them in interpreting flexibly what associations want to see happen and 
whatever emanates from bargaining councils.
external threat
The conclusion to be drawn for this factor is once again different compared to the 
previous two. Whereas differing levels of interest for ‘external threat’ are also 
statistically significant for us, the actual direction this changed level of interest takes is 
opposite to that for flexible association. In short, whilst interest in the concept of 
flexible association appears to be waxing, so that in external threat seems to be waning. 
The mean scores and t values set out below confirm the statistical robustness of this 
contention. As can be detected from the table below, there was a statistically significant 
difference for those manufacturers in survey 1 (w=3.42, SD=.15\) and those in survey 
2 (m=3.20, S!D=.771; t (231) = 2.185,/?=.03) when their mean scores were compared 
for the ‘external threat’ factor. Any lessening of interest in this component is not simply 
a chance occurrence but one shaped by time itself. It seems that whatever changes to 
circumstance have arisen in the time between surveys has caused a slight weakening in 
the degree of identification that sampled manufacturers have with the twin threats posed 
to their interests by strong government and labour.
314
Table 13. Independent-sample t-test score for ‘external threat’
Group Statistics
ID of company N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
factor3 t1 107 3.4174 .75109 .07261
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We now have some statistical verification for the differences in feeling that both sets of 
sampled manufacturers display towards two of the three factors underpinning 
associability. Whereas the notion of being in a looser form of association is one that 
resonates more strongly with sampled manufacturers second time round, the opposite 
applies in the case of any perceived threat to interests from government and organised 
labour. Here, there is some slight fading of interest in this factor from sampled 
manufacturers as measured by the difference in aggregated means scores. Moreover, it 
seems likely that contingency rather than randomness is a more likely source of 
difference for both sets of orientations. In other words, what South African 
manufacturers have both experienced, observed and formed views on throughout this 
transitional period has a direct bearing on what continues to inform their thinking (and 
how deeply) on their own associability. As the contextualised landscape in which 
manufacturers operate has changed so has their structured thinking on associability.
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Thus, South Africa’s transformational context, rather than mere statistical chance, better 
explains any altered thinking on associability. Further evidence for this comes from 
what informants have also felt able to report under interview (see Appendix 3 for their 
details). We not only turn our attention to this other source for further corroboration but 
also to provide possible reasons for these contextualised changes to employer 
perspectives.
10.6 Informants’ accounts of changes to the bargaining landscape
One explanation that accounts for changes to perception relates to ‘a new government- 
sponsored political direction’ that wants to see South Africa develop into a high wage/ 
high performance economy (De Plessis, interview notes 23/11/99). Whilst employers 
collectively accept the need for ‘social exchange’ and their contribution to it in times of
transition, nonetheless recent years have witnessed ‘a subtle shift in emphasis away
from contributing to democratic processes and towards tackling globalisation issues’. 
According to De Plessis, this has become especially true for ‘corporate employers’ who 
see their role as being one that is increasingly ‘instrumental’ and ‘economic’. They are 
assumed to want a return to ‘looking after business and shareholder interests’ given the 
‘global impact’ on business following South Africa’s re-entry into the world trade 
arena:
“Business just wants to get back to business now that the democratisation project
has become developed the globalisation agenda is seen by the average employer
to be a more legitimate terrain to get involved with than (any) democratisation 
agenda” (De Plessis).
For De Plessis in his capacity as a past legal advisor and negotiator for Business South 
Africa, such employers continue to believe that ‘social compromise’ still has its place in 
the wider scheme of things but should not be allowed to impede their own agenda in 
‘competitive wage-setting’ by being ‘over-prescriptive’ and by ‘duplicating enterprise
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agreements so that everything has to be negotiated twice over’. It can be deduced from 
the above that as employers move further away from the point at which political power 
was transferred to the incoming liberation government the more they perceive the 
economic agenda moving centre stage and the political one to the sidelines. In contrast 
to that concluded from the first survey, this means that belonging to employer 
associations and actively engaging in bargaining council proceedings has now become 
more of an economically-couched decision for manufacturers rather than as some 
counter against political uncertainty. Associability is at least as much an economic act 
as it is a political rejoinder, if not more so, in the view of many of them.
Even so, this is not always the case as exemplified by the formation of the Chemical 
Industries Bargaining Council in 1997. It is readily conceded by the likes of such senior 
HR practitioners as Randall (SASOL and the Chemical & Allied Industries Association) 
and Abbot (Alpha Cement and chief negotiator for the CAIA) that the introduction of 
centralised bargaining into the petro-chemical and allied products sector was the direct 
consequence of sustained ‘political pressure’ from both the Ministry of Labour and 
major campaigning unions along with the implementation of the Labour Relations Act 
itself (interview notes 1/12/99 and 8/12/99 respectively). Under the weight of this 
political momentum ‘employers felt that they had no other choice but to give it a go’ 
(Randall ibid). For Abbott, however, the hope remains for such delegated bargaining to 
produce framework agreements that address ‘restructuring and globalisation agendas’ 
otherwise she envisages ‘enterprise bargaining (eventually) superseding sectoral 
processes’ if there is no movement away from narrow pay rate fixing as is presently the 
case. Meanwhile, Unwin, as Corporate HR Director at Anglo-Gold (an all-important 
‘flagship’ conglomerate within South Africa), has levelled exactly the same criticism at 
the other five big Mining Houses in the Chamber of Mines for pursuing a ‘narrow rate- 
fixing’ policy rather than broadening it out to cover the need for both restructuring and a
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‘social plan’. Here, Unwin is referring to various change programmes currently under 
local negotiation with the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) that are designed to 
manage a ‘technology transition’ by taking a skills ‘high road’ to fewer but better paid 
jobs on the back of substantial ‘retrenchment programmes’. These ‘employability 
outcomes’ also require there to be a negotiated welfare plan that provides for ‘training 
and education, housing, career planning and joint planning of new businesses’ by way 
of recompense. Should the employer caucus attempt to undermine these developments 
then Anglo-Gold would seriously consider withdrawing from any future central bargain 
covering this vital economic sector (interview notes 29/11/99).
On the other hand, when pressed, these same employer representatives all concede that 
some combination of pragmatic political and market considerations continue to play 
their part in forcing their companies not to forego bargaining council processes as 
exemplified by the following.
“there is some virtue in delegated bargaining whereby skirmishing and warfare is
conducted elsewhere outside of the companies” (Abbott, ibid)
Meanwhile, Anglo-Gold recognise that abandoning the Chamber and going it alone may 
prove to be a risky strategy given the NUM’s preference for keeping the other ‘Houses’ 
in line. Anglo-Gold’s departure from the Chamber of Mines may only fragment the 
central bargain and lead to ‘rupture and instability’ such that mining competitors so 
undercut Anglo-Gold on unit labour costs that it jeopardises its ‘high performance/ high 
pay’ HR strategy (Unwin, interview notes 29/11/99). Indeed, Seimens (SA) - as a 
leading party employer that is also ‘familiar with the German system’- has also 
expressed approval for its Metal Trades bargaining council in delivering on a useful 
form of pay moderation............
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“that has taken the volatility out of pay bargaining and produced a more stable 
environment for the whole industry”
Moreover, Siemens even regards sectoral agreements as being helpful in ‘managing 
local retrenchments better’ and in generally restructuring the whole industry through 
providing ‘certainty and stability in labour costs’ along with a welcome peace dividend 
(Doyle, interview notes 6/12/99).
The importance of centralised agreements in invoking the orderly management of 
industry restructuring is not lost on the officials of bargaining councils themselves. For 
example, the Industrial Relations Director of the most important manufacturing 
employers’ federation (SIFSA) reports having witnessed ‘serious attempts’ in recent 
years at:
“restructuring the (bargaining) relationship away from one previously 
characterised as being adversarial/low trust to a joint problem-solving / high trust 
one”.
At its heart lies a ‘two-tier bargaining system’ with framework agreements setting 
‘useful parameters’ for local talks on working hours, skills development, productivity 
and flexibility. However, there is also an ‘industry restructuring package’ that provides 
substantial funding of health, education and housing projects. Once more, however the 
driver to reforming the bargaining scope appears to be the same as that reported by 
other informants:
“the joint global experience of intensified competition, threat to business survival 
and severe retrenchments has forced the parties together to evolve restructuring 
strategies and social plans within a centralised bargaining forum”. (Carson ibid).
All this withstanding, it is readily conceded within SIFSA circles that such efforts have 
met with mixed results given that some employers’ associations (like vehicle 
manufacture) are much more ‘progressive’ than others (for example, vehicle
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manufacture). Interestingly, it is also acknowledged that what ‘enlightenment’ exists is 
due in no small part to the personal conversion of the main union’s (NUMSA) chief 
negotiator to its merits (Carson, interview notes 1/12/99).
Unfortunately, attempts at coordinating restructuring through centralised agreements
hold little relevance for other sectors of the economy that are more harshly exposed the
opening of the economy and the removal of tariff protection as in the clothing and
construction industries. Indeed, if anything, these sectors are becoming less organised
and associated according to such Directors of Regional Employer Associations as
Lauser (Clothing) and De Kock (Building and Construction)). Indeed, the former tells
of an ‘employer flight’ from association and party bargaining and into outsourcing and
homeworking such that a newly realised national bargaining council process is being
seriously compromised as a result (interview notes 9/12/99). She further suggests two
explanations for this seemingly unstoppable trend.
“First, unit labour costs are seventy five per cent of total unit costs so flexing (sic) 
the workforce is extremely cost-saving. Second....the unsustainable burden of 
fixed labour cost overheads on the small employer is much too much....that is, 
pension, health and housing subsidies”.
De Kock expresses similar sentiments in describing the sector as ‘weak and fragile’ and 
considers future prospects for employer ‘single-table bargaining’ in the sector to be 
‘bleak’ with ‘break-ups and closures (of regional bargaining councils) imminent’. 
Indeed, he considers delegated bargaining to have become less, not more, attractive 
given the increased burden placed on associated employers in the form of more 
generous welfare provision, a more onerous disputes resolution procedure, the 
introduction of severance pay and an inadequate policing of agreements. However, he 
also believes that ‘industry bargaining will never completely disappear’, explaining that 
such resilience is partly due to a lack of exposure to foreign competition (unlike 
clothing) and the need for smaller building firms to avoid wage spiralling through pay
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rate-fixing (17/11/99). Interestingly for us however, both representatives of these 
employer associations (TCMA and MBA respectively) also acknowledge the presence 
of ‘powerful industrial union(s)’ (Lauser 9/12/99) and the desire of both larger and 
smaller manufacturers for labour market stability (De Kock 17/11/99) to be key 
determinants in ensuring the durability of associability in whatever form and however 
weakened. For them, their respective constituencies appear divided as to how best to 
respond to a changed economic order and the market turbulence this has created. Whilst 
some (mostly ‘party’) employers see bargaining council determinations as providers of 
stability, other (‘non-party’) employers hold them to be excessively restrictive on to 
their competitiveness and undermining of their survivability. Meanwhile, there is a 
difference of view between ‘party’ employers as to whether the bargaining scope should 
remain rooted in rate-fixing or broaden out to include industry restructuring and social 
(welfare) planning.
An additional motivation for ‘party’ employers sticking with single-table bargaining 
relates to their ability to ‘influence outcomes’ which also explains why ‘large firms 
dominate proceedings’, according to the head of the National Association of Bargaining 
Councils (NABC) -  a voluntary federation of ‘party’ employers established in 1994 to 
campaign for and advise on standard-setting and rule-making for the bargaining council 
system generally. For Stapelberg, the prospect of having to bargain locally is also 
sufficient motivation for many of his members to stick with multi-employer bargaining 
even when others are ‘distancing themselves from the process’. Indeed, the belief is that 
many ‘non-party’ employers perceive the ‘bargaining council system to be an antidote 
to plant bargaining’ and, by inference, to whipsawing tactics deployed by unions and to 
workplace militancy (interview notes 18/11/99).
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summary
The observations of our sample of employer representatives bear close testimony to 
what the exploratory data has previously managed to uncover for us. Namely, although 
political factors regarding (both industrial and workplace) union strength and 
governmental pressure play their part in influencing employer thinking on associability, 
it is increasingly economic and competitive market considerations that are beginning to 
feature more prominently. As reported by these close observers of the bargaining 
council scene, new internal debates and tensions appear to be opening up within these 
various employer constituencies as to the best way forward in terms of an appropriate 
bargaining locus (industry versus enterprise agreements) and of bargaining scope (broad 
industry restructuring versus narrow rate-fixing). Furthermore, these witnesses are at 
pains to identify for us a growing dichotomy within their constituencies between those 
perceiving associability still capable of affording employers some element of security 
and flexibility and those less enamoured who regard it as a source of market rigidity and 
an impediment to competitiveness. Moreover, it seems to these ‘insiders’ that the 
apparent nature of the sector, vulnerability to overseas competition and evidence of 
‘non-party’ free-riding and defection makes any individual decision on associability an 
extremely contingent one given what troubles both ‘party’ and ‘non-party’ employers 
alike. Nonetheless, their representatives confirm for us under interview that pursuit of 
labour market protection and workplace control continues to be of universal concern to 
employers in whatever sector they should find themselves and with whatever bargaining 
status.
10.7 Concluding thoughts on empirical findings
Empirical investigation into the associability of South African manufacturers was 
undertaken in the course of two field trips in 1996 and 1999 respectively. Key findings
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have been presented and discussed in chapters nine and ten and their significance for us 
can be summarised as follows. First, comparative descriptive data (in the form of 
frequency and cross-tabulated analysis) has been produced on the back of two surveys 
that assess approval ratings for various aspects of associability and the bargaining 
council system and how and why these might be changing over time. Second, 
comparative exploratory data (in the form of factor analysis) has been generated that 
reveals the structured thinking underpinning contemporary views on associability for 
both samples, how strongly respondent firms feel towards each specific component and 
whether there is any change to its composition. In this we are helped by the use of 
significance testing that identifies for us how orientations towards these constructs 
might be altering. Finally, testimony from key informants representing various 
employer constituencies is drawn on as a way of verifying what the survey data 
suggests is happening to employer thinking on associability as well providing some 
contextual reasons as to why.
descriptive findings
Analysis of frequency scores for items allows conclusions to be drawn regarding the 
level of support that employer associations and bargaining councils attract from each 
sample of manufacturers. Overall, it seems that more respondents were more favourably 
disposed than not to most features of associability that are itemised within and across 
both surveys. However this encouraging level of approval for collective action is to be 
tempered by the fact that a fair minority of manufacturers remained indifferent or, as 
yet, undecided from ‘approval’ item to ‘approval’ item. Nonetheless, when asked to 
assess the functionality of employers associations and the efficacy of bargaining 
councils generally, there was no discernible groundswell of disapproval recorded for 
manufacturers but, if anything, a guarded endorsement from just under half of them.
The same could be said as regards certain controversial aspects of associability and
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centralised bargaining such as the legal exemption and extension of agreements. 
Unpredictably and against expectation, neither the possibility of employers being 
exempted from agreements, nor legally obliged to comply with them proved decisive in 
deciding whether to associate for a majority in each sample. Moreover, this overall 
approval rating for associability appears to have changed little from one survey to the 
next although there is some evidence to suggest that the temptation to free-ride on the 
back of members and/or not comply with agreements might be on the increase whilst 
disapproval in others free-riding continues to grow from survey to survey.
These findings were next disaggregated by reference to various categories of 
manufacturer such as associational membership, workforce size, foreign ownership, 
unionisation and workplace morale. Overwhelmingly, approval for the work of 
employer associations and bargaining councils seemed more likely tied to actual 
membership of an association itself ahead of any other variable. Nonetheless, other than 
for associational membership, no other categorisation had such a marked impact on the 
way sampled manufacturers chose to view associability in general. That said, 
appreciation for what employers’ associations and bargaining councils are attempting to 
do and for what they have achieved to date seems, on the evidence, to be more 
forthcoming from those manufacturers who have relatively large workforces, are 
recipients of some overseas investment, are highly unionised or where workplace 
morale is thought reasonably high.
In sum, this descriptive data indicates there to be bedrock support for belonging to 
associations and delegating at least some bargaining authority to them. However, this is 
a far cry from being a ringing endorsement for the bargaining council system, 
whichever survey we look at. Indeed, there is a substantial number who, at worst, 
remain stubbornly resistant to any idea of collective action or, at best, indifferent to the
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issue. It is this group that matters to us most given that their eventual support or outright 
opposition may prove crucial to any enduring success that these bargaining reforms 
might enjoy. In short, it is the eventual decisions of these uncommitted employers that 
will determine whether or not critical associability is achievable, centralised bargaining 
sustainable and organised employment relations more than aspirational in such a crucial 
sector of the South African economy as manufacturing. This evidence suggests that any 
future public policy discussions around further reform of bargaining and employment 
relations need to take account of these approval ratings for associability. There seems to 
be little room for complacency from policy makers towards this issue, given the 
fractured character of the views expressed here by this representative sample of a key 
business constituency. A better understanding of what preoccupies employers when 
thinking about their associability might help us in this endeavour.
exploratory findings
Factor analysis reveals employer thinking on associability in South Africa to be highly 
structured rather than anomic as might have been anticipated in the first flush of 
political liberation and given the ‘triple transition’ that followed. This structure takes 
the form of three clearly delineated and explicable factors that address issues for 
employers around their perceived competency in handling employer relations matters, 
the degree of local autonomy felt possible under the bargaining council system and their 
sense of vulnerability in the face of a strong state allied to a powerful labour movement. 
Results from this exploratory analysis allow us to assert with some confidence that these 
three factors are sufficiently robust as to account for how individual firms respond to 
the respective items that test for their orientation to associational membership and, by 
proxy, single-table employer bargaining. Moreover, this configuration of rationales has 
not changed radically, survey to survey. They remain durable, distinctive and 
recognisable as time passes but not without some change to their composition such that
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this preoccupation with self-capacity, flexible associability and power status has 
become even more crystallised over the interim for many South African manufacturing 
employers, whether in membership or not.
However, significance testing also tells us the following. How strongly manufacturing 
employers might feel towards each component of the factor structure is beginning to 
change despite the level of identification with all three remaining generally high overall, 
survey to survey. Thus, manufacturers seemingly want to focus significantly more than 
previously on how much discretion is left to them when acting collectively and 
significantly less on perceived power disparities between themselves and other actors. 
The inference here is that whilst employer thinking on associability continues to be 
influenced by both political and economic considerations as before, it is the latter rather 
than the former that appear to weigh slightly heavier with South African manufacturers 
at the second time of asking. It seems that the passing of time since the ‘resistance 
years’ and the downfall of apartheid only makes this switch in emphasis more, not less, 
likely. These findings are of even greater significance for us once we recall that over 
twice as many respondents are in associational membership as not for both surveys.
Any future adjustments to thinking on associability are far from being the preserve of 
those not yet in membership based on these findings. In fact, if there are changes 
currently underway as to how strongly manufacturers feel about associability then they 
are ones very much shared between members and non-members alike.
To conclude, this empirical work suggests to us that there is a critical level o f 
associability in place within the South African manufacturing community that has not 
faired badly but held up reasonably well through the lapse of time. There is also 
evidence to suggest that three very specific constructs help determine the propensity of 
South African manufacturers to associate and remain party to industry or regional
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bargaining. However, as political uncertainties fade and economic ones mount for 
employers in the post apartheid era, so too has the strength and direction of feeling 
towards these factors begun to alter. Increasingly, employers are beginning to identify 
more strongly with issues around their capacity to achieve market competitiveness and 
flexibility and less so with those relating to the potential threat to interests that 
government and labour might pose. It is the ‘push-pull’ dynamic of these conflicting 
political and economic rationales that lies at the heart of the dilemma for employers 
pondering their associability and explains their characterisation as ‘reluctant 
collectivists \ Authoritative testimony from those well placed to comment describes the 
way these broader economic and political transformations are beginning to subtly alter 
how manufacturers view their own associability and the linked bargaining council 
institution. Their account helpfully corroborates findings from the survey data that tells 
of how these very same tensions play on the minds of manufacturing employers when 
revealing a preference to associate or not. All of this evidence is to suggest that 
associability cannot be taken for granted by those custodians of public policy who also 
wish to see South Africa’s experimentation with social corporatism prosper. Policy 
needs to be developed that bolsters associability assuming a state preference for multi­
employer bargaining to be coordinated and employment relations organised. The 
question remains as to what policy interventions might be appropriate for South Africa. 
This remains the focus of the concluding chapter.
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Chapter 11. South African employer associability: 
implications for state policy-makers?
11.1 Introduction
With this final chapter, we identify conclusions to be drawn from this thesis that can 
hopefully inform public policy debates in the new South Africa regarding possible 
reform of its central bargaining institution. The particular focus is on the role to be 
played by employer associability in preventing significant rates of defection from any 
central bargain and how the propensity for employers to act collectively might be 
strengthened through re-prioritising state policy. We first revisit what bargaining reform 
was supposedly meant to achieve in transformational terms, what has actually transpired 
according to the evidence and what policy implications this holds for us accordingly. To 
help us with this, we also call on the views of experienced observers of the bargaining 
scene, well capable of passing comment upon issues that remain as problematical as 
ever and are yet to be resolved. Taking stock provides us with a vantage point from 
which to identify suitable policy guidance, reinforcement and development that could 
help to consolidate employer associability in South Africa.
Reconciliation between fierce political and military opponents brought apartheid rule to 
an official end in the mid-1990s and ushered in an era of full political emancipation. A 
universal franchise was established and elections freely held for the first time. This 
‘negotiated revolution’ (Adam and Moodley 1993: 59-70) culminated in the 
appointment of a Government of National Unity (GNU) that spearheaded the 
dismantling of remaining apartheid structures. Apartheid labour relations was one such 
legacy considered ripe for reform given its perceived centrality to nation-building 
projects aimed at racial, economic and political transformation. From the outset,
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reforming employment relations institutions was viewed as integral to ongoing 
economic adjustment and democratic consolidation, especially given their past 
importance in shaping both the country’s colonial and post-colonial development. In 
this same spirit of political compromise, ‘peak’ representatives for both organised 
labour and capital were mandated by the state to broker a settlement over what should 
constitute this new employment relations. The upshot is a revised legal dispensation 
that establishes an institutional framework through which South African employment 
relations is meant to become transformed at all levels. What characterises this new 
labour relations regime is best summarised as follows.
11.2 State policy and employment relations reform
This political bargain, as embodied in the legislation, reveals a certain policy direction 
towards employment relations reform. Its general orientation is both the product of 
preferences espoused by negotiating reformers and of constraints acknowledged to be 
‘path-dependent’ given their proximity to new political realities and recent labour 
history. As such, it reconciles those wanting their employment relations and bargaining 
institutions to be highly market-sensitive, deregulated and decentralised with those 
preferring to see some state oversight of employment relations along with bargaining 
centralisation. Thus, the preference is for a type o f ‘bargained’, or ‘democratic’ 
corporatism that both unifies and normalises a warped employment relations regime 
previously characterised as being racially segregationist and socially divisive. The 
policy intent has been clear from the outset: the transformation of employment relations 
from one rooted in racial and class discord and workplace adversarialism to one built on 
social harmony and collaboration. Henceforth for policy-makers, social contestation, 
rather than social contestation, is to be the hallmark of South Africa’s newly re­
institutionalised employment relations system. The reasoning is transparent. Instilling 
these social norms chimes with grander aspirations for civic society to be more 
egalitarian. A strong democracy is assured through the presence of strong voluntarist
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institutions that promote ‘voice’ as the means by which the balance between equity and 
efficiency is to be struck.
In the quest for structures that could match these aspirations, policy thinking was 
partially informed by European notions of social partnership, centralised bargaining and 
workplace codetermination as evidenced by the introduction of new and revised 
institutions that symbolised encapsulate these neo-corporatist features. Indeed, as 
conceded by the then Executive Director of NEDLAC, state reformers were always 
‘highly conscious of the European model’ with government especially appreciative of 
the way it chimes with how the ANC, COSATU and the SACP learnt to function when 
in opposition (Dexter, interview notes 15/11/99). Accordingly, multi-tiered institutions 
have been put in place in the form of NEDLAC chambers, bargaining councils and 
workplace forums that supposedly make bargaining articulated. Such sought-after 
articulation amounts to a policy aspiration by which employment relations is to become 
organised and the economy coordinated. It is a policy, however, that has never been 
fully stated or codified according to the Director of one of the country’s leading 
academic research centres.
“Neither ‘articulation’ nor ‘coordination’ is deliberately a built-in design feature 
of the three-tier system - they are not explicitly spelt out anywhere but only to be 
inferred”. (Webster, interview notes 20/11/99).
Nevertheless, for Baskin in commenting as a past Director of Communications at the 
Ministry of Labour, the expectation is always that sectoral bargaining agendas and 
processes will become ‘more sophisticated and complex in ways that take into account a 
changing world order’ (interview notes 7/12/99). Correspondingly, multi-employer 
bargaining is thought pivotal to the maturation of South Africa’s model of social 
corporatism. This is because it acts as an all-important linchpin in the articulation of 
these corporatist structures. Framework agreements reached within bargaining councils
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covering sectors, industries or regions are meant to influence the bargaining agenda for 
those negotiating at the enterprise level but not before negotiators at this intermediate 
level supposedly take note of any accords, compacts and social plans arising from any 
social dialogue taking place within NEDLAC. The inference is that bargaining council 
negotiators, acting as surrogates for both workers and employers within designated 
sectors, can hopefully expedite labour market coordination, both vertically and 
horizontally. Certainly, policy reformers appear relaxed about centralised bargaining 
continuing in its revised form given their past experience of Industrial Councils 
(Webster ibid). Unfortunately, the reality indicates something different from what was 
first anticipated given what has actually evolved and how the parties have responded 
subsequently.
11.3 Problems with centralised bargaining
There are a number of problems that have surfaced recently and to which certain well- 
placed academic commentators and government officials can attest following reform of 
the centralised bargaining system through the Labour Relations Act (1995). First, social 
partners in the NEDLAC process rarely act in ways that generate concordats and 
accords useful to bargaining council negotiators. In part, this is because participants in 
the NEDLAC chamber still perceive social dialogue to be ‘a contested terrain’ -  not 
least by ‘strong business interests’ who fail to see the benefits of NEDLAC proceedings 
and a labour leadership that is prone to ‘by-pass the NEDLAC process’ when politically 
convenient for them to do so. There seems to be only a token commitment from the 
social partners to produce ‘accords and social plans’ that can help shape directly the 
content of industry bargaining (Dexter, interview notes 15/11/99). Second, and as with 
apartheid, bargaining council coverage remains uneven across and within industries and 
regions, being commonplace in some sectors and negligible in others. But it also seems
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that for those industries that are either ‘import-sensitive’ or export-orientated’ issues 
around trade liberalisation have impacted on industry bargaining directly (for example, 
clothing and vehicle manufacture) leading to noticeable pay moderation (Van Der Walt, 
interview notes 17/11/99).
Third, too many bargaining council negotiators prefer to stick to a ‘limited bargaining 
agenda’ due to the amount of mutual distrust and antagonism still present in the 
workplace.
“the parties have tended to stick to narrow economistic bargaining too much”
(Baskin, interview notes 7/12/99)
For Webster, this amounts to an abuse of the process as intended with too many union 
and employer negotiators seeing bargaining council proceedings as a means of ‘short­
term narrow wage-fixing rather than as part of a social dialogue process’(interview 
notes 20/11/99). As a consequence, there is reluctance on the part of negotiators to use 
framework bargaining as the means by which to restructure industries and inform 
negotiations at the level of the enterprise. There appears not to have been any significant 
‘paradigmic shift in thinking’ away from a traditional sectoral bargaining agenda to a 
more ‘progressive’ one other than for ‘isolated sectors’ such as manufacturing and 
mining (Baskin, ibid). That said, he is also quick to acknowledge that some sectoral 
bargainers are
“fumbling towards finding out what bargaining claims (sic) are to be handled 
more suitably at the sectoral level (for example, pensions and medical health)”.
As importantly, there is even some evidence of employers beginning to delay their own 
pay negotiations so as to take account of ‘what comes out of the bargaining council 
process’ (Van Der Walt, interview notes 17/11/99). Fourth, there are still too many 
‘rural’ and ‘township’ SME employers who are as yet unwilling to be formally 
incorporated into the bargaining council system given their past distrust and avoidance
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of authority generally and their formal exclusion from the centralised bargaining system 
under apartheid rule. Such ‘evasion’ is most apparent in those sectors like the 
construction industry where unions remain ‘weak’ and enforcement of agreements 
‘negligible’ (Baskin, ibid).
These reports from observers of the bargaining scene usefully identify for us some 
defining characteristics of the bargaining council system. Undoubtedly, multi-employer 
bargaining is an institutional force that commands our attention, certainly in terms of its 
impact on the formal sector of the economy and not least in terms of potential shadow 
and pattern bargaining effects. However, its coverage remains uneven across the 
economy, being stronger in some industries (for example, manufacturing), weaker in 
others (building and construction) and non-existent elsewhere (agriculture). This means 
its coordinating capacity is noticeably weakened as a consequence. Problems are further 
exacerbated by the very conduct of those occupying seats in the bargaining council 
chamber itself. There appear to be too many occasions when the apartheid legacy of 
mutual distrust and adversarialism predominate. As a consequence, council negotiators 
have generally struggled to broaden the bargaining scope away from narrow pay-setting 
agendas to ones covering broader restructuring and allied welfarist issues (that is, 
industry accords and social plans). Mutual interests, high trust and consensus-seeking 
behaviour- prerequisites for this type of integrative bargaining- are not yet traits most 
readily associated with bargaining council proceedings. However, there are some 
notable exceptions such as the industrial accords that have been piloted in some key 
manufacturing sectors and that exemplify the potential for this more organised approach 
to industry restructuring (see, for example, Hirschsohn et al.2000: 101-32).
Nonetheless, for Baskin, an increasingly common occurrence is for both the larger 
corporate employer and the stronger workplace organisation to:
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“circumvent sectoral agreements altogether through reaching local deals and 
social pacts around restructuring work, retrenchments and social plans that are 
either being avoided or not even addressed by bargaining councils” (interview notes 
7/12/99).
This trend epitomises another defining characteristic of South Africa’s revised 
bargaining system. The new dispensation encourages the continuance of a dualistic 
bargaining system that had already begun to appear under late apartheid. This is for the 
following sets of reasons. First, mandated bargaining is not made compulsory on the 
parties but remains essentially voluntarist or, rather, bargaining councils can only be 
formed at their behest and when they also represent the majority of those working in 
that designated industry. Second, the new dispensation equips unions with certain 
organising rights such that the chances of gaining workplace recognition have 
improved. Crucial to this thesis, all agreements are now uniformly binding in law 
regardless of whether reached at firm or industry level. Finally, the right to strike 
extends equally to actions in support of plant as to industry bargaining including both 
secondary action and political ‘stayaways’. All of this amounts to due process treating 
one bargaining level the same as another despite an official preference for the system to 
become more articulated and agreements more coordinated through centralised 
bargaining activity. Unintentionally, new legal structures appear only to have 
exacerbated a dualism in the bargaining institution that first evolved under apartheid and 
that has now become such a defining feature of the landscape.
11.4 The importance of employer associability and collective action
A more fundamental problem that this bargaining dualism uncovers is one of employer 
preference. Voluntarism in South Africa’s bargaining system implies not only that 
employers can exercise choice over the granting of recognition but also, and crucial to 
this thesis, they can select the level at which they would prefer the bargaining locus to
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be. However forced this element of choice might prove to be in the reality due to the 
enabling legislation and the relative strength of organised labour, nonetheless it is still 
the case that an individual employer’s own state of preference proves crucial in deciding 
whether to engage with corporatist structures generally and mandated bargaining in 
particular. Some may favour industry bargaining taking precedence over enterprise 
bargaining or vice versa. The aggregate of these individual decisions can either 
strengthen or weaken a bargaining institution that is so instrumental to the overall 
articulation of South Africa’s experimentation with social corporatism.
If institutional structures remain unhelpful in this respect, then the question arises as to 
whether more focused public policy initiatives directed at encouraging employer 
associability and collective action might prove more effective long term. This is to 
argue in favour of a public policy stance that is prepared to intervene as required in 
order to maintain a critical level of associability within South Africa’s employment 
relations system. Here, critical associability means sufficient numbers of employers 
favourably disposed to associate together within the governance of an employer’s 
organisation that then partakes in bargaining council proceedings on their behalf. The 
choices are clear-cut for the individual employer: to be ‘party’ or ‘non-party’ to an 
encompassing system of single-table bargaining or to defect completely from any 
central bargain through a strategy of avoidance, even evasion of any form of collective 
action. There are certainly grounds enough for individual employers to associate as to 
disassociate making any such decision-making finely balanced depending upon their 
reading of the situation they face. These explanations can be summarised as follows.
There appear to be three distinct rationales that are thought to explain why employers 
might choose to combine together in response to particular circumstances. The first two 
relate to different types of control that are commonly thought desirable for employers to
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have. First, industry agreements remain sources of market control such that wages are 
removed from the heat of competition either to prevent an unstoppable race to the 
bottom over pay rates or to frustrate powerful unions deploying whipsawing tactics 
against individual employers considered vulnerable. Second, collective action is 
thought capable of enhancing managerial control through helping to neutralise union 
power in the workplace. Finally, associability may be seen as a way of compensating 
for perceived competency and resource deficits when it comes to the local management 
of employments relations. In contrast, the attractions offree-riding and non-compliance 
with agreements can weaken the appeal of employer solidarity as can an employer 
offensive against the very notion of centralised bargaining on grounds of the rigidities it 
brings into workplaces and the flexibilities it denies to those managements seeking 
competitive advantage . But what of these very same collective action problems 
materialising in the case of post apartheid South Africa? How wedded is the South 
African business community to centralised bargaining as embodied in the bargaining 
council system? Indeed, what are the chances of multi-employer bargaining becoming 
extensive and cohesive such that South Africa’s experimentation with social 
corporatism becomes robust? In short, what does the evidence tell us and what of the 
prospects?
11.5 The state of employer associabilty in South Africa
Contemporary evidence indicates bargaining council coverage extending to just under 
half of all formal workers, one in four of private sector workers and a healthier three- 
fifths of all those employed in manufacturing. Although these ratios appear to be fairly 
respectable compared to those for other parts of the world it also reminds us that there is 
little room for complacency, come the future. Such misgivings are compounded by 
growing evidence of employers in certain sectors beginning to deploy restructuring
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strategies aimed entirely at evading associability through the ‘casualisation, 
extemalisation and informalisation’ of work (Theron 2004). Such trends raise questions 
for us as to how resilient the bargaining council system may prove to be over the longer 
term and whether there is case for more policy intervention. How well associability 
bears up under pressure from both political and economic transitions becomes highly 
pertinent for countries like South Africa that are committed to corporatist-type 
solutions. Do the same collective action problems observed elsewhere apply equally to 
South Africa and at what risk to the well-being of its centralised bargaining system? In 
short, are growing numbers of employers becoming averse towards centralised 
bargaining as in, say, Sweden or Germany? This is the purpose behind my own 
researches into the associability of manufacturers operating as they do in such a key 
sector of the South African economy.
Results from the fieldwork are mixed. Survey findings tell us that whilst just under half 
of those manufacturers canvassed for their views show unwavering support for 
centralised bargaining, the rest remain either averse, indifferent or, as yet, undecided. 
Such evidence is neither a ringing endorsement for bargaining councils but nor is it 
testimony to a frontal assault on South Africa’s centralised bargaining system. To date, 
there is no mass desire from this sample of manufacturing employers for the total 
abolition of the bargaining council system. Nonetheless, some clearly prefer to exercise 
their own exit option but so far constitute a clear minority on the basis of this evidence. 
Perhaps more worrying are those employers who have yet to commit to the bargaining 
council system given the wider public interest in maintaining a level of critical 
associability that buttresses the workings of the centralised bargaining system.
How these abstainers, defectors and defaulters (see figure 3, chapter 7) are to be won 
over to the virtues of associability and to the authority of the bargaining council remains
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of fundamental importance to us from a policy standpoint. This question boils down to 
what policy initiatives might be introduced that can convert our sample of sceptical and 
agnostic manufacturers to the merits of collective action and employer solidarity. The 
answer partly lays in what troubles them most when thinking about associability in the 
first place. My own survey work postulates that there are three well defined factors that 
all too frequently come into play: employers’ perceptions of their own competency, of 
the flexibility afforded them under associability and of the threat posed by powerful 
government and strong unions. These constructs seemingly attract and repel employers 
into and out of associability. However, it is also apparent that an economic rationale 
around labour flexibility is beginning to dominate employer thinking much more than 
any political one relating to the relative power of the other actors. The earlier testimony 
of well-placed informants and observers of the bargaining scene provides an additional 
confirmation. Mindful of these considerations, we next turn our attention to the policy 
ramifications to be drawn from these empirical findings overall.
11.6 Policy guidance on employer associability
Any policy thinking should be predicated on certain suppositions and principles that 
stem primarily from what these findings signify generally. Essentially, these deductions 
are intended to guide our thinking as to what might constitute ‘good’ as opposed to 
‘bad’ policy prioritisation in this area and are to be viewed in this light. This is to infer 
that any impact assessments and feasibility studies of proposed bargaining reforms 
should be conducted from the standpoint that expanding associability is a highly 
desirable public good. Holding to this criterion also requires that possible (private) 
‘costs’ to employers should never become the overriding consideration for policy 
reformers wanting the employment relations system organised.
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employer opt-out
First; we need to acknowledge that industry bargaining enjoys such an institutional 
presence within South Africa that it is unlikely to collapse overnight. However, its 
permanency is not constitutionally safeguarded. The voluntarist nature of the bargaining 
council system ensures that ‘employer flight’ from associability remains an ever-present 
possibility. There is a body of unassociated manufacturing employers (currently in a 
minority) who remain to be convinced as to the merits of collective action but who 
choose to withhold (but not withdraw) their consent for centralised bargaining. It is this 
constituency that should become the prime focus of our attention. Neglecting this key 
constituency is not an option for policy-makers interested in embedding centralised 
bargaining within South Africa’s business community. Discouraging an employer opt- 
out from the bargaining council system becomes the central tenet of policy-making.
employer lock-in
Second, the primary objective, therefore, is to maintain levels of critical associability 
that prevent any further erosion of the bargaining council system. Incentivising 
employers into association and disincentivising them away from disassociation is one 
obvious way forward. Thus, the essential purpose behind any policy development is to 
fortify an institutional lock-in of employers through their membership of associations 
that articulate their interests within a bargaining council chamber. In doing so, there is a 
better guarantee of the ‘shadow o f the future ’ manifesting itself within the bargaining 
council system such that the parties regard their bargaining relationship as being long 
term, interdependent and symbiotic and that their immediate deliberations will always 
be overshadowed by such considerations (Standing et al 1996: 10; Traxler 2003c: 143).
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the balance of advantage
Third, and in consequence of the above, any policy recommendation should always seek 
to ensure that the balance o f advantage lies with those employers seen to be favouring 
associability as against those not so disposed. Impartiality is not helpful in this instance. 
Maintaining employer choice should no longer be the priority but rather skewing the 
options in ways that favour associability. This is to imply that state policy should 
change from a stance of neutrality between associated and unassociated employers to 
one of positive discrimination towards the former when it comes to the way that future 
policy might be formulated and subsequent legislation drafted. The supposition is that a 
policy bias should prevail in favour of ‘associated’ as opposed to ‘unassociated’ 
employers when discussing possible reform of the bargaining system. Being even- 
handed between the two, although instinctively fair and natural, should be resisted for 
the overall public good.
reviewing policy
Fourth, adopting this same outlook also requires reformers to ponder policy in this area 
from two distinct vantage points. There is always a case for periodically reviewing the 
current stock of policy and legislation in order to identify what needs to be conserved 
and ring-fenced and what might benefit from a make-over in order to ensure a better 
fitness for purpose. In contrast, there is also an exercise to be undertaken that identifies 
gaps in current policy provision that might tip the balance of advantage towards 
associated employers more patently whilst closing loopholes that only encourage further 
disassociability from disaffected employers.
bundling
Finally, it might also pay to take note of developments in the area of strategic HRM. 
Here, contemporary thinking has the notion of HR strategy complimenting business
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strategy through achieving a type of ‘best fit’ between the two (for example, Schuler 
and Jackson 1987). For the likes of MacdufFie (1995), this is best achieved through the 
development of HR-orientated ‘policy bundles’ that can underpin compatibility. 
Likewise, we might envisage something similar here whereby a coherent set of policy 
bundles is used to shore up associability within the wider South African business 
community. This is to suggest that no one policy prescription proves sufficient other 
than when tied to others. Indeed, ‘Additive’ benefits supposedly accrue as a 
consequence (Guest 1997: 271-3). ‘Bundling ’ also implies that policies have to 
compliment each other so as to avoid inconsistencies (Wood and de Menezes 1998: 
487). Any new initiative can only be approved when shown to reinforce, rather than 
undermine, the internal coherence of any existing policy set. Thus, impact assessments 
are required to take account of the potential for incompatibilities to occur.
11.6 Policy prioritisation and associability
The following discussion on policy prioritisation is informed by the need to angle any 
singular cost-beneflt calculus towards association and away from disassociation such 
that the former appears ever more advantageous relative to the latter. The argument is 
straightforward and the evidence unambiguous. The more powerful both labour and the 
state appear to be, the more likely are employers drawn to associability. The more 
organised the bilateral actors become, the more it necessitates them engaging co­
operatively with corporatist structures and processes. Current policy should be 
adjudged by reference to this fundamental goal and future developments assessed for 
their likely contribution to its attainment. With this objective in mind, state regulation 
and policy is first reviewed by reference to what is best preserved prior to exploring 
possible additions to the existing policy canon.
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policy conservation
According to Traxler (2003c: 152-3), ‘procedural state regulation’ always provides a 
better guarantee of employment relations becoming organised. On this basis, five 
particular facets of South Africa’s current regulatory regime seem particularly worth 
retaining, especially in light of my own survey findings.
extension
First, making industry agreements encompassing through legal extension is considered
crucial to the success of any centralised bargaining regime. My own survey work
reaffirms the sensitivities surrounding the particular free-riding and non-compliance
aspects of being a ‘non-party’ to industry single-table bargaining. This might well
explain why extending agreements through Ministerial approval appears to be
unproblematic in this case - at least for the majority of those manufacturing employers
sampled previously. Legal extension has three characteristics that are deemed vital for
the sustainability of any centralised bargaining system. It ensures maximum bargaining
coverage beyond membership (through the device of the Common Rule). It assuages the
fears of ‘party’ employers that their ‘non-party’ rivals might undercut them. Finally,
there seems to be an unambiguous positive correlation between a reliance on legal
extension and membership density in employer associations -  at least for the OECD
countries (Traxler 1998). This is because employers appear motivated to associate out
of a desire to influence outcomes from any industry bargaining process that they are
bound by regardless of membership or not (Traxler 2003c: 152). For these reasons, it
seems that legal extension has become a prerequisite for sustainable employer
associability in South Africa. However, legislative amendments introduced in 2002 may
prove unhelpful in this respect. This is because the law now requires the bargaining
parties to represent a majority of not just those falling within the registered scope of the
council but also upon its extension. In addition, there is also an entitlement for ‘non-
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party’ employers to make direct representation to the Minister prior to determination. 
These legislative refinements may require further monitoring for their possibly negative 
impact on associability.
exemption
Second, it also seems that nowadays ‘hardship clauses’ are a necessary adjunct to legal 
extension as a way of keeping potentially disaffected employers on side (see, for 
example, Bhorat et al. 2002: 50-1). Thus, the provision of legal exemption from the 
specific terms of agreements under current legislation continues to prove popular with 
many of the SME population of manufacturing concerns, according to survey evidence 
and official policy. Its continuance remains a given but also raises questions as the 
proper role of bargaining councils in overseeing such applications despite their record of 
establishing independent panels and of frequently granting exemptions to non-party 
employers (Stapelberg 1999: 30-2). The possibility of gaining exemption from parts of 
agreements remains a crucial element of the flexible associability that surveyed 
manufacturers have recently identified as being of growing interest to them.
enforcement
Third, codifying the monitoring and enforcement of terms agreed in bargaining councils 
through the appointment of ‘designated agents’ under the 1995 Labour Relations Act 
(s.33) is also held to be supportive of mandated bargaining. However, there may well be 
a case for further extending the policy despite the articulation of explicit monitoring and 
enforcement powers introduced under amendment in 2002. As matters presently stand, 
enforcement costs fall wholly on the relevant bargaining council many of whom 
financially struggle to provide an adequate level of inspection through to enforcement 
that ensures a critical level of conformance with the terms of agreements. A weak 
enforcement regime only exacerbates the problem of free-riding and non-compliance.
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Once again, from a public policy perspective, matched funding or state subsidy of a 
bargaining council’s enforcement activities may prove beneficial in terms of its 
deterrence value and the ultimate enhancement of bargaining co-ordination. Certainly, it 
warrants further investigation as to its feasibility by way of pilot studies. If nothing else, 
these enforcement standards should be kept under constant review to ensure that, at the 
least, employers are discouraged from disassociability through their non-compliance 
with agreements.
organising
Fourth, additional state support for multi-employer bargaining can come indirectly 
through measures that promote union organising in the workplace (Traxler 2003c: 142). 
In South Africa, legal provision for union organising rights, agency shops and the strike 
weapon can only increase the chances of some element of representation and 
membership taking hold in more workplaces than would otherwise be the case. These 
improved circumstances for labour can also have consequences at the sectoral level. The 
more unions are able to amass workplace membership across designated sectors, the 
more likely they are to reach cumulative thresholds of representation that pass the legal 
test for registering bargaining councils. Moreover, my own survey findings suggest to 
us that a growing union presence in the workplace can only increase the likelihood of 
associability for those individual employers believing themselves vulnerable and 
lacking capacity. The more unions and their affiliates prosper the more solidaristic will 
employers become. Thus, labour laws that are designed to underwrite the organising 
capacity of unions in the workplace can also consolidate, even facilitate, multi­
employer bargaining and employer associability, as with South Africa’s Labour 
Relations Act. Indeed, there is a case for union strategists factoring these considerations 
into their calculations when mounting future mobilisation campaigns. Likewise, no
South African government should ever contemplate diluting these organising rights.
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Indeed, the same can be said for all the above auxiliary measures aimed at enhancing 
the organising capacity of unions, their affiliations and employer groups.
alliance
Finally, maintaining a political alliance between South Africa’s ruling parties (ANC and 
SACP) and its leading union affiliation (COSATU) can also be viewed as encouraging 
employers to behave more solidaristically. It seems that this ‘Tripartite Alliance’ still 
has the potential to galvanise employers into acting collectively according to survey 
evidence that suggests a fair proportion of manufacturing employers remaining wary of 
politically strong labour movements acting in partnership with powerful governments. 
Never mind that this coalition has come under increasing strain since 1995 as 
disagreements mount over the direction taken by government on macro-economic 
policy. There is still considerable benefit to be had in sticking with a collaboration that 
affords both allies mutual gains in terms of their power status relative to capital.
Policy Development
Strengthening associability and the functioning of bargaining councils involves a
number of measures that entail changes to various labour market policies and
regulations. The following suggestions for improving the current policy package are
made not withstanding earlier efforts already made by the Department of Labour to
address ‘misuse and abuse’ of the registration process by those bent on emasculating the
whole bargaining council system. Recent years have seen a proliferation of ‘bogus’
trade unions and employer bodies intent on taking up seats in bargaining council
chambers with a view to undermining their proper functioning. Now, through further
amendments to the Labour Relations Act in 2002, steps have been taken to debar these
‘phoney’ organisations from bargaining council proceedings through empowering the
Registrar of Labour Relations to de-register them. But this intervention alone might not
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suffice. Perhaps there is more still to be done through implementing further 
modifications to the Labour Relations Act.
legislative reform
As noted previously in chapter seven, employer groups like COFESA have deliberately 
set out to recruit employers into membership and help them convert protected 
‘employees’ into unprotected ‘independent contractors’ with the express purpose of 
removing them from bargaining council coverage. To foreclose on these legal loopholes 
might require additional measures along the following lines. As in the European Union, 
'pro rata'protection rights for atypical workers could be grafted onto the legislation. 
Alternatively, the registered scope of bargaining councils could be altered in ways that 
automatically cover such categories of worker. Another way of strengthening 
bargaining council jurisdiction would be to introduce legal tests similar to those applied 
in UK common law that are designed to ascertain the employment status of workers. All 
these suggestions should prove useful in obstructing those employers bent on evading 
their responsibilities to their workers. However, there is also another problem yet to be 
resolved. Bodies like COFESA have also sought to secure seats on councils with the 
outright intention of dismantling them.
As the Act currently stands, there is always leeway for a determined employer group to 
register as a party with the express purpose of de-registering the bargaining council 
itself. This ‘exodus’ strategy may prove especially popular with non-party employers 
disaffected with centralised bargaining arrangements. Provided such firms employ a 
majority of workers within the ‘registered scope’ of the council then organised de- 
registration must always remain a possibility. The following steps could be taken to 
render this prospect ever more remote. First, for an employers association to become 
registered as a ‘body corporate’ would require it to have within its constitution a
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declaration of intent to become a party that occupies seats in the relevant bargaining 
council. Second, an express condition of registration as a party might require both trade 
unions and employer associations to undertake ‘good faith ’ bargaining within the forum 
of a bargaining council. Such an obligation means that inappropriate bargaining 
behaviour by any one party could attract the attentions of the Labour Court. Third, 
registration of a bargaining council could automatically require its constitution to adopt 
a code o f practice that spells out what bargaining in good faith means within the 
specific context of the bargaining council forum. ‘Party’ adherence to the code might 
then be taken into account in any subsequent legal or arbitral proceedings. Fourth, 
should such registered parties subsequently give notice of withdrawal from a bargaining 
council whereby the latter’s registration itself becomes liable to cancellation, then at 
that point the Minister of Labour is obliged to mount an inquiry into circumstances and 
investigate alternatives for preserving its bargaining reach.
training
But it is not just changes to the legislative framework that could make a difference. For
instance, my own survey work reminds us how significantly training resonates with
most manufacturing employers There may well be opportunities to capitalise on this
interest through linking associability more explicitly to the structure of the country’s
vocational education and training system (VET). Most notably there is a skills levy-
grant system that is intended to promote ‘employer provided training’ (EPT) through
imposing a ‘targeted payroll tax’. The aim is to encourage companies both to develop a
training strategy and framework for themselves as well as contribute to VET overall.
Under the system, a compulsory levy is deducted from companies who can
subsequently recover the majority cost of the levy upon ‘enactment, recording and
submission of certain regulated training-related activities’ (Lee 2002: 4-7). Clearly, the
intended beneficiaries of any reductions in the tax burden are those companies acting as
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training providers. Further adjustments to this fiscal arrangement could be made such 
that such ‘training’ companies could also be rewarded for being members of a registered 
association and party to a bargaining council that either regulates or negotiates on 
training provision. Associated employers would then be entitled to receive either a 
greater discounted levy or increased refund.
social dialogue and productivity coalitions
It is not just the practices of employers and bargaining councils that should attract 
scrutiny from policy-makers. There is also the issue of social dialogue and how this 
peak forum might itself contribute to bargaining centralisation and co-ordination. The 
labour market chamber of NEDLAC has previously attempted to improve matters 
through various accords and social plans but with mixed results to date (for example, 
Dexter interview notes 15/11/99). A fundamental problem has been has been reluctance 
on the part of the bilateral partners (primarily BUS A and COSATU representatives) to 
accept responsibility for ensuring that whatever has been agreed at this level is 
disseminated to industry negotiators in ways that deeply informs their own negotiations. 
Conversely, the same can be said of the bilateral parties sitting in bargaining councils. 
By and large, they too feel little obligation to take note of what has been discussed and 
agreed within NEDLAC chambers (Baskin, interview notes 7/12/99; Webster, interview 
notes 20/11/99). However, it might prove worthwhile trying to remedy this anomaly 
through drawing on a productivity accord that is currently under discussion within 
NEDLAC.
An opportunity now presents itself for NEDLAC parties to pressure bargaining council 
negotiators into making a series of industry accords in line with whatever eventually 
emerges from this proposed productivity coalition. These accords would be derived 
from a framework established under the auspices of NEDLAC’s labour market chamber
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that could explicitly address a number of restructuring issues simultaneously. This 
would likely entail trade-offs and concessions around employment, work, technology 
and employability training. In this way industry accords could also take account of 
what any national accord might intend whilst also setting the agenda for any enterprise 
bargaining that might then follow. Such ambition requires NEDLAC representatives to 
be liaising with bargaining council counterparts on a more regularised and mediating 
basis so as to ensure sympathetic interpretations of the national productivity accord that 
best fit idiosyncratic sectoral needs. Above all, it should be state representatives that 
take the lead in all of this. Any such initiative will likely lose impetus without their 
whole-hearted support and determination. Revitalising NEDLAC’s social dialogue 
processes requires a form of leadership that only the state can provide.
The same maxim applies to any championing of industry bargaining reform. Only the
state has the means by which South Africa can change from having a dualistic
bargaining system with multi-employer overtones to one that becomes recognisably
multi-tiered and coordinated in terms both of process and outcome. Formally
acknowledging ideas like the above for making associability stronger through policy
guidance, conservation and development can signal an end to any ambivalence the
South African state has previously shown towards making its employment relations
more organised and its corporatist institutions more robust. For South African
corporatism to become stronger in future requires both the other organised actors to do
likewise. However, reformers are constrained in what they can initiate. Given South
Africa’s retreat from racial corporatism and elitism, any form of compulsion would
prove to be a step too far. Instead, it must be left to the South African state to facilitate
organisability through policy prescription and a programme of incentivisation that
acknowledges this voluntarist precondition. Subtlety, not insensitivity, is the
prerequisite for this type of policy approach. Such prioritisation applies equally to
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capital as much as it does to labour since their mutually reinforcing strength and 
capacity provides the best guarantee that each stays within the corporatist fold. The 
contention throughout this thesis has been that, nowadays, it is capital ahead of labour 
that is more likely to defect from any central bargain. Based on this presumption, this 
country study tries to substantiate why employer associability should enter the policy 
lexicon for any state wedded to social corporatism. In fact, these abridged observations 
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Appendix 1 SURVEY Nos.l (Summer 1995)
Specimen Questionnaire
Dear Sir/Madam
I am a UK lecturer conducting research as part of my doctoral thesis at the London School of 
Economics . I am interested in employers' views about how the Labour Relations Act (1995) 
will affect their current industrial relations arrangements. My particular concern relates to the 
official encouragement for businesses to seek or retain membership of an employers' 
organisation.
Your organisation has been selected as one of many within the business community of the New 
South Africa whose views are to be valued.
Your responses will be held in the strictest confidence. Neither you, nor your organisation, 
will be identified by name in the resulting study.
The questionnaire has been designed not to waste your time ( or, at least, as little as possible !). 
You are simply asked to tick a box or circle a number between 1 and 5 for each item as 
indicated. Overall, these are intended to denote your preferences and views across a range of 
issues. Eventually, I hope to make the results available to participants upon request.
Unfortunately due to the restricted length of my visit this time, I would be grateful if the 
questionnaire responses could be returned to me within three weeks of receiving this 
request for help. Your cooperation will be much appreciated.
The survey itself should take you no more than 20 minutes to complete .
Ideally, I would like to extend the research by way of a limited number of interviews based on 
the survey's preliminary results. To this end, I have asked organisations to indicate whether 
they would be interested in such a follow-up. I would be extremely grateful if some 
consideration could be given to this although I fully appreciate the constraints upon your time.
Upon completion, please forward to the address provided.
Thanking you in advance for whatever time you can afford this matter.
Yours faithfully,
Eddy Donnelly
Senior Lecturer in HRM at Bournemouth University Business School 
registered doctoral candidate at The London School of Economics (London, UK).
c/o Pretoria Polytechnikon; Faculty of Economic Sciences (fax: 012-318-5635)
contacts (UK):




nb: n/a indicates 'not available'
CURRENT WORKFORCE:
1. please underline which of the following industry categories best describes the main
business o f your organisation:
manufacturing mineral products, chemicals metal goods manufacture
construction & heavy engineering textile & clothing
food & drink other manufacturing
2. what is the total size of your workforce (across all sites)? _ n/a
3. what percentage (approx.) are :
clerical/admin?   n/a skilled manual?   n/a
professional? ___ n/a semi-skilled manual? ___  n/a
managerial?   n/a unskilled manual?   n/a
4. is your company foreign-owned? wholly/ partly / not at all
5. what percentage (roughly) of managers are white? 
what percentage o f employees (roughly) are non-white?
6. what percentage (roughly) of managers are female? 
what percentage (roughly) of employees are female?
CURRENT and FUTURE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ARRANGEMENTS 
pleases circle as appropriate
7. how many of your employees belong
to a union? none / less
8. do you currently recognise any representative union(s) 
for bargaining purposes in any part of your operations?
9. do you have a closed shop agreement in 
operation within any part of your organisation?
10. does your organisation belong to an employers' 
organisation ?
11. if yes, does this body currently sit on a bargaining council?
12. if yes, are you happy enough for such a body
to continue to represent you in this way? yes/no/not sure
13. if no, would your company approve of the employers'
organisation helping to establish a bargaining council? yes/ no/ not sure
14. if not a member, is your company considering joining
an employers' organisation ? yes/ no/ not yet
than 50% / more than 50%
yes / no /don't know
yes /no /don't know
yes/ no/ don't know 
yes/ no/ don't know
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15. if yes, would your company like such an organisation
to help form the employers' side of a bargaining council? yes/ no/ not yet
16. has your organisation established anything similar to
that proposed for workplace forums under the new law? yes/ no/ not yet
17. is your organisation considering introducing the equivalent
of workplace forums for non-unionised parts of workforces? yes/ no/ don't know
RECENT COMPANY PERFORMANCE
please place a circle around that number which you feel best representsyour views on the statements 
on offer, your choices are as follows:
1.... below average 2.... average 3.... slightly above average
4.... above average S.... well above average
(current) comparisons with the rest of the industry (including close competitors) suggest 
that:-
18. the company's financial performance is  1 2 3 4 5
19. productivity performance for the company is ... 1 2 3 4 5
20. company profitability has been improving  1 2 3 4 5
or
company profitability has been falling  1 2 3 4 5
21. the company has expanded the number of jobs ... 1 2 3 4 5
or
the company has decreased the number of jobs... 1 2 3 4 5
22. the industrial relations 'climate' for the
company remains.... 1 2 3 4 5
23. recently, market competition has begun to increase for the company by 




Below are set out a number of statements that try to reflect the most popular 
explanations for why organisations might choose to belong or not belong to an 
employers' organisation. As a representative of your company, you are asked to indicate 
how strongly you feel about these matters bearing in mind the recent changes brought 
about by the Labour Relations Act (1995).
please place a circle around that number which you feel best represents your views 
on the statements on offer, your choices are as follows:
1.... strongly agree (with the statement)
2.... strongly agree 3.... neither agree nor disagree
4.... disagree strongly disagree
24. it makes sense for a company to belong to an
employers' organisation when a government
gives strong support to trade unions. 1 2 3 4 5
25. any agreements reached by the parties in a bargaining 
council still provides enough leeway for an employer
to implement it flexibly within his/her company 1 2 3 4 5
26. it is good for companies to have representatives
working with union counterparts to moderate 
'over-competitive' labour practices
27. it makes sense for companies to trust their employer 
representatives and give them a virtually free hand 
to negotiate on their behalf
28. my company would be prepared to conduct a 
'lock-out' of workers if recommended to do so
by an employers' association 1 2 3 4 5
29. it is natural for an employer to want to join 
an employers' organisation so as to protect
its interests against a powerful union movement 1 2 3 4 5
30. an employers' organisation can do a good job in getting 
agreements from bargaining councils on the provision
of vocational training that is helpful to businesses 1 2 3 4 5
31. too much autonomy is lost by a company through
membership of an employers' organisation and
subsequent representation on a bargaining council 1 2 3 4 5
32. the agreements that come out of bargaining councils
provide the best means for managing the 'crisis of
expectations' that has arisen post apartheid 1 2 3 4 5
33. there is nothing wrong with non-members deriving
the same gams as members from the efforts of
employers' organisations dealing with unions 1 2 3 4 5
34. the possibility of gaining exemption from industry
-wide agreements is a decisive factor for companies 
when deciding to commit themselves to an employers'
organisation 1 2 3 4 5
35. my company fails to see how agreements reached in
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
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a bargaining council can lead to a significant
improvement in our 'productivity performance' 1 2 3 4 5
36. it is unnatural for companies to collaborate with 
business rivals within an employers' organisation over
employment matters effecting market competitiveness 1 2 3 4 5
37. my company has the confidence and 'know-how' to
manage its industrial relations without the need
to be represented by an employers' organisation 1 2 3 4 5
38. all members o f employers' organisations should be 
prepared to abide by decisions made on their behalf 
whether they like them or not
39. agreements reached in bargaining councils will 
make a significant contribution to improvements in 
the economy's overall 'productivity performance'
40. it is tempting to avoid membership of an employers' 
organisation because o f the competitive advantage 
enjoyed by those who remain non-members
41. the way that bargaining councils and workplace 
forums operate in practice still leaves a company 
sufficient scope for managing its industrial relations 
affairs as it sees fit
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
42. these days, company industrial relations matters
are too important to be left in the hands of
employers' organisations and bargaining councils 1 2 3 4 5
43. it is only fair that a company tries to offset the costs 
of an industry-wide agreement by trying to shape the
terms of that agreement to better suit its own needs 1 2 3 4 5
nb: please indicate whether you would mind participating in a
follow-up interview upon my return to South Africa in Spring '97 yes /  no
if yes, please provide in the space provided
name of company: contact name:
telephone nos. fax nos. e. mail address
Thank you for your time and help.
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Appendix 2 EMPLOYER SURVEY nos 2 (Autumn 1999)
Specimen Questionnaire
Dear Sir/Madam
I am an academic from the UK conducting research as part of my doctoral thesis at the London 
School of Economics. Some of you may recall an earlier questionnaire I circulated in mid-1996, 
the response to which was both positive and informative and for which I owe you many thanks. 
This second questionnaire is a follow-up to the first one. I am still interested in employers' 
views, and how they might be changing, following the implementation of reforms associated 
with the Labour Relations Act (1995), its subsequent amendment and current debates over 
further adjustments to the system. My particular interest is in measuring their impact on current 
arrangements for managing labour relations at the industry level. This survey addresses a past 
encouragement for businesses to seek or retain membership of employers' organisations and, 
thereby, their endorsement of the ‘bargaining council process’.
Your organisation has been selected as one of many within the business community of South 
Africa whose views are to be valued in this respect. Your responses will be held in the 
strictest confidence. Neither you, nor your organisation, will be identified by name in the 
resulting study.
The questionnaire has been designed not to waste your time (or, at least, as little as possible!). 
Mostly, you are simply asked to circle a word or phrase and a number between 1 and 5 for each 
item as indicated. Overall, these are intended to denote your preferences and views across a 
range of issues. There are forty ‘quick’ responses that are sought in total.
Unfortunately due to the restricted length of my visit, I would be grateful if the questionnaire 
responses could be returned to me within three weeks of receiving this request for help.
Your cooperation in this regard would be greatly appreciated.
The survey itself should take you no more than 20 minutes to complete. Upon completion, 
please forward via the self-addressed, pre-paid envelope attached.
If you wish to find out the ‘headline’ results from both surveys please do not hesitate to contact 
me at the numbers provided below. I will be returning to the UK in mid- January and will be 
working on the findings from this second survey from March 2000 onwards.
Thanking you in advance for whatever time you can afford.
Yours faithfully,
Eddy Donnelly Senior Lecturer in Human Resource Management (MSc; MA; MIPD)
Bournemouth University / The London School of Economics (UK).
C/o The Sociology of Work Unit (Rm. 232a)
University of the Witwatersrand,
Private Bag 3, Wits, 2050 
Johannesburg,
South Africa
tel 011 716 2908 fax 011 716 3781
contact (UK): tel 0944-1202-504216 fax 0944- 1202 - 298321
e.mail e.donnell @ bournemouth.ac.uk
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Section A: Company Data
TYPE OF BUSINESS
1. please underline which of the following industry categories best describes
the core business of your organisation;
manufacturing: mineral products chemicals/petro-chemicals
construction & engineering textile & clothing
food & drink metal goods manufacture
light engineering other manufacturing
2. what is the total size of your workforce (across all sites)? (approx)____
4. is your company foreign-owned? wholly/ partly / not at all
CURRENT LABOUR RELATIONS ARRANGEMENTS
please circle as appropriate
7. how many of your employees belong to a union?
8. do you currently recognise any representative union(s) 
for bargaining purposes in any part of your operations?
9. do you have a closed shop agreement in 
operation within any part of your organisation?
10. does your organisation already belong to an employers’ 
organisation ?
11. has your organisation established a workplace forum 
or similar anywhere in the company?
12. is your business registered as a ‘party’ or ‘non-party’ 
employer with any bargaining council?
RECENT COMPANY PERFORMANCE
Please place a circle around that number which you feel best represents your 
views on the statements on offer. Your choices are as follows:
1....well below average 2.... below average 5.... average
4.... above average 5.... well above average
(current) comparisons with the rest of the industry (including close competitors) suggest 
that:-
13. the company’s financial performance is  1 2 3 4 5
none/ minus 50%/ plus 50% 
yes / no /don’t know 
yes / no / don't know 
yes/ no/ don't know 
yes/ no/ not yet 
party/ non-party/neither
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14. productivity performance for the company is ... 1 2 3 4 5
15. recent company profitability has been...  1 2 3 4 5
16. the industrial relations 'climate' for the 
company remains.... 1 2 3 4 5
17. recently, market competition has begun to increase for the company by
very much /  much /  a little /hardly at all /  nothing at all
Section B: Employers Associations and Industry Bargaining
Below are a number of statements that try to reflect the most popular explanations for 
why business might choose to belong or not belong to an employers' organisation that 
participates in the bargaining process. As a representative of your company, you are 
asked to indicate how strongly you feel about these matters being mindful of the 
original changes brought about under the Labour Relations Act (1995) and your 
experience of its workings to date.
please place a circle around that number which you feel best represents your views of 
the statements on offer. Your choices are as follows:
1.... strongly disagree (with the statement)
2....disagree 3.... neither agree nor disagree
4.... agree strongly agree
18. being allowed exemptions from agreements is important for 
our company deciding whether to belong to an employers’ 
organisation that then sits in a bargaining council
1 2
19. industry agreements reduce industrial conflict and
provide valued stability within my industry 1 2
20. it makes sense for a company to belong to an 
employers' organisation when a government
gives strong support to trade unions. 1 2
21. employers’ organisations in my industry do not 
protect my company’s interests within
the bargaining council process or equivalent. 1 2
22. agreements reached by parties in a bargaining council 
still provides enough leeway for an employer to
implement it flexibly at the company and plant level 1 2
23. too much autonomy is lost by a company through 
membership of an employers’ organisation and its
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subsequent representation on a bargaining council 1 2 3 4 5
24. it is natural for an employer to want to join an 
employers’ organisation so as to protect its
interests against a powerful union movement 1 2
25. my bargaining council’s ‘agents’ deal effectively with 
those employers not registering and not complying with 
its agreements 1 2
26. there is nothing wrong with non-members deriving 
the same gains as members from the efforts of
employers' organisations dealing with unions 1 2
27. my company fails to see how agreements reached in 
a bargaining council can lead to significant
improvements in our 'productivity performance' 1 2
28. I can see the bargaining council process helping to 
restructure the whole of my industry in the future 1
29. it is unnatural for companies to collaborate with
business rivals within an employers' organisation over
employment matters effecting market competitiveness
1 2
30. my company has the confidence and 'know-how' to 
manage its labour relations without the need 
to be represented by an employers' organisation 1
31. the changing world of work makes bargaining much more 
important at industry than at company/ workplace level
1 2
32. all members of employers' organisations should be 
prepared to abide by decisions made on their behalf
whether they like them or not 1 2
33. generally, industry-wide agreements help, rather than
hinder, my company’s management of its workers 1 2
34. it is tempting to avoid membership of an employers' 
organisation because of the competitive advantage 
enjoyed by those who remain non-members 1
35. the interests of both small and medium-sized firms are 
well represented by the employers’ association within 
the bargaining council process for my industry
1 2
36. the way that bargaining councils (or similar) operate 
in practice still leaves a company sufficient scope for 
managing its industrial relations affairs as it sees fit 1
37. legally extending industry agreements to non-parties 
is a welcome part of the bargaining council process
1
38. these days, company industrial relations matters 
are too important to be left in the hands o f employers’
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organisations and bargaining councils (or similar) 1 2
39. the content of industry agreements sets the framework for 
more useful negotiations to occur at the enterprise level 1 2
40. within bargaining councils, employer associations should 
just stick to setting basic pay and conditions for the industry
and not bother itself with broader ‘restructuring’ issues
1 2 3 4 5
41. employers’ associations reflect ‘urban’ employer interests 
better than those of ‘rural’ employers when negotiating 
industry agreements with their union counterparts
1 2 3 4 5
Thank you for your time and help. Please return to the address provided in the pre­
paid envelope
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Appendix 3 Interview Schedule (November/December 1999)
name status
HR Corporate Directors
Nigel Unwin HR Director
Sipho Sitole HR Director
Bill Doyle HR Director
Penny Abbott HR Director
organisation date
Anglo-Gold 29.11.99
Erickson Telecom (SA) 30.11.99
Seimens Telecom (SA) 06.12.99
Alpha Cement (SA) 08.12.99
Employer Association Officials











Masters Building Association 17. 11.99 
(Cape Province)
Chamber of Mines (COM) 30.11.99
Steel & Industry Federation 01.12.99
of South Africa (SIFSA)
Chemical & Allied Industries 01.12.99
Association (CAIA)
Transvaal Clothing (TCMA) 09.12.99
Manufacturers Association
National Employer Organisation Officers
Andre Van Nierkerk Legal Advisor
Adrian De Plessis Executive Officer
Business South Africa (BSA) 18.11.99 
Business South Africa (BSA) 23.11.99
Governmental and Non-Governmental Officers
Phillip Dexter Executive Director National Economic Development 15.11.99
and Labour Council (NEDLAC)
Dennis Van Der Walt Director of Collective Department of Labour 17.11.99
Bargaining
Wayland Stapelberg Chief Executive National Association of 18.11.99
Bargaining Councils (NABC)
Jeremy Baskin (Past) Director of Department of Labour 07.12.99
Communications
377




Frank Howitz Professor of HRM University of Cape Town 
(Business School)
Shane Godfrey Researcher/lecturer University of Cape Town
(Sociology Department)
Eddie Webster Professor/ Director of University of Witswaterand 
Sociology of Work Unit (Johannesburg)
Louet Douwes Dekker Professor of Industrial University of Witswaterand 
Relations Business School
date
11.11.99
11.11.99
20.11.99
04.12.99
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